Democracy and Elections

Demonstrators took to the streets in car, Chad, drc, and Cameroon, protesting against their governments and/or against the outcome of past elections. In this year, only one country held national elections, namely the drc : arguably, those – despite being deeply flawed – were the event with the most far-reaching effects on democracy in the entire sub-region during the year. After considerable concern, both within and outside the country, about the timing and fairness of the elections had dominated public debate over the preceding two years, they did, at least, lead to a change at the top: Joseph Kabila, having clung to his presidential position since 2016, when he should have relinquished power, did not stand in the December 2018 elections. What is more, his preferred candidate did not win. The independent election commission published the results of the presidential elections on 10 January and declared Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo the new president. However, leaked data, independent reports, and profound analyses all suggested that opposition candidate Martin Fayulu had received a majority of the votes. Officially, Tshisekedi won by a margin of 3.8%, but observers were convinced that Kabila simply preferred him over the more radical Fayulu, manipulating results accordingly. After a period of uncertainty and tension, Tshisekedi was confirmed as president by the constitutional court on 20 January, provoking Fayulu to declare himself the winner of the elections. The public outcry was much lower than expected: the Congolese population seemed to be satisfied that the Kabila era was over – irrespective of the exact score and of who should truly have been the winner. One of the new president’s weaknesses was the low number of members of parliament elected from his alliance of parties (only about one-tenth of the Lower House) in the parallel legislative elections. Some seats in two insecure provinces (North Kivu, Yumbi) could only be filled during the year, but this did not alter the situation profoundly. Indirect senate elections were held on 14 March and were a blow to Tshisekedi’s ambitions: a large majority of the seats (91 out of 108) went to the ‘Front Commun pour le Congo’ (fcc), the platform supported by Kabila. Provincial assembly members, i.e. the only voters in senatorial elections, were under pressure and reportedly received bribes to vote for fcc candidates. Similarly, the outcome of gubernatorial elections was not favourable to Tshisekedi. Subsequently, the new president manoeuvred carefully, with a mix of concessions to his still-powerful predecessor Kabila and first steps in augmenting his own autonomy.

Chad’s parliamentary elections, overdue since 2015, were again postponed, this time until December 2020. The government invoked funding shortfalls and the unstable security situation following attacks by Boko Haram. While such threats were real, the opposition had reason to believe that the regime was too quick in declaring elections impossible to hold and that in reality it feared losing many seats, if not the majority, due to its growing unpopularity. A new political party (‘les Transformateurs’) with a rhetorically strong leadership made headlines but was not officially recognised for formalistic reasons. Only in July was a ban on social media imposed in March 2018 lifted.

In car , core opposition parties and several civil society groups formed a new opposition platform, mostly in protest over government concessions to armed groups which were a consequence of a controversial and internationally brokered peace agreement that did not include non-armed opposition movements. International mediators were accused of selling out democracy for entirely uncertain prospects of peace. The opposition thereby also prepared for elections scheduled for 2020. President Archange-Faustin Touadéra was losing not only popular support but most of his main political allies. Several meetings of the opposition platform were disbanded by security forces.

Cameroonian security forces arrested opposition leader Maurice Kamto and several others in January. They had protested against the 2018 presidential election results – which had allowed President Paul Biya to serve a seventh mandate after 36 years in power already – and called for a recount. Kamto was charged with insurrection. His trial in September attracted a lot of international attention, which was most probably what triggered the decision to release him later in October. A “Grand National Dialogue”, aimed at resolving the Anglophone crisis, was held between 30 September and 4 October. President Biya had made it clear when announcing the event that it would take place “within the context of the constitution”; this clearly meant that the form of the state (unitary or federal) and the issue of secession were not on the agenda. This conditioned the participation at the forum, with most opposition parties and separatist movements refusing to attend. Prominent opponent and former barrister Akere Muna declared on the second day that he would withdraw unless the form of the state were to be discussed. With the prime minister (Joseph Dion Ngute) presiding over the event, in analogy to a so-called ‘Tripartite Conference’ in 1991 which fell short of expectations of a more revolutionary ‘National Conference’ as in other Francophone countries, public expectations regarding far-reaching conclusions were low. The resulting proposals were nevertheless not entirely cosmetic, granting special status to the two Anglophone regions and more local autonomy more generally. Already on 18 December, a general code of regional and local authorities was passed by the National Assembly, at an extraordinary pace. However, trust in the government was so low that no effect on either the armed conflict or the domestic political climate more generally could be observed.

