Domestic Politics

Tensions within the ruling coalition between President Tshisekedi’s cach platform and former president Kabila’s fcc continued throughout 2020. At the beginning of the year, both sides reiterated their commitment to maintaining the coalition. However, already in January during a visit to London, President Tshisekedi expressed his intention to dissolve the parliament and dismiss ministers if his reform efforts continued to be blocked, to which the fcc’s president of the national assembly, Jeannine Mabunda, countered that the prerogative of the president to dissolve the parliament was limited to situations of persistent crisis between the government and the parliament, and that doing so in the absence of such a crisis could prompt a trial for high treason.

Judicial authorities started proceedings against two senior figures of Kabila’s security apparatus – both under international sanctions – in February. On 12 February, Kalev Mutond, the former head of the national intelligence agency (anr; Agence Nationale de Renseignements), was briefly detained for illegal possession of a diplomatic passport, questioned by the anr for suspected ‘destabilisation’, and finally, banned from travelling outside the country. On 27 February, the head of military intelligence, General Delphin Kahimbi, was suspended for allegedly spying on President Tshisekedi’s government. The next day, Kahimbi was found dead at his house; diverging accounts about the cause of his death soon emerged, ranging from a heart attack to suicide to an assassination.

On 8 April, the president’s chief of staff and head of the cach-affiliated Union pour la nation Congolaise (unc) party, Vital Kamerhe, was detained after numerous allegations of fraud and nepotism. Kamerhe, who had held key responsibilities in the $ 500 m emergency infrastructure programme during the first 100 days of Tshisekedi’s presidency, was charged with the embezzlement of $ 51.2 m. Kamerhe had publicly displayed his flamboyant lifestyle – most notably through a video circulating on social media, in which his children played with bundles of $ 100 notes – yet the judicial proceedings against a politician on this level were highly surprising. While Kamerhe himself denied the charges, interpretations of the unusual judicial proceedings varied. His unc party released a statement deploring his ‘arbitrary arrest’, and supporters continually referred to an unfair and politically motivated trial. Some civil society organisations welcomed the proceedings as a milestone in the fight against corruption and requested that similar measures be taken against other officials. Some observers saw the arrest as a major blow against President Tshisekedi, inflicting the loss of a major ally and the strategic mastermind of his platform. Others speculated that Tshisekedi himself might have taken the opportunity to show progress on his promise to fight corruption while also neutralising a future rival in the upcoming elections. In any case, a conviction would prevent Kamerhe from standing as a candidate in 2023, in which Tshisekedi had pledged to support him in exchange for loyalty during the current administration. On 20 June, Kamerhe was sentenced to 20 years in prison, a ruling against which he appealed immediately.

In May, a petition started by opposition mp Jean-Jacques Mamba of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (mlc) against interim president of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (udps) and vice-president of the national assembly Jean-Marc Kabund escalated into the arrest of Mamba for alleged forgery and fist-fights in parliament. On 25 May, 289 parliamentarians voted to remove Kabund from his position as vice-president, attesting to the political nature of the procedure despite Kabund’s technically problematic behaviour. Kabund objected judicially, but on 17 June the constitutional court ruled that the ouster was admissible.

In June, fcc deputies in the national assembly attempted to introduce judicial reforms that would have made judges answerable to the minister of justice, a political position held by the fcc. The proposal was widely criticised for attempting to undermine the judiciary and firmly rejected by the opposition, civil society, and international observers. The deputy prime minister in charge of justice, Kabila loyalist Célestin Tunda ya Kasende, bypassed the government and the president and endorsed the reform proposals. While the fcc majority in parliament wanted to push through the new laws, angry protesters erected barriers and burned tyres in front of the national assembly. On 27 June, justice minister Tunda was briefly detained by police after clashing with President Tshisekedi the previous day, which further exacerbated political tensions in the capital and prompted prime minister Sylvestre Ilunga Ilunkamba to threaten that the government would resign over the matter. After Tshisekedi stated informally that he would fire Tunda, the minister resigned on 11 July.

