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Introduction
The Muslim population of Sweden is very diverse when it comes to ethnic and linguistic background, and no group is in a clearly dominant position. Up until the mid-1980s the largest single Muslim group consisted of people from a Turkish background, but since then it has not been possible to talk about one group as being numerically dominant, and today Muslim communities are made up of Arabs, Iranians, Africans and South Asians, as well as a growing number of individuals of a Muslim background who were born and brought up in Sweden, and Swedish converts to Islam. Since Sweden has had, and still has, a very liberal immigration policy compared to the rest of the European Union, the composition of Muslim communities in Sweden is often linked to international crises and conflicts. For example, the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the current wars in Syria and Iraq have had a strong impact on Sweden’s Muslim communities in many ways. From a European point of view, Sweden is among the countries in the European Union to have accepted the largest numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers from Iraq and Syria. Approximately one third of all Syrian refugees who have arrived in Europe since the crisis in 2011 have settled in Sweden.1 This development has had a great impact on both Shi’i and Sunni Muslim communities, but it has also increased the number of Christians and other religious minorities from the Middle East who have settled in Sweden.
Citizenship |
2014 |
2013 |
Total |
56 440 |
52 816 |
Syria |
9 795 |
5 099 |
Sweden2 |
9 369 |
9 542 |
Stateless3 |
3 539 |
1 180 |
Eritrea |
2 251 |
1 583 |
Somalia |
2 232 |
6 714 |
Poland |
2 221 |
1 929 |
Afghanistan |
1 791 |
2 322 |
India |
1 419 |
1 032 |
Iraq |
1 052 |
1 112 |
Finland |
947 |
852 |
Source: Statistiknyhet från scb (Nr 2014:194).4 |
The statistics on immigrants do not contain any information or estimates of how many refugees and asylum-seekers are Muslims, Christians or atheists/agnostics, or belong to other religious communities. Despite the great need for further research on how immigration patterns and international conflicts impact local communities, there are some indications that the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are spilling over into Sweden and that tensions are increasing between different Muslim groups (Sunni and Shi’i), as well as among and between other religious communities from the Middle East that also live in Sweden.5
Public Debates
Since the summer of 2014, public debates on Islam and Muslims in Sweden have been dominated by the rise of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and especially by the fact that a growing number of Swedes have decided to join it. All major forms of media (television, national radio, newspapers) have highlighted the violent and explosive situation in the Middle East and the fact that young Muslims born and raised in Sweden are willing to risk their lives by going to Syria as foreign fighters. In particular, a social programme broadcast on Swedish national television (Uppdrag granskning, svt, 21 May 2014), focusing on a young man called Bilal who left Sweden and died shortly afterwards in Syria, contributed to public debate. In the programme, the sorrow, despair and shame of his family were revealed, giving rise to heated debates in both the social and public media.6
According to recent estimates, the number of Swedes who have joined the conflicts in Syria as foreign fighters could be as high as 300, making Sweden one of the European Union’s member states with the highest number of foreign fighters per capita (in 2014, ca. 9.6 million people were living in Sweden). The Swedish Security Service (säpo) has confirmed that approximately 100 individuals have travelled to Syria to take part in the fighting there, but the figure may be as high as 250–300 individuals. A large percentage of the Swedish foreign fighters have died, but many have also returned to Sweden. How to stop young Muslims from joining the so-called Islamic State and how to handle those who return, have, therefore, become a focus of public debates about Islam and Muslims in Sweden.7
Like many other European states, Sweden has discussed the possibility of making legal changes that will make it more difficult for Swedes to take part in international conflicts. However, many individual spokespersons and Muslim organisations have pointed out that such measures also carry the risk of increasing Islamophobia in society at a time when Muslims are already being negatively associated with violence and terrorism. Others have pointed out that it is not only Muslims who take part as foreign fighters but also other groups. For example, approximately 30 individuals with nationalist or far-right views have also taken part in the fighting in Ukraine.8 Furthermore, the number of Swedes fighting with other groups in Syria and Iraq (for example, the Kurdish Peshmerga or a Shi’i group like Hezbollah) is unknown. Consequently, it is argued that Sweden should not only be concerned about Sunni Muslims who are acting as foreign fighters in the Middle East.9
In line with the fears discussed above, there are several indications of growing anti-Muslim opinions and Islamophobia in Sweden, as highlighted in the media and public debates on several occasions. For example, in the latest national elections in 2014, the Sweden Democrat Party (Sverigedemokraterna, or sd), which has especially targeted immigration and Islam as social problems, made a very strong showing. sd won close to 13% of the votes, and approximately 800,000 individuals had voted for their policies, a fact that increased their influence over the political debate.10 To what extent this has had an influence on public debates and anti-Muslim feelings is hard to measure, but sd’s success in the 2014 elections indicates that many Swedes have negative opinions about immigrants and Muslims. From that point of view, Sweden resembles other countries in the European Union (especially in Western and Northern Europe) that also have political parties critical of immigration and Muslims.
