Domestic Politics

The former director-general of the Directorate on Intelligence and Security Services ( diss ), Isaac Kgosi, was dramatically arrested on 15 January by diss agents on arrival at Sir Seretse Khama International Airport, in full view of the media. The reasons for his arrest were not disclosed, but reports immediately suggested that it was in relation to tax evasion. During his arrest, Kgosi threatened to “topple the government”. He was released the following day as he was considered “cooperative”, but law enforcement agents from the diss, the Botswana Unified Revenue Service (burs), and the Botswana Police Service searched his properties at ease and in public view. As part of law enforcement agencies’ investigation against Kgosi, their search was extended to some of his associates. Kgosi’s arrest was welcomed in certain quarters, while others, including the opposition udc and former president Ian Khama, condemned his dramatic public arrest only to be released the following day. His arrest followed standing assertions of corruption against him, and reports on 13 January that he was being investigated by burs. It was suggested that around 2.4 bn pula had been siphoned from the diss for personal use during the ten-year period Kgosi was diss director-general.

Surprisingly, Isaac Kgosi was arraigned before court on 3 April for a different offence, of disclosing the identities of diss agents to the media on 20 February, contrary to the diss Act. It was reported that Kgosi disclosed the identities of security agents whom he stated were tormenting him, declaring that there was a plot to eliminate him. This allegation was made after diss agents tracked him to a physiotherapy clinic on 18 February. The diss rebuffed these suggestions. A magistrate decided not to preside over Isaac Kgosi’s case, declaring that “he was close” to Kgosi. In turn, the case was allocated to a regional magistrate. In July, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (dpp) successfully applied for the seizure of Kgosi’s properties while he was away in Malaysia receiving medical treatment. On 23 July, the dpp successfully applied for a warrant of arrest against Kgosi for disregarding his bail conditions after he was considered a fugitive. Despite the arrest warrant, Kgosi returned to Botswana on 3 December without law enforcement noticing, and he immediately appeared in court and successfully applied for his warrant of arrest to be set aside after a government medical officer declared that he was not well.

The Independent Electoral Commission (iec) started its second and final supplementary voter registration exercise for the 2019 general elections on 15–28 April. At the end of the second supplementary registration, the iec put the total number of registered voters for the 2019 elections at 930,933 out of a possible 1,592,350 voters, demonstrating that voter apathy remains a challenge. On 8 April, the case in which the Botswana Congress Party (bcp) challenged the Electoral (Amendment) Act of 2016, which, among other changes, introduced electronic voting machines, was brought to a halt and removed from court following a common understanding being reached by those involved in the matter. This followed a government decision in August 2018 that the controversial 2016 amendment would not be implemented during the 2019 elections. In April, parliament approved a Private Members Bill, brought by an opposition bcp/udc member of parliament, Samuel Rantuana, that proposed to repeal the contentious Act (which introduced electronic voting machines and ended supplementary registration, amongst other measures). On 1 March, parliament approved a motion that called for the direct election of the president.

Internal divisions within the bdp played out. On 3 April, Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi sought court intervention to halt or suspend the bdp Special Congress scheduled for 5 April in Kang, at which she intended to challenge President Mokgweetsi Masisi for the position of president of the bdp. Venson-Moitoi was challenging her party’s decision on 2 April that disapproved 26 delegates who had nominated and supported her candidature for party presidency, as well as its failure to provide her with election rules. Remarkably, it was reported that three judges, Justices Letsididi, Busang, and Segopolo, one after another, decided not to preside over the case, citing different reasons. Their recusals possibly showed the weaknesses and apparent lack of independence of the country’s judiciary. Some judges appear brittle before the executive, particularly when the president is involved. Judicial officers (judges and magistrates) in Botswana are appointed by the president. Consequently, on 4 April a three-judge panel led by the chief justice was appointed to preside over the case. In turn, reports suggested that the case was adjourned after President Masisi proposed a meeting with Venson-Moitoi to resolve the matter out of court, and the case was to proceed only if they failed to reach an agreement. However, the party corrected this, declaring that it was Venson-Moitoi’s legal representatives who proposed a meeting with party leader and President Masisi, which he acceded to. President Masisi and Venson-Moitoi could not reach an agreement, and the case was revived in court. On 4 April, the court decided against Venson-Moitoi, stating that she had not confirmed or established that she was eligible to compete as president of Botswana as per the dictates of the constitution, which requires candidates to be a citizen by birth or descent, and that her application was not considered urgent. The court decision gave the impression to some that Venson-Moitoi’s citizenship was in doubt, yet in reality the issue was that she had omitted to indicate in her court papers that she was a citizen by birth or descent as required by the constitution.

