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Sign upPodcast: 'In Chains' Episode 3
In the third episode of our new themed series In Chains, we speak with Dr. Alexis Aronowitz from University College Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands, who is the author of the article, “Regulating business involvement in labor exploitation and human trafficking” published in Journal of Labor and Society.
Brill Publishes Two New Book Series in the Social Sciences
Brill is pleased to announce the addition of two new peer-reviewed book series to its Social Sciences publishing program: International Studies in Maritime Sociology and Studies in Political Economy of Global Labor and Work. The series will be published online and in print.
Brill adds Two New Journals to Its Social Sciences Publishing Program
Two journals, the Journal of Labor and Society (JLSO) and Protest, have been added to Brill’s expanding publishing program in the Social Sciences. Both journals will be published online and in print. Previous volumes of JLSO are already available on Brill’s website, the first issues of Protest are planned for publication in 2021.
All political activities in Djibouti 2004 were focused on the presidential elections that were to take place in April 2005, after the parliamentary elections held in January 2003. There was little uncertainty about the result in the camp of the president, Ismaël Omar Guelleh, locally nicknamed IOG. Fairly positive economic developments mainly benefited a small circle around the president.
The year opened with a note of optimism regarding chances of some modest advances towards introducing limited democratic elements into a political system hitherto characterised by the authoritarian regime of President Guelleh and its undisputed full control of all aspects of public life. A hastily arranged coalition of opposition parties participated in legislative elections in February for the first time in ten years, thus ending a period of election boycotts in protest at the unfair electoral system. However, violent demonstrations against alleged election fraud quickly led to renewed sharp confrontations between government and opposition forces. Elected opposition candidates refused to take up their seats in parliament, and an attempt to conduct a dialogue between the opposing political camps broke down after initial rounds of talks. No end to the deadlock was in sight, while a climate of intimidation and repression persisted. Guelleh continued to represent his small state at many international forums and to pursue the vision of transforming Djibouti into an important commercial hub by taking advantage of its strategic geographical location. General economic performance was relatively satisfactory and a number of ambitious new infrastructural projects got underway or were planned.
The year opened with continued deadlock between the government and the coalition of opposition parties in the aftermath of the strongly disputed February 2013 parliamentary elections. Insisting that massive electoral fraud had taken place, elected opposition candidates persisted in refusing to take up their seats in parliament. Throughout the year, several attempts were made to re-open political dialogue and to find a workable agreement, but they stalled despite intermittent signs of apparent progress. It was only on 30 December that a formal accord was finally signed, opening vaguely optimistic prospects for some advances towards introducing limited democratic elements into a political system hitherto dominated by the authoritarian regime of President Guelleh and its undisputed full control of all aspects of public life. Intimidation of dissidents and repression of opposition activists continued during the year. The government further pursued the vision of transforming the small and resource-poor state into an important commercial hub by taking advantage of its strategic geographical location. Cooperation with Ethiopia was further intensified and raised speculation about closer political links. On the back of continued investment inflows, a number of ambitious infrastructural projects were under way or planned, with general economic performance remaining relatively satisfactory.
Early in the year, there was some hope for a process of cautious democratisation when the candidates of the opposition coalition ended their boycott and took their seats in parliament. However, harassment of the opposition continued and the situation deteriorated rapidly towards the end of the year, when President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh declared his candidacy for a fourth term in office. Violent clashes occurred on 21 December between security forces and members of the Yonis-Moussa clan who had gathered for a religious celebration, which resulted in more than 100 casualties. On the same day, police attacked the opposition coalition’s leadership during a meeting and three politicians were seriously injured. Violent clashes continued between government forces and a militant wing of the ‘Front pour la Restoration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie’ (frud) in the Afar-inhabited north. China and Djibouti reached an agreement on the construction of a naval base, which further strengthened the country’s position as a centre of international military facilities. Economic life was marked by substantial fdi and ambitious infrastructure projects, while endemic poverty and unemployment were not alleviated and standards of nutrition deteriorated due to worsening drought conditions.