Similarly, or even slightly worse, in Congo one competitor to President Sassou Nguesso in the 2016 elections, André Okombi Salissa, stood in a trial that was meant to intimidate any challengers to the Sassou family’s rule. Okombi Salissa was found guilty of threatening state security on 7 March and sentenced to 20 years of forced labour (similarly to a further opposition candidate, General Moukoko, condemned one year earlier).

Contested family rule and dynastic politics were features also in neighbouring Gabon, where the Bongo regime reacted nervously to the coup attempt in early January which came after last year’s stroke that had incapacitated President Ali Bongo for at least two months. Bongo appointed a new prime minister and thereafter reshuffled his government no less than eight times during the year. A number of former ministers even ended up in jail. The background to such elite struggles was that two factions within the Bongo family were struggling to gain more influence by filling important positions. Criticising family businesses was even more dangerous in Equatorial Guinea, where President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo marked 40 years in power and tried to manage an ongoing feud between his sons Teodorín and Gabriel Lima, both in ministerial positions and vying for his succession. Much as in earlier years, opposition activists were beaten by police and arrested, and some were tortured.

While all was not well in São Tomé and Príncipe (stp), with quarrels within the political elite mostly in relation to the justice system but also with regard to the internal dynamics of one of the key political parties, the island republic looked again very different from all other countries of the region.

Overall, international ratings of democracy in Central Africa did not change fundamentally. The Freedom House index classified Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Congo as “not free” with a worsening record, with the same category attributed to car and drc but slight improvements noted, and with Chad fully unchanged in the same category. Only stp was regarded as “free”. This situation contrasted with that of other African sub-regions, where a lot of hybrid regimes (“partly free” according to Freedom House) could be found.

Instability, War, and Peace

This was another year with depressing news from the sub-region, though from a bird’s eye perspective some improvements in the long-term violent crises of drc and car could be detected. However, four countries had many fatalities reported according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (acled): for drc, 3,660 fatalities were recorded, about 600 more than in the previous year, while the fatalities in Chad more than doubled from 224 to 505, nearly reaching the level of the count in car (576). In Cameroon, despite a decrease of 20%, some 1,200 fatalities were still recorded. Such figures can only partially describe the conflicts in these countries, have to be seen relative to population sizes, and also should be observed critically, as deaths from the peripheries of the countries could be significantly under-reported (and with massive displacements, sexual violence, hunger, and disease having other far-reaching social effects).

Formally, the peace agreement for car , signed in February in Sudan’s capital Khartoum, was a step forward and conditioned outside assistance and un involvement. However, and hardly surprisingly, most signatories did not comply with core elements of the peace agreement to which they had committed. Rebel groups, among them most factions of the former ‘Séléka’ alliance, continued to operate road blocks and proceed to violent attacks on each other, on state institutions (such as police stations), and also on un peacekeepers and civilians. While the situation improved overall in the capital Bangui, it worsened substantially in Birao (in the north-east) and tensions remained high in many other conflict zones.

In drc too, several theatres of conflict could be distinguished. While the security situation in the two Kivu provinces remained as bad as ever, with many civilians killed during the year, there was positive news in other places. The country’s armed forces lost many soldiers in combat, mostly against the Ugandan-based Allied Defence Force rebel group in the Kivus. In Ituri province, the newly elected President Tshisekedi managed to broker a peace agreement with one rebel group (while others continued to fight), and in his home region (Kasai) armed encounters went down significantly. This was not yet the case in Tanganyika province. Overall, a mixed balance-sheet could be drawn: more casualties in the east, some promising developments elsewhere.