Remarkably, the Ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs, when rebutting a story in the ‘Monitor’ newspaper on 18 March claiming that Venson-Moitoi was required to “renounce Malawian citizenship”, stated that she was “not required to renounce the other country’s citizenship as Section 20(1) of the repealed Chapter 3 of the 1966 Constitution of Botswana conferred citizenship by birth upon persons born in the former Bechuanaland Protectorate”. On 5 April, Venson-Moitoi pulled out of the contest for party president, contending that she would not participate in a fraudulent process and declaring it a “sham” as “the election was rigged from the beginning”. On the same day Ian Khama reiterated Venson-Moitoi’s sentiments and stated that the election “was rigged in favor of … President Mokgweetsi Masisi’. Interestingly, on 9 April government affirmed Venson-Moitoi’s citizenship. Venson-Moitoi declared that President Masisi had pledged to appoint her as vice president when he ascended to the position of state president in April 2018, a suggestion that was rejected by Masisi.

Venson-Moitoi’s presidential aspirations exposed the apparent weaknesses in the party’s internal democracy as well as those afflicting the country’s judiciary. Venson-Moitoi vented her frustrations as she was not allowed free access to party delegates while “well-resourced” President Masisi campaigned freely. She also complained that she had challenges in securing a place where her supporters could lodge in the run-up to the Kang Special Congress. It would appear all odds were stacked against Venson-Moitoi after she declared her candidacy for the party presidency, as this would be the first time the party president had been challenged in the party’s history. In fact, the party and its leadership were intolerant of her candidature.

Following Venson-Moitoi’s withdrawal from the contest for party president, President Masisi was approved as party president. In turn, President Masisi declared a wish to restore confidence in the bdp, and called for party unity as it prepared for the 2019 elections. He also stated that he would reach out to Venson-Moitoi and seek her support, in his efforts to unite the party. Meanwhile, the media continued to suggest that there were plans associated with the ‘New Jerusalem’ faction to topple President Masisi. Reports also suggested that there was a plan to form a new political party, and that 12 bdp members of parliament were expected to quit the party. Venson-Moitoi’s key allies and supporters, Ian Khama and the member of parliament for Tati East, Samson Guma Moyo, did not attend the Special Congress in Kang. Moyo, who had declared his intention to contest the position of secretary-general of the party, was reported to be in Johannesburg. In February, it was reported that Moyo was being interrogated by the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (dcec) and burs. In March, reports suggested that Moyo had skipped the country, citing a plot to kill him. Following the Special Congress on 5 April, on 6 April the bdp held its 57th National Council, at which it decided to hold a non-elective congress or not to elect its executive committee in July. In April, the Botswana National Front (bnf) urged China to desist from supporting the bdp. This followed a visit by a delegation of the Communist Party of China in April. Meanwhile, on 27 April the bdp unveiled and presented its 2019 election manifesto in Gaborone. Ian Khama was absent from the bdp manifesto launch, giving rising to suggestions that he was going to quit the party.

During the build-up to the Kang Special Congress, there were suggestions that the bdp would split. In April, the ‘Sunday Standard’ newspaper suggested that a South African businesswoman, Bridgette Motsepe Radebe, and others supported Venson-Moitoi. Bridgette Motsepe Radebe rejected these suggestions. As per President Masisi’s pledge in Kang, newspaper reports stated that he had met with Venson-Moitoi on 8 April without much success. Subsequent to newspaper reports that associated Bridgette Motsepe Radebe and others with Venson-Moitoi in her attempt to challenge President Masisi for the party presidency, on 17 April the minister of nationality, immigration, and gender affairs, Ngaka Ngaka, announced that Bridgette Motsepe Radebe and Malcolm X, both South African nationals, required a visa/authorisation to visit Botswana. Bridgette Motsepe Radebe is married to South Africa’s minister of energy Jeff Radebe and is the sister of South African president Cyril Ramaphosa’s wife, Tshepo Motsepe, and Patrice Motsepe, a mining mogul. On 18 April, South Africa’s minister of international relations and cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu, visited to affirm positive relations with Botswana, and disassociated South Africa from Bridgette Motsepe Radebe’s machinations.

