Political Developments

Overall, politics in Eastern Africa retained its strongly authoritarian character under long-dominant ruling parties or autocratic presidents, but elections were held in Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia and Somaliland, including, in the last three countries, for the presidency. The Kenyan parliamentary elections took place twice, because the 8 August round was marred by serious irregularities and was rejected by the Kenyan Supreme Court. The re-run on 29 October confirmed the incumbent, President Uhuru Kenyatta, in office. The elections in Rwanda were highly problematic due to the undermining of the electoral process and, as predicted, kept President Paul Kagame in power with a suspect 98.8% of the vote. In Somalia, a contested presidential election, manipulated by all kinds of moneyed interests and an indirect clan-based voting system, produced an unexpected winner, Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’, although he was not a newcomer to Somali politics (having previously been a prime minister). The only credible election was the presidential polls in Somaliland, although the candidate of the ruling party Kulmiye came out victorious.

Some countries, such as South Sudan and Sudan (Darfur and the Nuba mountains), saw undiminished levels of armed conflict, with civil strife and demonstrations continuing in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Burundi. Citizens in countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda suffered under ongoing intrusive surveillance and the stifling of political and civic life.

In Burundi, although the open violence triggered by President Pierre Nkurunziza’s pursuit of a third presidential term in 2015 subsided, tension remained, as his presidency beyond the constitutional term limit continued to be resented. Nkurunziza nevertheless strengthened his position by bringing the ruling party cndd-fdd more into line and suppressing civil, political and armed opposition. There was talk in the media of addressing the long-standing issue of constitutional reform and also preparations for the 2020 elections, but the president’s politics remained highly contested by opposition groups and the younger generation.

In neighbouring Rwanda, nothing changed, despite the elections: President Kagame continued as before, having made sure that no one could effectively oppose him. Government policies and measures could not be criticised or challenged by the population without repercussions. The human rights record continued to be challenged by international human rights organisations and even the un. Donor countries, unable to learn from the examples of, for instance, Egypt and Ethiopia, were again soft on him and condoned his authoritarianism, perhaps due to Rwanda’s gdp growth and the country’s role as leading troop and police contributor to peacekeeping operations.

In Somalia, the delayed presidential elections produced Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ as the new president, a candidate who found broad acceptance, despite somewhat dubious and externally influenced elections. He announced reforms, offered amnesty and talks to al-Shahaab (which were rejected) and tried to forge more consensus. A turn-around in the country’s political and socio-economic path was not achieved, however. The Somali Federal Government remained a problematic outfit, not expanding its political-territorial control or governmental authority over the country much, and marred by corruption and too much dependency on donor funding, remittances and other (Middle Eastern) interference. amisom peace-keeping forces continued combatting al-Shabaab, who committed the worst car bombing in Somali history, killing 512 people in Mogadishu.

Somaliland showed much more stability and also had presidential elections, which were orderly and credible and yielded a new candidate, Muse Bihi Abdi, from the ruling Kulmiye party.

Elections in Kenya were fraught with difficulty in a somewhat chaotic and violent political landscape. First-round results triggered protests and violent police reprisals in the days after their announcement, and at least 37 people in opposition strongholds in Nairobi and western Kenya were killed by police. In some places, such as Laikipia, the election reignited tensions over land ownership between local communities and the significant community of European origin. An opposition petition to the Supreme Court led to its annulling the August result (in a 4–2 vote), with a statement that “the elections had not been conducted in the spirit envisioned by the Constitution”. The second election round on 29 October, as noted above, returned President Kenyatta to power. Protests were to no avail this time.

Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, consolidated in power in 2016 after another term extension and election, also carried on business as usual, still with no clear succession trajectory outlined. The constitutional age limit for tenure of the office of president was definitively scrapped. The plan had led to public protests and violent scenes even in parliament, but it eventually became law and created the opportunity for the incumbent to extend his tenure for the foreseeable future. The political atmosphere in the country deteriorated, with the president’s political opponents, civil society organisations and the media on the receiving end.

