The increasing tension in the Sahelian region, especially in Mali, constituted the most obvious security risk to Mauritania, along with potential threats from terrorists and extremists within the country. Increased costs for military and security measures and the growing influx of refugees from Mali complicated the financial situation. The impact of the 2011 drought further exacerbated living conditions. At the same time, increased aid volumes and new commercial contracts, especially in the fishing and mining sectors, boosted the economy. Although parliamentary and municipal elections were postponed, the political situation, including the position of President Aziz, was regarded as reasonably stable, and both opposition parties and the press were allowed to operate relatively freely.
The ‘Conseil Militaire pour la Justice et la Démocratie’ (CMJD) led by President Vall, which overthrew President Maaouiya Ould Taya on 3 August 2005 after he had held power for 20 years, was strongly condemned by the international community (including the UN, AU, France and the US) from the beginning, even as most Mauritanians welcomed the coup. By 2006, however, the CMJD had been largely accepted internationally because it formed an interim government charged with organising legislative and presidential elections within 19 months and had granted a general amnesty to political prisoners. Parliamentary elections took place in November–December in the presence of a large number of international observers and were regarded as relatively free and fair. Although the human rights situation generally improved, there were reports of ill-treatment of detainees, ethnic tensions among the country's Arab, Berber, Moor and sub-Saharan African groups, and some evidence of the persistence of slavery. The economy received a boost with the commencement of oil exports in February. However, agriculture, on which most Mauritanians depend, was affected by drought and locust invasions. Mauritania has least developed country status and qualified for debt relief under the HIPC initiative. Poverty reduction programmes continued.
After an unexpected dispute between President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani and his predecessor, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, at the end of 2019 when Aziz signalled his intention to remain in the leadership of the ruling party, Union Pour la République (upr), Ghazouani strengthened his position and undertook a major shake-up in order to isolate from political power officials close to the former president. Investigations under the auspices of a parliamentary committee that scrutinised Aziz’s time in power consolidated Ghazouani’s position, while Aziz’s unpopularity unified political forces behind a judicial process that could, if not get him imprisoned, at least block him from returning to power.
President Mohamed Abdel Aziz completed his mandate and transferred power to an elected successor, the former defence minister Mohamed Ould Cheikh Ahmed Ghazouani. This was the first peaceful transfer of power between elected heads of state since the country gained independence in 1960. At the end of the year a deepening estrangement between Aziz and Ghazouani became obvious. A challenge for Ghazouani was how to steer the shift from the strong informal networks connected to Aziz to his own support base and to confront the fact that many of those who had benefited under Aziz might lose out under him. The risk of widespread social tension remained acute owing to political repression, the high rate of unemployment, and the generally low standards of living.
In the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’, a new protest movement, ‘Coordination de la Jeunesse du 25 Février’, emerged at the beginning of the year. The previously contested election of President Abdel Aziz in 2009 was regarded as a fait accompli and, instead of regime change, the protesters mainly focused on tangible social issues and constitutional amendments. The government responded by launching a series of social programmes and initiated a national dialogue with the opposition in September. Severe criticism from the opposition concerning lack of information and coordination as regards the election process, as well as serious allegations from minority rights groups concerning the national census, eventually forced the government to postpone the parliamentary and municipal elections. Activities of the terror network al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) constituted a regional destabilising factor and led to an increase in military spending. Despite certain tensions in the mutual relationships with Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, these countries continued military cooperation in accordance with the Tamanrasset agreement of 2010. Joint efforts with the EU to reduce illegal immigration from West Africa continued.
The widespread expectation that the country's first freely elected president, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, would bring increased press freedom and a more tolerant political climate at first appeared well founded. Repatriation of Mauritanian refugees from Senegal started as agreed. Risk factors included the growing terrorist threat, drug networks and illegal immigration to Europe. Ethnic tensions between Afro-Mauritanians and Arab-Berbers were also reported. Rising oil and food prices raised fears of more food riots, especially given the limited prospects for oil revenues. Political tension increased during the summer when President Abdallahi and his government were accused of corruption, bad governance and an inadequate response to the economic crisis. Although Abdallahi was supported by political parties united in the ‘Pacte National pour le Developpement et la Démocratie’ (PNDD), formed on 5 January, on 6 August a successful military coup took place. It was condemned by the international community although some Mauritanian politicians supported the takeover. By contrast, trade unions appealed for resistance to the military. As a consequence, aid intended to finance rural development, health, education, road construction and anti-terror training was suspended. However, most ongoing aid operations in the country continued, including those undertaken by UN agencies and NGOs.
The failure to establish a dialogue between the government and the opposition dominated the political climate. Elections for one-third of Senate seats were postponed and the major opposition group, the ‘Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques’ (rfd), ignored the government’s initiative for a national dialogue. Instead, the rdf organised street campaigns trying to exploit public frustration over the government’s inability to reduce poverty and unemployment. Regional security remained problematic. Potential security threats arising from terrorist groups in neighbouring countries dominated the foreign policy agenda. Mauritania reasserted its role as a regional mediator as President Aziz remained chairperson of the ‘G5 du Sahel’. Although the government’s main economic policy focus was on macroeconomic stability and attempts to boost the role of the private sector, it failed to agree a new three-year programme with the imf. A four-year fisheries accord with the eu was signed and was expected to boost the fishing sector considerably.
The return to democratic government, which had involved a constitutional referendum followed by parliamentary and municipal elections in 2006, was concluded this year with senatorial and presidential elections. Criminalisation of slavery and a tripartite agreement on repatriation of Mauritanian refugees from Senegal were important steps in improving the country's reputation in the field of human rights. Following the successfully finalised transition process, the country was readmitted to the AU. Relations with both Arab countries and West African neighbours improved and the country's position as an important ally of the US was maintained. Poverty reduction programmes continued but approximately 60% of the population continued to live below the poverty datum line. Oil income was less than expected.
The country continued to face a significant threat of attack from a regional militant group, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The low-intensity but still existing terrorist activity in the region seriously impeded economic development, particular in transport and tourism. However, the trade surplus was higher than expected following the recovery in international demand for iron, gold and copper. Together with the increased aid flows, this clearly strengthened President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz’s popularity. Consequently, the risk of popular unrest was considerably reduced even if the opposition continued to claim that the president had reneged on his commitments under the Dakar accord of 4 June 2009. Regional cooperation in security issues between Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad was strengthened and economic and political ties with the Arab countries were further enhanced.
An eight-party opposition alliance, the ‘Front National pour la Démocratie et l’Unité’ (fndu), which had boycotted the 2013 elections, adopted a common strategy and participated in the parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections in September. Although the ruling ‘Union pour la République’ (upr) emerged victorious in elections, the formation of the fndu as a coherent opposition was regarded as a positive step in order to establish a more united political opposition. No terror attacks on Mauritanian soil were reported during the year. However, terrorism remained a threat due to a number of jihadi groups and other criminal organisations in the neighbouring region, as well as to the return of radicalised combatants from war zones such as Iraq and Syria. The unemployment rate remained high, and the risk of renewed social unrest persisted owing to political repression, narrowly based growth, and low living standards.