Social Sciences
The Social Sciences at Brill
The Social Sciences at Brill are central to our mission of publishing superior scholarship that addresses the complex needs and struggles of the ever-changing political and cultural landscape of a globalized world.
Anchored in well-established critical and comparative publications, the Social Sciences at Brill are experiencing dynamic expansion and diversification by reason of our three core principles for achieving enduring growth in ways that are uniquely relevant to the 21st century: 1) social responsiveness; 2) multi-/inter-/transdisciplinarity; and 3) innovation and revitalization.
Highlights
News & Announcements
Stay up-to-date with the Brill Community and sign up to our newsletter!
Sign upPodcast: 'In Chains' Episode 3
In the third episode of our new themed series In Chains, we speak with Dr. Alexis Aronowitz from University College Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands, who is the author of the article, “Regulating business involvement in labor exploitation and human trafficking” published in Journal of Labor and Society.
Brill Publishes Two New Book Series in the Social Sciences
Brill is pleased to announce the addition of two new peer-reviewed book series to its Social Sciences publishing program: International Studies in Maritime Sociology and Studies in Political Economy of Global Labor and Work. The series will be published online and in print.
Brill adds Two New Journals to Its Social Sciences Publishing Program
Two journals, the Journal of Labor and Society (JLSO) and Protest, have been added to Brill’s expanding publishing program in the Social Sciences. Both journals will be published online and in print. Previous volumes of JLSO are already available on Brill’s website, the first issues of Protest are planned for publication in 2021.
Insecurity in large parts of the country and its containment was the main feature of domestic and foreign affairs and of socioeconomic developments. In its face, management of the transition after the coup of 2003 proved particularly difficult. A constitutional referendum and preparations for elections necessitated massive outside support.
The year saw the rising and declining star of yet another politico-military entrepreneur at the helm of the state. Michel Djotodia declared himself president after a rebel alliance swept the Bozizé regime overboard. However, in the aftermath of the uprising, Djotodia was unable to stabilise his regime – and even less the country as a whole. In the western half of the country bloody encounters between predominantly Muslim Séléka groups and Christian militias spiralled out of control, leading to interreligious massacres. The humanitarian situation remained disastrous throughout the year.
The transition phase after the overthrow of President François Bozizé in 2013 ended with presidential and legislative elections, but the new institutions barely had an influence on (in)security, and close to none in the eastern half of the country. Large parts of the territory were under the control of rebel movements, though infighting along ethnic (and no longer religious) lines clearly increased. un peacekeepers were only partially successful in keeping the various armed groups at bay and became increasingly unpopular. The upsurge in violence clearly impinged on economic recovery.
The population faced another disastrous year with the number of idps and refugees continuing to increase as a result of renewed fighting in various parts of the country; food insecurity hit nearly half of the population. The elected government in conjunction with international actors managed to secure the vital Bangui-Douala corridor, but fully controlled only the south-west. In the centre, the south-east and the north-west, new deadly confrontations, often involving unexpected coalitions of armed movements, could not be prevented, even by international peacekeepers who sometimes faced outright popular hostility. Efforts to prepare the justice system to deal with past crimes against humanity were taken, but did not yet yield results.
Both the domestic and international support base of the government appeared volatile. President Faustin-Archange Touadéra tried to extend his power base by creating his own political party, thereby sidelining former allies. A visible extension of Russian influence met with distrust by more traditional external partners of the country. Violence and insecurity haunted not only the inhabitants of Bangui but also a majority of prefectures, particularly in the first half of the year and again towards the end. Some of the major armed groups managed to consolidate their power bases, including by fixing zones of influence. Taxing the cattle trade became a major source of income for armed groups, adding to the benefits of smuggling natural resources.
After nearly one month of negotiations in Khartoum, a peace agreement was signed by 14 armed groups and the government. It strongly influenced the way in which both international actors and the government tried to consolidate a still fragile peace. Many rebel movements did not comply with the provisions of the agreement, which led to massive criticism of a peace plan based on power-sharing with mostly materially motivated groups.
General elections at year’s end were contested by the opposition and violently interrupted by a new rebel coalition. The absence of any positive perspective was the responsibility not of ordinary people but of both government elites and rebel movements. The plight of car’s citizens continued unabated. The internationally brokered peace plan of 2019 ultimately failed, representing a failure not only of the government but also of international mediators, who had courted ruthless rebel leaders and coup-makers. The consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic only added to an already bleak situation.
A major military effort by combined rebel forces, fought back to an extent by government troops but mostly by their international allies and the UN peacekeeping mission, failed to topple the government in January. Most rebel movements allied within the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (cpc) thereafter witnessed defections and were on the defensive against the government army, which received military support from a (semi-)private Russian mercenary group and – for half a year – the Rwandan army. The announcement of the results of presidential and legislative elections held at the end of 2020 (and by-elections in May and July) confirmed the dominance of President Touadéra and his camp, but also created new frictions within the political elite. The UN authorities complained about the misbehaviour of all armed actors. The government faced the freezing of budgetary aid and was unable to start major reconstruction projects; it even had trouble funding its state apparatus. While the number of refugees grew, the number of idps went down after an initial surge in the first months of the year.
The government left most efforts to reconquer territory from diverse armed groups to its private Russian ally (Wagner Group), which was accused of atrocities by many sides. After holding a stage-managed, partly boycotted ‘republican dialogue’, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra felt strong enough to push for constitutional reform that was mostly meant to allow him to stand for a third term in elections as remote as 2025. He met with stiff opposition from the constitutional court, which was itself targeted by the president and his supporters. The head of the UN peace operation deplored the lethargy of the peace process. Economic crisis and fuel and food shortages hit the population, with a growing proportion at risk of severe malnutrition.
Presidential and legislative elections dominated public debate, but insecurity in the north and floods in the south were more immediate threats to the population. President Bozizé consolidated his power by winning elections and forming a new coalition government. The plight of the public purse and the misery of large segments of the population had become more apparent in the two years since the civil war ended.