Further tensions emerged in July when Ronsard Malonda was proposed by discordant groups of religious dignitaries as the future president of the Independent National Electoral Committee (ceni). The appointment of Malonda, who has held different ceni positions in the last 15 years and was partially responsible for the rigging of the 2018 elections as then ceni secretary-general, could hardly be seen as a step towards democratic change. The parliament’s confirmation of Malonda’s status as ceni board member and presumptive future president on 9 July caused further large-scale demonstrations across the country, leading to at least three deaths, including the lynching of one police officer. President Tshisekedi stated that he would not sign the ordinance appointing Malonda and called for consultations and harmonisation between the members of the designating group and across the political spectrum. On 19 October, the Episcopal Conference of the Congo (cenco), which had previously opposed Malonda’s nomination, denounced the exertion of political influence to control the ceni as well as the lack of consensus on the necessary electoral reforms.

On 17 July, President Tshisekedi made several appointments to civilian, judicial, and military bodies during the absence of the fcc’s Prime Minister Ilunga, instead having the deputy prime minister from his own party sign off the presidential ordinances. This method exacerbated tensions between the two sides of the coalition, prompting Ilunga to protest and call the appointments unconstitutional. The public tv announcement of the army reshuffle extended over two hours and included senior positions in charge of defence zones, units, bases, military schools, and training centres. Some of Kabila’s top generals were moved from operational positions to administrative responsibilities. Most notable was the replacement of the sanctioned General John Numbi as the general inspector of the army by General Gabriel Amisi (alias ‘Tango Four’), who is equally under international sanctions. Numbi did not receive a new post and seems to have been effectively removed from power. Another general under international sanctions, Charles Akili ‘Mundos’, became the deputy general inspector. General Fall Sikabwe Asinda – not sanctioned but previously accused of serious human rights violations and embezzlement – became the army’s chief of staff. Rather than upsetting powerful stakeholders in the security sector and the former regime through more dramatic changes, Tshisekedi seemed to have opted to carefully yield some power and create loyalty in the military apparatus through a large number of conciliatory alterations. The approach seemed to be adequate, as the army subsequently vowed to remain apolitical during Tshisekedi’s face-off with the old regime in December.

Most controversial was the nomination of three new constitutional judges, who have ultimate authority over the electoral process and other fundamental questions of political legitimacy. The inauguration of the three judges was thus delayed and hotly debated. On 13 October, the president of the national assembly, Jeannine Mabunda, and the president of the senate, Alexis Thambwe Mwamba – both fcc members and Kabila loyalists – questioned the constitutionality and legality of the nominations in a meeting with President Tshisekedi. In contrast, a delegation to the president from the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature confirmed the legality of the presidential ordinance the next day. On 21 October, the swearing-in ceremony of the three judges in the national assembly was attended only by the president and 60 parliamentarians from his cach platform, with the noteworthy absence of the fcc-affiliated majority, the prime minister, the president of the senate, and the president of the national assembly.

Tshisekedi’s take-over of the constitutional court subsequently turned out to have been a crucial move that allowed him to engage in a staggering dismantling of the former regime. On 23 October, during an address to the nation on television, Tshisekedi pointed to the continued tensions in the ruling coalition and announced consultation with all political and civil society stakeholders to form a ‘Union Sacrée’ (sacred union) and overcome the political impasse. These inclusive consultations took place between 2 and 25 November. On 6 December Tshisekedi then announced on state television that he was ending the coalition with Kabila’s fcc and attempting to gain a parliamentary majority in order to be able to form a new government and implement crucial reforms. The president warned that if he could not form a new coalition, he might be forced to dissolve parliament and hold new elections. He also stated that he would shortly appoint an informant to identify a new parliamentary majority. A few days later, on 10 December, Congolese parliamentarians (mps) voted to dismiss the speaker of parliament Jeannine Mabunda and the other members of her office, by 281 votes to 219 – meaning that many of the fcc’s majority had voted against their own political camp. However, this was likely to be more the result of disgruntlement among the members of the fcc than a desire for real change. Over the last couple of years, Kabila’s personalised and closed-off leadership style had left many people wanting a clearer political vision, more accessible decision-making, and, undeniably, also a better position for themselves. There were also persistent allegations that massive vote buying had swayed many parliamentarians. While resembling a political earthquake, Mabunda’s ouster therefore did not mean that the tectonic plates of power were aligning behind President Tshisekedi. Much will depend on the ability of the future ‘informateur’ to identify and unite the manifold interests. The fact that Tshisekedi appointed Modeste Bahati Lukwebo to this position on 31 December was encouraging. Bahati, an ambitious fcc dissident and the head of what was formerly its second-largest party, was widely perceived as a good choice because of his political influence and organisational capacities. Another reassuring albeit surprising development was that on 29 December, 24 of the 26 governors (mostly fcc-affiliated) committed to support President Tshisekedi’s vision and priorities in the framework of the Union Sacré.

