Domestic Politics

The key political event of the year was the constitutional referendum held on 30 July. The constitution, initially drafted during the first term of President Azali Assoumani in 2001, was revised to reflect the recommendations of the Comorian National Conference, the ‘Assises Nationales Comoriennes’, a week-long national forum held in February to assess the state of the Union of Comoros 42 years after independence from France. The opposition signalled their scepticism over the exercise, arguing that the conference was, in reality, a means for Assoumani to change the constitution in order to stand for the presidency on, potentially, two further occasions.

Based on the recommendations of the National Conference, the revised constitution radically altered the existing electoral system. The proposed revisions did not entirely abandon the concept of a rotating presidency among the islands, but rather allowed a candidate to complete two consecutive terms as president. Under the existing system, Assoumani would have been required to step down in 2021 at the end of his current mandate to allow the election of a new candidate from Nzwani. Justifying his proposals, Assoumani argued that a single term was insufficient time to implement the economic reforms required for Comoros to achieve its ambition of becoming an emerging economy by 2030. Furthermore, “the rotating presidency would be strengthened, since it will be doubled … there will not be a single term, but a renewable term”. The result was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 6 August, with 92.4% of the vote choosing ‘yes’ on a turnout of 62.7%.

Having called for the electorate to boycott the referendum, the opposition denounced the conduct of the poll. The Third Way Collective, a civil society group, called the referendum “the most scandalous electoral masquerade in recent years”, claiming that voters had in reality “steered clear of the ballot box”. Alleging widespread fraud in the conduct of the poll, the Parti Juwa’s spokesman estimated a turnout nearer 7% of the electorate. In the wake of the referendum result, Assoumani announced that he intended to stand for re-election, under the provisions of the new constitution, early the following year.

The referendum took place in the context of increasing criticism of Assoumani’s alleged growing authoritarianism. Prior to the referendum, Assoumani dissolved the Constitutional Court, banned political demonstrations, and arrested and jailed opposition politicians. In particular, leading activists from Juwa, the second largest party in the National Assembly, were targeted. Juwa’s leader, former president Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, was put under house arrest in May. The party’s secretary general, Ahmed El-Barwane, was detained the day after the referendum. He was jailed for seven years at a mass trial of Juwa activists accused of ordering an assault on a police officer. In December, former vice president Jaffar Ahmed Said Hassani was sentenced in absentia to forced labour after openly criticising the constitutional reforms.

In October, there was a limited armed uprising against the authorities by masked youths in Mutsamudu, the capital of Nzwani. At least two people were killed and several wounded. In the wake of the uprising, the governor of Nzwani, Juwa’s Abdou Salami Abdou Salami, was removed from office and charged with “undermining national unity, participation in an insurrection movement, [and] complicity in murder and rebellion”.

A parallel and intersecting political development was the release in April of a parliamentary report into a scheme, initiated in 2008, to sell Comorian passports to the governments of the uae and Kuwait to provide the stateless population of those countries, known as the Bidoon, with identity documents. However, the parliamentary report indicated that beyond the 4,000 passports sold as part of the original scheme, many more had been sold outside the deal, and the revenue from these sales, thought to be at least $ 100 m, but possibly as much as $ 971 m, had gone missing. The report also found that former presidents Ahmed Abdallah Sambi and Ikililou Dhoinine were “suspected of the embezzlement of public funds”. In August, whilst already under house arrest, Sambi was further charged with “corruption, misappropriation of public funds and forgery”.

Corruption remained prevalent in Comoros, which ranked 144/180 countries in ti’s Corruption Perceptions Index for the year. Observing that “press freedom violations were on the rise”, Reporters Without Borders rated Comoros at 49/180 countries in its World Press Freedom Index, down 5 places from the previous year. In terms of political rights and civil liberties, Freedom House rated Comoros as “partly free” in its Freedom in the World survey.