Tanzania’s President John Magufuli, in his second year in office, pursued a more authoritarian leadership style, which narrowed existing democratic space and curtailed critical public debate. Freedom of assembly and of expression by opposition groups were frequently restricted by the authorities, and political rallies were banned outside of election periods. Opposition politicians were frequently arrested, interrogated and intimidated, critical media were closely scrutinised and there was increasingly less tolerance of dissenting opinions in general. The political system – with the dominant, long-ruling ccm (‘Chama cha Mapinduzi’, or Revolutionary Party) able to control all spheres of public life and enjoying the support of the majority of the population – was not under threat, despite a clear deterioration in the general political climate. Magufuli further consolidated his grip on the ccm, suppressing discontent within party ranks. Semi-autonomous Zanzibar remained relatively calm on the surface, but the long-standing confrontation between the ccm and the opposition cuf remained acute.

The small island state of Seychelles remained generally stable politically and economically, and had the highest per capita gdp in Africa. After the 2016 elections, the long-ruling ‘Parti Lepep’ still controlled the executive (government), but the legislature was dominated by an opposition coalition of three parties.

The other archipelago, the densely populated Comoros, also showed overall stability, although its politics remained divided due to a lack of unified ‘identity’, and the issue of the separate status of Mayotte Island was a challenge (its population wanted to remain French and not be politically part of Comoros). President Azali Assoumani had his first year in power after his election in 2016 and drew on his political experience to consolidate his rule at home and renew relationships with bilateral partners and international organisations.

Politics in Sudan remained as authoritarian and tense as ever. Media control and harassment continued and hundreds of political prisoners remained in jail. President Omar al-Bashir announced the formation of a new Government of National Accord, emerging from the so-called National Dialogue process. The composition of and participants in this government were far from representing a solid basis for peaceful political competition. Social and political tensions in society were unrelenting, with student movements contesting and (armed) groups active in peripheral regions. Tensions reached a peak in Darfur in May, when a joint attack was launched by rebel groups based in Libya (sla/Minni Minawi) and South Sudan (sla/Transition Council). They were repelled but the attack sent a message to the international community that the Darfur war (ongoing since 2003) was not over.

South Sudan had perhaps the worst humanitarian and political problems in Eastern Africa, with untold human suffering, deep food insecurity, violent ethnic ‘revenge’ actions and a spectacularly incompetent government. It gave official declarations of a ceasefire but went on with military campaigns and a deliberate counter-insurgency policy. A controversial National Dialogue initiative did not work out. Armed opposition remained fragmented, despite efforts to achieve greater unity. The ongoing fighting led to declarations of famine in two parts of Unity State in February.

Djibouti saw what could be called ‘political stability’ but of the same authoritarian and repressive kind, under veteran President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh and his ‘Union pour la Majorité Presidentielle’ (ump). They dominated the political realm, with little space for opposition or civil society activities. For example, in October, a demonstration in Tajourah, in the Afar-inhabited north, was violently dispersed by security forces. In this area, the ‘Front pour la Restoration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie’ (frud) had been active in previous years, but was relatively passive due to an Ethiopian military presence.

Eritrea was another story of stifling, authoritarian ‘stability’, with virtually no progress on any front, and a regime still dominated by Isayas Afewerki, its first and only president since Independence in 1991. The country’s militarised command-economy was maintained and the human rights situation was again very precarious. Political apathy reigned and out-migration of the young went on steadily, although in diminishing numbers. There was a crackdown on some remaining schools that offered religious education as part of their curriculum, and in one instance (an Islamic school) this triggered the first student demonstration in Asmara since 2001.

Ethiopia’s political scene was marked by insecurity and growing disagreement on the way forward within the ruling party eprdf (in power since 1991). Demonstrations and street actions by youths across Oromia and Amhara Regions continued, despite a reinstated state of emergency, and took on a grim character. The ruling party struggled to find answers and addressed the issues in several long meetings at the end of the year. There was a feeling that the regime had run out of options.

The political opportunity structures in Eastern Africa in general were not conducive to inclusiveness, freedom, rule of law or human security. Life remained precarious for large parts of the population, including socio-economically, and political activities continued to be high risk. Democratic culture and transparent, accountable government still had a long way to go, as in most countries political freedoms and judicial independence were at risk or not developed, usually on the basis of the idea that the ‘development process’ needed a strong and authoritarian government. The Freedom in the World report by the us-based watchdog Freedom House stated that democracy was on a “downward trend” during the year, with unreformed autocracies maintained in Rwanda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan (worst), and Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania having a ‘partly free’ status. Burundi’s political rights and freedoms after the controversial ‘election’ and reinstatement of President Nkurunziza, remained very subdued and the country was considered ‘not free’. Positive exceptions were Somaliland and Seychelles. Insecurity and mistrust marked the political process in most countries, fed by allegations of corruption and elite power abuse.