However, the national elections in 2014 also led to Mehmet Kaplan becoming the first minister in Sweden who is a practising Muslim. Kaplan’s background is in the Muslim youth organisation, Sweden’s Young Muslims (Sveriges Unga Muslim), and politically he is a representative of the Green Party (Miljöpartiet). After the elections he became the Minister for Housing and Urban Development (Bostads och Statsutvecklingsminister). However, his position was soon criticised by the Social Democrat Nalin Pekgul, who argued that Kaplan has a “hidden agenda” and that it is his mission to Islamise Sweden.11 Kaplan answered that the criticism was very vague and alleged in turn that Pekgul was trying to discredit him without any substantial evidence.12 According to those who criticised Pekgul, such vague accusations merely contribute to anti-Muslim sentiments, but for other participants in the debate (especially in the social media) Kaplan’s appointment should be taken as an illustration of the growing Muslim presence in Sweden. To accuse an individual or an organisation of allegedly having Islamist leanings seems to be an efficient weapon in political debates, indicating that the issues of Islam, Muslims and Islamophobia have acquired growing importance in both public debates and the general social landscape in Sweden.
According to the report Säkerhet och krisberedskap i Sveriges moskéer (Security and Crisis Prevention in the Mosques of Sweden) published by the Islamic Council for Cooperation (Islamiska samarbetsrådet), which includes the six Muslim umbrella organisations that have been granted state funding, mosques and Islamic institutions have become the targets of hate crimes and Islamophobia, and many organisations lack proper safety features (i.e. fire extinguishers, fire alarms and emergency exits). These findings were also made by a government report, Främlingsfientliga handlingar mot trossamfund: en kartläggning av religiösa gruppers och invidiers utsatthet i Sverige 2014, (Xenophobic actions against faith communities: A map of religious groups and individual risks in Sweden 2014), which also indicated that Muslims were the most vulnerable group in society and that Islam was the religion that most Swedes had negative opinions about.13 According to the independent expo Foundation that covers racism and especially Neo-Nazi activities in Sweden, approximately one mosque was attacked every month during 2014.14
However, the report Främlingsfientliga handlingar mot trossamfund makes it clear that negative opinions about religious groups are not only a problem for Muslims. All religious communities that were included (for example, Christians of different denominations, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs and other minority religious groups from the Middle East) reported that it has become more difficult to hold religious views in Sweden. Besides strong indications of Islamophobia and hate crimes against Muslims, it was pointed out that anti-Semitism is a serious problem in Sweden and that individuals of a Muslim background can also have strong anti-Semitic opinions. However, it is also clear that Christian groups (especially among the Free Churches and the Pentecostal movement) may also express anti-Muslim opinions, thus contributing to negative opinions about Islam and Muslims. The great majority of faith communities are concerned about these developments, and actions have been taken to support the principle of freedom of religion. All in all, the report shows clearly that Sweden is part of a global system, and that events and developments in the Middle East impact Muslims, Jews and Christians living in Sweden. The presentation and publication of the report contributed to a lively public discussion, and several newspapers and other media highlighted the report and stressed that freedom of religion is an essential aspect of an open and democratic society.15 It was also pointed out that religious communities should be viewed as potentially positive partners in strengthening the social fabric. Media responses to the report maintained that, on the one hand, it was essential to fight religious extremism that leads to violence, but, on the other hand, it was also necessary to emphasise that freedom of religion is part of the democratic system.
