Political Developments

The Covid-19 pandemic became secondary on the political agenda, and long-awaited elections took place. Ethiopia successfully conducted its long-awaited sixth general elections, twice postponed due to the public health emergency and logistical hurdles, in June. Unsurprisingly, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party (pp) was able to secure a clear popular mandate, although the results were disputed by many observers. Significantly, members of opposition parties such as the National Movement of Amhara (nama) and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (ezema) were appointed to ministerial positions. An unprecedented number of political parties competed in a hitherto restricted political system, albeit major opposition forces, mainly from Oromia, boycotted the electoral process. However, such appointments do not amount to political coalition-building: rather, individuals serve in an individual capacity and do not represent their party within the pp government.

In April, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh won Djibouti’s presidential elections without meaningful competition and secured another term in office. In power since 1999, the incumbent ‘ran’ against one independent candidate, Zakaria Ismail Farah, and secured a landslide victory with 97% of the votes. Relatively unknown to the public, Farah only announced his candidacy three months prior to the polls; the opposition had boycotted the electoral process already prior to the campaigning season. Given the age of the president, the elections could be a starting point for a post-Guelleh era and an arranged transition to a candidate of his choice.

Djibouti is a case in point that the removal of presidential terms and age limits hinders political renewal. While Guelleh ran for a fifth term, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni won his sixth term in a surprisingly contested race. Museveni will have been in power for 40 years at the end of this presidential term. The media and opposition faced arbitrary arrests, beginning already in November 2020, including those of presidential contenders Robert Kyagulanyi (‘Bobi Wine’) and Patrick Amuriat. During protests in November, more than 50 casualties had been reported. While the ‘People Power’ movement grew stronger, its leader Bobi Wine was arrested multiple times and hindered in mobilising his young supporter base. Calls for political change in Uganda are growing, as the polls clearly showed, yet Museveni successfully maintained his grip on power. While there are initial signs of the political aspirations of the president’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the ifs and whens of a future transition of power leave many questions open.

Somaliland saw relatively stable parliamentary and local elections in May, whereas federal Somalia ended the year in an increasingly unsettled situation. Presidential elections, originally scheduled for December 2020, were postponed twice. President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed announced his candidacy for a second term; however, by year’s end Somalia was once again close to a constitutional crisis, and it saw repeated outbreaks of political unrest and violence throughout the year. Not only Somalia but also Kenya will face crucial elections in 2022, with likely implications for the broader region in terms of security, economic integration, and democratisation. Kenya remained in campaign mood as it had since the contested 2017 presidential election that resulted in a symbolic alliance between President Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga. Deputy President William Ruto announced that he would run against Odinga; surprisingly, the latter seems to enjoy stronger support from Kenyatta than his deputy does. The upcoming elections will be highly competitive and no less contested, given the alliances of parties that have already pledged support to Odinga (Azimio Coalition) and Ruto (Kwanza Alliance). The formation of alliances, as well as potential running mates, could be determining in winning the support of the vote-rich Kikuyu ethnic group.

Overall, the power of the ballot box was limited in light of highly contested electoral processes in Djibouti and Uganda. On the positive side, Seychelles maintained its political pluralism, and the peaceful transfer of presidential power from Danny Faure to Wavel Ramkalawan in the previous year illustrated the stability of Seychelles’ political system.

In Tanzania, Samia Suluhu Hassan was sworn into office in March following the sudden and unexpected death of President Magufuli. The peaceful power transition to the sitting vice-president was testimony to the functioning of the political system. Nevertheless, the opposition renewed its calls for a constitutional amendment that would weaken the position of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (ccm). Hassan’s term ends in 2025, yet it remains to be seen if she can effectively consolidate her power base within the ruling party.

The situation in Comoros was still characterised by the controversial end to the presidential rotation between the islands of the archipelago; direct talks between the opposition and President Azali Assoumani did not take place following the 2019 elections, but by the end of the year there were initial signs of a rapprochement.

At the end of the year, Sudan’s promising political transition process came to a standstill. The transitional arrangements of the Sovereign Council put in place in 2019 between the military and civilian forces ended with the October coup d’état let by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; Sudan was left in turmoil. The situation in South Sudan was similarly precarious. Ten years after secession, the implementation of the peace agreement and reforms was stagnating. Relations between Khartoum and Juba were hence affected by growing instability and uncertainty regarding institutional arrangements following the October coup in Sudan, which hindered further progress in the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (jpsm).

