Domestic Politics

Despite the presence of foreign troops, the civil war escalated. In 2022, there were 460 confrontations and 420 deaths, up from 390 and 313 in 2021, according to acled. unhcr estimated that 946,508 people were displaced (as of 4 October). During 2022, the war spread to all districts of Cabo Delgado and there were a few attacks in neighbouring Niassa and Nampula provinces. The offshore gas field is the third biggest in Africa, divided into two parts. Area 1, closest to the shore, is managed by TotalEnergies of France, which had committed $ 25 bn but declared ‘force majeure’ on 26 April 2021 and halted all work, saying that it would not return until there was peace. TotalEnergies had begun work on the coast on a facility to produce lng. ExxonMobil of the US has gas straddling areas 1 and 4, and followed the lead of TotalEnergies. eni of Italy has the farthest-offshore segment and opened a floating lng platform, exported its first lng on 13 November.

Current procedures for recruiting soldiers do not produce the kind of army needed in the fight against insurgents in Cabo Delgado, according to David Munongoro, commander of the reservists in the Mozambican Armed Forces (fadm) and previously head of the military police for 12 years, at a conference in April. ‘The army must recruit in order to wage war. But what happens today is that we recruit in order to give people jobs. I recruit my son because I can’t educate him, so I send him into the army or the police. Then, when I hear that he’s being sent to Cabo Delgado, I do everything to take his name off the list.’

The supposedly elite paramilitary riot police (uir, Unidade de Intervenção Rapido) were attacked so often in Nangade district, Cabo Delgado, that ‘a significant part of the insurgent weaponry in Cabo Delgado has been taken from the military and police’. Attacks frequently occurred just when a base was being supplied with food, suggesting that the information is leaking to the insurgents, reported the reliable independent weekly ‘Savana’ on 26 August.

Rwandan troops took effective control of the two key gas districts, Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, and sharply reduced the fighting there. But insurgent guerrillas simply moved to other districts. Palma, the main gas boom town used as a base for all the contractors, was attacked in March 2021 and most people fled. By the end of the year, supported logistically and financially by TotalEnergies, there was a partial return to normal life. In Palma, the insurgents attacked only government facilities and not those of gas contractors. But after the insurgents left, the town was comprehensively looted by the police and army. The Amarula Hotel, a favourite with foreigners, reopened in March and looked the same. Assistant manager Ritha Jaime Lucas explained that, yes, the furniture was the same – they had bought it back at a ‘reasonable’ price from the police and army looters.

‘High-level corruption and local government corruption in Cabo Delgado in particular are now rife and are leading to a major breakdown in law and order’, concluded the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (gi-toc) in a 27 January report. ‘Illicit economies seem to have contributed to the conditions which gave rise to the insurgency and continue to drive it: endemic corruption, elite economic capture and a lack of legitimate economic opportunities for large sections of the population’, noted gi-toc. ‘The insurgency is largely driven by resentment of endemic corruption and the feeling that local youths are having their futures stolen from them.’

Corruption is a problem not just in Cabo Delgado but throughout the north of Mozambique, according to gi-toc. ‘There is virtual impunity for high-ranking politicians involved in criminal markets. Moreover, the police are described as the closest thing to a mafia group in the country, with law-enforcement officers often engaging directly in organized crime activities and acting as a hit squad for the government and ruling party.’

On 5 December, an investigation by Zitamar and the US investigation agency c4ads suggested that four linked companies had shipped 5,400 tonnes of illegal wood to China in 2019–21, and that this was just a small part of the ongoing trade. The export of thousands of containers of illegal logs can only continue with the protection of the Frelimo (the ruling party) oligarchs, with the power to bypass customs procedures in exchange for large commissions.

Meanwhile a dozen people, mainly businesspeople of Indian and Pakistani origin, were kidnapped and ransoms of $ 35 m paid in the first 11 months of the year, according to the vice-president of the Confederation of Mozambican Economic Associations (cta), Prakash Prehlad. Attorney-general Beatriz Buchili told parliament on 27 and 28 April that those involved included members of the Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic) and police, as well as magistrates and lawyers. She added that victims of kidnapping were ‘constantly blackmailed’ by kidnappers for money even after their release. Heroin and cocaine traffic continued unabated.

The World Bank’s Mozambique Country Economic Memorandum (cem), released in June, said that ‘Mozambique is ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world’. It was constrained by ‘weak governance and corruption’. In particular, procurement was biased towards ‘well-connected firms’.