Another public discussion about Islam and Muslims in 2014 focused on the question of who represents Muslim voters in Sweden. The debate was caused by the publication of a report by the neo-liberal think tank Timbro, which argued against the view that a so-called Muslim politician can represent all Muslims.16 This form of identity politics, which Timbro claims has been picked up by the Social Democratic Party, is based on a perception that representation is linked to group interests. Timbro argued that only individuals should represent individuals and that an individual cannot automatically represent a whole group just because he or she has the same ethnicity, skin colour or religious belonging as the presumed voters. This report was heavily criticised by the Muslim Human Rights Committee (Muslimska mänskliga rättighetskommittén), which arranged an alternative seminar, and several other voices argued that the report itself, as well as the discussants at the seminar at which the report was presented, did not represent Muslims.17 According to their critics, neither the author of the report nor the discussants had any idea about the reality of Muslims in Sweden, since they were all white middle-class men.18
Transnational Links
Like their European counterparts, Muslim organisations in Sweden have extensive contacts with international and global Muslim organisations and networks. Many of them are also rooted in and associated with international organisations like, for example, the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), the Muslim Brotherhood, Sufi organisations, Ahl ul-Bayt, etc.19
In terms of international and transnational links, there have been no major developments, but the conflict in Syria highlighted the fact that international militant organisations also build on transnational links. Many Muslim organisations (especially Islamic Relief) have also made collections and donations to local aid for Syria.20 These aid campaigns received both positive and negative media attention, and some of them were criticised for aiding just one party in the fight. For example, a former imam who had been working at the largest mosque in Stockholm was also linked to an affair involving the smuggling of illegal weapons to Syria, and, according to the Swedish media, he tried to provide the opposition to the Syrian regime with weapons.21 Muslim organisations that have been associated with the Muslim Brotherhood also suffered some negative media attention, and the question of who is and is not linked to this organisation (or more loosely to the ideas of the Brotherhood and their ideologues) is related to the public debate about transnational links, as well as how and if global Muslim organisations influence Muslims who live in Sweden.22
Law and Domestic Politics
When it comes to law and domestic politics, most debates focused on international terrorism and how to deal with the fact that a large number of Swedes had left Sweden to take part as foreign fighters in the wars in Syria and Iraq. To tackle these problems, the Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson launched a so-called quick investigation to determine how to make it illegal to take part in so-called jihad journeys, that is, to fight as a soldier in an army or a group that Sweden, the European Union or the United Nations classify as a terrorist organisation. The results of this investigation should become available in early 2015, and if Johansson so decides, it may become illegal and a criminal offence to take part in travel for purposes of engaging in armed jihad. Even though this legal measure is intended to target all forms of terrorism, the debate has been focused on Islam and so-called jihad journeys.23
Furthermore, in order to address these questions, the then Minster of Democracy Birgitta Ohlsson gave Mona Sahlin (former leader of the Social Democratic Party) the task of setting up and coordinating a national plan to combat violent extremism (including far-right, leftist and Islamist extremism). The task of the coordinator is to strengthen and facilitate cooperation between organisations (including faith communities), municipalities, and the State in order to encourage civil society to stand up to terrorism and political violence.24
The Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities (Nämnden för Statligt Stöd till Trossamfund, sst), which among other things is responsible for the distribution of the State’s financial support to religious communities, was very active during 2014. For example, it issued a number of publications dealing with Muslim communities in Sweden and with hate crimes (including Islamophobia).25 This governmental body also worked with religious communities on the problem of forced marriages, and how to engage faith communities and their members in the national elections that were held in 2014.26 During 2014, the sst also organised short training courses for religious leaders on how to function and work in Sweden (consisting of education modules on, for example, leadership, family law, Swedish history and religion in Sweden). The courses included religious leaders from a large number of denominations and faith communities, and courses were held in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö/Helsingborg.
