Domestic Politics

The Somali areas remained divided into the same autonomous political units, largely following their own political destiny: Somalia under the Somali Federal Government (sfg), Somaliland de facto independent since 1991 but still not gaining international recognition, and several states nominally recognising the sfg federal dispensation but autonomous in political decision-making, local administration, (preparations for) elections, and regional economic policy. Puntland and Jubaland were the strongest units, with the states of Galmudug, HirShabelle, and South West of lesser importance. The sfg claimed normative authority over Somalia as a whole and continued to be headed by President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’, in power since 2017. He retained his position despite an ongoing balancing act with parliament and his prime minister. The sfg struggled to solidify its authority and institutional rule and to gain more control over the federal political process, security issues, tax revenues, and the economy. Some headway was made with the formation of a constitutional court, the Judicial Services Commission, and the independent Human Rights Commission, and a review of the federal constitution was completed. But the planned National Human Rights Commission was not formed, and neither was a planned review of the old Criminal Code carried out. In addition, the practical effects of these measures were hardly felt on the ground. In general, the judicial system of the sfg underperformed and lacked independence. It was understaffed and fractured and had low esteem in the eyes of the public, partly due to perceived corruption. Court rulings were regularly ignored by the state administration and the police.

Some progress was made in reconciliation efforts on the federal and local levels. For instance, amisom troops helped to set the stage for a successful clan reconciliation conference in Galmudug. In various other local areas, violent clan conflicts were also mediated via conferences, as on 5–12 June in the villages of Taaroge and Saho-Kurun (west Mudug), where members of the Leelkase and Sa’ad clans signed an agreement to end the cycle of violence and promote local peace. In Jubaland, President Ahmed Mohamed ‘Madobe’ and opposition figures from the Ogadeni clans reached a settlement meant to lead to mutual recognition and cohabitation. More evidence of a desire to solve differences was shown in the meeting of Puntland president Said Abdullahi Deni and President Ahmed Abdi Karie of Galmudug in Gaalkayo on 27 June, committing to cooperation on keeping the peace, security, and economic development, especially regarding the shared border region of Mudug. On the federal level, a virtual meeting was held on 22 June between President Mohamed and the leaders of the five federal member states and the governor of the region of Banadir. It was the first kind of comprehensive political dialogue on this level since 2018, when a structure of federal cooperation was put on the agenda. It served to prepare for a follow-up summit on 18–22 July, where the format and timing of the parliamentary elections (for 2021) were discussed.

The sfg was again strongly supported by the international donor community, with development funding and security assistance to amisom in its perpetual campaign to contain the radical Islamist insurgent movement Harakat al-Shabaab, still allied to al-Qaida. The latter again made many victims with its terrorist attacks and hit-and-run actions against sfg targets and public facilities. It did not politically engage the sfg or any other potential civil society partners but retained its presence in the rural areas, through imposing its role in local communities and some religious leaders. It thereby claimed the role of mediator/arbiter in criminal cases or local disputes between sub-clan/(descent) groups in the countryside via an appeal to Muslim Sharia law as normative. It maintained its economic base via an extortionate economy of imposed local levies and (road) taxes and contraband activities, with exports of local commodities such as ivory, charcoal, and wildlife products, and it also received undisclosed sums from Somali diaspora communities and politico-religious connections in the Middle East. The movement also sought a rapprochement with Iran, as evident in various messages emanating in January from its leader Ahmed Diriye (‘Abu Ubaidah’).

Al-Shabaab also continued to provide services to local people in the absence of the sfg, notably in the domain of justice (land, property and business disputes, resource access), where according to local people and observers it had a reputation for delivering swift, effective, non-corrupt, and fair rulings, though exclusively based on Sharia. In matters of family law, gender-violence rulings, and criminal law, al-Shabaab’s role was less popular.

The sfg retained control of south-central Somalia in and around Mogadishu and extended its authority and territory somewhat. Its governmental services, however, reached only a few sections of the population, necessitating the large majority to continue to fend for themselves. Within the sfg, rivalry based on personal antagonisms, interest groups, sub-clan competition, and regional divisions made for frequent in-fighting and lack of a unified political and security agenda. The underlying segmentary nature of Somali political society was still evident and also influenced by outside factions and foreign players (such as Qatar, uae, Turkey, and Kenya). This was seen in the Somali National Army (sna) as well, which still showed a tendency towards devolved authority due to different regional/clan allegiances and lack of strong overall coordination and command.