On 1 April, President Mokgweetsi Masisi marked one year as president since he had automatically succeeded Ian Khama. However, an uneasy relationship between President Masisi and Ian Khama was sustained. On 31 January, efforts to reconcile President Mokgweetsi Masisi and Ian Khama were said to be still in motion. On 4 May, Ian Khama, who is also a paramount chief of Bangwato tribe, addressed a meeting in Serowe at which he declared to his tribe that he was considering resigning from the bdp, citing an ‘unbearable and tumultuous relationship’ with his successor, President Masisi, and Masisi’s government. He further stated that President Masisi and his vice president, Slumber Tsogwane, among others, were “intolerant and harass their opponents” and those who associated with him (Khama). Khama even chastised the party for being driven by “politics of the stomach”, suggested that “unity and peace” were in jeopardy under Masisi’s presidency, and even declared his willingness to work closely with the opposition, among others, to restore democracy. Reports suggested that the tribe had given him its blessing on his possible move. Despite his public disapproval and criticism of the party and its leadership, it was stated that the bdp did not “intend to make any statement nor take any step on the former president” as it had with others who had been either suspended or expelled from the party for working against the party or its leadership. At the meeting of 4 May, Khama identified some bdp parliamentary aspirants, including Vice President Slumber Tsogwane, whom he declared his intention to campaign against. Subsequent to the 4 May meeting, the ‘WeekendPost’ newspaper suggested that President Masisi had rebuffed a proposal by the director-general of the diss, Peter Magosi, for a ‘reconciliatory meeting’ with Ian Khama, ‘two days before’ Khama’s Serowe meeting. It was reported that Khama had warmed to the proposal to meet with President Masisi. Subsequent to this, it was also reported that another attempt to bring about a meeting between the two leaders to resolve or cease their feud was scuttled by, or not approved by, Khama’s uncles (the Bangwato traditional leadership) on 22 May. In May, the Botswana Federation of Public Sector Unions (bofepusu) urged President Masisi and Khama to “engage in meaningful dialogue in order to resolve their differences”, and deplored their public spat, which it declared had developed into “a national matter” and had some tribal connotations associated with it. In May, it was reported that Khama was taking the government to court for “failure and refusal to avail the former President access to the use of government-owned modes of transport (and in particular aircraft and boat transportation)”, which his lawyers considered to be a violation and contravention of the Presidents (Pensions and Retirements Benefits) Act, (Chapter 02:03), and the amendment thereto”.

On 18 June, the ‘Sunday Standard’ reported that the official aeroplane transporting President Masisi to the 12th us–Africa Business Summit in Maputo, Mozambique, had had to turn back amid fears of a plot to assassinate Masisi in Mozambique, and that Masisi was remaining out of sight until 20 June. This report was not rebuffed by government. Another newspaper, the ‘Patriot’, suggested that Masisi had turned back on 18 June after “receiving news that 65 councillors had just resigned from his party in the Central District Council to join the opposition Botswana Patriotic Front (bpf)”, a party associated with his predecessor, Ian Khama. On 20 June, the permanent secretary to the president (psp), Carter Morupisi, stated that Masisi “had to make an emergency return because he had another engagement to attend to”. diss confirmed that Masisi’s life was in danger – a suggestion that were rebuffed in certain quarters, including by Ian Khama. Surprisingly, no one has been arrested in relation to the alleged attempt to assassinate President Masisi, which casts doubts on the credibility these allegations.

In June, it was reported that Patrice Motsepe brought legal action against the ‘Sunday Standard’ for defaming him in a story of 1 April that suggested that he “had donated R22 million to Venson-Moitoi’s campaign, which had already been smuggled into Botswana”. Subsequently, in June the ‘Sunday Standard’ declared that Khama’s meeting in Serowe had been paid for by Bridgette Motsepe Radebe. The newspaper further affirmed that “Patrice Motsepe pledged R 22 m while her sister Bridgette Motsepe Radebe pledged R 11 m towards helping Venson-Moitoi’s campaign to unseat President Masisi as bdp president”. These pledges were reportedly made at a meeting with Ian Khama at O.R. Tambo Intercontinental Hotel’s Presidential Suite, Johannesburg, while Khama was on his way to India to visit the Dalai Lama on 10 March and to attend the 60th commemoration of the 1959 unsuccessful Tibetan revolt. Khama’s visit was not approved by government, in light of the One China policy.

President Masisi and his government’s intolerance to his opponents seemed to have been extended to the opposition, as concerns of intolerance were echoed by various opposition politicians. In March, the assistant minister of health and wellness and member of parliament for Tati West, Biggie Butale, revealed that there were plans by diss to eliminate President Masisi’s opponents. On 7 May, the bdp put Butale on suspension for a period of six months. On 9 May, President Masisi reorganised his cabinet, with Butale and Patrick Ralotsia being sacked as assistant minister of health and wellness and minister of agricultural development and food security and replaced by Sethomo Lelatisitswe and Fidelis Molao, respectively. Karabo Gare was assigned the portfolio of assistant minister of investment, trade, and industry, while Master Goya was relocated to the Ministry of Tertiary Education, Research, Science and Technology as an assistant minister. On 26 April, the bdp put the member of parliament for Lerala-Maunatlala, Prince Maele, on suspension for one year, while the mp for Tati East, Samson Guma Moyo, was dismissed from the party. On 28 May, Prince Maele, who has been considered Khama’s ally, was not successful in appealing his one-year suspension, despite his “sworn allegiance to the party, abandoning the anti-Masisi camp led by Khama”. In turn, he unsuccessfully stood as an independent candidate for Lerala-Maunatlala constituency.

