Domestics Politics

President Khama sustained his tour of the country, ahead of his last day in office (31 March), to bid the nation farewell. He received gifts, which met with disapproval in certain quarters. On 20 January, the Botswana Democratic Party (bdp) conducted primary elections in constituencies controlled by the opposition. It held its national council on 16 and 17 March in Gaborone, at which it also bid President Khama farewell and showered him with gifts.

On 1 April, Mokgweetsi Masisi automatically succeeded Khama as new head of state, in line with the constitution. During his inauguration speech, President Masisi identified unemployment as a priority, particularly amongst the youth. Given Masisi’s ascendancy to the presidency, the bdp’s central committee elected Slumber Tsogwane as the party’s chairman, in line with the party’s constitution. Masisi maintained ministerial portfolios but reshuffled his cabinet, dropping some of those who had been ministers under Khama, and nominated Slumber Tsogwane as vice president. His endorsement by parliament surprised many, probably including Khama, as it was generally believed that Masisi was going to nominate Tshekedi Khama, Khama’s brother. It was also generally believed that Masisi was going to be a protégé of Khama. However, things evolved differently. The party also held an extraordinary congress in Gaborone, on 8 and 12 June, the first under the leadership of Masisi. On 23 April, Kentse Rammidi, the Botswana Congress Party’s (bcp) former secretary general and the party’s parliamentary candidate for Kanye North constituency in the 2014 general elections, resigned and joined the bdp. On 2 May, Masisi sacked Isaac Kgosi, the revered director general of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (diss) and Khama’s close ally. He was immediately replaced with his nemesis, Peter Magosi. This gave rise to suggestions that Kgosi was going to be prosecuted for his alleged corruption, widely covered by the private media (see below) – state media remained mute on them. Kgosi’s sacking was well received in certain quarters, including by opposition parties. Khama requested that Kgosi be appointed his private secretary. When his request was denied by the government, Khama threatened to challenge the government in court but ultimately did not carry out his threat. Unsurprisingly, media reports suggested that relations between Masisi and Khama were strained. In July, Masisi resuscitated the All-Party Conference, which is provided for in the constitution and had not met under Khama’s presidency.

On 5 November, Masisi held his maiden State of the Nation address. Interestingly, and for the first time, Botswana Television offered live coverage of the responses of the leader of the opposition, Duma Boko, and of the leader of the minority ­opposition, Ndaba Gaolathe, to the address, which was a drastic departure from Khama’s government. Masisi openly and officially admitted his differences with Khama, thus affirming persistent media reports of their uneasy relationship, which Masisi had failed to acknowledge during his maiden press briefing in May. Masisi stated that “the transition from the previous administration has not been as smooth as expected”, and that attempts to resolve this had failed, much to the chagrin of Khama and his supporters. Masisi’s declaration triggered an immediate rebuttal from Khama, as well as public outbursts by the two leaders.

The opposition alliance Umbrella for Democratic Change (udc) was equally afflicted by internal squabbles, with its differences playing out in public, much to the disappointment of its supporters. According to media reports, the Botswana Movement for Democracy (bmd), and to some extent the Botswana People’s Party (bpp), queried the bcp’s membership in the alliance. The udc held its constitutional consultative congress, and launch, in Gaborone on 23–24 February, at which it discussed its draft constitution, policies, and governance principles. An invitation was extended to the Alliance for Progressives (ap), a breakaway faction of the bmd. It was suggested in certain quarters that the bmd was going to be expelled from the alliance at the congress, but that was not the case. On 13 August, government turned down a request by the leader of the udc and president of the Botswana National Front (bnf), Duma Boko, to register the udc’s amended constitution, stating that the udc was “not a political party but a cooperation agreement” and that “the registration of the udc’s Constitution falls outside the scope of the Act”. The government also stated that it was in possession of two other documents lodged by other members of the udc – the bmd and the bpp – which suggested that members of the alliance disagreed over its constitution. According to media reports, the amended constitution was meant to make the bcp acceptable as a member of the alliance. On 25 September, udc suspended the bmd from the alliance, a decision that was immediately rebuffed by the bmd. In October, the udc expelled the bmd, and the bmd challenged its expulsion in court. The court was yet to decide at the time of writing. The bmd, and to some extent the bpp, consistently contested the bcp’s membership of the udc.