The long-awaited elections in Ethiopia were pushed into the background as the armed conflict between the federal government and regional forces, on one side, and troops loyal to the formerly ruling Tigray People’s Liberation Front (tplf), on the other, escalated further. Following a humanitarian ceasefire declared by the federal government in June, tplf-aligned forces (the so-called Tigray Defense Forces, tdf) recaptured the regional capital Meqele and further advanced into the regions of Afar and Amhara. Combat operations extended to Oromia Region in the second half of the year and the government declared a country-wide six-month state of emergency (SoE) in November. While the advances of the tdf towards the capital city Addis Ababa were halted south of Dessie and Kombolcha in December by a successful counter-offensive operation of government forces, most foreign governments called upon their citizens to leave the country. By year’s end, most parts of the country, with the exception of Addis Ababa, remained in an increasingly fragile and unpredictable situation. With 19 deaths, Ethiopia was the deadliest country for aid workers worldwide. Investigations during the year revealed atrocities committed by all warring parties that cast a dark shadow on the prospect of a peaceful settlement and future reconciliation. On all sides, the conflict narrative was shaped by media campaigns through often manipulated content, deliberate omission of facts, and the discrediting of voices contradicting official lines. While the diaspora and individual international observers assumed key roles in these campaigns, the government itself took part in promoting its war narrative. Access to properly verifiable information remained limited in the second year of the conflict, and all assessments of the situation were hence greatly disputed.

Overall, the situation of press freedom deteriorated further, indicating a worrying trend in most countries of the region. Ethiopia and Eritrea were ranked among the countries with the highest number of journalists jailed – a drastic reversal of the promising situation in 2019, when Prime Minister Abiy declared that no reporters were jailed in Ethiopia and press freedom was a central agenda point of his administration. In the Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders in 2022 (based on data from 2021), Uganda was ranked 132nd (out of 180), a set-back of seven ranks compared with the previous year. Tanzania (123rd) improved its ranking by one position while Kenya was ranked at position 69, an improvement of 33 places. Online journalists and bloggers in particular faced increasing pressure and arrests, as for instance in Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia. Djibouti (164th out of 180) and Eritrea (179th) continued to occupy the very end of the list given the absence of private media outlets and de facto non-existent space for independent journalism. As in previous years, Seychelles ranked as the best on the continent (13th out of 180) for press freedom. The media landscape of the Eastern African island nation was characterised by growing pluralism largely free from government interference.

In Burundi and Seychelles, the respective commissions set up to investigate past crimes and promote political reconciliation continued their work. The Burundian Truth and Reconciliation Commission presented an intermediary report to parliament in December while the Truth, Reconciliation and National Unity Commission of Seychelles resumed hearings. Twenty-seven years after the genocide in Rwanda started, the process of coming to terms with the past continued and efforts to bring alleged perpetrators to justice made the headlines.

On corruption, few changes can be reported, with Seychelles still ranking best and Somalia and Sudan occupying the lowest ranks of ti’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 (based on 2020 data). Several major cases remained pending, such as in Comoros (which dropped four ranks to 164th out of 180); former president Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, accused of syphoning off public funds, remained in custody. The Pandora Papers published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (icij) in October exposed the offshore assets of several prominent businesspeople and politicians in the region. For instance, several members of the Kenyatta family and Uganda’s security minister Jim Muhwezi were among the group of prominent individuals allegedly entangled in tax evasion. The news was met with little public protest.

The au Mission in Somalia (amisom) ended in December and will be replaced by the au Transition Mission in Somalia (atmis) in 2022, with a preliminary mandate until 2024. amisom troops had been engaged in the fight against radical Islamist movement al-Shabaab since 2007. However, the activities of al-Shabaab continued to be a central destabilising factor in the country. The threat of terrorism was not limited to al-Shabaab. Uganda experienced a string of new terrorist attacks, with an affiliate of the Islamic State terrorist group claiming responsibility for a major attack in the capital Kampala in November. As a result, Uganda’s score on the 2022 Global Terrorism Index (gti) published by the Institute for Economic and Peace (based on 2021 data) decreased, with the country ranked at 43rd out of 163 globally. This is one rank better than Burundi; Tanzania was ranked 36th and Kenya 20th, whereas Somalia retained the highest gti score in the region, ranking 3rd globally. No terrorist incidents were reported for Djibouti; however, the international military deployment in the small Red Sea country bordering Somalia put security at risk: al-Shabaab has called for attacks on US and French military bases in Djibouti ahead of the presidential elections.