Presidential elections were held on 8 April, and Ismaïl Omar Guelleh was re-elected to serve his fourth term by 87% of the vote. The weak opposition coalition had not been able to agree on a common strategy to counter the political supremacy of Guelleh and his ump coalition. The president’s son-in-law, Djama Elmi Okieh (dubbed ‘Djama Speed’), was appointed minister of health and given substantial political power as Guelleh’s possible designated successor. The Afar-inhabited north around the town of Obock continued to witness violent clashes between government forces and a militant wing of the ‘Front pour la Restoration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie’ (frud), and Djibouti entered into a military agreement with Ethiopia, which was supposed to keep the rebels within bounds. The Chinese-constructed Djiboutian-Ethiopian Railway connecting the port of Djibouti with Addis Ababa was inaugurated in October, and China, which had started the construction of its first naval base in Africa in Djibouti early in the year, pledged to finance a $ 4 bn gas pipeline connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti. In spite of the country’s economic progress, widespread unemployment and endemic poverty prevailed.
The political situation in Djibouti remained stable, and President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh and his ‘Union pour la Majorité Presidentielle’ (ump) coalition dominated the political realm with little space for opposition or civil society activities. However, it seemed that Guelleh’s son-in-law, Djama Elmi Okieh (dubbed ‘Djama Speed’), was no longer a candidate to succeed him. The Afar-inhabited North, where the ‘Front pour la Restoration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie’ (frud) had been active in previous years, was relatively calm due to an Ethiopian military presence but, in October, a demonstration in Tajourah was violently dispersed by security forces. In August, China inaugurated its first naval base on African soil near the town of Obock, with a capacity to station up to 10,000 troops. The start of the new Djiboutian-Ethiopian Railway’s regular commercial operation connecting Djibouti’s port with Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, was delayed, and some other large infrastructure projects progressed more slowly than expected. The country was affected by prolonged drought conditions, and the humanitarian situation remained dire, with 200,000 people dependent on food aid.
The political situation in Djibouti remained unchanged, and president Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s ‘Union pour la Majorité Presidentielle’ (ump) coalition won 57 of 65 seats in the parliamentary elections of 23 February, while the scramble for his succession continued within his extended family. Ethiopian prime minister (pm) Abiy Ahmed’s regional peace initiative, which ended the stalemate between Eritrea and Ethiopia, caught Djibouti by surprise and evoked scepticism because it endangered Djibouti’s privilege of being the only sea outlet for Ethiopia. However, President Guelleh agreed to solve his border dispute with Eritrea amicably after Ethiopian intervention. China expanded its role as a major foreign investor by gaining control over the Doraleh Multipurpose Port and by securing the rights to construct a 700 km gas pipeline connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti. In May, a cyclone displaced tens of thousands of people in Djibouti City. In spite of continuous economic growth, poverty and unemployment remained endemic, especially in rural areas.
The political situation in Djibouti was stable and president Ismaïl Omar Guelleh continued to rule the country in an authoritarian manner, while quarrels over his succession continued within his extended family without an apparent winner. Relations with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed were tense due to Djibouti’s alleged involvement in an ethnic conflict in Ethiopia’s Afar region and Abiy’s support for uae-based dp World in its conflict with President Guelleh over a port terminal. No progress was made in the border conflict with Eritrea, and Djibouti competed with Kenya for a seat in the un Security Council. China continued to be the main investor in the country, and several projects, including a gas pipeline connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti, were initiated. The government raised its efforts to become energy self-sufficient and more resilient against droughts and flooding. Poverty and unemployment remained endemic despite economic growth and high levels of foreign investment.
Djibouti’s authoritarian political system was stable and President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh remained the strongman, with no strong competitor for the 2021 presidential elections in sight. Journalists and members of the political opposition were regularly intimidated. Djibouti lost in its competition with Kenya to gain a non-permanent seat in the unsc, and the border conflict with Eritrea was not resolved. President Guelleh cautiously backed Ethiopia’s military operation in Tigray but pledged for peace as the best option. The Covid-19 pandemic slowed down the economy, but the coronavirus-related death rate was relatively low. The government strengthened its investment in renewable energies, including wind, photovoltaic, and geothermal energy. The government continued its legal disputes with uae-based port management company dp World with little success. Poverty and unemployment were endemic and in addition to the pandemic, the countryside was hit by locust infestation.
Djibouti’s authoritarian political system remained stable, and in April Ismaïl Omar Guelleh was re-elected as president for his fifth term in office. All opposition parties had boycotted the presidential elections, and civil rights and press freedom were severely limited. The country retained strong relations with its main investor China and continued to host a variety of international military bases due to its strategically important location. President Guelleh’s prolonged conflict continued with uae-based port management company dp World. The economy recovered from the Covid-19-induced slowdown, but endemic poverty and unemployment prevailed. The country made progress in its efforts to achieve energy self-sufficiency through investment in renewable energies, including wind, photovoltaic, and geothermal energy, while plans to strengthen private-sector-induced development made little progress.