In January, the Court of Appeal put the failure of the Public Service Bargaining Council (psbc) on both the government and the Botswana Federation of Public Sector Unions (bofepusu) after they each decided to pull out of the psbc over their protracted discord, which in turn gave rise to several court cases, polarising relations between Khama’s government and the unions. On 28 March, bofepusu held a march against corruption. The same day, government announced a 3% salary increase, to be implemented from 1 April. Unlike his predecessor, who had engaged in an adversarial relationship with the unions, Masisi pledged to activate the psbc on his accession to the presidency on 1 April. However, the implementation of his pledge was further delayed when his government on 16 October decided to ask public sector unions to seek new validation agreements with government by close of July 2019, a decision that the unions disagreed with, securing a temporary deferral in court. In turn, it was decided in December that the 2019/20 and 2020/21 salaries be conducted not involving the psbc, following collective labour agreements, demonstrating that tensions between the government and the unions continued, even if they had, to some extent, subsided.

Some by-elections were held. On 24 March, the bdp won a council by-election in Ralekgetho in the Moshupa Manyana constituency. In April, the udc won a parliamentary by-election in Mochudi East constituency. On 19 May, the udc won a council by-election in Moselewapula ward in the Francistown West constituency, while the bdp held its party primary for the Moshupa Manyana constituency parliamentary by-election created by Masisi’s ascendancy to the presidency. The parliamentary by-election for Moshupa Manyana constituency, held on 16 June, was won by the bdp. The by-election showed cracks were apparent amongst members of the opposition alliance, with the bmd objecting to the bnf’s proposal to field a candidate. Party congresses were held by the Alliance for Progressives in Mochudi on 14–17 July and by the bcp in Bobonong on 14–17 July; the bnf held its congress in Rakops on 14–17 July. bdp party primary elections were held on 25 August in the remaining constituencies (constituencies controlled or won by the party in 2014) following a postponement from the initial date of 11 August, with the party citing a voter’s roll that had been tampered with, potentially impacting the integrity of the election. The primary election results were challenged in a number of areas, with re-runs allowed by the party in a few constituencies, in December. Several sitting ministers lost party primary elections.

In July, Duma Boko tabled without success a parliamentary motion of no confidence against Masisi and his government. The motion exposed Boko to disparaging remarks by members of the bdp in parliament, who accused him of failing to hold the opposition alliance together. It was suggested in certain quarters that Khama was behind Boko’s initiative. In October, the bdp suspended Tshepang Mabaila, its parliamentary candidate for Moditshane constituency, for five years. Mabaila, considered an associate of Khama, was said to have secretly urged some bdp members of parliament to endorse Boko’s no-confidence motion against Masisi.

On 14 December, Masisi announced a cabinet reshuffle involving five ministries. Interestingly, Khama’s brother, Tshekedi Khama, was appointed minister of youth empowerment, sports, and culture development, which was considered a demotion in certain circles, from being minister of environment, natural resources, conservation, and tourism. The bdp party presidency remained contested. Media reports suggested that Khama had not resigned as president of the bdp, reports that were denied by the party. In December, Kamal Jacobs, who lost the party primary elections for Lobatse constituency, lodged a court case contesting that Masisi was not the leader of the bdp, which was in line with Khama’s contention that he had not resigned as the party’s leader. Jacobs anticipated that Khama would be called as a witness, but this did not materialise. On 18 December, Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi announced that she would contest the party presidency at the 2019 party congress. Her decision seemingly infuriated Masisi and his supporters, as she was immediately sacked from cabinet, where she had served as minister of local government and rural development, and replaced by Frans Solomon Van Der Westhuizen. Venson-Moitoi was associated with a party faction, ‘New Jerusalem’, linked to Khama. Subsequently, Khama declared his support for Venson-Moitoi’s candidature, further affirming that his relationship with Masisi was strained. In some quarters, Venson-Moitoi was widely disparaged and was considered as being used by Khama to spite Masisi. The differences and the public spat between Masisi and Khama, with the two leaders openly disparaging each other, tore the party apart. Supporters of Masisi accused Khama of being reluctant to retire; supporters of Khama and his group labelled Masisi as somewhat intolerant. Media reports attributed Masisi’s and Khama’s differences to Masisi’s government’s decision to reverse some of Khama’s policies and reduce his expenses. Masisi reduced Khama’s security detail and impounded arms of war (sic) at Khama’s private residency in Mosu village, in central Botswana. Khama was also barred from flying army aircraft. Interestingly, Khama vented his frustrations through the private media, of which he had been intolerant during his presidency.