Land grabbing by the Frelimo elite became a major issue, with family of President Nyusi and other senior party figures controlling mines in several provinces, which are in turn operated by foreign companies, based in countries ranging from China to Australia to the UK. In 2016, the Mozambican government introduced licensing that made informal mining technically illegal, and artisanal miners – garimpeiros – had running battles with police and mine owners who removed them from the land. And it was not just mining where such activities occurred: a violent strike at the Xiavane sugar mill (run by Tongaat Hulett) was led by seasonal workers who had been pushed off their land by the expansion of the plantation.

Carlos Agostinho do Rosário was dismissed as prime minister and Adriano Maleiane was promoted to the role from the Ministry of Economy and Finance in a 2–3 March reshuffle. Both had been in post since being named to President Filipe Nyusi’s first government, on 17 January 2015. This triggered two other promotions. Maleiane’s seat was taken by Max Tonela (formerly minister of mineral resources and energy). He, in turn, was replaced by Carlos Zacarias (formerly chair of the National Petroleum Institute). Both are respected technocrats. Joao Machatine was dismissed as minister of public works, housing and water resources and replaced by Carlos Mesquita (formerly minister of industry and trade). Mesquita in turn was replaced at the Ministry of Industry and Trade by Silvino Moreno (formerly chair of Ecobank-Mozambique).

During the year, President Nyusi and ex-president Armando Guebuza continued fighting a bitter battle to control Frelimo and choose the next president. By the end of the year it was clear that Nyusi had won, and he started pushing for a third term as president, which would require a change in the constitution. The Nyusi–Guebuza battle was in part about who had the most patronage within the party. Tonela, Zacarias, and Mesquita are all very close to Nyusi and control money, key construction contracts, and contracts, land, and licences in the gas and minerals sector.

Their other battle was played out at the trial of those accused in the $ 2 bn secret debt scandal, in which Credit Suisse and Dubai company Privinvest convinced prominent Mozambicans, allegedly for large bribes, to take out $ 2 bn in loans for totally inappropriate and overpriced coastal protection and fishing systems. The loans were kept secret from 2013 to 2016, when they were revealed by the ‘Wall Street Journal’, causing donors to withhold considerable aid, triggering an economic crisis. The trial of 19 defendants started in September 2021; 11 of the 19 were convicted on 7 December and sentenced to 10–12 years in jail. They included Ndambi Guebuza, son of former president Guebuza; Renato Matusse, former political advisor to President Guebuza; Maria Inês Moiane Dove, former secretary to Guebuza; Gregório Leão, former director-general of the Information and State Security Service (sise, Serviço de Informações e Segurança do Estado); and António Carlos do Rosário, former director of economic intelligence at sise. Bribes and spending were detailed in evidence. Although not on trial, Guebuza was directly linked to the scandal by judge Efigenio Baptista, who noted that Guebuza’s son Ndambi was paid the largest bribe, $ 33 m, because he was regarded as the channel to his father. Indeed, it was noted that all of those convicted were close to Guebuza, and President Nyusi, who was defence minister of the time, and his close allies were not charged.

The two top men in sise were replaced by President Nyusi on 31 May. Bernardo Lidimba was the new director, replacing Júlio dos Santos Jane, and the new deputy director was Joia Haquirene. The security services have to be close to the president, and Lidimba is: he was the president’s head of protocol (a much more important post than the name implies) in 2016–18 and then ambassador to Kenya until last year. Joia Haquirene has been a member of the secret services since 1978, and has held positions including national director of counter-intelligence. His testimony to the secret debt trial pinned the blame on former president Guebuza and those around him, and not on Nyusi.

The election cycle sees municipal elections scheduled in 2023 and national elections in 2024. The dates must be set 18 months in advance, and it was announced in March that municipal elections would be held on 11 October 2023. National elections are expected in October 2024. Following the deaths of both opposition leaders, the opposition parties were weaker than in 2019. Renamo’s Afonso Dhlakama died of diabetes complications in 2018 and Mozambique Democratic Movement (mdm) leader David Simango died of Covid-19 in 2021. Replacements Ossufu Momade and Lutero Simango do not have the charisma or the same power within their respective parties. But both opposition parties have local bases: Renamo controls eight municipalities including Nampula, Nacala, and Quelimane, while mdm controls Beira. And mdm and Renamo have seats in many other municipal assemblies, even in the Frelimo stronghold of Gaza.