In 2014, the sst and the Christian Council of Sweden also helped Muslim communities to make their presence in hospitals more efficient and more visible. sst funds eleven positions (25%) as coordinators for Muslim health care and one part-time imam located at a hospital in the city of Skövde. These coordinators are available in the cities of Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö, Uppsala, Jönköping, Örebro and Skövde/Skaraborg and one coordinator will soon be hired in Umeå. The cost of this support for 2014 was estimated to have been 1,937,000 skr (ca. €207,000) plus expenses of 150,000 skr (ca. €16,000) for educational needs.27
Also in 2014, the Islamic Association in Sweden (Islamiska förbundet i Sverige) was included on a list of terrorist organisations by the United Arab Emirates (uae) because of the latter’s ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and all organisations associated with it. This decision was strongly condemned by Omar Mustafa, the chairman of the Islamic Association in Sweden, who stated in the Swedish media that his organisation had no links with the Muslim Brotherhood.28 He was also surprised that the uae should be pointing a finger at a Swedish Muslim organisation when the uae itself was known for violating human rights on a regular basis.29 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are no reasons to respond to the initiative by the uae, or to take any action against the Islamic Association in Sweden. Neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor the Islamic Association in Sweden has been placed on the eu’s list of terrorist organisations.30
Activities and Initiatives of Main Muslim Organisations
A main initiative taken by Muslim organisations in 2014 was the publication of the above mentioned report “Security and Crisis Prevention in the Mosques of Sweden.” This report indicates that Muslim organisations suffer from hate crimes and that many of them have problems with security issues. The data for the report are based on a questionnaire, and the report includes responses from 110 Muslim organisations.
Even though there are few national activities among Muslim groups, it is important to stress that most activities take place on a local basis. In Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö, and other cities as well, it is possible to find examples of local initiatives organised by Muslim groups and congregations. For example, Shi’i Muslims associated with the Imam Ali Mosque in Stockholm have been very active,31 and the Islamic Association (Islamiska Förbundet) has also organised annual Muslim family days in Stockholm. This initiative includes lectures, seminars, concerts, and family activities, for both children and adults, and attracted a large number of Sunni Muslims and many young Muslims.32 A network of seven Muslim congregations was started in Malmö with the aim of raising political questions and awareness among Muslim voters prior to the national elections in 2014.33 A multi-faith and pluralistic initiative, the Social Cohesion in Skåne Foundation (Open Skåne), was initiated in 2014 in order to combat racism, xenophobia and anti-religious sentiments in the South of Sweden. This initiative includes many different member organisations, and Jews, Christians, and Muslims are associated with it.34
Demographics and Statistics
The best source in order to gain quantitative information on Sweden’s Muslim population is the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities (http://www.sst.a.se).