As expected, on 23 May the name of a proposed political party associated with Ian Khama, the Botswana Patriotic Front ( bpf ), was accepted and announced. On 25 May Khama held another meeting in Serowe, at which he declared that he had left the bdp on account of the party not being properly run, and further stated his willingness to support the bpf and those who contested as independent candidates as well as other parties in the opposition, the intention being to defeat the bdp. Khama also disparaged the bdp leadership at that meeting, particularly President Masisi, stating that he had committed an error by anointing him as his successor. At the same meeting, Khama urged the dismantling of the diss and Military Intelligence (mi), on the grounds that they were not fulfilling their intended purpose under Masisi. Interestingly, there had also been an outcry under President Khama’s government that the diss was being used for purposes for which it was not intended. And, as anticipated, some members of parliament who were dismissed (Samson Guma Moyo) or suspended (Biggie Butale) from the bdp were subsequently associated with the bpf. Butale quit the bdp on 24 May, alleging that he was intensely disliked by President Masisi. On 8 June, the Gaborone town clerk denied the newly formed bpf access to the Tsholofelo Community Hall, where it was expected to hold its initial meeting, arguing that he had not been aware that the hall was going to be used for a political meeting. The bpf had to look for another venue for its meeting. Khama continued his public outbursts against President Masisi’s administration, to the extent of taking the blame for anointing Masisi as his successor. Equally, President Masisi criticised Khama for his conduct. Khama was not only closely associated with the bpf but was also considered to be the brains behind its formation. On 10 June, it was reported that another bpf meeting was scattered by the police. On 12 June, the bpf was officially recorded as a political party, on 6 July it held its launch in Kanye, and it launched its election manifesto on 7 September. On 25 September, Tshekedi Khama resigned from the bdp and in turn joined the bpf.

On 13 April, the Alliance for Progressives (ap), a splinter party from the Botswana Movement for Democracy ( bmd ), opted not to be a part of the opposition coalition, the udc, released its 2019 election manifesto, and declared its presidential candidate, Ndaba Gaolathe. On 8 June, Margaret Nasha of the ap, who is also a former speaker of the National Assembly, stated that Botswana was “at crossroads due to Botswana Democratic Party’s intolerance”, further noting that “the ruling party leadership has been intolerant to opposition parties” and that intolerance was also meted out to her while she had still been in the bdp. Nasha further urged President Masisi to step down, rather than just offer an apology, for acknowledging on 7 June that government had erred in amending the Presidents (Pensions and Retirement Benefits) Act in 2017, which permitted former presidents to work – an amendment that the opposition was opposed to. At the time of this amendment, Masisi was the leader of the house. Following Masisi’s acknowledgement, calls for him to step down were also echoed in other quarters. A smaller and unknown party, the Real Alternatives Party (rap), released its manifesto on 25 May.

The opposition coalition, the udc, released its 2019 election manifesto on 18 May in Maun, produced following a wide public consultation exercise. However, reports had suggested that there was ‘uncertainty’ surrounding the udc manifesto release as the party was engaged, on 17 May, in discussions with the burs, which had “temporarily seized manifesto documents” at Maun Airport, citing failure to meet customs requirements. The party in turn accused the ruling party for this, and further stated that it was hindering its readiness for the 2019 elections. The manifesto release was preceded by a party march against corruption. udc vice president, and bcp president Dumelang Saleshando rejected reports that associated udc’s 2019 campaign with Ian Khama, despite Khama’s declaration of his intention to work with the udc at his 4 May meeting in Serowe. Saleshando further declared that the party would not object to Khama voluntarily persuading voters to vote for the udc, as a paramount chief of Bangwato tribe. He also stated that the “bdp blamed Khama for corruption but Khama’s record is a record for bdp”. On 23 April, the ‘Mmegi’ newspaper reported that a campaign helicopter and a jet for the udc leader, Duma Boko, had been impounded or restrained by the burs, pending an investigation. Boko retorted, accusing the government of being “paranoid”, and maintained that this was meant to “derail and undermine their campaign”. burs rebuffed these claims. It was not the first time that Boko had attracted the attention of tax authorities: in February, his vehicle was seized by burs. In May, the udc lodged a complaint with the Ombudsman against the director-general of the diss, Peter Magosi, for what it termed “acts of maladministration and abuse of office”, as the party considered his conduct to have “overstepped his security functions and crossed into political landscape”. On 17 June, Gaborone mayor Kagiso Thutlwe criticised the burs, the dcec, the dpp, and the diss for being biased and deployed against opposition leaders by the ruling party. On 17 June, the ‘Sunday Standard’ reported that the udc had made a R 100 m (P 70 m) funding request for the 2019 elections campaign Bridgette Motsepe Radebe. This was denied by udc head of communications, Moeti Mohwasa. In September, reports suggested that the bcp was considering withdrawing from the udc, although this withdrawal did not take place.