The Afrobarometer surveys – an ongoing comparative series of public attitudes measuring projects on democracy, governance, and economic conditions in Africa now in their 7th round – were carried out in several countries, including Togo, Zambia, Ghana and Zimbabwe. Results revealed citizens’ ongoing scepticism and lack of trust in their governments, serious disappointment over (access to) judicial systems, general public service provision and employment, and resentment of the lack of political accountability and transparency, despite progress being noted in fields such as education, poverty reduction and basic services.

On the political indexes drawn up by global monitoring agencies regarding civil rights and political and media freedoms – to be interpreted with caution because of a certain lack of context appraisal – Eastern Africa was not doing very well: for instance, the World Press Freedom Index (of 180 countries) gave Comoros the highest position of Eastern African countries, at 49th, but all other countries in the region were placed below 85th. Lowest but one was Eritrea. Similar pictures of (lack of) political rights were drawn by hrw, the Human Freedom Index (of the Fraser Institute), Reporters without Borders (but with a slight improvement over 2016, except in Tanzania and Eritrea) and the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance. The last showed what many observers already knew: that progress in governance improvement as shown in the past decade had stagnated and in some countries had reversed, including, among others, Somalia, Burundi, South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan. Overall, a state of political misery and insecurity continued across the region.

ti’s Corruption Perception Index (180 countries) showed little change in the rankings of Eastern African countries on corruption, which is important to measure because of its overall corrosive impact on politics, public administration, economic life and public morality. South Sudan and Somalia were on the lowest places, with Sudan 175th, Eritrea 165th, Burundi 157th and Uganda 151st. Eastern Africa was disproportionately low on this scale. ti’s new measure, the ‘Bribery index’ of institutions (on a scale of 0–100) saw Rwanda as the least bribery-prone country in the region and Burundi as the most. Notably bribery-prone were the police, the judiciary and education sectors. But not all countries in the region were measured, and it was noted that reporting of corruption by citizens to the authorities in Eastern Africa was very low. Fundamental transformation towards political liberalisation, well-regulated open economies and governance and conflict management in the sub-region did not really occur.

Transnational Relations and Conflict Configurations

General issues in international relations between the countries of Eastern Africa were the perennial Nile water question (Ethiopia-Sudan-Egypt), major trans-border infrastructure investments (e.g., in Uganda-Kenya, Ethiopia-Sudan and Ethiopia-Djibouti) and violent conflict and terrorist threats in the region, as in South Sudan, Somalia, the Eritrea-Ethiopia border stand-off, and the aftermath of the Burundi crisis.

Acute security problems and armed conflicts continued in South Sudan, Somalia and Sudan (including Darfur, seemingly forgotten but still a war zone). International concerns with such problems persisted, as in Somalia, Darfur, South Sudan and Ethiopia (where, due to an Oromia-Somali Region ‘border conflict’ more than 800,000 people were displaced and hundreds killed), and these concerns were fed not least by the dramatic humanitarian consequences that followed. igad tried to further mediation in Eastern African conflict zones but with no substantial results.

Eastern Africa attracted increasing numbers of actors who envisaged for themselves a security role and/or a military facility on its soil. This seemed to be part of an emerging business model. China opened its first overseas military base near Obock in Djibouti on 1 August – a significant event, 90 years to the day since the founding of the Red Army. While described officially as a ‘logistics hub’, it was to be a full-fledged military base for around 10,000 personnel, equipped for communications monitoring and to resupply navy ships. Djibouti also hosted Japanese and Italian military bases, added to those of France (the oldest) and the usa. Russia also wanted to get involved but failed to reach a partnership agreement to share facilities with the Chinese. In addition, even India was considering opening a base in this most strategic Red Sea country, alongside its facilities in Madagascar and the Agaléga islands near Mauritius.

In February, the uae, which had had a military facility in Eritrea since 2015, got permission for a base in Somaliland. Saudi Arabia could not stay behind and also planned a military presence in Djibouti. Elsewhere, France, a key foreign military power in Africa, had 4,000 troops for Operation Burhane in the Sahel. They had their air power and mission headquarters in Chad, plus five Reaper reconnaissance drones in Niger, special operations troops in Burkina Faso, a logistics hub in Côte d’Ivoire and a small presence in Gabon. French President Emmanuel Macron saw Africa as a key foreign policy priority.