Foreign Affairs

Mozambique was unanimously elected by the unga on 9 June to one of the African seats on the unsc. As a non-permanent member, it will serve for 2023 and 2024. Even before Mozambique took up its seat, this gave the country increased political influence. Mozambique continued its efforts to gain development assistance and support for the war, while trying to keep the US and South Africa at arm’s length. This was an important reason for going to Rwanda for military support for the war. This was also linked to France, in part because the French company TotalEnergies was the lead company for the giant gas field and liquification plant, in part because France was providing military support and is stepping up support for Rwanda, and in part because France and ex-colonial power Portugal are pushing the EU to support the government in the war.

By the end of the year, Rwanda had more than 2,500 soldiers and police in Cabo Delgado and 25 countries had military personnel there. The sadc Mission in Mozambique (samim) had troops from ten countries, mostly from South Africa. The EU training mission consisted of soldiers and officers from 12 countries. By order of arrival, they were Portugal (the largest contingent), Spain, Finland (the second-largest contingent), Estonia, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Romania, France, Italy, Sweden, and Lithuania. The EU had 140 soldiers divided into two training centres, one in Chimoio and the other in Katembe. The US had a training mission, and Uganda too had a presence.

The South African navy’s frigate sas ‘Spioenkop’ (F147) patrolled the coast of Cabo Delgado for three months, March to late May. The ship took part in fighting against insurgents around Matemo Island, but by the end of the year South Africa no longer had a serviceable frigate for coastal patrol. The Tanzanian navy ship ‘Fatundu’ was also patrolling. The Indian navy conducted its first trilateral maritime exercises with Mozambique and Tanzania on 27–29 October, followed by joint missions with France and South Africa.

The EU ‘European Peace Facility’, which purchases military equipment and support and is partly funding the Rwandan forces, sent 35 Tideman speedboats to Mozambique for coastal protection. Mozambique already had pilot boats in Maputo from the Dutch company Tideman.

President Filipe Nyusi did a lot of travelling during the year, trying to drum up investment and development finance, as well as money for the civil war, and also to gain support for the seat in the unsc. He was in Brussels for the 6th Europe–Africa Summit with foreign and industry ministers Verónica Macamo and Carlos Mesquita. And he met with French president Emmanuel Macron, then president of the EU, on 18 February, to get military support and funding. Then he went on to Doha, Qatar, for the Summit of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (gecf), which agreed on 21 February to admit Mozambique as an observer member. Several more trips to Gulf states followed. President Nyusi made an official visit in June and a state visit in October to Dubai, uae. Dubai banks are believed to hold significant money gained by Frelimo officials from corruption. Visits to the Gulf states are partly about gaining investment, perhaps in agriculture, and also about trying to gain help in negotiating with Islamist insurgents.

Portuguese prime minister António Costa was in Mozambique in September, where he met President Nyusi and on 2 September publicly apologised for the Wiriyamu massacre, which he described as an ‘inexcusable act that dishonours’ the history of Portugal. During the independence war, around 400 unarmed civilians were murdered by Portuguese military forces at Wiriyamu on 16 December 1972. In November, Nyusi was in Lisbon and met with Portuguese president Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa.

The United States paid increasing attention to Mozambique, because of its unsc election, its minerals, and its abstaining on all Ukraine votes at the UN. The US convened its Minerals Security Partnership (msp) in June 2022 with Mozambique as one of the members. In an 18 April statement, the US Department of Energy (DoE) admitted that the US was 100% reliant on imported graphite, as China produces nearly all of the high-purity graphite needed to make lithium-ion batteries, essential for the clean energy transition. Mozambique produces high-purity graphite in Cabo Delgado, most of which goes to China. To get a non-Chinese source, the US DoE announced a $ 107 m loan to the Australian owners of a mine in Balama, Syrah Resources, to build a processing factory in Vidalia, Louisiana, to produce graphite-based anodes for lithium-ion batteries. With Chinese money, the Australian Triton Minerals will go ahead with its graphite mine in Ancuabe, Cabo Delgado, it announced on 1 December. In September, Shandong Yulong Gold committed a further investment of $ 3.4 m, and it visited and approved the graphite project on 22 November. Shandong Yulong appears to be held in part by state and provincial companies in Shandong and in part by private Chinese investors. Anodes are not complicated and could be manufactured in Mozambique. Under imf conditions, Mozambique cannot provide such loans for new factories, so the US and China get the industrial jobs and Mozambique gets holes in the ground.