Depicting Chad’s overall stability is difficult, with several armed confrontations being motivated quite differently. The most serious threat to the regime came from warlord Timan Erdimi. About 500 fighters began an incursion from Libya and drove towards N’Djamena in January. President Idriss Déby had to ask for military assistance from France, which used decisive air strikes to bomb the quickly advancing rebels. This action sparked controversy domestically and internationally. France was accused of keeping a dictatorial regime in power but defended itself by portraying Erdimi’s troops as “terrorists”. The classical juxtaposition of nomadic herders and farmers, mostly in Ouaddaï and Sila provinces, led to widespread violence, exacerbated by the use of easily available small arms. According to Chadian ngos, some 100 people were killed in such confrontations between May and June, and at least 50 in August. The authorities declared a state of emergency in both provinces on 20 August. In the Lake Chad area, Boko Haram incursions took a heavy toll on the official security forces in several incidents. Finally, in still another constellation, the army relied on mercenaries to fight vigilantes tied to artisanal gold miners in the northern Tibesti Mountains; the local population had other political claims, which were only superficially addressed in a ceasefire and a peace agreement document that the government managed to impose.

A coup against the incumbent president Ali Bongo took place in Gabon on 7 January. Lieutenant Ondo Obiang Kelly announced the overthrow of the regime on the airwaves of the temporarily occupied national radio station in Libreville, but neither did a popular insurrection follow nor would larger parts of the security forces take his side. The coup was quickly quelled and the insurgents arrested or killed.

In Cameroon, two distinct arenas of conflict had to be distinguished. Boko Haram or related armed groups operated mostly in the Far North region. Between January and November, 275 people were killed during attacks, according to data collected by Amnesty International. Out of the total number, 225 were civilians. Equally preoccupying was the situation in the Northwest and Southwest regions, where a growing number of secessionist armed groups fought the official security forces. Consequences were manifold: inter alia, over 840,000 pupils were deprived of school education by the conflict.

Given such developments, the number of refugees and idps remained unsurprisingly high in Central Africa. The drc, Chad, and Cameroon harboured particularly high numbers of refugees, with drc and car being the most important countries of origin. Despite continuous efforts to resettle refugees and idps, car remained at the top of the list when calculating a ratio of refugees/idps to the general population: 594,000 refugees seeking refuge, mostly in neighbouring countries, with Cameroon (293,000), drc (173,000), and Chad (94,000) the main destinations, according to unhcr. The already high number of idps grew to 687,000 in the second half of the year. This meant that more than a quarter of car’s population was on the run.

Generally, poor neighbouring countries had to cope with inflows of refugees. In Chad, 443,000 refugees were registered, most of them from Sudan. But here the number of idps also grew as a consequence of intra-state war. In November, there were more than 222,000 displaced people in the Lake Chad area, 24% more than in the previous un census.

Besides the refugees from car settling in the east, Cameroon faced to the west an inflow of Nigerians fleeing the raids attributed to Boko Haram plus the harsh counter-attacks by the Nigerian armed forces; about 109,000 Nigerian refugees were counted in Cameroon. On the other hand, up to 60,000 Anglophone Cameroonians had fled to Nigeria. Still, the very high number of 679,000 idps from the two Anglophone regions – representing nearly 15% of the local population – who were trying to protect themselves, including by moving to neighbouring provinces (over 90,000), was a new experience for the country and turned the conflict gradually into a crisis on a national scale. Nearly 300,000 idps in the Far North province (11% of the local population) had to be added to this high number.

