Angola introduced a new constitution, followed by several cabinet reshuffles, which consolidated the political dominance of the governing party and strengthened the position of the president. The opposition remained fractured and ineffective. 2010 also saw the resurgence of the separatist ‘Frente para a Libertação da Enclave de Cabinda’ (FLEC) rebellion, and the continuation of repressive politics against opposition voices, regime critics and ‘separatists’, not only in Cabinda, but also in the diamond-rich Lunda provinces. President dos Santos’ first state visit to South Africa in December was arguably the high point of the year in foreign relations. Economically, Angola’s oil-dependent economy recovered from the global financial crisis, but was set back by a debt crisis in June that arose over unpaid arrears with construction firms. While the oil-driven economy turned at high speed, and infrastructure and luxury residential construction projects were undertaken and completed, the majority of the population continued to live in poverty and ill health.
The first openly anti-government protests in Luanda and provincial capitals were met with bellicose rhetoric and swift intervention by security forces, showing a certain degree of nervousness on the part of the government. The demonstrations also highlighted the unanswered question of who would succeed President dos Santos, whose dominance of the political system was strongly felt, both among members of the ruling party and by the political and popular opposition. Despite growing popular discontent, opposition parties remained fractured and ineffective. Abroad, Angola emphasised South-South partnerships. The country also consolidated its standing with economic and political initiatives, namely in Guinea-Bissau, although it came under pressure for its stance in the Ivoirian crisis. The economy picked up again after a debt crisis in the previous year, although the majority of the population remained mired in poverty, confined to the informal sector and with low levels of education and health.
The first regular elections in 16 years were the most momentous political event of the year and brought about a massive win for the party in power, the MPLA (‘Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola’). Since the end of the civil war in 2002, President José Eduardo dos Santos and his entourage have tightened their grip on power and the resources of the country, with very little improvement in the living conditions of the majority of the people. The confirmation of his rule through democratic elections is thus only the last step in the consolidation process of Angola's singular power structure, centred on the presidency and the dominant party, which aims to improve the government's international standing.
The political year was dominated by the 31 August elections. In the run-up to the elections, opposition parties were surprisingly vocal in their criticism of the government, while youth protests faced administrative obstruction and increasingly violent repression. The elections were marked by irregularities and were won by the incumbent president and his party, with a comfortable majority. Abroad, the year was marked by the fiasco of the country’s engagement in Guinea-Bissau and continued dominance over the Portuguese economy; relations with the USA hit a low. Although the economy showed signs of recovery and diversification away from oil, socioeconomic conditions for the vast majority of the population remained dire and 10% of the population were affected by famine.
The consolidation of the government was only marginally affected by the ongoing debates about the long-outstanding constitutional reform. While presidential elections were scheduled for this year, technical reasons were cited as causing the delay in resolving the constitutional debates, and both the constitutional project and the date of the next presidential election remained unresolved issues. Instead, the ruling elite extended its grip on political and economic power. On 21 September, President José Eduardo dos Santos silently marked his 30 years in power, making him the second-longest-serving head of state in Sub-Saharan Africa. The human rights situation and media freedom improved only marginally, and the low-level guerrilla war in Cabinda simmered on. Although the world economic crisis, and especially the drop in crude oil prices, impacted adversely on economic growth, economic indicators were showing signs of recovery towards the end of the year. Economic and political ties with the most important partner countries were strengthened and in line with the country's growing ambitions as a regional power. Social conditions also improved slightly, but for the vast majority of the population the situation remained difficult.
The August elections defined political dynamics, which were marked by a hardening of the political and social climate. Hotly contested, the elections returned the ruling party and President João Lourenço to power with a narrower-than-ever majority, indicating growing dissatisfaction with and distrust in political institutions and their ability to represent the population’s interests. Foreign affairs largely followed the courant normal, and were dominated by economic rather than political considerations. Post-pandemic, the economy nominally recovered. This was largely due to rebounding oil prices, as oil income still dominated government revenues, yet costs of living remained high and living conditions for a majority of people were dire.
President João Lourenço pursued new political overtures both at home and abroad. The Angolan economy languished, while ordinary Angolans were battered by austerity measures and saw little improvement in their daily lives.
The political year was again marked by dominant-party politics, increasing repression of dissent, and the coming to light of several spectacular cases of grand corruption and mismanagement. Nonetheless, Angola successfully established itself as a regional power-broker and attracted unabated interest from foreign investors. However, the economy, still dominated by the oil industry, stagnated and was seriously affected towards the end of the year by an oil price shock. Accordingly, commodity prices rose even further, and social expenditure remained far under the actual needs of the population.
Parliamentary politics were to a large extent dominated by party manoeuvrings ahead of the 2022 elections that included the retroactive invalidation of the major opposition party’s last congress by the constitutional court. The killing of peaceful protesters in Cafunfo, Lunda-Norte, by the police in January set the tone for increased repression of protests, though citizen contestation was nonetheless on the rise. Foreign affairs were slow-going and the economy remained sluggish, both as an effect of the pandemic, with citizens suffering from further aggravation of costs of living.
This was a year of crisis, with falling oil prices causing a rapid deterioration in the economy. Domestic politics were shaped by the impact of the economic downturn, but rather than tackling the crisis head-on, the authorities unleashed the most violent persecution of suspected ‘internal enemies’ since the end of the war. Internationally, Angola multiplied its overtures to new and old creditors but all socioeconomic areas saw significant decline, with negative consequences for large parts of the population, including a hitherto relatively well-off, nascent urban middle class.