Malfeasance and money laundering continued to make headlines in the private media, with the state media maintaining its silence as in the past. According to media reports, corruption was entrenched and widespread, implicating senior public servants and politicians, revealing the apparent weaknesses in anti-corruption institutions. One of the cases to which the private media gave sustained and intense coverage involved Isaac Kgosi. Despite pressure to sack Kgosi, in the light of persistent allegations of Kgosi’s involvement in corruption, Khama had failed to do so. In fact, Kgosi was considered in some circles as ‘untouchable’ and ‘the most powerful man in Botswana’ because of his known proximity to Khama and because of the fear that his organisation had instilled in citizens. Masisi finally dismissed Kgosi on 2 May (see above), according to media reports because he had permitted Khama access to a diss aircraft after the government declined Khama the use of Botswana Defence Force (bdf) aircraft, as had been the custom during his and Festus Mogae’s presidencies. Another reason suggested was Kgosi’s utterances when appearing before the Public Accounts Committee (pac) of parliament, which was probing assertions of wrongdoing regarding the P (pula) 250 m National Petroleum Fund (npf) scandal, at which he was reported to have said ‘he does not account to anyone’.

The npf money laundering case continued to make damaging newspaper headlines, with additional names included on the charge sheet. In November twin brothers Zein Kebonang and Sadique Kebonang, Bakang Seretse and his brother Mogomotsi Seretse, Kenneth Kerekang, and Kago Stimela, as well as six companies, were charged in relation to the scandal, while Botho Leburu was left off the revised charge sheet. Zein Kebonang is a high court judge; Sadique Kebonang is mp for Lobatse constituency and was minister of mineral resources, green technology, and energy security under Khama. Media reports also associated Kgosi, Khama, Masisi, and other politicians to the npf scandal, reports that Khama and Masisi denied. There was relentless pressure for charges to be laid against Sadique Kebonanng and Kgosi, with the bcp proposing private prosecution.

The other contentious and complex corruption scandal that attracted sustained negative headlines and which was widely reported by the private media involved the Botswana Public Officers Pension Fund (bpopf) and Capital Management Botswana (cmb), regarding the possible mismanagement of around P 500 m of the bpopf, managed by cmb. Media reports suggested that cmb and Carter Morupisi, the permanent secretary to the president, were being investigated by the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (dcec), with reports of cmb vehicles being withheld in March by the dcec, including a vehicle that associated Pinny Morupisi, the wife of Carter Morupisi, with cmb. Morupisi, who was bpopf’s chairman, was being investigated by the dcec for his alleged dubious dealings with cmb. The government failed to sack Morupisi, with some beginning to question Masisi’s declared anti-corruption crusade. Masisi was also associated with the cmb scandal, as he was reported to have received funds when campaigning for the position of bdp chairman in 2017. Media reports suggested that the former director general of the diss, Isaac Kgosi, was an associate of Morupisi. On 5 November, Masisi stated that a draft Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Bill was in place, geared towards promoting openness in government.

Under Khama’s regime, the number of reports in which foreigners were declared prohibited immigrants increased. From 1 April, few such cases were recorded. In May, Masisi went back on his pronouncement that declared Mr Jao Carlos Salbany, a lawyer, an unwanted immigrant, and stated that it was an error and offered to apologise, supposedly as a result of pressure – the pronouncement had met with disapproval in certain quarters. Masisi pledged to revise some immigration laws that worked against investors setting up in Botswana. In May, a high court judge, Omphemetse Motumise, annulled Khama’s pronouncement rendering Peter Ogbole, a Nigerian citizen, an unwanted immigrant. Motumise was appointed from January after he successfully challenged Khama’s decision not to appoint him as a judge at the Court of Appeal. In September, the government withdrew its sedition charge, made under Khama’s government, against ‘Sunday Standard’ newspaper editor Outsa Mokone, which had met with disapproval, both nationally and internationally.

In August, the government surprisingly announced that the Electoral (Amendment) Act of 2016 – which provided for electronic voting, provoking disapproval in certain quarters and which had been challenged by the bcp in court – was not going to be put into effect for the 2019 elections. In turn the Electoral Act [Cap.02:09] was going to apply. In preparation for the 2019 general elections, the Independent Electoral Commission (iec) conducted a general voter registration exercise from 3 September to 11 November. As with past general registration exercises, the iec failed to meet its target, registering 750,965 voters out of a possible 1,592,350. This could be an indication that voter apathy was becoming entrenched. In turn, the iec announced a supplementary or additional voter registration period, from 17 December to 31 March 2019.

Foreign Affairs

Khama upheld his upfront policy until his retirement. On 12 January, Botswana denounced remarks attributed to us president Donald Trump that described African nations and Haiti as ‘shithole’ countries and urged other broad-minded nations and institutions to condemn them. On 26 February, Botswana disparaged foreign political leaders who failed to vacate office at the end of their term, singling out the drc and advising the global community to call on the leadership in the drc to vacate office. On 26 February, Botswana denounced Syria for “the worsening humanitarian situation” under the Assad government and deplored the unsc for failing to resolve the Syrian conflict. Similarly, on 17 May Botswana declared its uneasiness over the worsening state of affairs in the Gaza Strip, after the United States declared its intention to move its embassy to Jerusalem. On 5 November, the government pledged to join the aprm. It continued to support the icc.