Muslim Population |
Ca. 350,000–400,000 (if not higher, could be closer to 500,000. Up to 5% of the entire population). |
Ethnic/National Backgrounds |
No data available. |
Inner-Islamic Groups |
No data available. |
Geographical Spread |
The large majority (most likely over 50%) of Muslims live in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. |
Number of Mosques |
There are seven purpose-built mosques in Sweden (five Sunni mosques, in Malmö, Uppsala, Göteborg, and two in Stockholm, one Shi‘i mosque in Trollhättan, and one Ahmadi mosque in Göteborg). In Stockholm, Gävle, Västerås and Sundsvall Muslims have bought old churches and converted them into mosques. There are no reliable figures for mosques based in basements, flats or warehouses. |
Muslim Burial Sites |
No data available. |
Places of Islamic Learning and Education |
In 2010, the number of confessional independent schools was estimated at 68, of which nine were Islamic. There are no institutions of higher Islamic learning, or madrasas in Sweden. |
Muslim Media and Publications |
Most media activities are online line or via social medias, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. |
Main Muslim Organisations
- –
- The Union of Islamic Congregations(Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige, fifs, Kapellgränd 10, se-116 25 Stockholm, www.fifs.se). This is the oldest Swedish national Muslim organisation. It was started in 1974 and includes both Sunni and Shi’i Muslim congregations.
- –
- The Swedish Muslim Union (Sveriges Muslimska Förbund, smf, Kyrkbacken 14, bv. se-169 62 Solna). This is organisation was started in 1982 because of an internal split in the Union of Islamic Congregations.
- –
- The Swedish Muslim Council(Sveriges Muslimska Råd, smr, www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se). Despite of the tenstions between the Union of Islamic Congregations and the Swedish Muslim Union, they have managed to cooperate under the umbrella organisation of the Swedish Muslim Council. This organisation is often associated with the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
- –
- The Union of Islamic Cultural Centres(Islamiska Kulturcenterunionen, ikus, Box 61, se-191 21 Sollentuna). This organisation was started in the beginning of the 1980s and the main bulk of its members are of a Turkish ethnic background. The organisation is close to the Süleymanci movement and its counterpart in Germany.
- –
- The Swedish Islamic Assemblies (Svenska Islamiska Församlingar, sif, Moränvägen 13, se-136 51 Haninge). This organisation was started in 2002.
- –
- The Islamic Shi‘i Communities in Sweden(Islamisk Shiasamfund, iss, Box 690, se-175 27 Järfälla, www.shiasamfund.se/sida1.html). As the name indicates, this is an umbrella organisation for Shi’i communities. Members are of Iraqi, Iranian and Lebanese backgrounds. Most South Asian Shi’i congregations are members in the Union of Islamic Congregations.
- –
- The Swedish Ahmadi Community(Nasir Moské, Tolvskillingsgatan 1, se-414 82 Göteborg, www.ahmadiyya.se). This is the national body for Ahmadi Muslims in Sweden.
- –
- The Islamic Community(Islamiska förbundet, http://www.islamiskaforbundet.se/sv/). This organisation is particularly influenced by the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
Notes
1 Lallerstedt, Karl, Syrien och Sverige: En avlägsen konflikt med allvarliga konsekvenser på hemmaplan (Stockholm: Friavärlden, 2014), www.frivarld.se/rapporter/syrien-och-sverige-en-avlagsen-konflikt-med-allvarliga-konsekvenser-pa-hemmaplan/, accessed 24 January 2015.
2 That is, Swedish citizens who returned to Sweden.
3 Eight out of ten stateless persons were born in Syria.
4 www.scb.se/sv_/Hitta-statistik/Statistik-efter-amne/Befolkning/Befolkningens-sammansattning/Befolkningsstatistik/25788/25795/Behallare-for-Press/376142/, accessed 24 January 2015.
5 See, for example, Larsson, Göran, and David Thurfjell, Shia-muslimer i Sverige: en kortfattad översikt (Stockholm: sst, 2013), which contains some information on threats against Shi’i Muslims in Sweden. For more information, see Främlingsfientliga handlingar mot trossamfund: en kartläggning av religiösa gruppers och individers utsatthet i Sverige 2014 (Stockholm: sst, 2014).
6 For more information, see www.svt.se/ug/bilal-dog-som-en-av-de-svenska-jihadresenarerna and www.svt.se/ug/ug-referens/ug-referens-4, both accessed 23 January 2015.
