Domestic Politics

The president of Togo, Faure Gnassingbé, further consolidated his power. After the fierce quarrels following the disputed presidential elections of 2020, he initiated a national dialogue (‘Concertation nationale entre acteurs politiques’) with the opposition on 19 January, which was officially concluded on 13 July. As many as 17 of the 24 parties invited took the opportunity to voice their concerns. The main point of the discussions – also due to the postponement of the regional elections to 2022 – was the future composition of the Independent National Electoral Commission (ceni, by its French acronym), in which the parliamentary majority on the one hand and the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition on the other hand were to have the same number of members (seven each). Civil society (two members) and government (one member) were also to be represented with voting rights. As before, ceni would decide on the scheduling of elections, the establishment of electoral registers, and criteria for possible contestation. The rules and regulations for political parties were also debated, and proposals were made for the formulation of the Political Parties Act. So far, the government has not responded to the proposals; it remains to be seen whether elections will actually be held at the regional level in 2022. Neither the legal basis for the territorial demarcation of electoral districts nor the set of rules for political parties have yet been adopted.

Some opposition parties and movements either did not participate in the consultations or left the committee before the work was completed, allegedly because their concerns were not sufficiently taken into account. For example, Brigitte Kafui Adjamagbo-Johnson, general secretary of the Dynamique Monsignore Kpodzro (dmk), which had supported the defeated presidential candidate Agbéyomé Kodjo and declared him the winner, refused to allow her opposition alliance to participate in the dialogue. Jean-Pierre Fabre, leader of the Alliance Nationale pour le changement and former leader of the extra-parliamentary opposition, another 2020 presidential candidate, left the commission with his party on 12 July.

Thus, the opposition remained disunited and fragmented, did not formulate a programme for political change, and could not oppose the ruling Union for the Republic (unir). Their calls for civil resistance went unheard. Instead, Western ambassadors were the recipients of appeals for foreign countries to call the government to order. In this situation, it was not difficult for the government to occasionally put inconvenient opponents behind bars for critical statements. Djimon Oré, president of the Front des patriotes pour la démocratie and former minister of information, was sentenced to two years in prison after accusing the president of genocide in an interview. Jean-Pierre Oumolou, a former student leader and currently a key member of the dmk living in exile, was arrested on 4 November while in Togo. Agbéyomé Kodjo himself, like Tikpi Atchadam, founder of the Parti national panafricain, was either in hiding or in exile abroad.

Like his father, the president also relied on the loyalty of the armed forces. In return, the military was well equipped: 2% of gdp, the equivalent of $ 116 m in 2020, was spent on national defence. The Loi de programmation militaire foresaw a further increase in military spending and the enlargement of the army by about 5,000 soldiers for the years 2021–25. The project of modernising the armed forces was entrusted to the army’s new strongman, General Dadja Maganawé. The former prefect replaced the long-time chef d’état major, General Félix Abalo Kadanga, who was suspected of having something to do with the as yet unexplained death of Colonel Madjoulba Alba, commander of the rapid deployment battalion.

Innovations seemed inevitable in order to counter new asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. The creation of a special military unit within the framework of the regular armed forces, as well as a light intervention force to combat terrorism, was also justified by the existence of mainly jihadist groups advancing on Togolese territory from the north. In fact, a group of hitherto unknown terrorists carried out an attack on a police post on the border with Burkina Faso in November.

Togo could rely on international military support in the fight against jihadism, as Stephen Townsend, commander of Africom, confirmed during a visit to Lomé on 22 September. Togo’s international military engagement was commended at this meeting.

On 14 September, parliament extended the health emergency, which had been in place since April 2020, for another year. By the end of the year, a total of 30,673 infections had been registered; 248 deaths were attributed to the Covid-19 virus. Like the other West African countries, Togo was one of the least-affected countries worldwide. However, at the end of December, the number of cases increased significantly. Togo reached its goal of vaccinating a million people by the end of 2021: with 12% of its citizens fully immunised, it was not only above the African average but was also the front-runner in Francophone West Africa. In total, the country received 3.5 m doses of vaccine, including about a quarter through the global covax initiative. Other supplies came from China, Turkey, the US, and other supporters, including South Africa, which distributed Johnson & Johnson’s vaccine manufactured there to other countries through the au. Despite the results of a survey by Afrobarometer, which found that 50% of Togolese were willing to be vaccinated, the vaccination campaign slowed down towards the end of the year. Reasons included a lack of confidence in the safety of vaccines, the perception that the virus was not dangerous, and misinformation about vaccination and vaccines in social media. The government tried to counteract this: administrative buildings may now only be entered with a vaccination certificate. Public employers were free to suspend or dismiss non-vaccinated employees.