Foreign Affairs

Despite France, as the former colonial power, being Comoros’s most important economic, political, and cultural partner, the dispute over whether the archipelago’s fourth island, Mayotte, is Comorian or French has long caused tension between the countries. Since 1995, France has applied a highly restrictive visa regime for Comorian citizens seeking to travel to Mayotte, an overseas department which effectively has the same political status as a French metropolitan department. The restrictions on visas has led to a maritime migration crisis involving thousands of migrants making the perilous sea crossing without French entry visas. Since the establishment of the visa regime, it is estimated that over 10,000 Comorians have been killed attempting the crossing. In April, partly in response to an escalation of anti-Comorian activity on Mayotte, the Comorian government announced that it would no longer accept the 20,000 Comorian citizens deported annually from Mayotte to Nzwani. The following month, France retaliated by refusing to issue diplomatic and service visas for Comorians seeking to travel to Mayotte, ultimately extending this ban to all Schengen visa applications.

The Comorian foreign minister, Souef Mohamed el-Amine, reaffirmed his country’s long-standing claim that Mayotte is a sovereign part of Comoros and that Comorian nationals residing on the island are on Comorian territory. The rhetoric, however, concealed the extremely close ties between France and Comoros. The French Treasury guarantees the Comorian franc, there is a defence treaty between the two countries, and about 100,000–150,000 Comorians live in France. Meetings between the respective foreign ministers in April and August failed to settle the dispute. However, arguably, the durability of the crisis was the result of Assoumani’s campaign to win the constitutional referendum. A residual cultural attachment to France notwithstanding, the issue of Mayotte’s sovereignty cuts across party and island loyalties. Previous presidents have used their annual address to the unga to reassert Comoros’s claims to the island, in so doing reaffirming their nationalist credentials. Arguably, Assoumani was willing to precipitate a major schism with his country’s closest international partner by using Mayotte to win over voters prior to the referendum. As such, the visa dispute could be seen as part of a wider strategy to win the referendum, including the suspension of the Constitutional Court and the arrest and jailing of opposition politicians.

A joint statement was made by the Comorian and French foreign ministers on 6 November normalising relations between Comoros and France and reinstating visa and deportation arrangements essentially identical to those that existed before the dispute.

In January, three agreements were signed between Comoros and the People’s Republic of China. A first agreement relates to funding the refurbishment of the National Assembly building, originally built by China. The second provides for the funding of the second phase of the national project to eliminate malaria led by a visiting team from Guangzhou University of Chinese Medicine (gzucm). The third agreement was a donation of the equivalent of $ 15 m to be spent on infrastructural projects. Foreign Minister El-Amine announced that Comoros had “chosen to make China a strategic partner”. In September, Assoumani met Chinese president Xi Jinping in Beijing during the focac. Xi offered his support for Assoumani’s drive to make Comoros an emerging economy by 2030 by aligning China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Comoros’s Strategy for Accelerated Growth. In return, Assoumani offered his firm backing for the one-China policy.

In November, Foreign Minister El-Amine met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow. In a joint statement, the two foreign ministers promised to “consolidate their cooperation and partnership in the areas of education, security, fisheries, tourism and renewable energies” and to “strengthen and deepen their relations by raising them to a strategic level”. Lavrov also raised the issue of the status of Mayotte, declaring “countries that have organised the separation of Mayotte from the Comoros … show us flagrant examples of a policy of double standards”.

A further revision to the constitution approved in July enshrined Islam, specifically the Shafi‘i jurisprudence of Sunni Islam, as the state religion. By explicitly privileging Sunni Islam, the government sought to further strengthen links with countries such as the uae and Kuwait. The establishment of Sunni Islam as the state religion also further re-emphasised the decisions taken in 2016 and 2017 to break diplomatic links with Iran and Qatar respectively, geopolitically situating Comoros in Saudi Arabia’s regional orbit. In April, Assoumani attended the Arab League Summit in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where he welcomed the “solidarity of our Arab brothers”. The Arab League’s Council of Ministers adopted a resolution condemning “the illegal occupation of Mayotte”, calling it “null and void”, whilst the final declaration of the summit lent explicit support to the Comorian National Conference.