In absolute terms, drc stood out again: while receiving 548,000 refugees mainly from Rwanda and car, the country was also the place of origin of 881,000 refugees who had fled to other countries (mainly to Angola and Zambia). According to European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (echo), there were five million idps in the drc – 6% of the population – at the end of the year, unequally distributed over the national territory with all eastern provinces most affected (but also Kasai Central). In comparison, the 20,000 refugees from drc and 23,000 refugees from Cameroon in the Republic of Congo did not count much. However, the 134,000 registered idps from earlier episodes of civil war in this country could be considered high.

The international community provided humanitarian help to those affected, but also tried to positively influence both conflict dynamics and domestic politics by upholding sanctions in drc and car: In the drc , the sanctions included an arms embargo, an asset freeze, and a travel ban for 31 individuals. The arms embargo prohibited countries from selling or supplying weapons to rebel groups in the drc. Other sanctions targeted the ancient regime of Joseph Kabila: the us sanctioned the speaker of the National Assembly and the president of the constitutional court, as well as three senior officials of drc’s national independent election commission including its president and vice president, who were allegedly involved in major corrupt deals. Their assets within us jurisdiction were blocked, and us citizens were prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. The eu also extended the sanctions for another year; among those targeted were Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, the unfortunate candidate supported by Kabila in the presidential elections. The unsc extended a modified sanctions regime against car until January 2020; however, it unanimously approved an easing of the arms embargo that applied to all sides of the conflict, permitting the procurement of light weapons by the government. President Touadéra had asked for a full lifting of the embargo given that different rebel movements were able to purchase weapons in neighbouring countries. Five rebel leaders, three Anti-balaka commanders, Joseph Kony and two of his sons, plus former president François Bozizé remained under a travel ban and asset freeze. The latter was, however, able to enter Bangui in December, ahead of the 2020 elections.

The us government suspended Cameroon from its African Growth and Opportunity Act and thereby ended preferential trade conditions because of allegations of human right violations. President Donald Trump said that Cameroon had failed to address concerns over its “persistent gross violations of internationally recognised human rights” allegedly committed by official security forces. For the same reason, the us cut more than $ 17 m in security aid and support to Cameroon in February.

The 48th meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (unsac) was held in Kinshasa from 27 to 31 May. The head of the un Regional Office for Central Africa (unoca), François Louncény Fall (from Guinea), used the opportunity to invite the Central African states to make elections “a moment of national communication and a factor for peace, security and stability” – which they clearly were not. In this regard, he lauded the (only relatively) peaceful transfer of power in the drc. Typical for such a forum was the appreciation of state-led efforts, such as those of the Cameroonian government “to find a solution” to the Anglophone crisis. The Committee also noted the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons, illicit exploitation of natural resources by criminal groups, and the proliferation of terrorist groups. But self- inspection of their own responsibility by governments was apparently not on the agenda. A further meeting of unsac took place in Luanda from 25 to 29 November. The member states adopted a declaration in which they expressed their joint intention to combat climate change, to which was attributed a major impact on peace and security in Central Africa. Louncény Fall highlighted the important role of unsac for sub-regional peace – helping to increase trust between member states and to defuse political and diplomatic tensions. A warning was attached to his words, as unsac may not survive the current financial shortages of the un.

Human Rights and Transitional Justice

The signing of the peace agreement for car in February (in Khartoum) had no tangible effect on human rights violations. Some of the signatories continued to commit serious crimes, attacking and killing civilians, raping, and illegally taxing them. Between February and October alone, minusca recorded some 600 cases of human rights and humanitarian law violations. The lack of resources and capacity of the judicial system was a serious impediment to ending a culture of impunity, although some members of armed groups were finally sentenced to prison terms. Whether those trials were fully fair was a different matter. The government developed more and more authoritarian traits and clamped down on street protests. Paul Crescent Beninga, spokesperson for the ‘Groupe de Travail de la Société Civile’, was arrested after leading a demonstration on 15 April which protested against the inclusion of representatives of armed groups in the government (as agreed by all sides in the peace agreement). In June, a similar demonstration was disbanded by force.