Foreign relation activities were business as usual. On 28–29 January, Masisi, the then vice president, led a delegation to the Thirty-Second Ordinary Session of the Executive Council and to the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the au in Addis Ababa. President Khama visited Namibia on 5–6 February. On 12–13 February, Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa visited, while South African president Cyril Ramaphosa visited on 3 March. The president of the Saharawi Republic, Brahim Ghalin, and the president of the Federal Republic of Germany visited on 31 May–2 June and on 21–22 November, respectively.

In contrast to his predecessor, Masisi made numerous foreign trips, thus sustaining the country’s commitment to its foreign policy and relations. Countries visited included Namibia and Zimbabwe (9 April), Angola and Zambia (12 April), South Africa (13 April), Mozambique (16 April), Lesotho (30 April), Mauritius (3 May), Malawi and the Seychelles (7 May), Comoros (8 May), the Kingdom of Eswatini (17 May), Zambia (28 June), China (31 August–2 September), and Mozambique (31 October–2 November). Masisi also attended a number of meetings, summits, conferences, forums, and other international events, including the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (17–20 April); the brics Outreach Dialogue, South Africa (27 July); the Thirty-Eighth sadc Summit, Windhoek, Namibia (16 August); the inauguration of Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa (26 August); the Seventy-Third unga (25–28 September); the Illegal Trade Conference, London (10–12 October); the World Investment Forum, Geneva (22–26 October); the Eleventh Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the au, Addis Abbaba (17–18 November); the Twenty-Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP24) to the un Framework Convention on Climate Change, Katowice (2–5 December); and the Joint Summit of the sadc and the icglr, Brazzaville (26 December).

Vincent Seretse, the minister of international affairs and cooperation, attended the Hundred and Seventh Session of the acp Council of Ministers (27–30 May), the Forty-Third acp-eu Joint Council of Ministers Meeting (31 May-1 June), and the Seventeenth Africa-Nordic Ministerial Forum (6–8 June). Unity Dow was appointed as his successor on 20 June. She led a delegation to the Thirty-First Ordinary Session of the au Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Nouakchott, Mauritania (1–2 July), after Masisi could not travel. Dow also visited China (11–14 July) and attended the Retreat of the African Executive Council on the Reform of the au Commission (12–13 September), as well as the Ninth Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council, Addis Abbaba (14 September); the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development Ministerial Meeting, Yokohama (5–7 October); and the Fourth Session of the Joint Permanent Commission on Cooperation, Abuja (15–17 October).

Socioeconomic Developments

The country sustained its economic diversification drive, which was critical to reducing its dependency on minerals and a narrow growth base. Diversification of the economy was more urgent in light of the pressing challenges of poverty and unemployment, especially amongst the youth, which Masisi made his uppermost priorities. In January, Botswana embraced the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement Area. Inflation remained steady and kept within the central bank range of 3–6%, recorded at 3.2% during the first part of the year. Botswana secured and sustained attractive ratings from Standard & Poor’s, and Moody’s Investors (A-/A-2 and A2 respectively), a sign of confidence in its policies and institutions. The country slipped (to 90/140 countries) in the wef’s 2018 Global Competiveness Index.

The 2018/19 budget put revenues and expenditure at P 64.28 bn and P 67.87 bn respectively, a shortfall of P 6.96 bn, more than the P 3.59 bn suggested initially, demonstrating once again the economy’s fragility. gdp growth was 4.5%, compared to the projected 5.3%, suggesting a slow but steady recovery of the domestic economy, although that recovery remained precarious. As expected, minerals comprised the largest source of revenue (38.3%), followed by customs and excise (23.1%) and non-mineral revenue (20.8%).

The government upheld its flagship social welfare programmes supporting vulnerable and underprivileged groups. On 5 November, Masisi estimated that 109,134 had accessed the programmes. The government also maintained its health programmes, including those that were meant to contain the hiv/aids menace. On 5 November, government declared that 94% of those in need of antiretroviral therapy had access to it, and mother-to-child transmission remained at below 2%. According to the 2015/16 Botswana Multi-topic Household Survey published in February, poverty was estimated at 16.3%, whilst unemployment was recorded at 17.7%, demonstrating that the country must continue to make concerted efforts to address these challenges.