Meanwhile, former president Joseph Kabila stayed remarkably absent from the quickly developing events and seemed to refrain from mounting a solid defence against the rolling Tshisekedi train. Some speculated that given the current momentum, Kabila was willing to let Tshisekedi try (and most likely fail) to bring together the various interests in a productive way. Moreover, Kabila could use his institutional influence behind the scenes to frustrate the junior president’s efforts, thereby preparing his own political comeback in a less confrontational manner. Nevertheless, Kabila seemed to have underestimated the real gains that Tshisekedi was able to obtain during his absence.

In any case, Tshisekedi will have to deliver on his 2019 promise to improve his country’s security situation. The number of violent deaths in the east markedly increased in 2020, exacerbating the political pressure on the president. The UN’s Joint Human Rights Office (jhro) documented 7,393 human rights violations in conflict-affected provinces, representing a 28% increase from the previous year. This includes the conflict-related deaths of at least 2,811 civilians – more than double the 2019 figure. Of the human rights violations, 51% (3,746) were committed in the province of North Kivu, which remained the hotbed of armed group violence.

The Allied Democratic Forces (adf) continued to be the deadliest armed group in the drc, committing regular atrocities against the civilian population supposedly in retaliation against military operations. The Kivu Security Tracker reported 113 adf attacks, resulting in at least 599 civilian deaths (The jhro reported 849 victims). While the group remained most active in the Beni area of North Kivu, the trend of adf movement in the southern part of the province of Ituri (Irumu and Mombasa territories) and on the roads to Uganda (Mbau-Kamango and Beni-Kasindi) increased. The former was caused partly by the pressure of army operations and the latter was reportedly connected to the harvest of cocoa and other agricultural produce. Already during the first quarter of the year, 250,000 people were displaced in Ituri due to these adf incursions. The group also continued to attack army patrols, involving looting and abductions, and resulting in over 100 soldiers from the Force armées de la République démocratique du Congo (fardc) being killed and many more wounded. As previously, the adf returned to areas that they had been chased away from when the army units there were redeployed elsewhere. On 22 June, suspected adf elements attacked a monusco convoy on the Beni-Kasindi road, killing one peacekeeping and injuring another. On 20 October, adf elements attacked Beni prison, which allowed 1,335 prisoners to escape. Only 404 prisoners had been returned to the prison by 12 November.

As monusco was unable to prevent the violence, political and civil society actors blamed the mission, criticised its purported uselessness, and, at times, even alleged involvement in the carnage. Multiple demonstrations were organised by civil society organisations in locations across the province, including in the town of Beni and in Mbau, Oicha, and Goma.

Also in North Kivu, the Forces démocratique de libération du Rwanda (fdlr) reportedly attacked civilians in Nyiragongo and Rutshuru territories, killing dozens and reportedly committing the most conflict-related sexual violence of any armed group. When the national army responded with military operations, the fdlr raised the costs of these measures by retaliating against the civilian population. On 24 April, alleged fdlr elements killed 13 rangers in Virunga National Park.

Meanwhile, fighting between Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové (ndc-r) and a coalition of Nyatura, fdlr, and the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (apcls) continued in Masisi and Rutshuru and, as previously, resulted in gained territory for the ndc-r. By June, approximately 200 of these clashes had resulted in the loss of more than 160 civilian lives as well as other human rights violations, including conflict-related sexual violence. The military prosecutor of North Kivu issued an arrest warrant against ndc-r leader Guidon Shimiray Mwissa. On 8 July, the deputy of the group, Gilbert Bwira, then led an attempt to overthrow Guidon. Interestingly, the press statement by the Bwira faction used almost identical wording to explain the revolt to that Guidon himself had used against the previous head of the group, Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, in 2014. Sheka was then sentenced to life imprisonment on 23 September for war crimes committed by the ndc between 2007 to 2017 in Walikale territory. Meanwhile, the two ndc-r factions clashed on multiple occasions around Pinga, Mweso, and Kashuga. On 18 August, approximately 485 ndc-r combatants surrendered to government authorities. Although the split weakened the ndc-r, it did not result in an improved security situation, as other armed groups took over its positions in Rutshuru, Masisi, and southern Lubero. In-fighting between the two ndc-r factions worsened in September and October around Pinga, displacing over 5,000 families.