In Cameroon, both the armed separatist groups and the security forces committed serious human rights violations in the Anglophone areas. Separatist groups targeted civil servants and members of defence and security forces, but also ordinary people who failed to respect instructions to close schools or to follow other “ghost town” requirements. They were also responsible for numerous abductions of students, journalists, and humanitarian workers. The security forces, above all the ‘Battalion d’Intervention Rapide’ (bir), conducted extrajudicial executions and destroyed houses during their operations in the Northwest and Southwest regions. The Cameroonian government failed to address concerns regarding persistent human rights violations being committed by security forces. Violence intensified in July and August when a military court in Yaoundé ordered life sentences for ten leaders of the separatist Ambazonia Interim Government. hrw considered the trial flawed. Attacks by Islamist movements in the Far North region involved killings, abductions, mutilations, and lootings. Older people and people with disabilities were often among the victims. Freedom of expression and assembly were equally severely hampered in Cameroon. Hundreds of protesters sympathising with the opposition ‘Mouvement pour la Renaissance du Cameroun’ (mrc) were arrested during peaceful marches in spring. Most were charged by a military court for hostility against the fatherland, incitement to insurrection, offence against the president of the republic, or destruction of public buildings and goods. Torture and other ill-treatment of these and other prisoners has been reported by human rights organisations. President Biya ordered the release of his opponent Kamto on 5 October, coinciding with the end of the “Major National Dialogue” that was boycotted by the most important opposition parties and secessionists. Two days earlier, Biya had issued a decree that discontinued the court cases against 333 Anglophone activists. This was a belated signal. The continuing deterioration of the human rights situation was a source of international concern and became an issue at the un Human Rights Council in its October session. Human rights defenders expressed disappointment at this occasion about the lack of follow-up.

The state of emergency declared over the Ouaddaï and Sila regions of Chad in August had a negative effect on human rights. Security and defence forces used excessive force and arbitrarily arrested and detained people. Two deaths as a result of torture in police custody were reported. Boko Haram used mines, suicide attacks, kidnapping, and night attacks targeting not only official security forces but also civilians in the Lake Chad area. Human rights defenders were targeted themselves: the secretary-general of the ‘Convention Tchadienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme’, Mahamat Nour Ahmat Ibedou, was temporarily arrested by security forces on unspecified charges. On the positive side, in November the N’Djamena court of appeal released detainees who had been behind bars for nine years without a court decision. The right to assembly was, as in many previous years, under attack: even a demonstration by the victims of former president Hissène Habré (1982–90) to demand payment of damages ordered by the N’Djamena court of appeal was repressed by the security forces, although this did not directly concern the current regime. Originally, CFAfr 82 bn ($ 153 m) was awarded to 7,396 named victims, and an au trust fund was mandated to raise this money, mostly by searching for Habré’s assets. The au had already allocated $ 5 m for reparations, but the fund had not become operational 30 months after the Dakar verdict. hrw qualified this in no uncertain terms: “Habré’s victims fought relentlessly for 25 years to bring the dictator and his henchmen to justice, and were awarded millions of dollars, but they haven’t seen one penny in reparations.”

The power shift in drc led to a slight improvement of the human rights situation, with hundreds of prisoners of conscience released and exiled activists allowed back in the country. In January, the old regime heavy-handedly stopped public demonstrations protesting against election manipulations and asking for publication of all election results. It also shut down the internet and banned several media for 20 days. The ongoing armed conflicts in the east were again accompanied by severe human rights violations, committed by not only Congolese rebels and security forces but also armed groups originating in neighbouring countries. International mining companies used private security firms, operating jointly with state police and security forces, to dislodge artisanal miners by force from production sites. They also used excessive violence against the informal miners.