Socioeconomic Developments

Comoros’s population was estimated at 850,000, with an annual population growth of 2.2%. At an estimated 2.8%, real gdp growth during the year was only fractionally higher than the revised figure for gdp growth the previous year (2.7%). The current account deficit was estimated at 3.5% of gdp and the trade deficit 16.3% of gdp. Whilst the economy benefitted from continuing improvements in the supply of electricity, notably the purchase of new generators, and the establishment of competition in the telecoms sector, infrastructural projects, especially the rehabilitation of main roads, remained unfinished. The ilo’s estimate of unemployment as of November was 3.7% of the labour force, although unofficial estimates from media and diplomatic sources estimated a much higher level of unemployment, ranging between 20% and 40%.

The revised estimated inflation rate for 2017 was 1.0% and the estimated rate for 2018 was 1.8%. This was the result of increased global rice prices and currency depreciation offsetting lower oil prices.

In June, the imf published a statement at the conclusion of the latest Article iv Consultations with the Comoros authorities that noted “an improvement in the performance of the Comorian economy”. The statement commended a commitment by the government to finance development, whilst equally stressing the timidity of the structural reforms being undertaken, a fragile business climate, and tensions in the financial sector. The imf highlighted the importance of controlling public spending and the need for fundamental structural reforms, notably establishing sustainable revenue collection. The imf statement estimated Comoros’s total external debt at $ 191.6 m at the end of 2017, or 25.8% of gdp. An update of the Joint imf-World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis for Low-Income Countries assessed Comoros’s risk of external debt distress as “moderate”.

In August, a national ‘validation workshop’ of the un Development Assistance Framework (undaf) for the period 2015–19 was held, focussed on aligning the actions of the un system in the Comoros with the economic and developmental ambitions of the government. The government had requested that the planning of programmes funded by bilateral partners and multinational agencies be revised to come into line with the Strategy for Accelerated Growth for Sustainable Development (Sca2d) aimed at driving growth through projects to improve infrastructure.

In the energy sector, the state-owned ‘Société Nationale de l’Electricité’ (sonelec) announced plans for further expansion of electricity generation and the diversification of the country’s power sources. In August, the Abu Dhabi Fund announced funding for the electricity sector worth $ 9.6 m, a part of which was set aside to build a solar power plant on Mwali.

At the end of the year there was a potentially game-changing development in the oil and gas sector. Tullow Oil, an experienced and well-resourced British company, agreed to take a share in three offshore blocks. The blocks cover an area of 16,000 sq km with a gross un-risked resource potential of up to 7 bn barrels of oil. The possibility of offshore oil and gas exploitation in Comoros, however, raised questions over the status in international law of the waters around Mayotte.

In the tourism sector, plans were announced to expand the number of airlines using Prince Said Ibrahim International Airport, with Turkish Airlines beginning a seasonal service from Istanbul in the summer. However, doubts remained about the airport’s capacity to handle larger numbers and concurrent flights. The development of the derelict site of the former Galawa Hotel into a luxury resort was one of Assoumani’s specific election campaign promises. Owned by the Emirati Armada Group, it was announced that work on developing the site would begin by the end of the year.

In November, the finance minister, Said Ali Said Chayhane, signed a financing agreement with the World Bank as part of the Regional Communications Infrastructure Programme (rcip4) aimed at supporting the Digital Comoros 2028 strategy. Funding for the project, now standing at $ 32 m, will be partially targeted at an e-visa scheme to accelerate immigration procedures for tourists. Finance Minister Chayhane reinforced the core role of ict competence and access in the government’s economic strategy, stating, “we will continue to work for a real and dynamic digital economy with all the necessary infrastructure”.

During his visit to China in September, Assoumani visited the telecoms giant Huawei, describing the company as Comoros’s “partner of choice”. In December, a loan equivalent to $ 81 m from the Chinese government was finalised for the second phase of a project to expand the government-owned Comores Telecom’s network in order to cover the entire national territory and to establish ‘fibre-optic cable to the door’. The contract to deliver the project was given to Huawei. The loan for the project was tied in with China’s wider developmental strategy involving grants for infrastructural projects such as road rehabilitation.

Comoros has suffered a rise in mean annual temperature of 0.9° since 1960, and in recent years has seen a decrease in mean annual rainfall. In October, Comoros received a $ 41.9 m grant from the Green Climate Fund (gcf), a global fund established to promote climate-resilient development. The grant will support an 8-year project to strengthen water resource management in order to adapt to the effects of climate change and to allow Comoros to reach its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement.