African Studies
Utafiti: Journal of African Perspectives
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In 2004, Nigeria experienced a wave of hitherto unknown political violence, ethnic and religious conflict and organised crime, affecting almost all the 36 states and Abuja. The conflicts sometimes reached a level that threatened the political system and endangered the still infant democratisation process. While the shariah issue lost political momentum in the world's biggest Christian-Islamic country, infighting for resource and financial control, especially at state and council level, reached new heights. Several local militias were able to increase their political influence and some even successfully turned themselves into local and regional powerbrokers. The federal government responded by pursuing a strategy of political dialogue and force, depending on the perceived relevance of the issue for the central government. In conjunction with the intensity and variety of conflicts, this policy revealed the weakness of the modern institutions and caused widespread frustration with the political and very limited economic progress. Against this background, President Olusegun Obasanjo and his government started a new economic and social reform programme and scheduled a national conference for early 2005 to create at least some legacy of ‘democracy dividend’ and economic progress.
The precarious security situation in the northern regions deteriorated. Clashes between the security forces – particularly the army – and the Islamist sect Boko Haram and splinter groups such as Ansaru, took place almost every day, with hundreds of people killed. Over much of the year, sectarian violence with a noticeable ethnic undercurrent spread into states in the eastern and south-eastern Middle Belt. The sheer number of attacks, counter attacks and sectarian clashes rendered an adequate account of these events all but impossible. In contrast, the security situation in the southern parts of the country improved; this was due to the fact that several gangs involved in kidnapping, robbery and murder were captured or broken up. On the political front, the leadership of President Goodluck Jonathan was directly challenged by some state governors who were members of the ruling party, party members in the National Assembly, erstwhile party strongmen such as Olusegun Obasanjo and, last but not least, a potentially new political force that resulted from the merger of some smaller parties. These developments notwithstanding, Nigeria experienced another year of remarkable economic growth, financial stability and a building boom, particularly in the prosperous south, with the government finally breathing new life into the ailing power sector.
Throughout the year, Nigeria had to face up to enormous security and political challenges. Despite the fact that democratic institutions were quite stable, the president and his government dealt with the endless deterioration of the security situation in the North with brinkmanship. Clashes between security forces and factions of the Islamic sect Boko Haram took place almost daily with a high death rate on both sides. Almost unnoticed, Boko Haram had changed its name, and now called itself ‘Jama’at ahl al-sunna li-l-da’wa wa-l-jihad ‘ala minhaj al-salaf’ (Community of the people of the Sunna who fight for the cause of Islam according to the method of Salaf). Several hundred people, including innocent persons and security personnel, as well as alleged members and sympathisers of the sect, died in bomb attacks, suicide bombings, indiscriminate killings, rape and deadly raids on barracks, police stations, mosques, churches, schools, hide-outs, villages, outdoor refreshment stops, markets and prisons. The sheer number of attacks, counter attacks and sectarian clashes makes an accurate account of these events all but impossible. At year’s end, Boko Haram was ranked second of the top ten terrorist groups worldwide. Over 2,000 people had lost their lives, bringing the number to around 12,000 victims (a modest estimate) since the Islamist insurgency started in the aftermath of the killing of the Boko Haram leadership by security forces in 2009. In addition, Nigeria’s human and civil rights record was mixed at best. These developments notwithstanding, Nigeria experienced another year of remarkable economic growth, particularly in the prosperous and booming South. This, together with financial stability, consolidated the Nigerian economy as one of the leading economies in Africa, although the plummeting oil price in the last quarter of the year heralded what would probably be painful structural socioeconomic adjustments. At the end of the year, however, all eyes were on the elections due in early 2015, particularly the battle for the presidency between President Goodluck Jonathan and his challenger, Muhammadu Buhari, a repeat of the last election in 2011.
The March and April elections at the federal and state level dominated the political scene. For the first time in Nigeria’s history, a sitting president was voted out of office. Muhammadu Buhari won decisively and was given a strong political mandate. An improved election commission conducted the most credible elections yet in Nigeria’s history, although it had initially appeared that the postponement of the elections would derail the whole election process with unforeseeable repercussions. However, at the end of the day, the political class and the vast majority of the elites demonstrated their willingness and ability to stabilise the Fourth Republic. The new government intensified the fight against the Islamist insurgency in the North-East, which improved the security situation as a whole. However, Buhari faced economic challenges amplified by plummeting oil and gas prices.