The us kept some 4,000 troops in Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, and about 800 in Niger. Special us operatives were present in Somalia (an estimated 500) to aid the Somali Federal Government against the Islamist terror movement al-Shabaab, which over the year killed more people than Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The au’s Mission in Somalia (amisom), with around 22,000 personnel, also continued to assist the Somali Federal Government in combating al-Shabaab. This movement offered no political way forward except rejection of the Somali political system and government, and persisted with constant violent attacks on government personnel, media, civilians and local ngo staff. Many bomb attacks occurred, creating hundreds of victims and causing huge damage, in a fruitless cycle of sabotage and bloodshed. A political solution did not seem in sight but a military solution was not reached either, due not least to amisom’s limited mandate and unwise tactics.

After several years of the decline and near elimination of piracy, it suddenly increased again off the coast of Somalia. Twice as many incidents (54) compared with 2016 were recorded, including failed attacks, suspicious activities, (attempted) hijackings and kidnappings. The violent conflict in Yemen also continued to affect maritime space in the region, with a number of incidents occurring off its coast. Although these threats were expanding, shipping activity remained constant, with many more ships carrying armed guards. The hijacking on 23 March of the Comoros-flagged merchant tanker ‘Aris 13’ off the north-eastern coast of Somalia marked the first successful seizure of a merchant ship in five years. All this showed that insecurity remained high and that an underlying piracy infrastructure was still present, ready to be re-activated when conditions were right. A comprehensive, locally based maritime security approach remained a necessity.

While intensive donor-country relations with Eastern African nations were obvious, China’s presence in the region also continued to grow in prominence; its ongoing economic activities and investments, and the opening of its military base in Djibouti have been referred to above.

As to conflict configurations in the sub-region, no major breakthroughs were reached on outstanding conflicts. The eac and igad did their best but did not have sufficient influence on nations’ elite group interests to solve them.

Burundi struggled with unresolved political and economic instability after the contested Nkurunziza presidential term extension and election, and its relations with Rwanda, Belgium, the eu and the un remained fraught with tensions.

Rwanda tried to play an active role as au and eac trailblazer, helped by its relatively favourable economic growth trajectory and its peacekeeping troop contributions, but its bilateral relations with both Burundi and France remained strained.

Somalia and Somaliland presented quite different pictures with regard to security and conflict, with the latter largely peaceful and the former still caught in the violent turmoil of regional conflict and terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab. Somaliland, however, did not solve its border conflict with the Puntland Region around the territories of Sanaag and Sool, with troops on standby. Somalia’s relations with Kenya remained tense; with Ethiopia they were much better. A London conference on Somalia was held in May, to give further impetus to institution building, peace-making and economic development.

Kenya’s two election rounds showed the fragility and unrest in its domestic politics, and in various peripheral regions, where violence and predation continued, beyond the control of the central government. Kenya kept a contingent of several thousand amisom troops in Somalia and lost dozens of its soldiers in al-Shabaab attacks on some of its bases.

Uganda still exercised its role as a major regional player and continued to be held in high esteem in African and international fora.

Tanzania strengthened its relations with Rwanda and Uganda, amid minor disputes with Kenya over trade issues. Relations with Western aid donors became more strained over their mounting ambivalence or dissatisfaction with President Magufuli’s erratic and authoritarian governance style. Tanzania’s cooperation with China was further intensified.

Compared with its African and Indian Ocean neighbours, Seychelles enjoyed domestic stability and few if any foreign policy problems. The country worked with fellow Small Island Developing States (sids) to address looming climate change issues.

The new Comoros government under President Assoumani determined that the country should aim to become an ‘emerging economy’, a goal that influenced both domestic and foreign policy. The president prioritised cooperation with France, but also intended to cement relations with Saudi Arabia as Comoros’s principal partner in the Muslim world.

Sudan enjoyed improved relations with its neighbours and in the global domain, except with Egypt, and Khartoum aimed at a broader policy of ‘normalising’ its foreign relations. us sanctions (in place since 1997) were lifted in October, even though one precondition, an end to the Darfur war, was not really met. President al-Bashir’s regime also remained an important partner for the eu on the migration issue. Al-Bashir skilfully managed to remain neutral in the Gulf crisis, in which Saudi Arabia and the uae opposed Qatar.

