African Studies
Utafiti: Journal of African Perspectives
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Internal power struggles and financial challenges poisoned the political climate, eclipsing the war that continued to rage in the two Anglophone regions. While affirming the strength of his ties with Russia, President Paul Biya – who this year celebrated his 40th anniversary as head of state – allowed himself to be courted by his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron, who had come to meet him in Yaoundé for the first time. While gdp continued to grow, the population suffered from the ill effects of high inflation.
Half of the countries in Central Africa continued to face violent conflicts, with no major positive developments on record. Political theatre – with ‘national dialogues’ being held in car and Chad and elections, such as those in Congo and Equatorial Guinea, whose outcomes were simply not credible – undermined rather than strengthened democracy. Some economic recovery after the end of the Covid-19 pandemic (and the counter-measures to control it) was tangible in most countries. The prospect of a merger of three sub-regional organisations into a single one created some hope of greater effectiveness on a supranational level.
The government left most efforts to reconquer territory from diverse armed groups to its private Russian ally (Wagner Group), which was accused of atrocities by many sides. After holding a stage-managed, partly boycotted ‘republican dialogue’, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra felt strong enough to push for constitutional reform that was mostly meant to allow him to stand for a third term in elections as remote as 2025. He met with stiff opposition from the constitutional court, which was itself targeted by the president and his supporters. The head of the UN peace operation deplored the lethargy of the peace process. Economic crisis and fuel and food shortages hit the population, with a growing proportion at risk of severe malnutrition.
Promised since February, the long-awaited ‘inclusive and sovereign national dialogue’ finally started on 22 August. Some 1,400 participants, including representatives from around 40 out of 53 rebel groups, discussed issues related to administration and governance. Neither the political party Transformateurs nor the rebel group Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (fact) accepted the conditions for taking part in the dialogue. On 20 October, Wakit Tama, a coalition of civil society organisations and political parties, including Transformateurs, organised a rally to protest the non-commitment of President Mahamat Déby to stepping down by this date. Some 130 people were killed by the police and other government forces during the march and another 900–1,000 were imprisoned.
On 10 July, the government of President Denis Sassou Nguesso organised the fifth set of legislative elections since he reclaimed power in 1997. With his two chief opponents from the 2016 election still in prison, the elections were boycotted by several major opposition parties. Amid widespread and credible reports of fraud, Sassou Nguesso’s Parti Congolais du Travail (pct) claimed an overwhelming victory. Civil society groups estimated a turnout of just 10%. After the election, the government launched a crackdown against rivals. Civil society groups had their offices ransacked, an opposition leader was detained, and a tv station was suspended. The government’s foreign policy was animated by Russian’s invasion of Ukraine. In exchange for diplomatic support, Sassou Nguesso signed new cooperation agreements with the government of Russian president Vladimir Putin. As European governments sought to diversify their energy sources away from Russian oil, they looked in part to Sassou Nguesso, who signed fresh production agreements with Italian major Eni. In France, the Sassou Nguesso family continued to confront allegations of corruption, asset seizures, and indictments for money laundering. Although government debt remained on the verge of distress and more than half of citizens lived in extreme poverty, Congo’s economic fortunes were buoyed slightly by the rise in global oil prices and new loans from the imf.
President Félix Tshisekedi found himself in pole position to contest the electoral race scheduled for December 2023 based on the broader support structure he had created in 2021. However, the first cracks soon began to show in the so-called Union Sacrée de la Nation (usn). As early as January, Jean-Marc Kabund, a central figure within Tshisekedi’s own Union pour la Démocratie et le Progès Social (udps), was removed from his positions, and he was eventually expelled from the party. A few weeks later, François Beya, Tshisekedi’s security advisor, was arrested. The biggest challenge developed in the east: the rebel group M23, which since late 2021 had become active again in the border region with Uganda and Rwanda, intensified its activities. It went on to seize control of much of the province of North Kivu, eventually almost completely encircling its capital, Goma. International efforts to control the conflict crystallised within the eac, which drc had joined on 29 March. But neither the diplomatic démarches nor the eac force deployed had a notable impact.
Quite famous for still being the world’s longest-serving president and despite another unsurprising electoral victory in November, with 94.9% of the votes, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has unofficially but firmly been handing over the reins to his successor and son, the vice-president Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, popularly known as Teodorín. Rumours about the president’s ill health were unfounded, but nevertheless, Teodorín’s energetic Twitter and Instagram accounts showed who was acting as the current centre of state affairs, with constant interventions directing domestic and partly also foreign policy. A stream of high-profile US officials visiting the country was related to the apparent Chinese scheme to construct its first Atlantic naval base in the port of Bata. Buoyed by rising lng production and its international price, the economy, entirely dependent on the offshore export of oil and gas, was projected to exit a seven-year-long recession, but a large incident at ExxonMobil’s famed Zafiro oilfield led to a continuation of the contraction.
Four years after President Ali Bongo’s stroke, the manner in which he has persevered to wield power through his inner family circle during his convalescence still divided elites. On one side, critics demanded his resignation to end his dynasty’s six-decade grip on power, with democratic opponents trying to find a candidate around whom they might unite in the 2023 presidential elections. On the other side, Parti Démocratique Gabonaise (pdg) loyalists played institutional charades to mask the fragility of their leader, with family members jockeying for positions. Gabon sat on the unsc, and was admitted into the British Commonwealth. High oil prices buttressed the regime’s finances.
In September, the Ação Democrática Independente (adi) gained an absolute majority in the legislative elections and, after four years in opposition, returned to power with party leader Patrice Trovoada as prime minister, for the fourth time since 2008. Two weeks after Trovoada had assumed office, the country was shocked by the news of a failed armed assault on the military barracks to seize arms, and the subsequent arbitrary killings of four of the men arrested for their supposed involvement of the attack. A concession agreement signed by the outgoing executive with a Ghanaian company on the construction, modernisation, and management of ports was immediately classified as harmful to the country’s interests by the new Trovoada government.