On 20 July, it was announced by the sfg that the planned direct, one-person-one-vote elections, foreseen for November, were again delayed, until 2021, officially due to lack of resources and preparation and the problems caused by the Covid-19 outbreak.

The popular prime minister Hassan Ali Khayre was dismissed by the Somali parliament on 25 July, in a 170-to-8 vote. Allegedly, this was due to his failure to organise the elections and to ‘not establishing a better national security force’, but in reality it was because of the long-standing tensions with President Mohamed on election delays and personal ambitions. The EU and the US condemned the parliamentary procedure of Khayre’s dismissal as ‘irregular’. Puntland president Said Abdullahi Deni labelled this vote of no confidence in Khayre ‘illegal’. On 23 September, Khayre was officially succeeded by political newcomer Mohamed Hussein Roble (of the Hawiye-Hilowle-Sa’ad-Habr Gidir sub-clan). Mohamed, a 57-year-old engineer and Swedish citizen who had previously worked at the ilo office in Nairobi, announced his new cabinet on 19 October, with 15 of the 26 ministers under Khayre retained. In September Khayre announced that he would challenge President Mohamed in the presidential elections of 2021.

Somaliland politics was more stable, but the electoral process stalled. Following the trajectory of delay seen in the presidential elections, the parliamentary elections which had been due in October 2018 were delayed to May 2021.

Somalia scored low again on the Freedom House index of 2020, with the label ‘not free’, and showed little if any improvement over previous years. In particular, the repeated delays of elections were seen negatively, in addition to the restrictions on civil society, the media, and political activity. The corruption and impunity of security forces in cases of abuse were also seen as stifling freedom and political life. In al-Shabaab-controlled areas, the situation was the worst.

Somaliland scored much better on the index, as ‘partly free’, but the report noted an ‘erosion of political rights and civic space’, as evident in the pressure on journalists and public figures. Also, minority clans were still subject to marginalisation, and gender-based violence (against women) remained widespread.

Journalism was a precarious occupation. On 16 February, journalist Abdiwali Ali Hassan was shot and killed by unknown attackers in Afgooye. There were also arrests of journalists on 17 March and 29 July on dubious charges of murder and of producing ‘fake news’. About 25 pending cases of murdered journalists were still unsolved by year’s end. In Somaliland, journalism was also under fire, with government restrictions on news gathering and reporting and with three journalists arrested. Somalia was ranked 163rd out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders. In a meeting with Reporters Without Borders on 27 October, President Mohamed promised to improve the sfg’s record.

Religious diversity was very limited in a country with 99.5% (Sunni) Muslims, but there was much intolerance towards Christian and other religious minorities. Islam is the state religion in Somalia. There was no religious freedom, as exemplified in a decision by Somaliland’s Youth and Sports Ministry on 18 December to cancel a women’s football tournament as ‘un-Islamic’. Proselytisation by other religious faiths than Islam was forbidden, as were Christmas celebrations.

Al-Shabaab actions were again marked by excessive violence and targeted killings and hit-and-run attacks on smaller bases and government institutions and foreign forces assisting the sfg. There were hundreds of attacks. For instance, on 4 January, al-Shabaab units attacked a base on the island of Manda in the Indian Ocean used by US and Kenyan troops. Four attackers were killed, but there were report of planes and equipment damaged. On 23 June, a suicide bomber killed two Somalis near a Turkish military training facility. On 13 July, a vbied (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) attack by al-Shabaab in the district of Hodan targeted the convoy of the head of the sna, Brigadier General Odowa Yusuf Rageh. He escaped, but three sna soldiers and three civilian bystanders were killed and ten others injured. On 3 August, another al-Shabaab suicide bomber blew himself up inside the Luul Bar and Yameni Restaurant in Mogadishu, with two guards killed and three civilian bystanders seriously injured. In other areas of Somalia, more al-Shabaab violence was seen: on 29 March, the governor of Nugal was killed in Garoowe, and on 17 May in Gaalkayo in the Mudug region, the convoy of the governor of Mudug was killed in an al-Shabaab vbied attack with four of his bodyguards. Further attacks occurred on 23 and 24 May when, during the Eid celebrations in Baidoa and Dinsoor, at least seven civilians were killed and over 40 injured. On 21 June, another vbied exploded near a police station in the Hobyo district, killing two soldiers. There were also abductions and killings of local and regional politicians throughout the year. On 16 August, al-Shabaab car-bombed and stormed the Elite Hotel in Mogadishu, killing 17 civilians and injuring many more. On 18 December, an al-Shabaab suicide bomber blew himself up near a political gathering at a stadium in Galkayo, killing 17 people, among them high-ranking officials, civilians, and three soldiers. Al-Shabaab, incapable of engaging in open battle with the sna and amisom, limited itself to such (daily) terror attacks and to targeting convoys. It also carried out about a dozen mortar attacks on Mogadishu international airport.