The new US ambassador Peter Vrooman arrived from Rwanda. In a note circulated on 15 March, he reminded Mozambique that the US is the biggest bilateral donor, giving $ 500 m per year, and called for solidarity with Ukraine. But on 15 March, foreign minister Verónica Macamo said that Mozambique would not respond to intimidating ‘messages and pressures’ from the US ambassador. Welcoming Portuguese president Rebelo de Sousa on 17 March, President Nyusi stressed that Mozambique would not take sides: ‘Mozambique doesn’t support war, but Mozambique doesn’t say A is right and B or C are not’.

On 1 April, the United States Agency for International Development (usaid) signed a new $ 1.5 bn five-year agreement. It targets central and northern Mozambique, promoting business, helping the regions to withstand the shocks of natural disasters, and responding to ‘violent extremism and food insecurity’. Also on 1 April, the US launched its Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability in just two places in Africa, Mozambique and coastal West Africa. But this did not buy or influence a change in the UN votes. On 4 April, the US named Mozambique as one of five countries given special attention under the Global Fragility Act (gfa). According to the US Institute of Peace on 5 April, the number one criterion for choosing a gfa country is ‘US national security interests’.

On 9 May, the imf board agreed a new $ 456 m loan, with $ 91 m available immediately with no interest. The government promised the imf big wage and staff cuts, with the total civil service wage bill to be cut by 17% by 2026, a cut of $ 425 m per year from a peak in 2023. Staff cuts would be achieved ‘by replacing only one in three civil servants leaving the civil service, except in education, health, justice and agriculture’.

But that was the only condition, because it seemed the imf was anxious to get back into Mozambique. In April 2016 the imf led the donor strike, cutting off substantial aid when the full size of the $ 2 bn secret debt was revealed. imf head Christine Lagarde and many ambassadors felt seriously offended because they had been personally told by Mozambican ministers that there was no further secret debt. Thus, the donor strike began as personal vendettas by these figures to punish Mozambican ministers for lying to them. Only the EU and the World Bank did not join the strike. The economic damage to Mozambique was significant, but the elite survived, the economy partially recovered, and Frelimo made no concessions. Donors and ambassadors realised that they had used their last weapon – cutting aid – and now had no power. As part of the normal rotation, ambassadors for whom being lied to was a personal issue departed and were replaced by others briefed to be friendly to Frelimo. Normal relations were restored, albeit with a lower level of aid in some cases. Eventually, the imf was the last hold-out. It wanted an agreement with Mozambique, but the Frelimo elite was in no hurry. In April 2019, the imf had given the country a Cyclone Idai credit of $ 118 m with only one condition, that it would ‘a diagnostic report on governance and corruption challenges’. In April 2020, the imf made a $ 309 m Covid-19 loan with limited conditions. And in May, the imf returned with its tail between its legs.

After 15 years of failed attempts, the proposal for the Mphanda Nkuwa dam just downstream from Cahora Bassa moved forward. Two key actors became involved: the World Bank’s ifc and the AfDB. The project would generate 1,500 megawatts of electricity and require an investment of $ 4.5 bn, including the construction of a 1,300-kilometre high-voltage direct current transmission line between the dam and Maputo. It will take until 2024 to complete financial arrangements, and power should flow in 2031. Eight companies and consortia submitted proposals to implement the project. There were also hints of a change from South Africa, the obvious buyer of the electricity, which for a long time had insisted that all energy supplies be national, in part to support corrupt local contracts.

The roots of the Cabo Delgado civil war were a major bone of contention between President Nyusi and certain key donors and lenders. Nyusi repeatedly blamed unnamed foreign forces and denied there were local grievances. The World Bank publicly challenged this in its June cem, which said ‘There is a widespread consensus that among the driving forces behind the insurgency is the systematic sense of exclusion and grievances that were capitalized by extremist groups’. It added that in some cases the insurgency was ‘supported by local population [which] signals the importance of addressing the socioeconomic dimension … With a poverty rate at 50%, the northernmost province of Cabo Delgado is one of Mozambique’s poorest.’ Disenfranchised youth were being recruited by extremist groups.