In Ituri, Lendu armed groups, including the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (codeco), attacked security forces and civilians from other ethnic groups, particularly Hema, in Djugu and Mahagi territories. Between March and May, at least 333 civilians were killed in the area, including 70 women and 61 children. Approximately 300,000 people were displaced by the violence in the first half of the year alone. The fardc launched military operations in March and successfully killed and arrested some of the codeco leaders, disintegrating the group into various smaller factions that did not lay off the violence. Most dramatically, 37 civilians were killed on 8 July during a major attack in the village of Bunzenzele. The government dispatched a delegation of former armed group leaders, including the former head of the Force de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri (frpi), Germain Katanga, to advocate for an end of the violence. As these negotiations were ongoing, the different militias continued to target civilians with extortion and killings. In August, violence against civilians ebbed after a pledge for peace in Mahagi territory that was signed by 42 Lendu chiefs and the adoption of a road-map by 60 leaders from the Alur community. On 4 September, over 100 Mai-Mai entered the provincial capital Bunia during the day to demand the release of codeco prisoners. An armed escalation was avoided through negotiations and without freeing their comrades, the group was escorted out of the town by security forces. Towards the end of the year, different codeco factions clashed over the control of several gold mines in northern and western Djugu territories.

In southern Irumu territory, progress was made on the demobilisation of the frpi . On 28 February, the government and the frpi’s leadership signed a peace agreement. The process progressively improved the security situation. However, the reintegration of demobilised frpi units stalled, resulting in sporadic exactions from communities living close to the pre-cantonment sites. The demobilisation and reintegration of 1,100 additional frpi combatants was delayed due to Covid-19 as well as disagreements about prisoner release and the possibility of amnesty and integration into the army. In contradiction to the negotiations on the ground, the special representative of the unsg (srsg) Leila Zerrougui publicly spoke out against amnesty and integration in early September, prompting President Tshisekedi to follow suit, effectively preventing the implementation of an agreement that had been negotiated with monusco support. When their stipends were subsequently not paid, frustrated frpi elements looted and destroyed parts of the disarmament and demobilisation sites in Karatsi and Kazana on 30 September. After negotiations, payment of the pending stipends proceeded but continued to be an issue, impacting the willingness of frpi elements to disarm.

Also in Irumu territory, the Front patriotique et intégrationniste du Congo (fpic) attacked the army and civilians, causing further tensions between Bira and Hema communities and triggering retaliatory attacks by the Hema-based ‘Zaire’ armed group in Irumu and Djugu territories.

In South Kivu, inter- and intra-community violence continued in the middle and high plateaus of Fizi, Mwenga, and Uvira territories, specifically in Bijimbo, Mikenge, and Minembwe. The continued Rwandan and Burundian support of each other’s rebel groups that collaborate with various militias in the high plateaus exacerbated the dynamics. An estimated 130,000 people remained internally displaced in the high plateaus, and militias targeted idps throughout the year. As previously, self-proclaimed indigenous Bembe, Fuliro, Vira, and Nyindu militias mobilised around the ‘balkanisation’ narrative, which postulates that foreign invaders want to divide and annex the drc, while also fighting other ‘autochthones’ over local power disputes. On the other hand, Twigwaneho and Gumino militias usually ‘defended’ Banyamulenge (Tutsi) communities jointly, but also clashed with each other repeatedly. The former fardc colonel of Banyamulenge origin, Michel Rukunda (alias Makanika), defected from the army in January and consolidated his control of the Twigwaneho militias. In Bijombo, Twigwaneho and Mai-Mai militias clashed frequently, triggering monusco interventions. In July, Twigwaneho conducted a retaliatory attack against Kipupu village and killed at least 18, after Mai-Mai elements had raided Banyamulenge cattle. On Twitter, 2018 Nobel peace laureate Denis Mukwege denounced the incident as a massacre of 220 civilians and connected it to previous Rwandan attacks during the Congo Wars, demanding that the ‘mapping report’ of human rights violation between 1993 and 2003 be revised and those responsible brought to justice. Mukwege subsequently reported receiving death threats and saw his UN personal protection increased.