The number of piracy attacks along the Somali coast fell to a historic low. In December, the unsc adopted a resolution to support maritime security and continue the fight against piracy. The mandate of the EU’s naval operation Atalanta was prolonged in January and ends in December 2022. Germany announced the withdrawal of the deployed maritime patrol aircraft that have supported EU navfor Atalanta from Djibouti since 2009.

Transnational Relations and Regional Conflict Configurations

Peace and stability in the Horn of Africa was lastingly affected by the domestic conflict in Ethiopia, and no less so by the involvement of neighbouring countries. Bilateral tensions increased especially between Ethiopia and Sudan as a result of the complex conflict in Ethiopia’s northern regions. After initial denial, by March the government in Addis Ababa finally acknowledged that Eritrean troops were involved in combat operations inside the country. Throughout the year, the political security and humanitarian challenges in the Horn of Africa became increasingly interlinked. Eritrea’s confirmed military involvement contributed to the rift within the Eritrean diaspora between supporters of the government and opponents of long-term ruler Isaias Afewerki. In Djibouti, clashes between Somali Issa and Afar in eastern Ethiopia over land led to renewed communal violence in Djibouti Ville between the two dominant ethnic groups. Nevertheless, economic ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti remained strong given their mutual dependency in logistics.

The so-called tripartite alliance forged between Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed, Somalia’s Mohamed Abdullahi, and President Afewerki of Eritrea in 2018 did not achieve much in stabilising geopolitical dynamics at the Horn. On the contrary, regional tensions increased on multiple fronts, which became visible in growing territorial disputes. No concrete steps towards closer regional economic integration among the Horn of Africa nations, including Kenya, were taken.

The al-Fashaga triangle between Ethiopia and Sudan added another layer of complexity to bilateral issues. Sudan refused any negotiations over the fertile land disputed between the regions of Amhara and Tigray and the state of Gedaref, and violent clashes continued. Since the outbreak of the war in northern Ethiopia, the number of refugees in Gedaref and Kassala states has grown to approximately 60,000. In May, Sudan and Egypt conducted a joint military exercise called ‘Guardians of the Nile’. While it was indeed a show of force of symbolic importance towards upstream Ethiopia, Egypt’s alleged interference in the domestic politics of Sudan could cause greater problems.

South Sudanese leader Salva Kiir offered to mediate between the warring parties of the Tigray conflict in September. Several factors would have supported Juba’s aspiration to take this role, despite its own challenges in ensuring peace at home. Members of the South Sudanese political nomenklatura maintain long-standing relations with both the tplf and Ethiopia’s present rulers. However, Ethiopia remained firm in its position of refusing any foreign inference in solving domestic issues. South Sudan was also caught in a complex situation over the eventual adoption of a position on the gerd issue.

The final stages of construction and filling of the reservoir of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (gerd) were not directly affected by the domestic turmoil in Ethiopia. Ethiopia went ahead with the second filling in July, whereas no agreement had been reached with downstream Sudan and Egypt on the utilisation of the river flow. The controversial dam at the headwaters of the Blue Nile produced a political deadlock in the region, which was by no means limited to the riparian states. The negotiation efforts led by the au collapsed before the unilateral second filling of the reservoir. In July, the gerd was also on the agenda of the unsc, resulting in a joint call to restart discussions towards a binding agreement between upstream Ethiopia and downstream nations Sudan and Egypt. Unsurprisingly, the gerd and the dispute over the reservoir filling was the central issue determining the relations of the Horn countries with Egypt. Significantly, despite Eritrea’s military support for the Ethiopian government, Egypt and Asmara remained on cordial terms.

