African Studies
Utafiti: Journal of African Perspectives
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Held in October, the presidential election was, unsurprisingly, won by the incumbent president Paul Biya, in power since 1982, though the outcome of the election did give rise to tensions. Very few voters from the country’s two English-speaking regions, the Southwest and the Northwest, were able to vote due to the intensification of the war between the security forces and armed groups, the number of which rose steadily throughout the year. This unprecedented war led to a rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the area and had significant negative repercussions for the country’s economy, albeit without undermining the government.
The dramatic downturn in global crude oil prices in 2014 was seemingly reversed during the year (without prices reaching pre-2014 levels), but the oil-exporting economies of the region, all of them autocracies, were only to a limited degree able to absorb the shock even after four years. This had repercussions on the scope of action of underfunded sub-regional organisations, but also on the leverage of individual countries in foreign affairs: the presidents of Equatorial Guinea, Congo, and Gabon clearly were not as powerful as they were before; Chad’s president, Idriss Déby, unpopular at home and facing street protests against austerity measures, managed to remain in position only with a military geo-strategy that maintained the position of main Western allies in the entire Sahel. Cameroon, though able to weather the economic storm better based on a relatively diversified economy, was increasingly embroiled in an armed confrontation between official security forces and Anglophone secessionists, while the car and the drc barely managed to keep decentralised violence at bay. In the latter case, outgoing president Joseph Kabila even fueled some conflicts. Only the tiny island republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, although economically far from successful and increasingly indebted, was ruled differently and once again was labelled a democracy.
Both the domestic and international support base of the government appeared volatile. President Faustin-Archange Touadéra tried to extend his power base by creating his own political party, thereby sidelining former allies. A visible extension of Russian influence met with distrust by more traditional external partners of the country. Violence and insecurity haunted not only the inhabitants of Bangui but also a majority of prefectures, particularly in the first half of the year and again towards the end. Some of the major armed groups managed to consolidate their power bases, including by fixing zones of influence. Taxing the cattle trade became a major source of income for armed groups, adding to the benefits of smuggling natural resources.
Massive strikes and demonstrations by public and private employees, in addition to demonstrations by students and civil society organisations, marked severely both business and civil life. A new constitution strengthening the president’s power over the parliament was adopted on 4 May. Among many changes was the elimination of the post of the prime minister. President Déby changed, as usual, the government numerous times during the year, making ministerial positions uncertain and thereby further strengthening the president’s powers. Fighting terror with the help of Western powers continued to be an important source of income, as well as of international legitimacy, for the regime. Chad hosted some 500,000 refugees from neighbouring countries, creating tensions over land and other resources with the local population.
Two years into his third presidential term since reclaiming power in 1997, president Denis Sassou Nguesso spent the year struggling to contain popular frustration following the constitutional referendum of October 2015, the presidential election of March 2016, and a persistent financial crisis. He did so, in part, by amplifying repression. In May alone, the authorities prosecuted three of his political opponents, including General Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, a candidate in the 2016 presidential election, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison. This wave of repression was accompanied by persistent allegations of corruption from human rights groups and journalists abroad. These revelations complicated Sassou Nguesso’s efforts to persuade the imf to reschedule Congo’s debt, which reached at least $ 9.2 bn. This debt crisis drove Sassou Nguesso’s foreign policy, as he made a series of trips to Saudi Arabia and China to press his case for relief.
Elections continued to be the major driver behind events in the drc during the year. After more than two years of delays, there were serious doubts whether they would finally take place on 23 December. In particular, it remained unclear for most of the year if president Joseph Kabila would violate the Congolese constitution and run for a third term in office or how he would otherwise attempt to retain power. Uncertainty about the president’s intentions heightened anxiety within the political system, including among the presidential majority, directly impacting the security situation. In an increasingly polarised climate, the government continued to weaken potential resistance by dividing the opposition, limiting political freedoms, and exacerbating violent conflicts across the country. State security actors and armed groups continued to prey on the population and increasingly clashed with each other, leading to an intensification of the humanitarian crisis. While most domestic and international observers agreed that the widely unpopular Kabila “had to go”, the opposition was unable to overcome its fragmentation, and international actors failed to show the necessary resolve to alter the regime’s cost-benefit calculus. However, a number of unforeseen developments, such as the surprising release of former vice president Jean-Pierre Bemba by the icc, made this eventful year appear at times like a thrilling chess match in which Kabila seemed to prevail.
The year was marked by apparent fissures in a once-ironclad regime buoyed by oil rents and obstinate political repression. The alleged coup attempt of late December 2017 allowed the ruling Essangui clan of Mongomo, with president Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo at its head, to purge and tighten its ranks, as the regime sought to clear the way for the succession of Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue (‘Teodorín’). But a dire fiscal position, plummeting oil receipts, an international reputation for criminality, and inner-circle detractors continued to frustrate any obvious resurgence.
After nearly two years’ delay, legislative elections were finally held in October. The ruling ‘Parti Democratique Gabonais’ (pdg) retained a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, winning 98 of the 143 seats. President Ali Bongo subsequently suffered a stroke while on a trip to Saudi Arabia. After being released from hospital in Riyadh, he was discreetly flown to Morocco, where he spent the rest of the year recovering at a private residence in Rabat.
On 3 December, Jorge Bom Jesus, new leader of the ‘Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe/Partido Social Democrata’ (mlstp/psd), was inaugurated as prime minister. His party and its coalition partner obtained a slender majority of 28 seats in the 55-member Assembleia Nacional (an) in the elections of 7 October. It was the seventh time since 1991 that elections resulted in a peaceful change of government. After having assumed power, the new coalition government revoked several controversial measures imposed by the former government party, ‘Acção Democrática Independente’ (adi).