Meanwhile, in April the court scheduled the case in which the bmd was contesting its dismissal from the udc on 27 August. In May, the bmd declared that it was proceeding to vie for votes in the 13 constituencies that the udc had earmarked for the bmd, despite having been expelled from the coalition, arguing that it had prospects of being successful in the court case in which it was contesting its expulsion. On 29 August, the bmd unsuccessfully challenged its suspension and resultant expulsion from the udc and on 9 September its effort to ensure a fast-tracked review of the high court decision at the court of appeal was unsuccessful.

Issues of corruption and money laundering continued to be widely reported on. In February, the Public Accounts Committee ended its inquiry into the National Petroleum Fund (npf) because the issue had been brought before the court. Also in February Bakang Seretse and his associates, who had been charged in relation to the npf money-laundering case, called for charges against them to be dropped. On 13 February, the eu put Botswana on a list of countries considered vulnerable to money laundering and illegal financial flows, a move that is likely to work against the country’s efforts to attract foreign direct investment. The decision followed an assessment of the country’s anti-money-laundering framework by the Financial Action Task Force (fatf), which found the framework to be inadequate and put it in a high-risk category in October 2018.

On 2 April, the director-general of the dcec, Victor B. Paledi, was redeployed to the Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security. Reports speculated as to the reasons for his redeployment, including the disappearance of dockets and involvement in “a political witch-hunt using the National Petroleum Fund (npf) case. He has been accused of emotionally imposing himself on the ongoing corruption case together with his team of investigators, his target not necessarily being the accused before the court, but the government.” Paledi was replaced by Brigadier Joseph M. Mathambo, who immediately declared that he had decided to reopen “13 prominent corruption-related cases that closed investigations due to the alleged insufficient evidence to prosecute”. Furthermore, Mathambo was quoted saying that “this country was in a situation called State capture where certain institutions were systematically weakened and squeezed to a position where they could not perform their mandate”, which appeared to reiterate public perceptions in relation to the dcec. He also declared his intention to restore public trust in the dcec. On 30 April, reports indicated that Mathambo had declared that his life was in danger. In October, Mathambo stated that dcec lacked the capacity to investigate corruption.

Meanwhile, the P 500 m Botswana Public Officers Pension Fund (bpopf) and Capital Management Botswana (cmb) scandal persisted, and enjoyed wide coverage, particularly in the private media. In March, President Masisi stood by the psp and secretary to cabinet, Carter Morupisi, who was associated with the scandal, in which there was an ongoing investigation into alleged misuse of bpopf funds. When offering an interview, Masisi retorted that “many people still serving are either under investigation or are being investigated. I don’t know what is different”, declaring his reluctance to sack Morupisi. On 16 March, Masisi reiterated his commitment to combating corruption. In April, some members of parliament called for the suspension of Carter Morupisi in connection with his alleged involvement in the bpopf and cmb scandal. One of the members of parliament criticised “Government for using state oversight institutions to settle political scores while protecting others”. Morupisi rebuffed these assertions. In April, newspaper reports suggested that Rapula Okaile and Tim Marsland had been arraigned in relation to the misuse of a part of bpopf funds for personal benefit. It was also reported that Okaile had “exonerated … Morupisi from any wrong doing”. In August, cmb pledged to return P 450 million to bpopf, as a way to avert prosecution. In a turn of events, in August Morupisi, alongside his wife, Pinny, were also arraigned in relation to the bpopf and cmb scandal. Consequently, Morupisi was put on suspension on 2 September, and he declared that his suspension was “politically motivated”. Morupisi had been at the centre of the public spat between Khama and Masisi. His suspension met with approval in certain quarters, including by bofepusu. On 16 October, reports also associated the leader of the ap, Ndaba Gaolathe, with the cmb scandal. Morupisi was replaced as acting psp by Elias Magosi, who is a relative of the diss director-general, Peter Magosi.