Togo continued to rank at the bottom of the Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, rsf) index. On 7 January, the newspaper ‘L’Indépendant Express’ had its licence revoked and its director, Komlanvi Ketohou, was imprisoned. He had alleged in an article that two female ministers had stolen golden spoons at an end-of-year reception. Despite an apology from the editor-in-chief immediately afterwards, the proceedings were not stopped. On 12 October, the newspaper ‘The Guardian’ was banned for four months and the press card of its director, Ambroise Yawo Kpondjo, was revoked. The journal ‘La Symphonie’, which criticised the suspension, was also banned for two months on 3 November and its director, Yves Galley, was accused of insulting the president and the members of the Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication (haac). On 10 December, the directors of the magazines ‘Fraternité’ and ‘L’Alternative’, Joël Egah and Ferdinand Ayité, were charged and placed under arrest after critical comments on a YouTube channel. ‘L’Alternative’ had already been banned from publication for four months earlier in the year following complaints from a minister. A year earlier, the newspaper had been banned from publication because of a complaint from the French ambassador about inappropriate reporting. Ayité is one of the 300 people identified whose phones had been tapped through the installation of Pegasus software by the Israeli company nso, used by the Togolese government. They were released from prison on 31 December. Their passports were confiscated and were instructed to appear once a week before a competent judge until the court sentence was pronounced.

These incidents made it clear that the liberalisation of press freedom and freedom of expression, cautiously initiated after the social uprisings in 1990, has been increasingly reversed in recent years. The Ministry of Interior now has extensive powers to suppress or restrict print and online media, as well as television and radio, and has made diligent use of them. The haac, which is entrusted with the task of (self-)regulating the various media, acts more or less as the government’s accomplice, as rsf complained in a statement published on 11 March. It remained to be seen whether the increase in the number of journalists on the body, as provided for in the new version of the law on the haac passed by parliament on 23 November, would lead to greater consideration for press freedom. The events at the end of the year (see above) gave little room for such hopes.

An Afrobarometer survey of a representative sample of Togolese citizens, conducted between December 2020 and January 2021 and published in September, found that a good half felt that they were not allowed to express their opinions freely. Three quarters thought that people should be careful about what they say in public. The majority of respondents also believed that the media, although free, were not allowed to report uncensored; even investigative media reporting was welcomed by the majority. The corruption and mistakes of the government should be exposed – however, the president should enjoy a certain protection against criticism and insults.

As in previous years, Togo was rated ‘partly free’ in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World rating. In the eiu’s Democracy Index 2021 (based on 2020 data), Togo fell to 136th place out of 167 countries and continued to be described as an authoritarian regime. The global ngo network Civicus rated the degree of restriction of civil space as ‘repressive’, the lowest level awarded.

The next periodic review (after 2012 and 2016) of the human rights situation in Togo by the UN was scheduled for early 2022. By year’s end, the national report and the submissions of various stakeholders had already been deposited at the unhrc in Geneva and published there.

Foreign Affairs

Togo was engaged at the international and regional levels, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Traditional partners such as France and Germany were joined by countries such as China, Russia, and Turkey, which increased their engagement with Togo during the year. The aim of the intensive diplomatic efforts was to mobilise international support for economic development and to raise the country’s standing at both the African and the international levels, as foreign minister Robert Dussey explained at the end of the year.

Togo has often been involved in UN military missions. Currently, the country supports minusma operations in Mali with a contingent of 1,100 soldiers. Seven of these soldiers died in a blast from an improvised explosive device on 8 December. Togo withdrew its contingent of 161 soldiers from South Sudan with the end of unamid, the UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

Togo was very active in the negotiations between the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (oacps). Foreign minister Dussey was the chief negotiator for the group of states. The new agreement fundamentally modernised cooperation and expanded the scope and scale of EU and oacps ambitions to better address current and future challenges. The partners increased their commitments in the following priority areas: human rights; democracy and governance; peace and security; human development, including health, education and gender equality; environmental sustainability; climate change; sustainable development and growth; and migration and mobility. The agreement also included a strong new regional focus and a governance structure tailored to the needs of each region – a first in over 40 years of cooperation. Dussey complained at the end about the lack of unity among the countries he represented, which had not allowed for more concessions from the EU. At year’s end, the treaty had not yet been ratified.

On 18 October, the 22nd Political Dialogue between the EU and Togo took place in Lomé. In addition to discussing the implications of Covid-19, the meeting also addressed issues of gender equality, current exchanges between political actors, and the regional elections scheduled for 2022.

