African Studies
Utafiti: Journal of African Perspectives
Call for Papers: Utafiti is inviting you to submit your manuscript – any topic in the humanities - for consideration in the next issues.
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Robin Attfield talks about how Africa finds itself vulnerable to drought but also the flooding of its coastline, among other untoward environmental effects of climate change and civil war.
The situation in Cameroon presented stark contrasts, with the country organising a pan-African sports competition while at the same time continuing to wage a war in two of its ten regions, where its army sustained its heaviest casualties since the beginning of the conflict in 2017. While parts of the population suffered from the economic consequences of the security situation and of the health crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the country experienced renewed growth in spite of the fact that the level of corruption remained high.
The opaque and unconstitutional father-to-son transition in Chad after Idriss Déby’s violent death was but one example of the fully undemocratic style of governance in the entire region – and it impacted heavily on inter-regional relations, where Chad had been one of the most active players. A new impulse from the Angolan diplomacy to revive ceeac and icglr represented the most notable response within the sub-region. Measures to contain the spread of Covid-19 were suspended or gradually lowered, while vaccination rates remained low in most countries. Somewhat vague hopes for a gradual economic recovery after a very harsh 2020 were voiced by the imf.
A major military effort by combined rebel forces, fought back to an extent by government troops but mostly by their international allies and the UN peacekeeping mission, failed to topple the government in January. Most rebel movements allied within the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (cpc) thereafter witnessed defections and were on the defensive against the government army, which received military support from a (semi-)private Russian mercenary group and – for half a year – the Rwandan army. The announcement of the results of presidential and legislative elections held at the end of 2020 (and by-elections in May and July) confirmed the dominance of President Touadéra and his camp, but also created new frictions within the political elite. The UN authorities complained about the misbehaviour of all armed actors. The government faced the freezing of budgetary aid and was unable to start major reconstruction projects; it even had trouble funding its state apparatus. While the number of refugees grew, the number of idps went down after an initial surge in the first months of the year.
Running for his sixth presidential term, President Marshal Idriss Déby Itno was re-elected on 11 April. A week later, on 18 April, he was shot while combating rebels near Mao, and on 20 April he was declared dead. The same day, a 15-general-strong Military Transitional Council (cmt), headed by the deceased president’s 37-year-old son, General Mahamat Déby Itno, overrode the constitution and declared itself the governing body in Chad for the next 18 months. The new regime initiated numerous reconciliation initiatives with civil and politico-military groups. However, countless cleavages remained and resistance to a father – son presidential transition was strong, both within the extended Déby Itno family and among other groups.
On 21 March, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo stood for his fourth election since reclaiming power in 1997. Sassou Nguesso left little to chance. In the run-up to the election, he purchased massive amounts of weapons from abroad, kept his chief opponents from the 2016 election in prison, and incarcerated journalists, civil society leaders, and opposition activists. The election was boycotted by most major political parties. Western governments refused to send monitors. Few citizens bothered to participate, since no one believed the election would be free and fair. Amid credible and widespread reports of fraud, Sassou Nguesso claimed 89% of the vote. The government struggled to contain the Covid-19 pandemic. Unable to organise an efficient vaccination campaign, the government resorted to more coercive measures, including a night-time curfew and requiring vaccination cards to access financial institutions, public transportation, and other basic services. Sassou Nguesso’s foreign policy was animated by the ongoing economic crisis, which yielded a debt-to-gdp ratio of 115%, and his legal troubles abroad, which culminated in the seizure of state assets in France and a settlement with the US Department of Justice. By year’s end, the government was poised to finalise an agreement with the imf that would provide $456 m and unlock as much as $900 m from other creditors.
The year 2021 was a turning point for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Not only did President Tshisekedi enter the second half of his term, but he also succeeded in liberating himself from his predecessor Joseph Kabila for good. Kabila’s camp was effectively dismantled, but Tshisekedi’s new ‘Union Sacrée’ majority proved difficult to consolidate. Tshisekedi has left no doubt that he will seek to be re-elected. Less than two years away from new elections, he must now convince voters that he is indeed capable of delivering on his promises of stability in the east, better daily living conditions, and the fight against corruption.
The year was particularly disastrous for the long-dominant Essangui clan of Mongomo. In addition to the challenges of Covid-19 and chronic human rights abuses, vice-president Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue (Teodorín) continued to draw negative international attention to the regime, resulting in virtually collapsed relations with the West. Persistent economic decline prompted desperate attempts to revive the hydrocarbons industry, with limited success.
President Ali Bongo’s health and preparations for dynastic succession were top themes in semi-public debates. The government took initiatives to join the Commonwealth. It also announced an interim development plan with ambitions to diversify the economy, reduce poverty, and fight climate change.
In the run-off of the presidential elections in October, Carlos Vila Nova, the candidate of the opposition Ação Democrática Independente (adi), defeated Guilherme Pósser da Costa, nominee of the ruling Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe/Partido Social Democrata (mlstp/psd). The final ballot was delayed by a month due to a crisis in the constitutional court where the five judges issued contradictory verdicts in response to a recount request by the third most voted-for candidate in the first election round in July, who alleged irregularities during the ballot counting. Despite the failed implementation of similar agreements in the recent past, the government signed two ambitious agreements for the construction of a large free trade zone and a deep-sea container port, the futures of which were equally uncertain.