7 Holender, Robert, “säpp: Upp till 300 svenskar kan strida för is”, Dagens Nyheter, 22 November 2014, www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/sapo-upp-till-300-svenskar-kan-strida-for-is/, accessed 21 January 2015.
8 Holender, “säpo: Upp till 300 svenskar kan strida för is”.
9 Grabovac, Haris, “Jihadresorna är inte vårt enda problem”, expo idag blogg, 29 October 2014, http://expoidag.blogspot.se/2014/10/jihadresorna-ar-inte-vart-enda-problem.html, accessed 21 January 2015.
10 www.val.se/val/val2014/slutresultat/R/rike/, accessed 26 January 2015.
11 Pekgul, Nalin, “mp-ministerns dolda agenda”, Dagens Industri, 14 October 2014, www.di.se/artiklar/2014/10/14/debatt-mp-ministerns-dolda-agenda/,accessed 25 January 2015.
12 Stiernstedt, Jenny, “Pekgul: Kaplan har ‘dold agenda’ ”, Svenska Dagbladet, 15 October 2014, www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/politik/pekgul-anklagar-kaplan-for-dold-agenda_4007689.svd, accessed 25 January 2015.
13 This report can be downloaded from www.sst.a.se/sstsuppdrag/framlingsfientligahandlingar.4.2fd784f81498e7bc198f3809.html, accessed 21 January 2015.
14 The additional information is taken from Berglund, Jenny, “Sweden’s protests against Islamophobia highlights the polarised views of Swedish citizens towards Muslims”, europp/lse Comments, 7 January 2015, http://expo.se/2014/flera-moskeattacker-i-sverige_6737.html, accessed 21 January 2015, as well as from the webpage of expo and other Swedish media. See, for example, Vergara, Daniel, “Misstänkt anlagd moskébrand i Eslöv”, expo idag, 29 December 2014, http://expo.se/2014/misstankt-anlagd-moskebrand-i-eslov_6753.html, accessed 21 January 2015; and Carp, Ossi, and Marit Sundberg, “Brandbom kast mot moské i Uppsala”, Dagens Nyheter, 1 January 2015, www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/brandbomb-kastad-mot-moske-i-uppsala/, accessed 21 January 2015.
15 For an example of how the report was discussed in the Swedish media, see www.sst.a.se/sstsuppdrag/framlingsfientligahandlingar.4.2fd784f81498e7bc198f3809.html, accessed 21 January 2015.
16 Arpi, I., Vem representerar Sveriges muslimska väljare? (Stockholm: Timbro, 2014). Timbro mainly criticised the Social Democratic Party, which, in Timbro’s view, had elected Omar Mustafa to its governing board (Partistyrelsen) in April 2013 so that he could represent Muslim voters. Mustafa’s election was heavily debated in the media in 2013, and he soon had to step down because of a conflict over his responsibility as chairperson for the Islamic Association in Sweden (Islamiska förbundet i Sverige). This organisation was criticised because it had invited speakers who had voiced anti-Semitic and anti-gay opinions in the media. A number of articles on this debate have been collected at www.dn.se/stories/s-braket-kring-omar-mustafa/, accessed 24 January 2015. For information in English, see Vinterhagen Simpson, Peter, “Omar Mustafa and the Social Democrats”, The Local.se, www.thelocal.se/20130423/47500, accessed 24 January 2015.
17 The whole Timbro seminar has been uploaded on to YouTube; see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78z9KjxwIHs, accessed 23 January 2015.
18 See, for example, Röstlund, Lisa, “Dessa män ska prata om muslimer”, Aftonbladet, 18 January 2014, www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article18198200.ab, accessed 24 January 2015. The criticisms have also been reported by Swedish Radio and discussed in the programme Människor och tro, 30 January 2014, http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=416&artikel=5770308, accessed 24 January 2015.
19 For more information about transnational links, see Larsson, Göran, Islam och muslimer i Sverige: en kunskapsöversikt (Stockholm: sst, 2014).
