Social Sciences
The Social Sciences at Brill
The Social Sciences at Brill are central to our mission of publishing superior scholarship that addresses the complex needs and struggles of the ever-changing political and cultural landscape of a globalized world.
Anchored in well-established critical and comparative publications, the Social Sciences at Brill are experiencing dynamic expansion and diversification by reason of our three core principles for achieving enduring growth in ways that are uniquely relevant to the 21st century: 1) social responsiveness; 2) multi-/inter-/transdisciplinarity; and 3) innovation and revitalization.
Highlights
News & Announcements
Stay up-to-date with the Brill Community and sign up to our newsletter!
Sign upPodcast: 'In Chains' Episode 3
In the third episode of our new themed series In Chains, we speak with Dr. Alexis Aronowitz from University College Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands, who is the author of the article, “Regulating business involvement in labor exploitation and human trafficking” published in Journal of Labor and Society.
Brill Publishes Two New Book Series in the Social Sciences
Brill is pleased to announce the addition of two new peer-reviewed book series to its Social Sciences publishing program: International Studies in Maritime Sociology and Studies in Political Economy of Global Labor and Work. The series will be published online and in print.
Brill adds Two New Journals to Its Social Sciences Publishing Program
Two journals, the Journal of Labor and Society (JLSO) and Protest, have been added to Brill’s expanding publishing program in the Social Sciences. Both journals will be published online and in print. Previous volumes of JLSO are already available on Brill’s website, the first issues of Protest are planned for publication in 2021.
While the criticism that the eu is too inward-looking is generally unjustified, the year 2019 did provide some strong evidence for this claim. Such evidence of a Union entangled in domestic challenges prominently included the European Parliament elections in May, followed by extensive horse-trading over the eu’s executive positions during the summer period, a delayed start to the von der Leyen Commission in December, and the time invested in the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union.
President João Lourenço pursued new political overtures both at home and abroad. The Angolan economy languished, while ordinary Angolans were battered by austerity measures and saw little improvement in their daily lives.
In 2019, the government of President Patrice Guillaume Athanase Talon continued with some of the political, economic, and social reforms considered essential for the emergence of the country, according to the ‘Bénin révélé’ programme. However, the very nature of some political reforms, and the way opposition and dissent were treated, produced a general feeling that individual and democratic freedoms were being increasingly undermined.
The tension between President Mokgweetsi Masisi and former president Ian Khama remained unresolved. The uneasy relationship between the two leaders escalated as preparations for the 2019 general elections intensified, with Khama actively campaigning against his former party, the Botswana Democratic Party (bdp), with the aim of dislodging Masisi and his party, in support of his newly formed party, the Botswana Patriotic Front (bpf), and the opposition coalition Umbrella for Democratic Change (udc). Masisi and his party managed to ward off Khama’s intense opposition challenge and won elections but lost control of the Central District, where Khama is a paramount chief. Meanwhile, issues of corruption and money laundering continued. There was no shift in the country’s foreign policy or socioeconomic barriers.
InThe views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Department of Defense, or the us government. recent years, insecurity in Burkina Faso has gradually worsened as multiple armed jihadi groups have waged insurgencies in the northern and eastern regions of the country. In 2019, these conflicts expanded and diversified as militants increasingly targeted communities farther south. As conflict intensified, generalised violence and criminality correspondingly increased and officials grappled with the growing crisis. The spread of insurgent violence and the accompanying insecurity triggered a humanitarian crisis in which more than half a million people were displaced, and at least 1,200 lost their lives. This crisis dominated domestic politics. Foreign affairs also centred on the growing threat of terrorism, increased insecurity, and the resultant humanitarian crisis unfolding in much of the countryside, by strengthening ties between regional governments and counter-terrorism partners, notably France and the United States. Despite the insecurity, the biannual Pan-African Film Festival known by its French acronym, fespaco, celebrated its fiftieth year in Ouagadougou and the economy maintained a steady growth rate of 6% real gdp.
The domestic political scene in 2019 was dominated by speculation over whether President Pierre Nkurunziza would again run for office in the 2020 elections, and if not, who would be the ruling party’s candidate. The ruling ‘Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces pour la défense de la démocratie’ (cndd-fdd) continued to consolidate its hold on power, while proceeding with transforming the political, social, and economic landscape of the country in line with its vision for the state. The registration of a new party by Agathon Rwasa – considered to be Nkurunziza’s main competitor – constituted a major development in national politics. Meanwhile, most opponents of Nkurunziza’s regime who left Burundi in 2015 remained outside of the country. Mediation initiatives to bring them back, and to overcome the deep political and societal divisions that fuelled the 2015 crisis, remained deadlocked. Burundi’s relations with neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda, and with the international community continued to be tense.
After months of debate, in April the government withdrew the regionalisation law after it failed to obtain the necessary support for a qualified majority from the opposition ‘Partido Africano para a Independência de Cabo Verde’ (paicv) in the final voting in the Assembleia Nacional (an). In contrast, in October both the ruling ‘Movimento para a Democracia’ (MpD) and the paicv unanimously adopted a parity law on political gender equality. Finally, in March the government concluded the privatisation of Cabo Verde Airlines when Loftleidir Icelandic acquired 51% of the ailing state-owned company.
Re-elected for another seven years in late 2018, President Paul Biya began his sixth term of office in the midst of turbulence that included the imprisonment and release of his political opponent Maurice Kamto, the continuation of the war in the country’s two Anglophone regions, which displaced hundreds of thousands and caused substantial material damage, and the mounting political pressure exerted on Biya’s government by his Western partners. The authorities also had to deal with a long and fierce legal battle between the Autonomous Port of Douala, a public enterprise, and the French corporate group Bolloré.
With the exception of the tiny island republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, all other states did not have what could be called an ordinary year. The atmosphere of continued crisis dragged on, with armed conflict and its repercussions impacting heavily on an ever-growing share of the population of the sub-region. After two particularly difficult years in terms of public finances, the region looked somewhat more stable financially, not least because reserves could be built up to face any future shocks. But fiscal consolidation translated into cuts in public investment. Without substantial progress in structural reforms, including a diversification of sources of income, economic growth continued to depend too strongly on oil income for five out of eight countries. Both the risk of a further deterioration of the highly problematic regional security situation and the prospect of a crisis of the world economy, with a concomitant slump in the oil price on the world market, did not permit a lot of optimism. Considerable uncertainty about the future of the common currency within cemac and the logical, but not materialising, dilution of cemac within ceeac were further sources of concern. Such major reforms at a supranational level could theoretically be drivers for new forms of cooperation among countries and economies. However, most governments did not invest in regional cooperation, as they were preoccupied by their grave domestic problems: growing contestation and continued armed conflict.
After nearly one month of negotiations in Khartoum, a peace agreement was signed by 14 armed groups and the government. It strongly influenced the way in which both international actors and the government tried to consolidate a still fragile peace. Many rebel movements did not comply with the provisions of the agreement, which led to massive criticism of a peace plan based on power-sharing with mostly materially motivated groups.