Equatorial Guinea again targeted human rights activists. Joaquín Elo Ayeto was arrested on charges of holding information in the context of a planned assassination of the president. He was tortured, threatened with death, and finally tried on 21 November on charges of defamation and threats against the president. Alfredo Okenve, another prominent human rights defender, severely beaten in 2018, was held under house arrest. A giant trial opened on 22 March before the Bata provincial court: 130 people (including prominent members of the opposition) were accused of treason, personal injury to the head of state, rebellion, possession of arms and ammunition depots, terrorism, and terrorism financing. On 31 May, 112 of them were found guilty and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 3 to 97 years. In an extraordinary initiative, eight ngos, either within Equatorial Guinea (the Center for Development Studies and Initiatives in Equatorial Guinea and eg Justice) or outside the continent (ai, Global Witness, hrw, Natural Resource Governance Institute, Oxfam, Publish What You Pay, plus all eight civil society members of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative/eiti), wrote an open letter to the imf executive board expressing reservations about the desperately needed credit scheme for the financially embattled government. They requested that the board delay any vote to allow for further consultation and risk assessment, pointing to past mismanagement and grand corruption, but also to the repression, harassment, and overt physical abuse of good governance advocates. Notwithstanding, the imf did approve the loan in mid-December.

With the strong focus of the icc on Central Africa and the comparatively new Special Criminal Court (scc) for car, a considerable share of the international attention devoted to the sub-region was in the field of transitional justice. Some older cases were now considered closed, but others dragged on or were only begun.

On 8 July, the icc found Bosco Ntaganda, one of the leaders of the ‘Union des Patriotes Congolais’ (upc), guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 2002–03. The fact that it was only 16 years after the events that a judgment could be reached was indicative of the main problem of this form of justice: the deterrence effect is very limited and the same sort of atrocities listed could be committed in the Ituri area of drc by subsequent generations of warlords. In its ruling, the icc found that a preconceived strategy of targeting the civilian population was put into practice by the upc and that Ntaganda was liable as a direct perpetrator for aspects of three of the crimes, namely murder as a crime against humanity and a war crime and persecution as a crime against humanity. He was also convicted as an indirect perpetrator for the remaining crimes (including rape, sexual slavery, persecution, forcible transfer, and deportation). On 7 November, Trial Chamber vi sentenced Ntaganda to a total of 30 years of imprisonment.

More recent were the crimes for which two Anti-balaka leaders from car were arrested and deported from car to the icc. Alfred Yekatom faced a long list of accusations ranging from murder to torture to enlistment of child soldiers, as well as forcible transfer of population. The alleged crimes were committed in various locations in and around car’s capital, Bangui. The charges against Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona were similar but also included acts of violence in Bossangoa in the west of the country. Both Anti-balaka leaders had actively targeted Muslim communities at the height of the civil war between September 2013 and December 2014. Yekatom had appeared before Pre-Trial Chamber ii for the first time on 23 November 2018, Ngaïssona only on 25 January. On 20 February, the Chamber decided to join the cases and on 11 December it decided unanimously to confirm partially the charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity brought by the prosecutor against the two men, committing them to trial. The proceedings in The Hague were controversial back in car, as only Anti-balaka leaders were transferred while none of the opposing Séléka leaders were: they were instead courted to participate in peace talks and some received key positions in the post-conflict order while accusations of similar crimes were still in the air.

A partial answer to this was the installation of the scc as hybrid jurisdiction, staffed by national and international judges and operating in Bangui. It quickly received 27 complaints, some of them referred by the ordinary courts. It was unclear when the first indictments would be processed and whether this would concern the opposite side in the original armed confrontation. hrw pointed to a crucial lack of funding and stated that the scc had “had a slow start and needs to intensify investigations so trials can be initiated based on strong, compelling evidence”. Overall, international actors underestimated the symbolic and political consequences of a perceived one-sidedness in judicial proceedings. A Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission was another envisaged instrument of transitional justice for car. This element was included in the peace agreement signed by 14 rebel organisations in February, but questions went beyond issues of funding and timing: victims of violence feared that their voices would remain unheard here too, in the name of upholding a fragile peace.