Allegations of corruption extended to ministries, government departments, and parastatal institutions. In March, the assistant minister of health and wellness, Biggie Butale, declared that his ministry was confronted with the challenge of corruption, stating that “We are under siege. We have people that pay hospital staff to deliberately damage some of our equipment because they need patients to be referred to their private practices.” In April, the commissioner of police, at the 47th Senior Officers Conference, declared that there had been an increase in the number of police officers involved in corruption. Meanwhile, the media carried reports of a number of parastatals that continued to incur losses.

The National Petroleum Fund ( npf ) scandal continued to unfold and was widely publicised, particularly by the private media. Although President Masisi had earlier rebuffed reports that associated him with the scandal, on 24 May ‘Mmegi’ reported that the dpp had affirmed that Bakang Seretse had made donations of P 2 m and P 300,010 to Masisi. Newspaper reports also associated Khama and Gaborone mayor Kagiso Thutlwe with the npf scandal, and the dpp expected Khama and Thutlwe to give evidence in court. Khama was associated with P 250,000 from Bakang Seretse that “was paid to Sharps Construction to procure material for the refurbishment of [his] retirement home”. Thutlwe was linked to P 400,000 that was used towards the 2017 Gaborone Mayor Football Cup. Seretse was one of those charged in relation to the P 250 m (at times referred to as P 320 m) npf scandal, together with his company, Basis Points Capital. Those charged alongside Seretse included Zein Kebonang, a high court judge; Sadique Kebonang, a former minister under Ian Khama; Mogomotsi Seretse, who is Bakang Seretse’s brother; Kenneth Kerekang and his wife, Mpho Kerekang; Tshepho Bojelo, Sharifa Noor; Alfonse Ndzinge; Kago Stimela; and some companies, including Kgori Capital. In April, the high court decided that Kgori Capital and directors Alfonse Ndzinge and Sharifa Noor, and Bakang Seretse as a former director, should pay back around P 10 m obtained illegally from government. However, on 26 July Kgori Capital successfully challenged the decision at the court of appeal. On 24 May, ‘Mmegi’ reported that one of those expected to offer evidence was the former director-general of the diss Isaac Kgosi, although initial reports had suggested that he was likely to be charged. In November, twin brothers, judge Zein Kebonang and former member of parliament for Lobatse and former minister Sadique Kebonang, called for their charges in relation to the npf to be dropped. The udc vice president, Dumelang Saleshando, declared that should the udc win elections in October, it would inquire into whether President Masisi had benefited from npf funds, with the intention to charge him.

Reports suggested that on 7 February the diss director-general called for a withdrawal of a number of tenders, including a P 1.8 bn water tender awarded to a Chinese company, China Jiangsu, declaring the company “a security threat” because it was implicated in widespread corrupt activities. The P 1.8 bn tender was granted to another Chinese company, Zhengtai. On 13 February, the Ministry of Mineral Resources, Green Technology and Energy Security urged institutions under its purview not to do business with the company. China Jiangsu challenged the withdrawal of tenders in court; it was not successful, but the advice from the diss that was used to withdraw the tenders was considered not acceptable by the court in August. In May, reports suggested that the dcec was investigating a “Chinese contractor Zhengtai Group Botswana and some senior government officials over allegations of corruption”. In August, it was reported that the dcec was investigating Khama and his twin brothers Tshekedi and Anthony for corruption. In October, a former army commander, and member of the bdp executive committee, Tebogo Masire, rebuffed reports that he was being investigated by burs. Masire is a shareholder in Avanti Security, which was being investigated. The other shareholder is Olebeng Ngwakwena, who was considered as an associate of Khama.

On 7 October, damning reports suggested that dcec investigation officers decried obstruction of investigations by the diss, stating that “they have lost their independence to the diss Director General and in some instances the Financial Intelligence Agency (fia) Director General” and that the dcec director-general Joseph Mathambo was receiving “operational direction, especially on high profile investigations” from diss and fia director-generals. The officers also stated that the dcec director-general and his spouse were under investigation but that the case docket could not be found since Bruno Paledi had been redeployed. It was also alleged that the diss director-general Peter Magosi had “been offered millions of Pula by China Zhengtai in order to influence the award of the Maun infrastructure tender as well as the Moshupa hospital” in favour of the company. They also suggested that the fia director-general, Abraham Sethibe, was being probed by the dcec for receiving rewards from contractors building fia head office. This could partly explain why there has been limited success in high-profile cases.

In August, ructions surfaced within the diss, with some demanding that the director-general, Peter Magosi, be sacked. In October, it was reported that Magosi was being investigated by the dcec. In November, reports suggested that he had been put on suspension, allegedly for presenting “several flawed high profile corruption, terrorism and money-laundering cases that have bruised government’s image and cost taxpayer funds”. Magosi rebuffed these allegations, maintaining that he had a positive relationship with President Masisi. The credibility of the diss has not improved, even with the departure of Isaac Kgosi.