Al-Shabaab showed flexibility and adaptiveness as a socio-political and fighting force but had no political strategy of engagement or compromise. The movement could afford this position due to its relatively successful economic base and its regular recruitment of young, unemployed Somali men, seeking some kind of stable income – which the movement was in a position to offer. It continued to coercively recruit children into its forces, routinely threatening retaliation on parents and communities that refused to cooperate.

But al-Shabaab’s military activities were degraded by sna action and by frequent US-supported airstrikes, which notably increased in number this year. The sfg recovered some territory, for example capturing the strategic town of Janaale (in the Lower Shabelle region), with allegedly 140 al-Shabaab troops killed. On 20 March and 18 July, amisom and Somali security forces near the villages of Koban and Bula Haaji (Lower Juba region) inflicted heavy casualties on al-Shabaab forces. Another al-Shabaab attack on 18 July on an Ethiopian amisom base in the town of Halgan in Hiraan region was repulsed, with an unknown number of attackers killed. Due to drone strikes, some al-Shabaab masterminds were killed, such as Bashir Qorgab, who had planned the 4 January Manda airbase attack, and one al-Shabaab Amniyat (security) chief, Yusuf Jiis. On 25 August, the notorious commander Abdulkadir Osman Yarow (Abdulkadir ‘Commandos’) was killed. Whether the (very slow) extension of sfg authority and control in former al-Shabaab areas would last was dependent on its delivering acceptable services and justice. In August, there were reports that al-Shabaab’s leader Abu Ubaidah, ill with kidney failure, had been replaced by his deputy, militarist hardliner ‘Sheikh’ Abukar Ali Adan (Hawiye-Gaal Jael sub-clan), although this choice was contested by another (Hawiye-Habr Gidir-Ayr-based) faction within the movement.

There were also attacks by militants affiliated to the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ (isil), a ‘competitor’ of al-Shabaab – for instance, two in Mogadishu and one in Boosaaso – but the number was much lower than in the previous year.

On 5 March, amisom carried out a further troop reduction of 1,000, leaving 19,626 uniformed personnel in service. Logistic support from donors via the UN Support Office in Somalia (unsos) continued. Also, 10,900 troops of the Somali Security Forces were supported by unsos. The expansion of Covid-19 slowed down the training of sna forces needed to fight al-Shabaab.

Foreign Affairs

Somalia and Somaliland foreign affairs were primarily geared to keeping relations with the donor community in order to enhance stability and economic and humanitarian support, and in the case of Somaliland to enhance its international recognition. Both received a lot of attention from the global community, but the two governments themselves did not play an active role in regional or global affairs. Foreign relations were low-key due to Covid-19 restrictions, although online virtual meetings were held with donor country partners and UN agencies.

On 27 January, president Mohamed met with Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki and Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed in Asmara over a joint plan of action concerning security cooperation, economic and social development, and enhancing regional cooperation.

Relations of the sfg with Kenya remained difficult, if not hostile, due to disagreements on amisom and the case of the dispute over the maritime delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia vs Kenya), brought to the icj. It was announced on 22 May that a ruling on this was delayed and was to be expected only after March 2021. The sfg also resented Kenya’s continued support for Jubaland president Ahmed Madobe. On 1 December, Somalia recalled its ambassador in Nairobi and ordered the Kenya envoy in Mogadishu to leave in protest against Kenya’s ‘interfering in the electoral process’. But on 7–9 November, a Kenyan economic delegation visited Somalia to discuss investment opportunities and boost bilateral ties between the two countries.

Somaliland tried to maintain good relations with Ethiopia and Kenya, but on 16 February it signalled that it was rejecting a planned joint visit by President Mohamed and Ethiopian prime minister Abiy to Somaliland’s president in Hargeisa.

The country made no progress in its efforts to gain international recognition, but it began diplomatic relations with Taiwan and a representative office was opened in Hargeisa in September. This drew condemnation from China and led to a rapprochement of this country and the sfg in Mogadishu.