Socioeconomic Developments

According to the imf, cemac’s economic and financial situation improved over the year. Stable oil exports, a moderate increase in imports, and overall stable capital flows contributed to this moderately positive picture. But economic activity remained well below pre-crisis levels. In line with this assessment, growth rates were below expectations for the region’s governments. As in previous years, the AfDB announced higher rates than the imf: overall for the sub-region (not including stp), AfDB announced a gdp growth rate of 2.4%, contrasting with barely 1.5% given by the imf. With these figures, Central Africa would again fare less well than Africa on average (at 3.4%; imf), worse than East Africa, better than Southern Africa, and somewhat similarly to West Africa. The imf’s World Economic Outlook (published in April 2020) reported modestly satisfactory gdp growth rates for car (estimated at 3%), the drc (4.4%), and Cameroon (3.7%). After two years of recession (2016 and 2017) following the fall of prices for oil on the world market, which led to a debt crisis, Chad could show gdp growth reaching 3% in 2019. Gabon’s economic recovery continued thanks to the momentum created by non-oil activities (mines, timber, rubber, and palm oil), resulting in an estimated real gdp growth of 3.4%. By contrast, gdp declined in Congo (−0.9%) and – again dramatically – in Equatorial Guinea (−6.1%).

For Cameroon, a dynamic tertiary sector and growth in consumption and investment were seen as guaranteeing modest growth. In car , the recovery of agricultural and mining activities was noted. But both countries experienced a challenging security situation, not least in productive farming areas. Chad’s recovery was attributed to good harvests of grain and cotton and a higher level of oil production. The assessment of Congo varied strongly between imf and AfDB. The slower growth of drc ’s economy was attributed to, inter alia, the fall of prices of raw materials, but also energy shortages and low productivity in agriculture. Equatorial Guinea’s shrinking economy was again imputed to the low oil price on the world market, the country depending nearly entirely on this export commodity.

Rather good news came from the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation), with only three countries in the worst category of “repressed” economies and five countries (Chad, car, Gabon, stp, and Cameroon) now in the “mostly unfree” category. Only the assessment of drc showed a negative trend, but with Congo ranked 176th out of 180, the worst rating received within the sub-region, a tiny amount of progress would certainly also not mean much. Gabon ranked best, at 118th. The World Bank’s Doing Business report provided a similar picture: Cameroon ranked best (167th out of 190) followed by Gabon, stp, Equatorial Guinea, and Congo. Chad, the drc, and car were again at the very bottom of the worldwide ranking (at ranks 182, 183, and 184, respectively).

At an estimated 2.8%, the overall inflation rate was close to the 3% threshold fixed by cemac. One major concern was the strong dependence of most member states on oil income: for the six countries of the cemac zone combined, some 39% of the value of exports was based on crude oil. The ongoing low price levels for oil products on the world market were clearly bad news for at least five countries of the sub-region (Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Congo, Gabon, and also to a lesser degree Cameroon).

The most dangerous epidemic disease was again Ebola, with its high death rate of over 50% of all infected. A new outbreak in drc had already been recorded in August 2018: more than 1,000 cases were reported in North Kivu and Ituri provinces before March 2019, and during the next three months this number doubled. Infection rates remained high over the following two months. From September onwards, the disease started to decline slowly for the rest of the year. Fighting in this area made the provision of assistance a daunting task.