In October, a diss agent, Welheminah Mphoeng Maswabi, was arraigned for “financing terrorism, possession of unexplained property and false declaration for passports”, in relation to P 100 bn allegedly stolen from Bank of Botswana, in association with former president Ian Khama, former diss director-general Isaac Kgosi, and South African businesswoman Bridgette Motsepe, and stashed in offshore bank accounts and South African banks. These claims were rebuffed Khama and Motsepe. South African banks have also denied the existence of the alleged bank accounts. Maswabi was granted bail on 22 November, a few days before Isaac Kgosi returned from Malaysia. During her bail application, it was suggested that the case was based on “a series of false statements, fabrications and manufactured evidence by the state”. These assertions were not rebuffed by the dcec, diss, or dpp.

In August, parliament chose not to approve a request for an additional P 900 million budget for a controversial Masama water tender and for it to be contained in National Development Plan (ndp) 11. It was suggested that the tender was designed for a company, Khato Civils, that was to assist in financing the bdp in the 2019 elections, but the bdp rebuffed this suggestion. Following the non-approval by parliament, it was affirmed that the president had decided in a Presidential Directive to carry out the project. The tender was meant to alleviate water shortage. On 8 August, parliament approved the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Act, despite opposition objections that it was not open to public scrutiny. On 28 August, parliament was dissolved.

Leaders of four political parties (ap, bdp, udc, and bpf) satisfied the requirements to stand as presidential candidates for the October general elections in line with Section 5 of the Constitution and Presidential Elections (Supplementary Provisions) Act on 21 September. On 23 October, the general elections were held. The bdp won 38 of the 57 seats, while the ap, bpf, and udc won 1, 3, and 15 seats, respectively. On 27 October, the udc declared the election outcome fraudulent. On 1 November, President Masisi was installed as the fifth president. Former president Khama and the bpf did not attend the ceremony, citing electoral fraud in the 2019 elections. On 18 November President Masisi presented his State of the Nation Address, in which he outlined the country’s achievements and how he intended to tackle outstanding challenges. In November, 19 parliamentary election petitions were registered (16 by the udc and three by the bpf), the highest number of petitions to be recorded in the country’s history, alleging electoral fraud, in particular ‘double-voting’. As expected, the high court dismissed the election petitions in December on technical grounds. The petitions included those of the leader of the udc, Duma Boko, and that of bpf leader Biggie Butale. A handful of council petitions were also registered. In November, udc vice president Dumelang Saleshando declared that burs and diss were instrumental in determining the outcome of the 2019 elections, thus making them “unfree and unfair”.

The tension between government and public sector unions seemed somewhat eased. On 14 January, it was reported that salary negotiations were expected to begin. On 1 February, it was reported that government had presented salary rises of 3.5% and 6% for C & D and A & B salary bands, respectively, for both financial years 2019/20 and 2020/21, yet unions wanted greater rises. On 28 January, five public sector unions successfully applied for deferral of a decision to de-recognise them by the Directorate of Public Service Management (dpsm). Unions also decried the dpsm for frustrating efforts to reconstitute the Public Service Bargaining Council (psbc). Following negotiations, the government and unions settled for a 10% salary rise for the years 2019/20 and 2020/21 respectively, for the A & B salary band. In August, there were suggestions that public sector unions were considering embarking on a strike over disagreements regarding salary increases, but this strike did not materialise. Unlike in the 2014 general elections, bofepusu did not support any political party for the 2019 elections. Meanwhile, on May Day, the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (bftu) released its maiden manifesto for the 2019 elections, meant to empower its members “on critical issues that they should consider when they are engaging parliamentary aspirants in their constituencies”.

On 22 May, the government removed a hunting ban after a consultation process, led by the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Hunting Ban and Social Dialogue. The ban had been found to have had detrimental effects. Consequent to this decision, the government engaged an international public relations firm to ward off negative publicity affecting its tourism, one of the major revenue earners for the country. Khama, who introduced the ban on hunting in 2015, described its removal as “Masisi’s blood policy”, much to the chagrin of those who welcomed a removal of the ban. Meanwhile, issues affecting minorities continued to be decided by the courts. On 11 June, the high court legalised homosexuality by setting aside sections of the Penal Code that were considered to be contrary to the constitution.