Regionally, Togo was committed to finding a solution to the situation in the Sahel. On 29 September, a strategy for the region was officially presented which, in addition to military elements, also emphasised the need for political, economic, and social improvements. Togo offered itself as a mediator for negotiation processes – as it had previously in Chad as well as after the first coup in Mali – and advocated for a detachment from dependency on non-African actors in the management of the current crisis.

For the first time since 2013, President Faure Gnassingbé visited the old colonial power, France, on 9 April and met with President Macron. The subject of the negotiations was an intensification of bilateral relations as well as the crisis in the Sahel. Internal affairs were not a subject of the exchange. France supported economic development with a wide range of projects in the energy, education, and private sectors. Togo imported goods worth $ 185 m from France (2020); exports reached $ 55 m, just under a third of the import volume. On 18 May, the president attended the financial summit for Africa in Paris. The aim was to mobilise investment from international partners for the 2020–25 agenda, which almost all foreign policy initiatives of the Togolese government serve.

On 15 June, foreign minister Dussey and German federal minister for economic cooperation and development Gerd Müller signed a ‘Reform Partnership for Growth, Employment and Reform’ in Lomé. Within the framework of the Compact with Africa agreed at G20 level, this formed a bilateral element with which Germany aimed to support countries particularly willing to reform in promoting good governance and private sector engagement. Togo was the fourth West African country to receive this special support, along with Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal. In May, in government negotiations, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development pledged € 53.6 m for the period 2022–23; a further € 89.3 m was promised. In the project portfolios of the governmental implementing agencies the giz (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – the German Agency for International Cooperation) and the KfW development bank, however, the stronger consideration of good governance as a priority was not evident; bilateral cooperation in this sector continued to concentrate on supporting the decentralisation process in a few selected municipalities. Togo ranked 129th among Germany’s foreign trade partners with imports of € 72.5 m (2020); it exported goods worth only € 6.9 m to Germany (rank 155).

From 1 April, Turkey had an official foreign representation in Lomé. There were plans to establish a Togolese embassy in Ankara. In October, the president and his Turkish counterpart, Erdogan, met in Lomé for the first time. The focus was on the expansion of trade relations, which had developed positively in recent years, as well as the establishment of military cooperation. Two other presidents – George Weah (Liberia) and Roch Marc Christian Kaboré (Burkina Faso) – also joined them on this topic. In passing, the transfer of the Ecole Internationale Zodiaque school of the Gülen movement to the Maarif Foundation, financed by the Turkish state, was agreed. In 2020, Turkey was still Togo’s eighth-largest international trading partner, accounting for 3.3% of imports, just behind Germany; this is likely to have continued to move in Turkey’s favour in 2021. Exports from Togo to Turkey reach only one tenth of this share. Trade exchange and economic cooperation are to be strengthened in the future. Turkish Airlines, which now flies to 37 African countries, is to establish a direct flight connection between Istanbul and Lomé from 2022.

China was Togo’s most important trading partner in terms of imports. More than a fifth of imports came from the Middle Kingdom. Exports there, however, only accounted for 2.5% (2020). Zainab Usman, director of the Africa Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pointed out that despite the restrictions imposed by Covid-19, exports to China had increased significantly. The establishment of a Joint Commission for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation, which met for the second time on 24 August, is intended to further strengthen relations.

On 19 February, foreign minister Dussey met with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in St Petersburg. The aim of the exchange was to present investment opportunities for Russian companies in Togo. Russia is Togo’s main supplier of durum wheat, some of which, as wheat flour, is also imported via third countries such as Ghana. Russia does not play a role as an importer of Togolese products.

Socioeconomic Developments

After the coronavirus year 2020, in which the economy did not shrink but grew by only 1.8%, Togo again experienced gdp growth estimated at between 4% and 5%. As a result, per capita income increased to about $ 1,000. Population growth of 2.4% per annum and inflation of 3.5% partly offset the gains. Incomes, however, were unequally distributed: 44.5% of the people lived below the poverty line of $ 1.9 per day. Poverty was twice as high in rural areas (58.8%) as in urban areas. Malnutrition and undernourishment were particularly endemic in rural areas. Around 170,000 people were provided with food aid by the World Food Programme.

International donors and financiers increased their support to Togo. The US alone provided more than $ 43 m through various agencies; US aid thus reached a new high. The World Bank pledged $ 176 m in projects, mainly for the social sector and mitigation of the effects of Covid-19. The imf’s ecf expired at the end of 2020. On 19 June, discussions were held with the Fund on a new edition starting in 2022. At the end of the year, Togo was 248 m in Special Drawing Rights (sdr) debt to the imf. The AfDB adopted its strategy for Togo on 17 December. Endowed with $ 356 m for the years 2022–26, it says it aims to support the acceleration of structural transformation and diversification of the Togolese economy to create decent, high-value-added jobs. It included the following two complementary strategic priority areas: the development of inclusive growth poles and social inclusion policies, and the strengthening of financial and sectoral governance.