Kenya and Tanzania visibly improved their bilateral relations, and both countries committed to eliminate trade barriers and promote closer economic ties. Relations between Nairobi and Somalia also normalised following the mediation efforts of Qatar in the ongoing maritime dispute. Ethiopia granted a mobile phone licence to a consortium led by Kenya’s telecommunication giant Safaricom in May. The mediation efforts of President Kenyatta in Ethiopia’s domestic conflict complemented the au-led initiatives of Olusegun Obasanjo, the high representative of the chairperson of the au Commission for the Horn of Africa. While no visible achievements could be reported by the end of the year, Kenyatta was one of the few regional leaders engaging in direct talks with the Abiy administration.

President Hassan of Tanzania visited neighbours Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, illustrating a new course in regional and bilateral relations. Tanzania and Rwanda retained their friendly relations and deepened cooperation. The countries signed three bilateral agreements in the fields of migration, education, and the regulation of medical products. Submarine cables landing in Dar es Salaam servicing Rwanda led to a fourth agreement between the two nations to advance ict cooperation. Also promising was the easing of relations between Rwanda and Burundi. However, clashes between the Rwandan military and rebel groups in the border regions illustrated the tense security environment. Compared with 2020, relations between the neighbours, which had reached a low point following the 2015 coup attempt in Burundi, improved gradually, Despite the normalisation of bilateral ties, by year’s end the Ugandan – Rwandan border remained closed. The closure of the Gatuna border post between Rwanda and Uganda continued to interrupt trade. and relations did not show improvements.

Foreign powers expanded their footprint in the region through a combination of soft diplomacy, bilateral agreements, and the deepening of trade and military ties. Beijing’s role received considerably less attention in light of the growing presence of Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf states. For instance, Russia continued its efforts to build a naval base on the Red Sea. The involvement of the Gulf states and Turkey mainly in Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia increased considerably. The downfall of the al-Bashir regime in 2019 lastingly affected the relations of Saudi Arabia and uae with Sudan; the 2021 military coup could result into another shift in relations. Also noteworthy is the growing importance of the Red Sea in terms of maritime security, as well as the geopolitical importance of the western Indian Ocean region, including Comoros and Seychelles.

Djibouti hosted a number of military bases and international troops, including the US military base Camp Lemmonier, China’s naval base with an unknown number of troops, the French naval base of Héron, Italian base Militare Nazionale di Supporto, and a Japanese military base.

The traditional pro-us sentiment of Ethiopia received a severe blow with the so-called #nomore campaign, which denounced alleged foreign interference into domestic issues. In November, the US government announced the suspension of Ethiopia from the tariff-free African Growth and Opportunity Act (agoa) over the handling of the armed conflict in the country and alleged human rights violations. At the end of the year, the EU also announced its readiness to issue further sanctions against both Ethiopia and Eritrea. The US also imposed sanctions on Eritrea due to its role in the conflict in Tigray. International donors, including the US and the World Bank, suspended aid to Sudan following the coup in October. Only five months after the Paris Conference to support the transition and the considerable international support for the economic reform agenda spearheaded by civilian prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, Sudan faced renewed international isolation. While news of novel sanctions regimes against countries of the region made the headlines, first and foremost against the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the lifting in November of US sanctions imposed against Burundi in 2015 was an important milestone.

Socioeconomic Developments

The region remained critically exposed to the Covid-19 pandemic, albeit with notable differences in public health measures and the degree to which governments committed to national vaccination campaigns. Eritrea imposed strict lockdowns affecting private and public life until March. However, no vaccination strategy was launched and no reliable data existed on how many doses of Covid-19 vaccines were administered. A year of denying the pandemic left Tanzania in an uncertain situation when Vice-President Hassan took office as president. The late John Magufuli had vehemently denied the existence of the virus and died of heart complications presumed to be Covid-related. Following an assessment of the situation, Tanzania eventually joined covax and a national vaccination campaign began. Seychelles reached a vaccination rate of 60%, while in other countries a combination of vaccine scepticism, logistical problems, and overall vaccine hesitancy by governments presented a different picture. The pandemic remained present in South Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia yet was not a priority concern in light of armed conflict and natural disasters.

Overall, the pandemic remained secondary in its second year, despite skyrocketing infection rates (especially of the Delta variant) in many countries, which led to the temporary return of containment measures for instance in Comoros, Rwanda, and Eritrea. The region’s health infrastructure continued to be ill prepared to deal with the pandemic. While all countries dedicated considerable portions of their budgets to the health sector, including social assistance measures (e.g. food provisions, cash transfers), in addition to international support, only a few, such as Rwanda, put plans in place to increase national preparedness for future health emergencies.