At the end of September, the situation in Minembwe deteriorated further when it was granted the status of a ‘municipality’ and a Banyamulenge mayor was installed during the visit of Azarias Ruberwa, the minister for decentralisation, who is himself of Banyamulenge origin. The fact that the long pending decision (since 2013) to create a decentralised territorial entity under Banyamulenge control was implemented by a Banyamulenge minister unleashed significant controversy and backlash against the perceived assault on the territorial integrity of the drc, playing into the justifications for Mai-Mai ‘resistance’. Ruberwa subsequently denied any responsibility, and President Tshisekedi overruled the decision on 8 October, announcing that a commission of independent scientific expects would retrace and redefine all the administrative boundaries in Fizi territory.

Multiple armed groups roamed the other parts of South Kivu (Kalehe, Mwenga, Shabunda, Uvira, and Walungu territories). Redeployments of fardc units repeatedly created security vacuums and exacerbated dynamics of violence. For instance, the fdlr splinter group Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (cnrd) was able to recruit in the northern part of South Kivu, especially among local youth in Kalehe territory.

Several Raia Mutomboki leaders returned to the bush after failed demobilisation attempts, which caused a surge of violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, particularly in Shabunda territory.

On the Ruzizi plain, Mai-Mai Kijangala and local bandits conducted raids against cattle, imposed illegal taxes, and attacked villages.

In the border area between South Kivu and Tanganyika and Maniema provinces, Mai-Mai groups and Twa militias remained active, resulting in continued displacement. Following army redeployments, the humanitarian and security situation further deteriorated. Mai-Mai Malaika continued to operate in Kabambare and Kasongo territories in Maniema province, resulting in the displacement of more than 1,500 families.

In Tanganyika province, the conflict between Bantu and Twa communities about land rights and local power remained unresolved, leading to repeated clashes and about 70 victims and 40,000 displaced persons in the first quarter of 2020 alone. In April, the fardc conducted military operations against Twa militias, successfully displacing them from the most populated areas but failing to stop their attacks on civilians. Twa combatants regularly conducted incursions from Tanganyika into Maniema province. In Kalemie territory (Tanganyika), different armed groups, including Mai-Mai Yakutumba, Apa Na Pale, and Fimbo Na Fimbo, conducted raids in mining sites and surrounding villages. Bendera remained the most affected area. On 5 October, the surrender of Mai-Mai Apa Na Pale leader Kasongo Amuri resulted in a reduction of violence in Nyunzu territory.

The security situation in Kasai, Kasai Central, Kwilu, Mai-Ndombe, and Sankuru provinces remained largely stable. Attempts to remobilise by former Kamuina Nsapu combatants towards the end of the year failed, after the arrest of their leaders and insufficient support among communities. The reduction of militia violence in the Kasai provinces is conducive to monusco’s foreseen withdrawal. However, the limited presence and legitimacy of state authorities make a re-emergence of violence possible. For instance, on 17 July and 4 August, clashes in Demba and Mweka territories led to the deaths of 11 civilians and the destruction of 263 houses.

In Haut-Katanga and Lualaba provinces, security forces killed 43 members of the Mai-Mai Kata Katanga when its leader Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga escaped his house arrest in Lubumbashi on 28 March. Gédéon, who has previously been sentenced for crimes against humanity, remains at large.

In Congo Central province, security forces killed 31 followers of the political-religious Bundu Dia Kongo movement and injured 40 more when they arrested its leader Ne Muanda Nsemi on 24 April. Nsemi, who was spectacularly freed from Kinshasa’s central prison Makala in 2017, had prompted the intervention through his self-declaration as the president and tribal hate speech.

In this tense security situation, against the backdrop of 11 civilians having been killed the same morning in a village close to Beni and with the controversy around Minembwe still fresh, President Tshisekedi arrived in Goma for the second time on 5 October. He restated his aim to improve the security situation and reform the security sector, including through stating the intention to stay several weeks in the east. Tshisekedi met with the governors of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Maniema as well as civil society. Furthermore, he proclaimed his support for the community-based approach to disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (ddr), to which he intended to nominate a national coordinator, and alluded to $ 50 m of World Bank funding for the endeavour.