An economic issue with foreign relations impact was Ethiopia’s closer involvement in the dp World (Dubai) investments in developing the port of Berbera, in which it held a 19% stake, with the aim of eventually handling 30% of its export cargo. This meant competition with Djibouti, and on 1 December its president Ismaïl Omar Guelleh reacted negatively to the Berbera port developments. Also notable was the economically driven rapprochement between Ethiopia’s Somali Region (under its dynamic president Mustafa Omer) and Somaliland, via rapidly expanding trade channels between the two, enhanced by a new road between Jijiga and Berbera via the border town of Togochale.

On 11 May, James Swan, the special representative of the unsg for Somalia and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, visited Mogadishu’s UN Level 2 hospital to discuss its capacity and needs for Covid-19 response.

A consultative meeting was held in Djibouti on 14 June at the behest of President Guelleh, with sfg president Mohamed, Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi and Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed attending. The aim was to prepare a resumption of the political dialogue between the two countries and thus enhance stability and cooperation. The two sides agreed to form a joint committee, which proceeded to meet over the next few days (15–17 June), with ‘facilitators’ from the US and the EU also present. But a second meeting on 12 July did not materialise; only on 14 September was an agreement reached on the modalities for the 2021 elections.

On 13 November, Ethiopia announced that it was withdrawing some 3,000 of its amisom soldiers, to be redeployed to the insurgent Tigray Region.

The us acting secretary of defence Christopher Miller visited Somalia on 27 November, coming from US Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, but did not meet with the Somali government. On 4 December, US president Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of American military personnel from Somalia, estimated at about 700 in number, in early 2021. Many Somali politicians voiced their opposition to this.

On 6 December, an Egyptian diplomatic delegation headed by assistant foreign minister for African affairs Sherif Issa visited Mogadishu to boost bilateral relations and counter Ethiopian influence.

Socioeconomic Developments

The economy was severely hit by the Covid-19 pandemic in Somalia, eliminating economic growth. With some reservations about the reliability of the data, gdp reached $ 4.6 bn, a decline of ca. 1.5% (AfDB data) compared with the previous year. This translated into a 4.4% decline in real per capita income.

Somaliland had a gdp of about $ 2.5 bn, with gdp per capita estimated at about $ 560. gdp growth was also slightly negative due to Covid-19, locust infestation, and export restrictions.

Trade and incomes were affected also by reduced fdi, a decline in remittances, and unpredictable bans on livestock imports from Somalia by the Gulf countries. The pastoral and agrarian sector was hit by locust invasion and major flooding. On 23 June, the World Bank approved a supplemental sum of $ 55 m to the sfg to deal with the shocks and with the impact of the coronavirus.

Somalia’s state budget was $ 476.2 m, with half of it provided by donors, mainly for developmental efforts and security support. In October, it was announced that the projection for the 2021 budget would be a staggering 40.9% higher, again with half of it supplied by donor grants and loans.

Donor funding again propped up the sfg budget (about 40% in loans and grants), and the government received $ 170.9 m in project and direct budget support from the international donor community. Additionally, the donors promised support for development projects worth $ 240.8 m, in the context of the sfg’s current National Development Plan (ndp 9, running from 2020 to 2024). Despite this continuity in the steady flow of external finances, there were few indications that Somalia was building up a solid and sustainable economic base by itself.

Although significant oil and gas reserves had been discovered in previous years, there were no major activities to exploit this wealth, except for the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources announcing the launch of an offshore licensing round (from 4 August 2020 to 12 March 2021). While (in)formal services expanded, investment in productive enterprises (commodities, minerals) remained scarce. Imports were again much higher than exports, and the current account deficit was estimated at 12.8%. Inflation went down slightly, to 4%.

Remittances covered another large chunk of Somalia’s income, supporting more than 40% of the population, and made up 34% of gdp. The remittances continued to flow in, but they were down by 7–9% compared with last year, from about $ 1.4 bn to some $ 1.3 bn. Due to Covid-19, there was a shift from cash-based transfers via the informal hawala system to digital transfers e.g., via the swift system.

Somaliland’s state budget was about $ 328 m, about 92% of which was financed domestically (taxes and import duties) and only 8% from foreign sources. The country received a remittance sum of around $ 1.3 bn, meaning a 6.8% drop compared with the previous year.