As noted above, the violent conflict in South Sudan continued and deepened. A new igad-led initiative aimed at revitalising the peace process did not work and, in December, the conflict entered its fifth year, with very little prospect of a lasting resolution in sight.

Djibouti’s international importance was very evident during the year, with quite a number of global players trying to get a foothold via a military base or other strategic interest. This gave President Ismail Omar Guelleh enough room to ignore domestic pressure from Afar and other opposition, continue autocratic policies and play foreign parties off against each other. Relations with Kenya and Ethiopia were good (although Ethiopian misgivings on high port fees were an issue). The new railway line between Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Djibouti City started commercial operations in November. Relations with Eritrea remained bad. In the Gulf crisis, Djibouti chose the side of Saudi Arabia.

Eritrea remained isolated in the region and unresponsive to criticism or calls for cooperation. The diplomatic crisis in the Arabian Peninsula and tensions between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan affected Eritrea’s foreign relations. Qatar ended its role as a mediator in the Djibouti-Eritrean conflict, and relations with Sudan were somewhat tense, as shown in the Sudanese troop build-up along the border with Eritrea at the end of the year in response to human trafficking issues and suspected Egyptian support to Eritrea.

Ethiopia remained the crucial Horn of Africa power, as a major donor fund recipient, a main participant in the amisom forces in Somalia and other peace-keeping forces in Africa, and the location of the headquarters of the au, eca and other organisations such as igad, as well as because of its population size. Its relations with Kenya, Djibouti and Somaliland remained stable and cooperative. Tensions with Eritrea persisted. Domestic problems, however, were quite serious, leading to fears of instability in the wider region. International donors and diplomats urged the regime in Addis Ababa to ease tensions and tackle the country’s social and political crisis.

Socioeconomic Developments

Eastern African economic growth was higher than that of other African regions, as measured by gdp increase: 5.4% on average. Ethiopia, Tanzania and Djibouti had the highest rates. Infrastructure investments were important again (though they raised public debt fairly rapidly), and so was the expansion of agriculture and services, and hesitant industrial production uptake was also seen. Educational levels rose in many areas, but social inequalities and governance issues, including corruption, persisted. On the scale of multidimensional poverty measurement, however, some the globally ‘poorest regions’ were still found in South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. Food insecurity threats loomed large over the region. Most food and humanitarian aid was provided by usaid ($ 13.9 bn since 2008).

Major challenges for the local economies, which would continue to be largely agrarian for the near future, continued to be climate change and unpredictability, growing densities of population and agrarian activities, criminalisation of parts of the national economies, and pressure on water resources and pastoral areas due to large-scale investment schemes and peasant-pastoralist tensions. Legal systems were not well-equipped to deal effectively and fairly with land, water and other resource disputes. In the wake of growing economies, population densities and climate variabilities, environmental-ecological problems came to the fore, but were not effectively managed. The bias against investing massively in the agrarian sector and rural livelihoods was not overcome, despite it being well-known that no major non-oil economy ever made the developmental transition without capitalising the agricultural sector. Investments in expanding and scaling up functional agrarian systems, ‘empowering’ local farmers, improving context-specific irrigation, working on drought and heat resistant crops, and integrated agricultural techniques would be necessary, with social safety nets in place for the vulnerable. Some countries made progress here, but not enough to achieve a turn-around.

The sub-region was marked by one of the highest population growth rates in Africa, with an estimated annual average of 2.9%, indicating continued exponential growth. The overall fertility rate was 4.8, the population’s median age was 18.1 years, and the total population in Eastern Africa’s 13 countries reached around 317 m. There were no signs of a ‘demographic transition’, except in some of the largest cities, where birth rates dropped.

In the wake of population growth, urbanisation also accelerated across the region, but this did not lead to a decline in rural population numbers. Most cities were not equipped with sufficient facilities (including transport, sanitation and waste management) to deal with the rapidly increasing urban population numbers.

Government investments in infrastructure, roads and new energy projects continued, including the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (lapsset) in Kenya. This project had a high price tag ($ 3.3 bn) and most major international investors gave up, but despite this – and the resulting delays – the project was pushed forward. The Mwambani Port and Railway Corridor (mwaporc), centred in Tanzania, fared better, with Uganda joining in with proposed oil link connections.

Most state budgets still showed substantial dependence on external funding. For example, the overall ratio of aid to government budgets was 20.5%. Rwanda and Burundi received around 45% and 50% of their budgets, respectively, from aid, despite Rwanda’s protestations that all dependence on foreign aid should be phased out, but Kenya only received 13%.