Foreign Affairs

Botswana upheld and revived its foreign relations. However, there were fewer inbound visits during the year. Namibian president and chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (sadc) Hage Geingob visited on 31 January and toured the sadc secretariat, based in Gaborone, on 1 February. During the visit, it was reported that Geingob had a meeting with former president Khama on 2 February, with media reports suggesting that the meeting was over the feud between Khama and President Masisi. On 21 March, Botswana extended humanitarian assistance to those affected by Cyclone Idai in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Mukhisa Kituyi, visited on 27–30 March; the vice minister of commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Qian Keming, on 22 May 2019; Rwandan president Paul Kagame on 27–28 June; Namibian president Hage Geingob, attending the 45th Ghanzi Agricultural Show as a guest speaker, on 27 July; Zambian president Edgar Lungu, attending the inauguration of President Masisi, on 1 November; the chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, on 22–23 November; and King Letsie iii of Lesotho on 11–12 December.

President Masisi made a private visit to Mozambique on 10–16 January, attended the 49th World Economic Forum ( wef ) annual meeting in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, on 20–26 January, made a private visit to South Africa on 7 February, and travelled to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 8–12 February. On 8 February, Botswana became a member of the African Peer Review Mechanism (aprm), after years of reluctance to join, as part of an effort to improve on its governance. President Masisi also attended the 28th Summit of Heads of State and Government who take part in the aprm on 9 February, the 32nd au Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 10–11 February, the Africa Business Health Forum on 12 February, and the inaugural session of the Botswana and Zimbabwe Bi-National Commission (bnc) in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 27–28 February.

President Masisi travelled to Zambia on 2 April; visited Qatar on 14–15 April; made a business visit to the United States of America from 28 May to 7 June; attended the inauguration of South African president Cyril Ramaphosa on 25 May; and visited Kenya on 22–24 July and Angola on 13–14 August. He attended Rwanda’s 25th celebration of its Liberation Day on 4 July; the inaugural Africa’s wildlife economy summit in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, on 23 June; the 9th Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of Countries (acp) summit of Heads of State and Government in Nairobi, Kenya, on 9–10 December; and the 28th wef on Africa in Cape Town, South Africa, on 4–6 September. Vice President Tsogwane attended the sadc Solidarity Conference on Western Sahara in South Africa on 26 March, and Robert Mugabe’s funeral on 14 September.

The minister of international affairs and cooperation, Unity Dow, attended the 1st eu–au Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, Belgium, on 21–22 January; the acp Africa Group of States and eu on the Africa Regional Protocol Ministerial Meeting in Mbabane, Eswatini, on 2–4 May; the 12th Extraordinary Session of the au Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Niamey, Niger on 7 July; the 19th Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (chogm) in London on 10 July; the Global Conference for Media Freedom on 10–11 July, also in London; and the 20th sadc Ministerial Committee of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in Lusaka, Zambia, on 18–20 July; and made business visits to Georgia and Russia on 2–8 June. She also led a delegation to the 39th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the sadc in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 12–19 August; visited Vietnam on 25–27 August, attended the 7th Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD7) in Yokohama, Japan, on 28–29 August; and attended the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September. Botswana hosted the Joint Botswana/North Carolina Cooperation Committee meeting on 17–18 July in Gaborone.

Socioeconomic Developments

As part of efforts to facilitate trade, Botswana acceded to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement in February. Meanwhile, economic performance remained steady, with no evident shift in economic indicators noted. Inflation was sustained within the Bank of Botswana’s defined range of 3–6%. gdp growth remained low, at 3.6%. Government put foreign reserves at P 74.2 bn in August. In terms of world rankings, in the 2019 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report Botswana emerged 91st out of 141 countries surveyed, while the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report placed the country at 86th position out of 190 countries.

Despite efforts to strengthen the country’s development, budget proposals registered yet another deficit, as in previous years: an indication that the precarious nature of the economy was far from over. The 2019/20 budget revenues and expenditure were altered to P 60.71 bn and P 68.64 bn, respectively, owing to an additional P 1.1 bn request. As result of the country’s failure to broaden its base, minerals continued to be the key revenue contributor, at P 18.43 bn.

Persistent socioeconomic barriers remained. The Botswana Multi-Topic Household Survey Report of 2015/16 put the poverty rate at 16.3%, while the unemployment rate was slightly adjusted to 17.6% (from 17.7%). However, a Quarterly Multi-Topic Survey Report (Quarter 3) of 2019 put unemployment of those aged 15 years and above at 20.7%, and youth unemployment of those between 15 and 35 years at 26.7%, suggesting a rise. The creation of jobs remained a challenge despite sustained efforts to facilitate private-sector-led economic growth. The rate of hiv prevalence remained at above 20%, with around 370,000 people infected. In November, government reported that it was on course to meeting the United Nations 90-90-90 goals, as 86% had been examined for hiv, 83% of those with hiv were on antiretroviral treatment, and 96% had their viral load under control or restrained. The government sustained implementation of social protection programmes for various susceptible groups, to alleviate hardships associated with socioeconomic barriers.