Somalia was officially a country in ‘debt distress’. In March 2020, the sfg secured debt relief under the hipc initiative. The aim was to gradually reduce its external debt, from $ 5.2 bn to $ 557 m by the end of 2023 (when the hipc scheme ends). The imf announced in March that Somalia would get a financing package worth $ 395 m under the joint ecf and the extended fund facility (eff).

On the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, Somalia was ranked lowest, 190th of 190 countries, but the value of such an index was limited, perhaps relevant for foreigners wanting to start a business in the country. In practice, starting an enterprise and running a business was easy, and Somalis went about this in innovative ways.

Corruption was one of the major obstacles. It remained rampant, as shown on the ti Corruption Perceptions Index, where Somalia was at the last but one position (179th). It showed no sign of diminishing and remained an essential ingredient of economic life, due also to the nature of this fractured society with weak public trust. Although there were no reliable data, it seemed that Somaliland (not listed in the cpi) suffered lower levels of corruption. However, in September, several high-ranking officials were arrested on corruption charges.

The still under-developed and under-funded medical infrastructure could not handle the coronavirus pandemic, of which the first case was registered on 16 March. Testing capacity and hospital care facilities were extremely inadequate. But great efforts were made and news on the disease and the precautions needed spread rapidly. Community surveillance teams undertook active case searching, contact tracing, and awareness raising. In November, according to UN information, community rapid response teams giving information on prevention had reached over 2 m people in 9,840 settlements, including 43,225 people in idp settlements.

After the first coronavirus case was registered in Somalia on 16 March, Turkey sent four planes of medical equipment, including intensive care unit beds, ventilators, protective gear, surgical face masks, face shields, and useful materials, during April.

During the year, various packages with materials to deal with coronavirus arrived from other donors. The who supported four biosafety level 2 pcr testing laboratories in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe. In December, some 4,580 cases of Covid-19 were confirmed nationwide, with total fatalities a comparatively low number in view of a population of 15.4 m, although this was partly due to lack of testing. While vaccination campaigns on measles and polio proceeded in some areas (such as Banadir), by year’s end no significant number of vaccinations had happened against Covid-19.

Somalia’s population reached approximately 15.4 m, based on a growth rate of 2.92% this year (World Bank data) and a fertility rate of 6.12: very high and a partly a reflection of the serious lack of (female) education, ignorance, and lack of contraceptives, and religious conservatism and pressure. In total, 46.8% of the population was urban (7,431,038 people in 2020). The median age in Somalia was 16.7 years.

Gender-based violence remained a widespread problem, with coercive (and child) marriage and sexual abuse of women very frequent. Female idps were especially vulnerable. Not only government soldiers and militia members but also ordinary Somali men were perpetrators. Only extreme cases of (gang) rape and murder came to the courts. Despite a legal ban, female genital mutilation operations, seen as culturally/religiously necessary by many, were also routinely done. In al-Shabaab-controlled areas, forced marriages remained common, whereby local women were wedded to fighters. A new Sexual Intercourse Related Crimes Bill was introduced in parliament in August, but it fell far short on addressing gender-based abuse in light of internationally agreed upon norms: it would allow for child marriage, reduce penalties for forced marriages, exclude a broad range of sexual offences, and include weak procedural protections for survivors. Remarkably, in Somaliland an equally controversial Rape, Fornication and Other Related Offences Bill was tabled and even approved by the lower house on 25 August, inspired by Muslim religious figures but displeasing many women and lawyers. In it, same-sex sexual relations were made punishable by death, child and forced marriages were allowed, and the definition of rape was made very vague.

Human trafficking (for purposes of sexual exploitation or forced labour) and child labour remained common as well, and law enforcement action on this was sparse and inadequate.

Humanitarian needs in the country remained extremely high: at year’s end, about 3.9 m people faced acute food insecurity. The UN said that 5 m people required assistance. Of the $ 1.05 bn funding requested by the UN, only $ 567 m was secured. Humanitarian workers again faced serious challenges in their work, due to general insecurity, targeted attacks, and various restrictions such as blockades by al-Shabaab of some government-controlled towns. Alongside cases of kidnapping, at least 11 humanitarian workers were killed on duty (UN figures).

The country’s idp population of 2.6 m (UN figures) increased by about 620,000 people due to locust infestation, flooding, and Covid-19 problems. idps and those lacking sufficient food and services were severely tested again but showed continued resilience and survival skills.