The economies of Eastern Africa took a severe hit in 2020, but promising signs of recovery were recorded this year. Real gdp growth was estimated at 4.8% (AfDB data), making Eastern Africa the strongest-performing region in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic performance in tourist-dependent economies, such as Seychelles, stabilised following the opening of borders and easing of public health measures. For Eritrea, no data on economic performance was available but the extended lockdown is likely to have lastingly affected the economy, especially small business. The overall outlook for economic recovery remains bleak. Debt-to-gdp ratios reached unprecedented levels, and more countries are likely to face debt distress, high risk, and growing fiscal pressure in 2022, according to imf forecasts.

Recession and disruptions to the economy affected the implementation of multi-annual development strategies and jeopardised the earlier achievement of the sdgs. Several countries faced multidimensional challenges – such as Comoros, the island nation not having fully overcome the impacts of Cyclone Kenneth, which hit the archipelago in 2019. Djibouti launched a Sovereign Fund in 2020 but failed to accelerate private investment given the prevailing global economic crisis. Sudan had an optimistic start to the year and the country actively promoted investment opportunities. In June, it had reached a crucial milestone to qualify for debt relief under the hipc initiative. However, the liberalisation of the economy and multi-donor support for the government’s reform efforts came to an abrupt end with growing political instability. Tanzania launched its third National Five-Year Development Plan (2021/22–2025/26) amid declining tourism revenues and lower trade volumes.

Eastern Africa is a case in point that climate change can act as a crisis multiplier, especially in countries where conflict and environmental fragility is prevalent. During the year under review, climate fragility visibly increased. Extreme weather events were recorded, for instance, in South Sudan, where extreme flooding occurred between April and July. At least 800,000 people were affected.

Sustainable and adaptive resource management remains a crucial component in fighting the impacts of climate change on rural livelihoods, yet regional initiatives are still missing. Illegal charcoal exports from Somalia have increased in recent years and have provided a crucial income stream to al-Shabaab in vast parts of the country. At the same time, Ethiopia continued its green legacy campaign, launched in 2019, and reported the successful planting of more than 6 bn seedlings across the country, though the actual rehabilitating effects of this are yet to be assessed. In Burundi, major flooding of the Ruzizi and Kajeke rivers as well as Lake Tanganyike in the first half of the year destroyed rural livelihoods and infrastructure and resulted in the displacement of entire communities. At least 60,000 people were affected by flash floods and rainstorms between July and September in Sudan’s West Darfur, Blue Nile, and Gedaref states. In Uganda, the concerning ecological situation in parts of the country was presented to parliament, which prompted the government to resettle communities from wetlands around Kampala. Climate change mitigation strategies remained insufficient and have still failed to receive adequate attention from policy-makers. Noteworthy exceptions in this regard were the small-island developing states such as Seychelles.

Overshadowed by the Covid-19 pandemic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda experienced the worst desert locust infestation in decades, affecting pasture and crops across the region. Delayed rainfall and joint efforts to control the movement of swarms led by the fao were successful, and the number of swarms declined in northern Kenya, most parts of Ethiopia, and Somalia – the most-affected countries of the region in the previous year. The EU alone increased its development and humanitarian aid to fao for the desert locust response in nine countries of the region; between 2021 and 2022, control and surveillance operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan were supported with an additional €8 m, increasing the total EU funding provided since 2020to €74 m. By year’s end, the situation in the Greater Horn region had improved considerably and swarms had been decimated, but humanitarian challenges and risks to food security unrelated to the desert locust infestation reached an increasingly critical scale.

The number of refugees and idps reached new heights, and the number of displaced communities was difficult to assess. The oldest and largest refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma in north-western Kenya, jointly hosted between 350,000 and half a million people. Kenyan authorities did not follow through with their intention to shut down the camps, but they announced their closure by June 2022. The question is what will happen with the current inhabitants of the camps, most of whom originate from Somalia and South Sudan. Uganda hosted more than 1.5 m refugees, according to unhcr estimates, from different countries of the region. Despite varying numbers, it is safe to say that with more than 4 m people, Ethiopia tops the lists of most idps globally as a result of the armed conflict in its northern regions, including pockets of insecurity and fighting in the south-western lowlands and across Oromia.