Remarkably, the projected oil economy boom in Uganda (with a 6.5 bn barrel reserve) and Kenya (750 m barrels reserve in the Turkana region, and more expected) did not materialise due to delays in pipeline construction, protracted bargaining about contracts, governance issues and stagnant world oil prices since the drop in 2014. Landlocked Uganda had long considered whether to opt for a pipeline to the coast through Kenya or through Tanzania, and in August decided for the latter, with a pipeline to be built for $ 3.9 bn. This cut short the idea of joining up with Kenya’s pipeline, due to security concerns and delays caused by land disputes in northern Kenya. Tanzania had also offered lower tariffs and other benefits. Kenya, counting on more oil finds, might still opt to build its own pipeline from Turkana region to the coast, in the framework of the lappset corridor. Meanwhile, oil exports from South Sudan – the country’s major source of income – remained at 130,000 b/d, down from 350,000 b/d before the start of the civil war in 2013. Persistent insecurity made oil companies desist from further investments. In general, politics and disputes between neighbours in Eastern Africa made oil and other trans-border investments anything but certain or secure.

State current account deficits continued to range widely, from 2% to 9% of gdp. Domestic tax revenue was still low, never beyond 50%. Surprisingly, the Somalia Federal Government had a budget surplus of $ 3.8 m, but this indicated underspending on necessary items such as education and security. The only other country with a surplus was Seychelles. South Sudan’s deficit was significantly reduced from 2016, to 2.8%.

Inflation figures varied widely, from crisis rates in South Sudan (around 182%) and Sudan (34%) to low rates in Djibouti (3%), Seychelles (3.2%), Uganda (4.4%), Tanzania (5.3%) and, surprisingly, Somalia (1.5%). Ethiopia was also high, at 13.6%.

The great diversity of socio-economic achievements was reflected in the separate country data. In Burundi, the government struggled to restart economic growth and control the national budget. It had to introduce controversial measures to mitigate the effects of alarming economic conditions.

Rwanda felt the adverse effects of the drought that hit Eastern Africa, but was able to maintain growth. Despite all the president’s plans of previous years, agriculture still remained the mainstay of the economy. The government made important progress in infrastructure development by increasing the number of households connected to electricity to over 35%, from 22% at the end of 2016. Economic performance remained strong, with a gdp growth of 5.1%.

Somalia and Somaliland had thriving private sectors but underdeveloped government investments due to a low revenue (tax) base and, in Somalia, insecurity and serious corruption. Somaliland fared better but had little access to global (capital) markets because of its unresolved political status.

Kenya suffered from the serious two-year drought, which sent food prices skyrocketing throughout the country. Alarming incidents of mass corruption, including the plunder of the National Youth Service, also damaged the economy.

Uganda’s economy experienced a slowdown in growth, but was deemed basically sound. Various steps were taken towards the much delayed exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits. The country again received more South Sudanese refugees, and others arrived from the drc.

Tanzania’s indicators of macroeconomic performance continued to be good, with a solid 7.1% gdp growth rate. President Magufuli’s economic nationalism and continuing severe liquidity problems weakened private sector initiatives, raising worries about a looming economic slowdown, added to by uncertainty over the government’s strategic orientation.

The economic policy of the government of Seychelles was concerned with achieving more productivity-based growth, beyond tuna fish production and tourism. Several development plans were being implemented or refined.

Comoros registered 3.4% gdp growth, stimulated by government investments in public works (roads and a national hospital) and by private business (the tourism and hospitality sectors). The informal economy was substantial. Inflation was around 3%, but pressure was felt due to the generally high cost of living, including high electricity prices. Cash transfers from the diaspora (mainly in Marseilles, France) amounted to around 25% of gdp.

The socioeconomic situation in Sudan, still at war with itself (in Darfur and the Nuba mountains) remained very precarious. High inflation and repeated shortages of basic necessities fuelled social tensions in the capital and the regions. The state budget had a modest deficit and was biased towards the security apparatus at the expense of social services and education. Inflation was the second highest in the sub-region, at 34%. A widespread and acute watery diarrhoea epidemic was estimated to have killed some 1,000 people across the country.

South Sudan continued to experience a deteriorating economic situation, not helped much by slightly improving oil fortunes. Inflation was alarmingly high, at some 182% according to the imf, but that was 50% less than in 2016 and the national budget was brought under control. The levels of underdevelopment and poverty, aggravated by famine conditions due to armed conflict and predatory activities in several areas, were stark.