Sub-Regional Organisations

All major sub-regional organisations in Central Africa experienced substantial crisis, not least with their own funding. Theoretically, far-reaching decisions were on the agenda of all organisations, but they received only limited attention.

cemac was obviously struggling with the prospect of deep reform or even abolition of the cfa franc, but also with its own underfunding. Heads of state of car, Chad, and Congo and prime ministers of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon met for the 14th summit on 24 March in N’Djamena. The slow implementation of the free movement of people and goods within the Community – originally accepted in 2017 – was countered by the adoption of a common policy on emigration, immigration, and protection of the Community’s borders. The summit had to reiterate the necessity of applying a decision taken earlier to suppress the need for visas within the Community. Previously, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon had blocked progress on this question, fearing a massive inflow of migrants. With their economic downturns, both countries now looked much less attractive to many – which may have caused a change in their risk assessment. The participants in the summit also reiterated their commitment to multilateral surveillance of public finances in the member states. Thus, the macroeconomic performance of member states must now meet the new convergence criteria of cemac. It was also agreed that a reliable early-warning system should be established. To complete the institutional set-up of the Community, the election of members of the cemac parliament by indirect universal suffrage was decided, but modalities were not yet fixed. Above all, what such a chamber, made up of hand-picked representatives of six authoritarian regimes, would add in terms of the region’s democratisation was entirely unclear. Funding was another thorny issue. While the Community’s autonomous financing mechanism did not work well and arrears in payments were deplored, the Commission was also invited by the heads of state to seek further sources of funding.

Presidents Biya, Touadéra, Sassou Nguesso, Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, and Idriss Déby Itno and Prime Minister Nkoghe Bekale (representing Gabon’s President Bongo) met also for an extraordinary cemac summit in Yaoundé on Friday 22 November. The final communiqué announced, somewhat prematurely, the overall recovery of the macroeconomic situation in the cemac zone, marked by positive economic growth, control of inflation, and a sharp reduction in the budget and current account deficits of member states. These statements had to be seen in the context of tighter surveillance by the imf. In December, imf directors considered that the composition of fiscal consolidation efforts would have to be “rebalanced by increasing non-oil domestic revenue, in order to preserve social spending and public investment”. The Yaoundé summit also called for the pursuit of institutional reforms within beac and vaguely confirmed a “willingness to develop the cfa franc”, including a readiness to deeply reflect on the conditions and framework for new cooperation (with France). In December, uemoa had reached a deal with France to gradually reduce the latter’s influence over this separate cfa zone and to rename the currency; Central Africa lagged behind. The beac and the Central African Monetary Union were invited by the summit to propose a plan in that regard. Fears were voiced that a devaluation of the currency would lead to a significant rise in social tensions due to higher inflation, while it could of course boost export earnings. Only at the margins were issues of security challenges and international terrorism dealt with.

The Ninth Extraordinary Session of ceeac’s Conference of Heads of State and Government was held in Libreville on 18 December after months of preparations that included many working visits by secretary-general Ahmad Allam-Mi and by Gabon’s foreign minister Alain Claude Bilie By Nze to the capitals of the region. Despite such efforts, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea were represented only by their prime ministers, Angola, Burundi, Congo, and Rwanda by their foreign ministers. Just five heads of state made it to Libreville. The only, but truly substantial, topic on the agenda was institutional reform of the ceeac, with, as a cornerstone, the replacement of the secretariat with a ceeac commission. au Commission president Faki Mahamat assisted as a guest, as did unoca’s Louncény Fall, representative of the unsg, underlining that ceeac was taken more seriously outside the region than within. The country officials signed a number of legal instruments necessary for the institutional reform of ceeac. They also committed their governments to ratifying the amended treaty within six months.

On 19 December, the 65th cblt Council of Ministers took place in Yaoundé; all member states except Libya were represented. The main item on the agenda was the progress of the project on water transfer and improvement of hydraulics within the Chad sea basin. Given the sobering financial situation of the organisation, with most member states not paying their contribution in time (and Nigeria being lauded for having paid all arrears as the only apparent exception), the executive secretariat was charged with finding donors for a study worth $ 2 m on the hydraulics matter. Even this modest sum could not be mobilised from within the organisation and its member states. Recruitment of staff was stopped until further notice.