‘Acknowledging and tackling the root causes of the crisis is essential for long-term peace in Cabo Delgado’, wrote the Institute for Security Studies (iss) in Pretoria on 8 September. Recruitment to the insurgency was ‘facilitated by the so-called natural resource curse’. In a survey, ‘45% of respondents said the main root cause of the insurgency was the discovery of rubies and natural gas’.

But the World Bank, with the EU, AfDB, and undp, failed to force the government to accept its line. In October 2021, they tabled an aid project for Cabo Delgado with promises of $ 2.5 bn attached. But the proposal document put substantial emphasis on local grievances – poverty, inequality, marginalisation, and no gains from local resources – as one of the major roots of the civil war. Despite the substantial amount of money on offer, the government refused to even submit the proposal to the Council of Ministers, leading to a stand-off. Donors finally surrendered, and on 21 June the Council of Ministers approved a proposal which did not include the objectionable text. Two factors were behind the surrender. First, the big donors and lenders approved outline budgets a year or more advance, and the pressure was on Maputo offices to disperse it. In the end, shovelling money out of the door was the priority. And gas and minerals and the potential for huge contracts led the international community to throw their full backing behind Frelimo as people they could deal with.

With young people still joining the insurgents, a pastoral letter published by the Catholic bishops on 11 November urged, ‘we must unite all our efforts to find ways of solving this disgrace, not depending solely on the use of military force’. ‘Without the equitable and fair distribution of resources and opportunities, without real social inclusion, our peace and social cohesion will always be threatened. No peace survives exclusions and social injustices.’

Italian president Sergio Mattarella visited Mozambique in July and told President Nyusi that increasing cooperation with Italian oil and gas company eni was important to reduce dependence on Russia. In July, senior Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, visited and met with President Nyusi, while in November, Manuel Gonçalves, deputy minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, made a three-day visit to Russia. There were no new agreements with either country.

Botswana president Mokgweetsi Masisi told President Nyusi at a state banquet in Gaborone that the donation of 500 elephants to Mozambique made in 2019 would take place ‘in the near future’.

Relations with neighbours improved. Tanzanian president Samia Suluhu Hassan moved to reverse the policy of her late predecessor by improving relations with Mozambique and made a three-day state visit to Mozambique on September. Military cooperation over the Cabo Delgado war improved, and economic cooperation was under discussion. Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa made a state visit to Mozambique in April and raised the status of their joint commission to a binational commission. In December, Mnangagwa announced that former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano would head a team to try to resolve Zimbabwe’s long-standing impasse with creditors and the international community.

Malawian president Lazarus Chakwera visited in April. A joint trade agreement was signed and the countries moved forward in reconnecting the railway line that runs from the south of Malawi to the port of Beira. Minister of public works, housing and water resources Carlos Mesquita visited Eswatini on 3–4 November to meet Jabulani Mabuza, minister of energy and natural resources of Eswatini, to improve cooperation on shared river basins. This was followed by a three-way meeting with South Africa on 24–25 November, looking at likely increases in discharges from dams because of the end of a long drought. South Africa, despite its electricity crisis, declined to buy power from Mozambique, which left a surplus with which to increase sales to Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Socioeconomic Developments

World Bank reports in June admitted the catastrophic failure of its policies in Mozambique over the past three decades. ‘Mozambique’s decades-long remarkable growth performance [makes it] one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa (ssa).’ But it follows a ‘growth model that has been associated with a rise in inequality’ and poverty, reported the Mozambique Country Economic Memorandum (cem). Mozambique ‘is now amongst the most unequal countries in ssa’ and ‘people in the bottom 40% of the income distribution have been largely left behind … Mozambique’s impressive growth rates have disproportionately benefited those at the top of the income distribution in urban areas.’ Rural roads remained poor, while ‘investment has been skewed towards urban areas and export corridors’.

The cem continued that Mozambique’s existing growth strategy of ‘dependence on export-oriented, capital-intensive mega-projects, with limited linkages to the rest of the economy … has been limited in its capacity to generate productive jobs and support accelerated poverty reduction … Today most jobs do not provide a sufficient stream of income of lift workers and their families above the poverty line.’

Increased availability of soya and maize for feed and an expansion of the number of poultry producers meant that Mozambique produced 136,000 tonnes of chicken meat in 2021, 98% of national demand, the Ministry of Agriculture announced on 21 February.

Two cyclones hit Nampula province: in January, Ana killed 38 people and destroyed 12,000 houses, while in March, Gombe killed 61, affected 480,000 people, and cut electricity in 16 districts. Beira and surrounding areas received an incredible 300 mm of rain in two days, 16 and 17 March.