Djibouti was affected by prolonged drought conditions, with a dire humanitarian situation for rural people (pastoralists) and some 200,000 people dependent on food aid. State revenues were healthy, due to the re-export business (notably, of course, from Ethiopia) and port fees from foreign bases and donors. The start of the new Djibouti-Ethiopian Railway’s regular commercial operation connecting Djibouti’s port with Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa was delayed, but started in December. Some other large infrastructure projects did not progress as expected, either. The country’s socio-economic inequality and the rural-urban divide were worrying.

Reliable economic data on Eritrea were lacking. The government tried to control all financial transactions by limiting cash transfers, but without providing adequate alternative financial instruments to handle payments. In December, it closed down hundreds of businesses as a punitive measure. The bulk of eu funds granted under the 11th edf remained unused, for lack of feasible development projects.

Ethiopia’s economy continued to grow, although foreign investment and tourism did not recover to the level before the 2016 crisis. Enormous economic and human damage was done by new clashes between ethnic groups erupting on the Oromo-Somali regional border, which led to the death of hundreds of people and hundreds of thousands being displaced.

On the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, of 190 countries there were a few changes in the places of Eastern African countries, with Rwanda ranked at a remarkable 41st and Kenya at 80th. Somalia was lowest, on 190th (although doing business for foreigners might be quite difficult, it was not so for Somalis). South Sudan was 187th, Sudan 170th, Ethiopia 161st, Tanzania 137th and Uganda 122nd. Burundi sank again – 7 places, to 164th – the price of political authoritarianism and violent unrest. The report noted that overall a record number of reforms were made in ssa economies, making business easier in 36 of the 48 economies.

Much of the economic growth in the Eastern African region was stimulated by continuing fdi, to the tune of $ 7.5 bn (estimate; data were incomplete). fdi presented a mixed picture, however: there was an overall 4.5% increase over 2016, but it was volatile and unevenly divided, with more fdi inflows into Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda but less into Kenya and Rwanda. Despite its political problems and civil unrest, Ethiopia attracted $ 3.6 bn in fdi, the largest amount in Eastern Africa and second only to Egypt as Africa’s prime destination.

While the ict sector again saw much dynamism, with numerous start-ups and new business applications, an underestimated danger to Eastern African economies was cyber-crime and hacking. Because of their low investment in cyber-security in previous years, banks were particularly vulnerable to this new form of predatory business, but e-commerce operators, mobile service providers and telecom companies were also affected. Countries in the sub-region lost tens of millions each to cyber-crime scams.

Sub-regional Cooperation and Sub-regional Organisations

The most important sub-regional bodies in the region, apart from the au as a continent-wide organisation, were still igad and the eac .

On 27 March, an igad Summit of Regional Heads of State took place in Nairobi, aiming to develop durable solutions for the protracted Somali refugee situation in the Horn (there were 1 m idps in Somalia and 900,000 in neighbouring countries). Voluntary country-of-origin resettlement was one option discussed. Representatives of the unhcr were present at this summit. Another meeting was held on 12–13 June: the 31st Extra-Ordinary Summit of the igad Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Addis Ababa. It was called by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn to address the deteriorating security situation in South Sudan and follow up on the March meeting. It also appointed Ismail Wais (Djibouti) and Mohamed Ali Guyo (Kenya) as as igad’s Special Envoys to South Sudan and Somalia, respectively. But South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir did not bother to attend. On 29 September, an informal ministerial meeting between eu ministers and igad foreign ministers was held in Brussels (Belgium) to discuss the multiple challenges affecting the security, stability and prosperity of the Horn of Africa, ranging from protracted conflicts and transnational crime to irregular migration and poor economic development; it ended with new pledges for better cooperation and new investment plans. The Somalia issue – which again took an inordinate amount of attention from eu and igad – was also discussed.