Nigeria faced substantial economic and security challenges throughout the year. Plummeting oil and gas prices coupled with the emergence of new and violent militia groups in the Niger Delta caused the worst recession for 30 years. Increasing violence, and organised crime on an unprecedented scale in central Nigeria and the eastern Middle Belt, compounded the already precarious situation and raised serious questions about the ability of President Muhammadu Buhari’s government to handle the multifaceted crises in the financial and economic sectors, as well as the security situation in at least three of the six geo-political zones, namely the North-Central, North-East and South-South. Despite the military’s progress in the fight against Boko Haram in the North-East, it was obvious that the security forces were overstretched and thus would have been unable to deal with other security challengers elsewhere.
The ill-health and absence of President Muhammadu Buhari, which lasted for months, the on-going Islamist insurgency in North East zone, the precarious situation in North Central, organised crime and the country’s slow recovery from the worst recession for 30 years set the political and socioeconomic scene. The president’s advanced age and poor health led to further debates during the second half of the year and at year’s end, when the issue of succession and questions about Buhari’s achievements and his capacity to lead the country were prominent, and the forthcoming elections in early 2019 did nothing to dampen these debates. Despite the many challenges, Vice President Yemi Osinbajo, a lawyer and former commissioner of justice in Lagos, handled the most dangerous threats in a professional and far-sighted manner, thus convincing the elites and the public that the democratic institutions were more stable than was widely assumed. However, the government eventually sealed a deal with the new us administration under President Trump, which was ready to sell military hardware to combat terrorism. Beyond that, the battered economy slightly began to recover.
Nigeria faced enormous security and political challenges throughout the year. The political and socioeconomic scene was characterised by the country’s slow economic recovery, the ongoing Islamist insurgency in the North East, the precarious situation in north-central states (which pitched nomadic herdsmen against settled farmers), and widespread, apparently organised, banditry in parts of the North West. The sheer number of attacks, counter-attacks, and sectarian clashes made an accurate account of these events all but impossible. At the end of the year, however, all eyes were on the elections due in early 2019, particularly, the battle for the presidency between the incumbent president, Muhammadu Buhari, and his main challenger, Atiku Abubakar. The surprising reappearance of the septuagenarian challenger, who had served as vice president under former president Olusegun Obasanjo, and who had already run three times (unsuccessfully) for the presidency, heralded a fierce and initially unexpectedly open battle for the highest office.
The February and March elections at federal and state levels dominated the political scene. In dubious circumstances, tantamount to a silent coup d’état, Muhammadu Buhari won his second and last term, heralding another extended period of uncertainty and crisis. Although the electoral commission was not up to the task of implementing the general elections, at the end of the day the political class and the vast majority of elites demonstrated their willingness to carry on and keep the Fourth Republic alive. Regrettably, Buhari and his government gave no indication of being able to breathe new life into the political and socioeconomic system. Quite the opposite, the economic and security challenges were amplified by widespread incompetence which was evidenced in relation to various national and international issues, such as the highly questionable closing of the borders with neighbouring states.
Throughout the year, Nigeria faced enormous security and political challenges, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and the protests against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (sars). The political and socioeconomic situation was characterised by the country’s economic downturn, the worst for three decades, by the ongoing Islamist insurgency in the North East, by the precarious situation in the north-central states (which, inter alia, involved nomadic herders pitched against settled farmers), by the widespread, apparently organised, banditry in parts of the North West, and by a persistently high crime rate in almost all the federal states and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. Some 12,000 people, most of them civilians, lost their lives. Moreover, election and by-election re-runs – out-of-cycle gubernatorial elections at the federal and state levels respectively – posed major challenges to the electoral commission.
Once again, Nigeria faced enormous security and political challenges. Throughout the year, the political and socioeconomic situation was characterised by the country’s slow economic recovery, triggered to a large extent by surging oil and gas prices, as well as by the ongoing Islamist insurgency in the North East, by the precarious situation in the North Central states, and by the widespread and well-organised banditry in most parts of the North West. The persistent high crime rate in almost all 36 federal states and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja played its part in the overall situation of uncertainty. This situation was exacerbated by worsening tensions in the Igbo heartland in the South East where, nevertheless, out-of-cycle gubernatorial elections due in one state were held. The Covid-19 pandemic, however, no longer took centre stage.