African Studies
Utafiti: Journal of African Perspectives
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Ten years after formal independence, the government continued to be of a provisional nature. There were no indications that parliamentary or presidential elections were to take place soon. At the close of the elections for regional assemblies in April, the chairman of the electoral commission stated, without giving a specific time frame, that the next election would be for the national parliament. So far the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) is the sole active party. The drought, coupled with post-war effects, has created severe food shortages. The dearth of foreign currency seriously curbed government purchasing capacity, resulting in a general shortage of basic goods.
No changes were made to the political and economic system during the year, but the government’s autocratic rule was increasingly challenged. In January, a group of soldiers temporarily occupied the Ministry of Information and demanded the implementation of the Constitution and the release of political prisoners. It remained unclear whether the operation was a failed coup d’état or a mutiny led by dissatisfied middle-ranking officers. The mass exodus of the younger generation to escape from the time-wise unlimited national service continued unabatedly. In October, 360 Eritrean refugees died near the Italian island of Lampedusa when their boat capsized. The government media’s initial concealment of the event caused indignation among Eritreans inside the country and in the diaspora. The economy remained in very poor shape and food insecurity prevailed despite additional income being generated through the mining sector.
Eritrea’s firmly entrenched autocratic political system and its command economy persisted, while the mass youth exodus accelerated rapidly. The four Catholic bishops harshly criticised the government’s policy of militarisation and demanded reforms, and passive resistance to forced conscription increased. The long-standing conflicts with Ethiopia and Djibouti remained unresolved and the un sanctions against Eritrea remained in place. The government tried to strengthen political ties with Egypt and Russia, whereas relations with Qatar cooled significantly. European governments were worried about the increasing influx of Eritrean refugees, but failed to pressure the Eritrean government to address the root causes of their flight. Eritrea reportedly reached the health-related mdgs, but food insecurity still prevailed and basic commodities remained scarce.
Eritrea’s autocratic political system and its command economy prevailed, and the mass youth exodus caused by the open-ended national service system continued unabatedly. The regime continued to host Ethiopian rebel groups on its soil, but in September the commander of the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement, which had served as a security force for President Isaias defected to Ethiopia with hundreds of troops. The government introduced a new penal code, but the human rights situation remained alarming, as was confirmed by the un Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea in its report published in the summer. Diaspora Eritreans were deeply divided between supporters and opponents of the homeland regime. Eritrea joined the Saudi-led anti-Houthi campaign in Yemen in the spring. The government lobbied European politicians concerned about the influx of Eritrean refugees to Europe, and the eu granted € 200 m in fresh development aid.
Twenty-five years after its de facto independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea celebrated its silver-jubilee but still lacked an implemented constitution. The autocratic political system under the unelected President Isaias Afewerki prevailed, and the militarised command economy persisted. Time-unlimited national service for all Eritreans of working age remained in place and the resulting mass exodus continued. The un Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea confirmed that it had good reason to believe that crimes against humanity had been committed by the government. In July, the un Human Rights Council welcomed the Commission’s findings and called on un bodies and the au to bring to account those who had perpetrated human rights violations. The diaspora remained politically split and respective groups organised pro-and anti-government demonstrations. Eritrea’s engagement in the Saudi-led anti-Houthi campaign in Yemen continued, and the uae built a military base at the port of Assab. The eu made little progress towards the implementation of development projects under the 11th edf, and unicef stated that almost half of the nation was suffering from malnutrition.
The State of Eritrea remained an autocratic political system with a heavily militarised command economy, and the open-ended national service that drove substantial numbers of the youth to flee the country remained in place. The human rights situation was worrying, and a crackdown on the very few remaining schools that offered religious education as part of their curriculum triggered the first student demonstration in Asmara since 2001. The young people protested against the arrest of a nonagenarian board member of the Islamic Al-Dia school, who had refused to accept government intervention in the school’s curriculum. The diplomatic crisis in the Arabian Peninsula and tensions between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan affected Eritrea’s foreign relations and led to the termination of Qatar’s role as a mediator in the conflict with Djibouti and to a Sudanese troop build-up along its borders with Eritrea at the end of the year. The government tried to control all financial transactions by limiting cash transfers without providing adequate alternative financial instruments to handle payments. In December, it closed down hundreds of businesses as a punitive measure. The bulk of eu funds granted under the 11th edf remained unused due to a lack of feasible development projects.