Regarding the eac (with six member states), it emerged after an April meeting of a subcommittee of ministers of its member countries that a ‘political federation’ was unlikely to be achieved, and instead it was announced that the aim was to form a transitional ‘confederation’, i.e. a union of political units for common action in relation to other units. The eac focused particularly on economic, regulatory and educational harmonisation issues. It was also announced that a common eac passport would be issued as of January 2018, a year later than planned. On 20 May, during the eac’s 18th ordinary summit in Dar es Salaam, Uganda’s President Museveni took over the chairmanship of the eac from his Tanzanian counterpart John Magufuli, who urged Museveni to continue eac cost-cutting measures and conclude a good eac-eu epa trade deal. A statement by the eac Secretariat after its meeting in Arusha (Tanzania) on 28 July declared, just before the Rwandan presidential elections, that the eac attached “… great importance to the promotion of democracy which will in turn guarantee political stability in the region”. The head of the eac’s election observation mission to Rwanda said “… we as a Community are keen on free, fair and transparent elections in all the six Partner States”. These were encouraging words but they had been heard many times before and had little effect on enhancing a level playing field or free campaigning for the Rwandan elections on 4 August. An article in the November issue of ‘Foreign Affairs’ even bemoaned the alarming decline of democracy in Eastern Africa, as all countries except two (‘partly free’) were rated by Freedom House as ‘unfree’.

The East African Legislative Assembly (eala), the 54-seat parliamentary/legislative body of the eac founded on 28 November 2001 and based in Arusha, was not much in the news, but met several times, including in May. Among the bills approved were the eac Community Youth Council Bill and the eac Cross Border Trade in Professional Services Bill. An eala committee also conducted public hearings on the eac Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Bill in five member countries: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. The five-year term of the eala ended this year, and on 18 December the 4th Assembly was inaugurated after Kenya had offered its selection of new candidates (voted via the parliaments of the member states), the last country to do so. An eala mp would receive a $ 13,500 monthly salary.

The Eastern Africa Standby Force (easf), the regional force under the au’s African Peace and Security Architecture (apsa) umbrella, and composed of military, police and civilians mandated to enhance peace and security in the Eastern Africa region, held various mission planning courses, a field training exercise at Gebeit military base in eastern Sudan, and other events. Personnel were drawn from ten member states. It did not become fully operational and was not deployed during the year in any conflict in the sub-region.

Cooperation agreements between Eastern African countries and the eu and other donor partners continued relatively high levels of donor assistance, training and funding. Apart from already existing agreements (periodically renewed), the eu strengthened aid for employment investment schemes in Eastern Africa and kept up security cooperation.

The various other political-economic institutions in the Eastern African sub-region, including comesa, icglr, ioc and ioar, held meetings and events but these were generally of too little importance and impact to be discussed here. comesa held its 37th Council of Ministers meeting on 3–4 November in Lusaka (Zambia), focusing, among other things, on a road map for deepening integration through the consolidation of the Free Trade Area, development of infrastructure, agriculture and industry, climate change adaptation and mitigation, gender mainstreaming and establishment of the Customs Union. Burundi had offered to organise the comesa summit in Bujumbura in October, but comesa Secretary-General Sindiso Ngwenya said the organisation rejected the offer because there was a “lack of an adequate vehicle pool, no relevant infrastructure and no reliable Internet infrastructure”.

Continued disagreements persisted on the use of the Nile waters. Ethiopia (supported by Sudan) did not reach agreement with Egypt on the central issue of the impact of the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance mega-dam, which would decisively affect the water levels of the Nile and damage Egypt, especially while the huge reservoir in Ethiopia was being filled. No consensus was reached. A meeting of ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on 11 November in Cairo failed to approve an introductory report produced by the jointly selected French engineering consultants brl Group and Artelia on the dam’s effects on Egypt and Sudan; it appeared this time that Ethiopia and Sudan rejected it. Egypt’s President Abd el-Fattah al-Sisi said again on 18 November that “… water to us is a question of national security…. a matter of life or death”. A proposal by Egypt to Ethiopia on 26 December that the World Bank be asked to be involved in technical discussions/evaluations on the possible impact of the dam was not accepted. At a meeting of the Nile Basin Initiative (nbi) on 22 June in Entebbe (Uganda), Ethiopia had taken over the leadership of the nbi from Uganda. It would chair both the Nile Council of Ministers and the Nile Technical Advisory Committee of the nbi for the next year. On 18 July, the eu announced it would allocate a grant of $ 15.8 m to the nbi for the stimulation of cooperation and the generation of data and information to sustainably manage and use the transboundary waters. On 23–25 October, the 5th Nile Basin Development Forum met in Kigali (Rwanda) for a kind of science and policy dialogue under the title ‘Investing in Nile cooperation for a water-secure future’, but no political decisions were taken there.