Foreign Affairs

President Tshisekedi continued his efforts in regional diplomacy, which is likely to have yielded international support for his domestic take-over. On 20 and 21 February, he participated in the third and fourth Quadripartite Summits with the presidents of Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda, resulting in the adaptation of measures to improve relations between Rwanda and Uganda, including prisoner release and commitments against the supporting of foreign armed groups.

In February, Tshisekedi was elected vice-president of the African Union and president of the continental body in 2021. While the exact implications and advantages of these offices remained unclear, it appeared that the president would use them and the connected international exposure to strengthen his position at home.

In mid-March, a land dispute between the drc and Zambia flared up, with both sides deploying troops at the border around Moba territory, Tanganyika province. Several Congolese soldiers were killed during sporadic clashes. The two countries declared their willingness to resolve the dispute diplomatically and called on the sadc to mediate. The foreign minister of the neighbouring Republic of Congo, Jean-Claude Gakosso, visited Kinshasa, Lusaka, and Harare, encouraging the two disputing countries to resolve their issues peacefully. On 15 July, Tshisekedi then travelled on his third state visit to Congo-Brazzaville to meet with President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo. They discussed the reopening of cross-river traffic, which had been closed for several months due to Covid-19 measures, as well as the presence of Zambian troops in drc territory, for which Nguesso offered additional mediation. The sadc subsequently deployed a technical team to the border area from 23 to 29 July, Zambia committed to withdraw its troops, and a phased approach was started in September to improve the demarcation of the border.

Intermittent clashes also took place between the Congolese and Angolan armed forces in the Kasai borderlands. In June, an Angolan soldier was reportedly shot dead during an incursion into Congolese territory. Moreover, Angolan authorities forcefully returned approximately 4,468 Congolese, including 660 women and 308 children, to the drc. On 16 September, the two countries signed a cooperation agreement on security and public order in the common border area and an agreement on the circulation of people and goods.

On October 7, Tshisekedi co-hosted a videoconference with the heads of state from Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda to discuss security matters. The summit had originally been planned to take place in Goma during Tshisekedi’s visit there, but the format was adapted due to Covid-19 restrictions. Burundi declined to participate, requesting more bilateral engagement first. The four heads of state expressed their willingness to eradicate ‘negative forces’ in the Great Lakes region, including through strengthening national capacity, cutting the financial sources of armed groups, and increase security cooperation.

Western nations, in particular the United States but also France and former colonial power Belgium, continued to support Tshisekedi and his reform plans. During his visit in February, the US special envoy for the Great Lakes region Peter Pham reportedly requested the removal of several key allies of Kabila, including General Delphin Kahimbi and General John Numbi (see above), which, in addition to creating pressure, might just have assured Tshisekedi of the backing he needed to act. The us ambassador to the drc Mike ‘Nzita’ ‘Amani’ Hammer was extremely active behind the scenes and gained popularity on social media through his public engagement with Congolese culture. Hammer was as explicit in his support of President Tshisekedi as he was outspoken in his criticism of the old regime. In return, Tshisekedi endorsed Donald Trump’s peace plan for the Middle East. In August, the two countries resumed military cooperation, and a training programme for Congolese officers in the US was announced. Some rumoured that the US was also a financial backer of Tshisekedi’s political take-over at the end of the year.

The rivalry within cach eventually cumulated in a governance crisis and effectively paused other governance efforts, in particular during several weeks of national consultations in November. Accordingly, international partners spent most of the second half of the year on the observers’ bench, although they had major projects to urgently move forward on. On the programmatic side, the delays in the development and implementation of a new ddr-Communautaire (ddr-c) programme were most unfortunate. In August, the three governors of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu launched a community-based ddr effort through the Commission interprovinciale d’appui au processus de désarmement, démobilisation, réinsertion, réintégration et réconciliations communautaires (ciap-ddrrrc). On 31 August, srsg Zerrougui, President Tshisekedi, Prime Minister Ilunga, key ministers, and the three governors discussed this endeavour. Donors quickly came to appreciate the more bottom-up approach to the urgently needed but so far dramatically failed ddr programme. On the technical level, donors gave feedback on the draft of a presidential ordinance and, despite several technical concerns, remained eager to support it. However, fcc members in relevant positions, including the development ministry, defence ministry, and the previous ddr coordination, blocked progress. On 22 October, Western ambassadors expressed their support for ddr-c in a meeting with the president. The next day, President Tshisekedi announced the national consultations for the Union Sacrée.