The EU pledged a substantial increase in its support for the year 2022 onwards. In the current year, € 43 m was to be granted as budget support. Further amounts were earmarked for vaccination against Covid-19 and for the expansion of electricity supply. A complete overview for 2021 is not yet available, especially as the European Development Fund programme had expired and from 2022 development cooperation will be handled through other instruments. In future, Team Europe, represented by the European delegation, France and Germany, will organise cooperation with Togo within the framework of a ‘Document Conjoint de Programmation 2021–2027’. The focus will be on grid expansion (electricity), agricultural value creation, and good governance. For 2022, € 243 m was earmarked for this purpose.

Most of the programmes and projects supported by foreign countries were included in the ‘Feuille de route 2020–2025’, which emerged from the national development plan and was adopted at the end of 2020 and presented to foreign partners on 21 January. Priority axes of the programme are social inclusion and peacekeeping, employment promotion through economic growth, and modernisation of land and infrastructure.

The core of the social measures was universal, low-cost health insurance for the part of the population that has a modest income. On 12 October, the corresponding law was passed. In addition to equipping the insurance, the construction of 200 new health posts and the renovation of 300 others is planned. On 27 November, the Institut national d’assurance maladie was commissioned with the implementation. The next steps to implement the programme were scheduled for next year. The World Bank pledged $ 70 m for implementation.

Agriculture employed 32% of the economically active population, but contributed only 18.8% to gdp. Cocoa and cotton were the main foreign exchange earners, generating about 20% of annual export earnings. With a yield of 2,400 mt of coffee, Togo recorded a decline of 4% compared within last year. Coffee exports even dropped by 23%. Cocoa production also suffered a set-back. Yields dropped from 10,600 mt to only 6,100 mt. Exports decreased by 50%. Lack of rainfall and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic were cited as reasons. Even cotton, the most important export product, took a rapid downward turn. At 67,000 mt, production fell by 43%. Adverse weather conditions may have played a role here as well. The World Bank’s climate risk country profile for Togo, published on 24 June, predicted temperature increases, variable rainfall, and an increased risk of floods in the coming years. However, the fact that a quarter of cotton farmers have given up cultivation is related to the unchanged low purchase prices for cotton. As an immediate measure, 51% of the shares of the Nouvelle société cotonnière du Togo were sold to the Singapore-based group Olam International. The Togolese state retained only 24% of the shares; the producers’ association retained 25%.

An important export product is phosphate. It was estimated that reserves would reach about 60 m mt. Exports have recently increased significantly to over 1.3 m mt, which may also have something to do with the sharp rise in world market prices.

The engine of economic growth, which contributed 60% to state budget revenues, was the deep-sea port of Lomé. This year, despite the interruption of international goods’ shipments by Covid-19, more than 1 m containers were handled, which corresponded to more than 1.5 m teu (twenty-foot equivalent unit) and renewed growth of more than 5%. Togo was thus becoming the main hub in West Africa for goods from all over the world, also to the countries of the Sahel. Although the Gulf of Guinea had the highest number of pirate attacks on merchant shipping and kidnapping of crews, the special attention that Togo paid to combating maritime crime gave Lomé a locational advantage. More and more ships bound for Accra, Cotonou, or Lagos were anchored off Lomé, waiting to sail on. The relative safety of the coast off Togo, but also the expansion of the Lomé–Ouagadougou–Niamey corridor with improved infrastructure, financed by the World Bank to the tune of $ 120 m, could bring even more ships to Lomé in the medium term.

International trade was also a gateway for crime. It was estimated that the state loses € 5–6 m in revenue annually due to smuggling, false declarations, and corruption. Corruption remains widespread. According to a recent survey, more than 58% of the population believed that corruption had increased in the last 12 months. Togo has seen moderate improvements in its ranking in ti’s Corruption Perceptions Index over the past three years; however, the level of corruption in Togo remained at an unchanged high level (scoring 30 out of 100), placing it 128th out of 180 countries globally. According to the anti-corruption agency, its record was not very encouraging. On 25 May, it pledged to present a national anti-bribery strategy by March 2022 with the support of the undp. So far, these announcements have not been followed up.

Despite substantial contributions from international donors to the reform plans, there were not enough funds to finance all measures. The revised national budget for 2021 foresaw expenditures of € 2.6 bn and revenues of € 2.4 bn, resulting in a deficit of 5.9%. Since part of the revenue was also financed by borrowing, Togo reached a national debt of 62.4% of gdp. The country’s main creditors are Chinese (state) banks with $ 700 m.