20 Swedish collections have been used to buy ambulances that have been sent to Syria. See, for example, the Facebook group “Ambulances to Syria”, https://sv-se.facebook.com/pages/Ambulanser-till-Syrien/433341740060556, accessed 24 January 2015. Several Swedish media reported on similar collections of money for ambulances; see, for example, Andersson Åkerblom, Tobias, “Ny last med ambulanser till Syrien”, Göteborgs-Posten, 1 August 2013, www.gp.se/nyheter/goteborg/1.1879113-ny-last-med-ambulanser-skeppades-till-syrien, accessed 24 January 2015.
21 Gustafsson, Ida, “Svensk imam ger vapen till rebeller”, Aftonbladet, 31 October 2013, www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article17757554.ab, accessed 24 January 2015.
22 See, for example, Kerpner, Joachim, and Oskar Forsberg, “Vill ha parallellt samhälle”, Aftonbladet, 19 April 2014, www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article16628650.ab, accessed 11 May 2015.
23 “Lag mot krigsresor ska snabbutredas”, Dagens juridik, 29 October 2014, www.dagensjuridik.se/2014/10/lag-mot-krigsresor-ska-snabbutredas-vi-maste-agera-nu, accessed 21 January 2015.
24 Delin, Mikael, “Mona Sahlin ska få bukt på extremismen”, Dagens Nyheter, 10 July 2014, www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/mona-sahlin-ska-fa-bukt-pa-extremismen/, accessed 25 January 2015.
25 Larsson, Islam och muslimer i Sverige; Larsson and Thurfjell, Shia-muslimer i Sverige and Främlingsfientliga handlingar mot trossamfund.
26 For more information, see www.sst.a.se/nyheter/nyhetsarkivaktuellt/vidareutbildningforvigselforrattareenheldagsutbildningomstarktskyddmotbarnochtvangsaktenskap.5.2ee6d3811485bad069426515.html and www.sst.a.se/sstsuppdrag/valen2014.4.76135ab8145baf78cb88f084.html, both accessed 24 January 2015.
27 For more information on the coordinators for Muslim health care, see www.muslimsksjukhuskoordinator.se, accessed 24 January 2015. See also Larsson, Göran, “Muslimsk palliativ vård i Sverige: ett outforskat forskningsfält”, Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift, vol. 89 (2013), pp. 78–79, and personal mail from Gunnel Andréasson, 26 January 2015, at the Christian Council of Sweden.
28 This organisation has often been accused of having links with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. However, it is not illegal to have an association with this movement. Furthermore, those who make these kinds of accusations do not provide any evidence of formal membership, or of ways the Islamic Association is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, it is likely that this Swedish organisation considers itself as being close to the Muslim Brotherhood. One example of this kind of accusations is found in Pekgul, Nalin, “Mustafa representerar inte Sveriges muslimer”, Dagens Nyheter, 18 April 2013, www.dn.se/debatt/mustafa-representerar-inte-sveriges-muslimer/, accessed 24 January 2015.
29 Besèr, Nathalie, “Svenskt islamförbund terrorstämplas”, Dagens Nyheter, 15 November 2014, www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/svenskt-islamforbund-terrorstamplas/, accessed 24 January 2015.
30 “Terrorstämple upprör svensk förening”, Svenska Dagbladet, 16 November2014, www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/terrorstampel-uppror-svensk-forening_4106287.svd, accessed 24 January 2015.
31 For more information, see www.imamalicenter.se, accessed 24 January 2015.
32 See, for example, http://muslimskafamiljedagarna.se/2014/ and www.islamiskaforbundet.se/sv/hem/tidigare-events/622-muslimska-familjedagarna-2014.html, both accessed 24 January 2015.
33 For more information, see www.m-m-n.se, accessed 24 January 2015.
34 For more information, see www.openskane.se/en/about-us/, accessed 24 January 2015.