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Podcast: 'In Chains' Episode 3

In the third episode of our new themed series In Chains, we speak with Dr. Alexis Aronowitz from University College Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands, who is the author of the article, “Regulating business involvement in labor exploitation and human trafficking” published in Journal of Labor and Society.

Brill Publishes Two New Book Series in the Social Sciences

Brill is pleased to announce the addition of two new peer-reviewed book series to its Social Sciences publishing program: International Studies in Maritime Sociology and Studies in Political Economy of Global Labor and Work. The series will be published online and in print.

Brill adds Two New Journals to Its Social Sciences Publishing Program

Two journals, the Journal of Labor and Society (JLSO) and Protest, have been added to Brill’s expanding publishing program in the Social Sciences. Both journals will be published online and in print. Previous volumes of JLSO are already available on Brill’s website, the first issues of Protest are planned for publication in 2021.

 

Acquisitions Editor

Brill

Jason Prevost

jason.prevost@brill.com

V&R unipress

Julia Schwanke

julia.schwanke@v-r.de

In 2004 the political stability of Mauritania remained fragile. The main cause for concern were two alleged coup d'états that were thwarted and growing political and religious opposition to the regime. A currency crisis and increasing consumer prices were used by the president as a pretext to reshuffle the government. Social stability remained precarious, as the repression of the opposition continued.

Parliamentary and municipal elections, which had been postponed several times, finally took place in November–December. The polls were boycotted by the opposition, which resulted in an absolute majority for the ruling ‘Union pour la République’ (UPR) and made the Islamist party ‘Tewassoul’ the second largest parliamentary group. Threats by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the fragile situation in Mali continued to feed security concerns. The country intensified its regional and international security cooperation, including by joining the ‘Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali’ (MINUSMA). The government recognised the risks of social unrest, and several measures were taken to tackle the high level of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment. Food security improved but dependence on food imports and tens of thousands of refugees from Mali made the situation fragile.

Ensuring political stability and tackling high rates of poverty and unemployment, as well as unequal growth, were the biggest challenges to President Aziz. The president benefited from the upr’s domination of parliament and the fact that the opposition alliance, the ‘Forum National pour la Démocratie et l’Unité (fndu), was fragmented and hardly represented in parliament. The moderate Islamist party, Tawassoul, established itself as the main opposition force. Progress towards the abolition of slavery continued to be slow, notwithstanding the government’s attempts to follow the road map to that end.

The failure to establish a dialogue between the government and the opposition dominated the political climate. Elections for one-third of Senate seats were postponed and the major opposition group, the ‘Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques’ (rfd), ignored the government’s initiative for a national dialogue. Instead, the rdf organised street campaigns trying to exploit public frustration over the government’s inability to reduce poverty and unemployment. Regional security remained problematic. Potential security threats arising from terrorist groups in neighbouring countries dominated the foreign policy agenda. Mauritania reasserted its role as a regional mediator as President Aziz remained chairperson of the ‘G5 du Sahel’. Although the government’s main economic policy focus was on macroeconomic stability and attempts to boost the role of the private sector, it failed to agree a new three-year programme with the imf. A four-year fisheries accord with the eu was signed and was expected to boost the fishing sector considerably.

The lack of sustainable and inclusive growth was a major challenge. Nearly a quarter of the population suffered from food insecurity, despite a slightly improved economy. Through its role in the fight against crime and illegal immigration, Mauritania remained one of the eu’s privileged diplomatic interlocutors in the field of security and development in the Sahel. Frequent arrests and detentions of human rights activists cast a shadow over the government’s claims to being commited to improving the country’s human rights record. The president’s proposal to abolish the Senate met with strong resistance from the opposition.

The political climate remained fragile owing to the fragmented state of the political opposition and the open split in the Senate within the ruling party, the ‘Union pour la République’ (upr) over President Aziz’s proposal to change the Constitution and replace the Senate with new regional councils. The upr nevertheless increased its concentration of power and executive responsibility. The death of the high-profile opposition leader, Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, on 5 May removed one of the most respected opponents to Aziz. Before his death, Vall had been expected to play an influential role in the referendum campaign on the constitutional changes. The government’s decision to tighten the blasphemy law restricted freedom of expression and thereby increased political repression. Aziz continued efforts to promote a ‘national dialogue process’, despite the fact that the most recent round of National Dialogue in October 2016 had been boycotted by the main opposition coalition, the ‘Forum National pour la Démocratie et l’Unité’ (fndu). The threat of radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism continued to jeopardise prospects for security and development.

An eight-party opposition alliance, the ‘Front National pour la Démocratie et l’Unité’ (fndu), which had boycotted the 2013 elections, adopted a common strategy and participated in the parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections in September. Although the ruling ‘Union pour la République’ (upr) emerged victorious in elections, the formation of the fndu as a coherent opposition was regarded as a positive step in order to establish a more united political opposition. No terror attacks on Mauritanian soil were reported during the year. However, terrorism remained a threat due to a number of jihadi groups and other criminal organisations in the neighbouring region, as well as to the return of radicalised combatants from war zones such as Iraq and Syria. The unemployment rate remained high, and the risk of renewed social unrest persisted owing to political repression, narrowly based growth, and low living standards.

President Mohamed Abdel Aziz completed his mandate and transferred power to an elected successor, the former defence minister Mohamed Ould Cheikh Ahmed Ghazouani. This was the first peaceful transfer of power between elected heads of state since the country gained independence in 1960. At the end of the year a deepening estrangement between Aziz and Ghazouani became obvious. A challenge for Ghazouani was how to steer the shift from the strong informal networks connected to Aziz to his own support base and to confront the fact that many of those who had benefited under Aziz might lose out under him. The risk of widespread social tension remained acute owing to political repression, the high rate of unemployment, and the generally low standards of living.

Authors: and

After an unexpected dispute between President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani and his predecessor, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, at the end of 2019 when Aziz signalled his intention to remain in the leadership of the ruling party, Union Pour la République (upr), Ghazouani strengthened his position and undertook a major shake-up in order to isolate from political power officials close to the former president. Investigations under the auspices of a parliamentary committee that scrutinised Aziz’s time in power consolidated Ghazouani’s position, while Aziz’s unpopularity unified political forces behind a judicial process that could, if not get him imprisoned, at least block him from returning to power.

Authors: and

Anti-corruption efforts, including investigation of the former president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, served as a noticeable public relations tool for building credibility abroad, and functioned also as a warning to current government officials and high-level businesspeople. The position of President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani remained stable, and one of his priorities was to ease tensions with the opposition. Civil society demands succeeded in applying pressure on the government to increase the representation of hitherto under-represented groups. Economic policy was largely focused on combating an increase in poverty as a consequence of the continued Covid-19 pandemic and the contraction in gdp in the previous year. The government addressed the Covid-19 recession with a more ambitious policy of redistribution, but community tensions persisted. Despite a still fragile security situation in the Sahel region, the terrorist risk on Mauritanian soil was assessed to be lower than in the neighbouring Sahelian countries.