Similarly, monusco’s exit and the required consultations for joint benchmarks and for the transfer of tasks and responsibilities to the government did not receive the necessary attention from the preoccupied Congolese side. In October, monusco and the government agreed on a ‘joint’ strategy for the ‘progressive and phased drawdown’. The public version appeared neither very strategic nor very joined up. It largely restated an independent strategic review from October 2019, and even international partners stated privately that they had hardly been consulted in the process. Further delays in monusco’s exit were expected also because the security situation in the eastern provinces had deteriorated.

On the operational level, joint military operations between UN peacekeepers, particularly the Force Intervention Brigade, and the fardc also hardly manifested. The UN continued to be reluctant to conduct operations together with the Congolese army without joint planning, which the Congolese side appeared reluctant to do. monusco thus supported the fardc mainly through medical evacuations, intelligence-sharing (e.g. from drones), logistics, and more policing-like tasks.

monusco contributed to the reduction and prevention of violence through supporting mediation efforts, deploying temporary operating bases and conducting more robust and frequent patrols in hotbeds of violence. In July, the mission’s leadership approved specific provincial strategies to address the root causes of conflict and reduce armed group activity in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika, Kasai, and Kasai Central.

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, monusco and the UN Country Team were forced to reduce their activities, particularly in regard to community engagement. The movement of personnel was also reduced and troop rotations were suspended until mid-July, which impacted the generation of new units and the implementation of the recommendations of the dos Santos Cruz report on better protection for civilians against adf attacks in the Beni area, including the deployment of the Geolocation Threat Analysis Unit (getau). In addition, significant staff shortages occurred at Force Intervention Brigade (fib) and regular force headquarters due to military staff officers leaving monusco before their replacements had arrived.

monusco’s mandate was renewed on 18 December (Security Council Resolution 2,556). While the mission’s two priorities – the protection of civilians and stabilisation remained unchanged – the emphasis on the reconfiguration and transition of monusco was palpable in the document.

Socioeconomic Developments

With a promising outlook and because of the ambitious government programme, the initial 2020 budget proposal had been increased from $ 10 bn to $ 11 bn on 31 December 2019. However, after a more realistic assessment by the finance ministry, the final approved budget was reduced to $ 8.2 bn in mid-February. The Covid-19 pandemic then further impacted the economic situation of the already fragile economy, mainly by weakening the exchange rate of the Congolese franc. The Congolese central bank rather optimistically projected a 2.4% contraction of the economy in 2020, but the World Bank later reported a 3.6% reduction of economic growth. Government investments fell by 10.2%. The government faced the dilemma of having to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic while its income declined due to fiscal relief measures and reduced growth. As a result, the fiscal deficit rose to 1.9% of gdp and the current account deficit increased to 4% of gdp. The government initially made do with advances from the central bank and then obtained emergency support from the imf and the AfDB, which increased external debt and domestic debt by 15.9% and 8.9% of the gdp, respectively. In August, the prime minister instructed the financial authorities to adhere to the government’s cash flow plan to stabilise the economy. Reportedly, the monetary stability pact between the government and the central bank was also successful in doing so. Growth of the extractive sector by 6.9%, mainly driven by strong Chinese demand, helped the Congolese economy as other sectors contracted by 1.6%. On 15 September, the 2020 budget was reduced to $ 5.7 bn. On 3 December, the 2021 budget was adapted to $ 7.1 bn, less than initially foreseen for 2020, but indicating some optimism. Real gdp was expected to grow by 3.3% in 2021 in an economic recovery which assumed that consumption and investments would recover and prices of raw materials, such as copper, would increase.

Major economic reforms to improve the business climate and the management of the mining sector were not manifested. The drc was ranked 183rd out of 190 countries in the 2020 Doing Business report, with particular shortcomings in regard to trading across borders, paying taxes, and getting electricity.