The combination of recession, prolonged drought, and the direct and indirect effects of instability will increase the number of people requiring urgent humanitarian food assistance in 2022 to more than 20 m, according to UN estimates. Most affected are southern and south-eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern Kenya, where growing crop and livelihood loses were recorded in the second half of 2021 due to prologued drought. In Sudan’s Darfur and South Kordofan regions in particular, conflict led to the displacement of approximately 190,000 people by the end of the year. unocha estimated that close to 20% of Burundi’s population was in need of humanitarian assistance. South Sudan recorded at least 2 m displaced people by year’s end, and famine-like conditions were recorded in several parts of the country.

Most countries of the region experienced atypical price spikes for basic foodstuffs and for fuel, which directly affected transportation costs.

Sub-Regional Cooperation and Organisation

Regional integration efforts were lastingly affected by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, which stopped the movement of goods, people, and services. Bilateral relations between some countries of the sub-region worsened with the outbreak of the pandemic. The official start of trade under AfCFTA rules in January 2021 was more of symbolic nature, as negotiations are still ongoing. However, the fast progress and sustained political momentum of the treaty are noteworthy for Eastern Africa for at least two reasons. First, the East African Community (eac) negotiated as a bloc, illustrating the determination of its member states. Second, the AfCFTA will be the crucial link between the eac, sadc, and comesa and other sub-regions and countries outside the region. On the downside, at the end of the reviewing period, Eritrea was still the only au member and only country in the region that had not signed and ratified the treaty.

Rwandan president Paul Kagame handed over the chairship of the eac to Kenya’s President Kenyatta during the 21st Ordinary Summit of Heads of State in February. Kagame, one of the main driving forces behind the AfCFTA, stressed the importance of regional integration for successful post-pandemic recovery strategies. The admission of the drc to the eac took concrete shape; it is now expected for 2022 and will likely add more complexity to regional security.

igad’s performance was mixed with regard to ensuring regional security, and the organisation was unable to fulfil its mandate for peace and security, as the situation in its member states illustrates. Looking ahead, igad faces major challenges given the multiple crises in the Horn. Shifting alliances and growing tensions could further affect the significance of the organisation. igad technically also oversees the security process in South Sudan. Executive secretary Workneh Gebeyehu and the igad special envoy for South Sudan visited Juba in August, yet without noteworthy results during the reviewing year. South Sudan was suspended from igad in December due to unpaid dues. It is noteworthy that igad endorsed the Blue Economy Strategy 2021–2025. A strategic departure from its core mandate and a renewed focus on less controversial themes could indeed increase its role and significance as a Regional Economic Community (rec). Combating the effects of climate change and supporting regional responses to the pandemic, including post-recovery visions, are obvious areas where igad could fulfil its responsibility and justify its mandate.

The comesa Heads of State and Government Summit took place in November under the theme ‘Building Resilience through Strategic Digital Economic Integration’, reflecting the challenges and opportunities of the year. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took over the chair of comesa from Madagascar and stressed the importance of regional integration – by all accounts, a central theme among the region’s recs and high on the political agenda. The organisation was a pioneer in trade integration and simplification of procedures among its 21 member states. The Medium-Term Strategic Plan for 2021–2025 was launched during the summit, which focuses on measures to promote regional economic integration in line with and aligned to the AfCFTA. The ratification process of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (comesa-eac-sadc) remained bumpy, and the required threshold set for June 2021 was missed again.

The Eastern Africa Standby Force (easf) continued to face severe funding constraints and tabled a budget of approximately $3.7 m for the coming year to maintain its capacity in addressing the security challenges in the region; its funding is provided mainly by the EU and other international donors, while member contributions made up less than 3% of its budget. Security is one of the key pillars in promoting regional integration. However, a deployment of the easf in Ethiopia was not actively proposed by the au. Assistance in maritime security operations was discussed between Seychelles and the easf operational command.

All recs faced budgetary constraints as the public health emergency continued to affect national budgets and the willingness and capacity of member states to pay their dues. Nevertheless, the level of regional integration in the sub-region is noteworthy and a central policy issue. However, trade and investment barriers and asymmetries in national capacity and governance continue to be central challenges to a functioning regional market. The pandemic has illustrated the importance, and tangible benefits, of regional economic integration. On the other side, it has also accentuated existing inequalities.