Eritrea’s political system was not reformed in spite of major changes in its foreign relations, and the country remained an autocracy led by President Isaias Afewerki and a small number of political advisers. In a surprising move, Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, declared in June his readiness to accept an international border verdict and to end the conflict with Eritrea. In July, a peace-and-friendship agreement was signed in Asmara, followed by a similar agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in September. Border crossings also opened in September, and Eritreans were free to leave their country for the first time in two decades. However, the open-ended national service programme was not reformed, and thousands left the country to join their relatives in the diaspora once the border was opened. Ethiopian traders sold consumer goods in the country, which led to an improvement in the supply of basic consumer goods; however, local traders were disadvantaged because their access to cash was severely limited by the government. The human rights situation, as well as the economic situation, did not improve, and no reforms were envisaged. eu funds granted under the eleventh edf remained virtually untouched. In the absence of a road map regulating relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and without border demarcation, many Eritreans feared for the sovereignty of their country.
One and a half years after Eritrea’s peace agreement with Ethiopia, none of the urgent reforms that were expected by the international community had been tackled: the unlimited duration of the mandatory national service was not reformed; no elections were envisaged; no political prisoners released; and the exodus of the youth continued. By March, Eritrea had unilaterally closed all border crossings with Ethiopia, and the boundary remained un-demarcated. Agreements related to Ethiopia’s use of Eritrea’s main ports, Massawa and Assab, and a trade agreement remained yet to be finalised. In June, the government closed all health facilities run by the Catholic Church after the Catholic bishops had demanded reconciliation and dialogue. The uae and Saudi Arabia continued to run a military base in the port city of Assab, used for its war against Houthi rebels in Yemen. Eritrea’s relations with Sudan improved after the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in April, and Eritrea’s president Isaias Afewerki interfered strongly in Sudanese affairs. The economic situation remained dire in the absence of development and the presence of increasing debt distress. The eu granted € 200 m for the construction of a road connecting Eritrea and Ethiopia, although the government was known to be using forced labour in its construction companies.
The State of Eritrea remained a dictatorship with no implemented constitution ruled with an iron fist by President Isaias Afewerki. The open-ended national service which had depleted the country of its productive youth remained in place and the human rights situation was dire, despite the release of some prisoners detained for their religious beliefs who had served long prison sentences. The government used the Covid-19 pandemic to introduce an indefinite harsh lockdown in April, with all businesses closed without compensation and all kinds of public meetings prohibited. The Ministry of Health claimed that only three Eritreans had died due to the virus, but nevertheless the lockdown, which led to a hidden famine, was not eased. Schools remained closed and no alternative means of education were provided for the youth. In November, Eritrean soldiers became part of Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed’s so-called law enforcement operation in Tigray against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in an undeclared war against the people of Ethiopia’s northern region bordering Eritrea. The EU’s support for road construction projects carried out by national service conscripts came under increased scrutiny.
Thirty years after its de facto independence, the State of Eritrea remained an autocracy with no implemented constitution. Throughout its existence, the country had been ruled by its unelected president Isaias Afewerki. The open-ended national service was not reformed, and Eritrean troops were deployed in the armed conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia’s northern region bordering Eritrea. The human rights situation remained dire, and the rule of law was absent. The Covid-19-related lockdown was eased in March and according to the Ministry of Health, the pandemic had claimed few victims. Eritrea was the only country in Africa with no vaccination campaign set in place. It was also the only African country that did not join the AfCFTA. The EU reallocated development funds approved for Eritrea to other countries due to the government’s lack of interest in economic cooperation and its military involvement in Tigray.