The drc’s limited wealth is distributed in an extremely unequal way, and the country’s pervasive and widespread poverty increased further due to the impact of Covid-19 on the economy. The World Bank reported that the country had the third-largest population of people living in poverty worldwide. Approximately 75% of the Congolese population (about 60 m people) lived on less than $ 1.90 a day.

Likewise, the already dire humanitarian situation was exacerbated by Covid-19. At the beginning of the year, an estimated 15.6 m people were in need of humanitarian assistance; this was subsequently raised to 21.8 m (approximately a quarter of the overall population). ocha’s 2020 humanitarian response plan foresaw the alleviation of suffering of 9.2 m Congolese. By August, only 22 % of the required $ 2.07 bn had been funded.

With more than 5.2 m people displaced, the drc also continued to have the highest numbers of idps in Africa, constituting one of the largest displacement situations globally. unhcr also reported 500,000 refugees from neighbouring countries in the drc, notably due to the December elections in the car.

The double health crisis of Covid-19 and Ebola viruses compounded human suffering in the drc in the context of evolving political and security crises. The wealthy elite reportedly imported Covid-19 to the country through their travels, making Kinshasa the epicentre and prompting the general population to initially take the virus less seriously. Only a handful of cases were registered at the beginning of March, but numbers quickly rose into the thousands, while insufficient testing facilities and a generally high mortality rate (outside of Covid-19) hindered an accurate assessment of this pandemic. Health authorities were, however, able to build on the capacities acquired through several recent Ebola epidemics, notable adapting surveillance, tracing, and diagnostics, and managing intensive cases.

On 24 March, President Tshisekedi declared a public state of emergency in response to the Covid-19 epidemic. With the price of basic commodities soaring, an emergency food programme was established on 18 April on the initiative of the president. However, Covid-19 preventative measures further hindered humanitarian access due to travel and cargo restrictions, as borders were closed and a pcr test requirement hindered inter-provincial movement. The allocation of limited resources to the Covid-19 response, furthermore, meant that other health issues, notably vaccinations against polio, measles, and yellow fever, received less attention. monusco provided logistical and security support for the Covid-19 response. Together with the Ministry of Education and unicef, the mission’s Radio Okapi media outlet also developed a distance-learning programme, providing a daily two-hour programme for over 22 m primary school students across the country. On 9 October, the Council of Ministers established an institutional framework for the implementation of the multi-sectoral emergency mitigation programme. By 15 November, 11,838 Covid-19 cases had been confirmed in 22 of 26 provinces, leading to 322 deaths.

After almost two months without infections, a new case of Ebola was reported in the eastern territory of Beni on 10 April. Local populations reacted with mistrust and demonstrations, doubting the reliability of the new case. While six more cases were soon reported in the same area, the virus was subsequently contained successfully. On 25 June, health minister Eteni Longondo officially announced the end of this tenth Ebola outbreak, which had started in August 2018 in North Kivu and had also reached Ituri and South Kivu provinces. Overall, 3,400 people had been infected, of whom more than 2,200 died.

A new Ebola outbreak was declared in Mbandaka, Equateur province (over a thousand kilometres from Beni), on 1 June. The who cooperated with the Congolese health ministry to support an immediate response on the ground. Together with the UN Country Team, the government also developed a three-month $ 40 m multi-sectoral response plan, which remained only half funded by the end of August. By mid-November, over 40,000 people had been vaccinated in Equateur province. By the end of the year, the virus appeared to be under control, with 130 registered infections, including 55 deaths. Meanwhile, measles, cholera, and malaria remained prevalent, causing thousands of deaths.

Epidemics and particularly Covid-19 increased the pressure on already limited basic services and exacerbated the vulnerability of suffering populations. During the implementation of Covid-19 restrictions, including those entailed under the state of emergency, security forces committed 163 documented human rights violations, including use of excessive force and extrajudicial killings.

Although the government released 3,286 prisoners to reduce the risk of Covid-19 infections in the massively overpopulated prisons, the detention situation remained dire, particularly regarding lack of food and insufficient access to healthcare. The jhro documented 76 deaths in custody (including one child) between July and October alone. In September, a mutiny took place in the prison of Lubumbashi during which at least 4 prisoners escaped, 3 were shot dead, 18 were wounded, and 21 women were gang-raped by rioting inmates.