The who estimated that 20 times more people died of Covid-19 than the number of official deaths reported by the Ministry of Health. In a 5 May report, the who published estimates of Covid-19 deaths for most countries of the world, based on estimates of excess deaths. For Mozambique their figure was 43,000 Covid-19 deaths in 2020–21, compared with the Health Ministry number of 2,006.

Poor training by unregulated private schools and institutes partly explained the poor quality of care in some health units, health minister Armindo Tiago told parliament on 20 April. ‘There has been a proliferation of educational institutions in the health area without adequate conditions to guarantee good quality training, including infrastructures, laboratories, internships and competent teaching staff.’ Faced with increasing competition for university and higher education places and falling quality in public primary and secondary education, the middle class, particularly in Maputo, demanded an expansion of private schools and universities. And the Frelimo elite, often with dubious sources of money, saw private institutes and universities as a highly lucrative industry. So over the past two decades there has been a boom in unregulated private higher education.

Soldiers were paid in cash and in March actually had to show up to collect it, and 7,000 ghost soldiers were identified. There was a growing number of children of former combatants, generals, colonels, and politicians swelling the ranks of the army and receiving salaries without ever having been in military training, let alone setting foot in a military unit.

In a still not totally explained fiasco, the government tried to introduce a unified salary scale (tsu, Tabela Salarial Única) for all public employees in July, which was to incorporate a wide range of perks and bonuses at higher levels. But protests led to repeated changes and continued controversy which were not resolved by the end of the year. The minimum wage, paid to 21,000 civil servants, was almost doubled, from $ 70 per month to $ 137 per month.

Non-government minimum wages were announced on 26 April, and were an increase in US dollar terms of 10–14% for most of the 17 categories. The lowest minimum wage was $ 81 per month in agriculture, while the highest minimum was $ 225 per month in banking. All minimums were lower than at their 2014 peak, before the secret debt crisis.

On 30 September, Maputo mayor Eneas Comiche cancelled the long-awaited bus rapid transit (brt) project, just a month after the World Bank said it would fund it with $ 250 m. Widely used in Latin American cities like Mexico City and Rio, brts operate with reserved lanes and high platforms for easy boarding, and provide fast public transport.

After peaking at 12.5% in August, annual inflation fell to 10.9% in December. The prime rate for loans was increased 0.1% on 30 November to 22.6%.

Due to falling foreign aid and loans, the government borrowed an additional $ 900 m from local banks and bondholders, reported Bank of Mozambique (BdM) in its quarterly economic report (2 December). Government domestic borrowing was $ 4.3 bn, up 25% since December 2021, according to the bank. Domestic borrowing had doubled in three years – in December 2019 it was $ 2.2 bn. As a share of gdp, domestic borrowing had jumped from 14.5% in 2019 to 26.6%. Banks consider government debt safer and more profitable than lending to local businesses, so this significant increase in government borrowing will have squeezed out the local companies.

Export data for the first three quarters (January to September) showed how much Mozambique had become an extractive economy. Mineral-energy exports increased to $ 2 bn compared with 2021. The top five official exports for January to September were coal ($ 2,182 m), aluminium (made with Cahora Bassa electricity, $ 1,453 m), electricity ($ 385 m), heavy sands ($ 365 m), and natural gas ($ 316 m). Neither mentioned nor officially recorded were heroin and methamphetamine, which together are probably the third most important export, at $ 600 m in the first three quarters. This is a transit trade – Afghanistan via Mozambique to Johannesburg and on to Europe – but with substantial amounts of money remaining in Mozambique, adding to the local economy.

The number of adults infected with hiv continued to rise, according to statistics released by the Ministry of Health on 1 December. The number of infected adults had increased from 1.7 m in 2015, when the previous survey was done, to 2.1 m. The hiv prevalence rate among adults aged between 15 and 49 was 12.4%.

Mozambique recorded 9.4 m cases of malaria in the first nine months of 2022, an increase of 20% compared with the same period in 2021, health minister Armindo Tiago announced on 23 November. According to the who, Mozambique is one of six sub-Saharan African countries which account for over half of all cases of malaria in the world.

In August, vat was reduced from 17% to 16%, the tax on profits from agriculture was cut from 32% to 10% for three years, and electronic visas for business and tourism were introduced.