Domestic Politics

President Archange-Faustin Touadéra met with criticism from many quarters when he had little to show in terms of economic progress and security after one year in office. Faced with half a dozen policy guidelines, some observers wondered what the government’s vision for restoring stability was and raised doubts as to whether there even was one. A core issue was the official attitude towards the numerous armed movements that continued to threaten peace and rarely behaved responsibly. Touadéra clearly favoured an inclusive approach, potentially because he did not have the means to confront rebel groups effectively. On 12 September, he carried out a major reshuffle of his government, appointing 16 new ministers and raising the number of portfolios within the cabinet from 23 to 34. The return of Marie-Noëlle Koyara, who had been the first female minister of defence during the transition period, to that same post was potentially a positive surprise. More significant, however, was the fact that some new ministers were linked to armed movements: Energy Minister Gontran Djono Ahaba, the nephew of former warlord president Michel Djotodia, and Water and Forestry Minister Lambert Mokove Lissane were clearly seen as representatives of the Ex-Séléka movement within government. Equally represented was now the opposing anti-Balaka movement with Government Secretary Jean-Alexandre Dedet and Culture and Tourism Minister Jacob Mokpem Bionli. Retaining his position, Prime Minister Simplice Sarandji was quoted as saying, “For me they are all Central Africans”, to justify the inclusion of rebels in the government. As a side-effect of this move, government expenditure was clearly set to rise.

In fact, both government and un peacekeepers were unable to prevent or stop on-going armed conflicts, at first in the centre of the country. Since November 2016, two former components of the Séléka alliance, the ‘Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique’ (frpc) and the ‘Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique’ (upc), had repeatedly clashed in or around Bambari. The fprc was seen as completely opportunistic in its choices of partners, who included its former opponents, the Anti-Balaka movements, while the upc was clearly linking up with sometimes very vulnerable, and sometimes violent and armed Fulani groups. On 12 February, the un Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the car (minusca) intervened to halt the advance of the fprc coalition, killing the fprc chief of staff, Joseph Zoundéko. minusca obtained the withdrawal of militia structures from the city, including the upc headquarters under Ali Darassa, and the local anti-Balaka chief, Gaétan Boadé, also left Bambari. minusca then declared Bambari a “city free from armed groups”. Violence declined in this key city, but the moves resulted in a transfer of conflict further east, with several attacks recorded on Bakouma, Nzako and Zémio. An upsurge in violence was recorded in May, hitting mostly the provincial capitals of Bangassou (with more than 100 killed) and Bria, but also Alindao (188 died here alone according to hrw, which also documented 25 cases of rape), Mobaye and later again Zémio, often against armed Fulani cattle herders and Anti-Balaka groups loosely allied to the frpc. In Bria, in-fighting between the factions of this alliance resulted in an upsurge of 73,000 idps in May and June. Between 20 and 23 June, over 80 civilians died in these battles. In a particularly bloody confrontation in the town of Gambo in early August, Anti-Balaka elements attacked upc and armed Fulani individuals, who retaliated by targeting a local health centre; more than 100 civilians were killed, including International Committee of the Red Cross volunteers. On 18 October, Anti-Balaka militia attacked the Fulani village of Pombolo, killing at least 26 civilians; this was preceded by an attack on Kembe eight days earlier resulting in a similar death toll.

The second most dangerous zone was the area between Batangafo and Kaga Bandoro (in the north). Here the ‘Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique’ (mpc) and Anti-Balaka groups fought for control of Batangafo. In December, two villages in the vicinity were largely destroyed by mpc troops, leading to the displacement of some 24,000 civilians. Further to the west, at the end of the year the newly established ‘Mouvement National pour la Libération de la Centrafrique’ (mnlc; a recent mpc splinter group) clashed with the locally strong ‘Révolution et Justice’ (rj) movement in and around Paoua. rj and the hitherto rival Anti-Balaka fighters joined forces to counter the mnlc, but also targeted civilian Muslim communities, killing four civilians; the mnlc burned down entire villages in retaliation. Tens of thousands of people were internally displaced and up to 500 people were killed.

But tensions were also high in many other places. While autochthony discourses and interreligious animosity played some role in individual outbursts of violence, it was rather the competition for access to valuable natural resources or trade routes that remained the key driver of violence among the armed groups. Even within the armed movements, significant violence was used to settle scores between local commanders, On 7–8 December, rival factions of the fprc clashed in Ippy (in the centre of the country), resulting in an undetermined number of casualties and the displacement of over 15,000 civilians. This terminated a phase of relative peace that had prevailed after the ‘Rassemblement des Républicains’ (rdr), an Anti-Balaka faction, had signed an agreement with the fprc, mpc and upc in October. In mid-December, upc elements reportedly killed Gaétan Bouadé, the rdr leader.

In contrast, the security situation in the capital Bangui improved somewhat after the last escalation in February, when a local militia leader was killed, leading to further killings in retaliation. It was mostly in the third arrondissement of Bangui that militia members clashed in internal power struggles and competition over illegally imposed taxes; in one obscure event a grenade exploded on 11 November, killing four people.

Although pilot projects were started, the implementation of ddr made little progress – to no one’s surprise in the circumstances. The fprc, one of the most important movements, even suspended its participation. The government and the donor community, with minusca as the main implementer, engaged in all sorts of ddr, while in parallel working to build up new and reliable national security forces. In November, minusca removed the mostly Fulani 3R (‘Retour, Reclamation, Rehabilitation’) forces under the command of General Sidiki Abass from Bocaranga and the mpc from nearby Bang. On 30 October, Defence Minister Koyara issued a concept paper for the training of the national armed forces by the eu Military Training Mission (eutm-rca) and, on 18 November, President Touadéra signed two decrees on the organisation of the ‘Forces Armées Centrafricaines’ (faca) and the general staff. Seventy faca soldiers trained by the eutm-rca were deployed to Obo in November as a first detachment, and 72 further faca soldiers were sent to Paoua to work alongside minusca.

Considerable efforts were deployed to reach an inclusive peace agreement. The Catholic Sant’Egidio community organised intensive talks in Rome and Foreign Affairs Minister Charles Armel Doubane and President Touadéra’s political advisor, Georges-Isidore-Alphose Dibert, eventually signed a so-called ‘Entente de Sant’Egidio’ on behalf of the government, as did representatives of 13 armed movements. Of the important players, only the 3R movement was not present. It is worth noting that four of the major civilian political parties co-signed the document along with the vice president of the National Assembly. The document called, inter alia, for an immediate ceasefire, respect for the elected authorities and the acceptance of the political-military groups as part of security sector reform and the reconstruction process. The possibility of an amnesty was alluded to, in stark contrast to the peace roadmap presented by the National Assembly to the government in May, which had excluded amnesties for war crimes. The document was clearly not worth the paper it was written on: only a day after the signing of the agreement, nearly 100 people were killed in Bria in clashes between the fprc and Anti-Balaka fighters. Taking the fragmentation of groups into account, it was much more realistic to engage in local peace agreements as those signing a paper would then also commit to their words. An agreement between the 3R and local Anti-Balaka groups was signed in Bouar on 15 December, and local authorities in Bria, supported by minusca, launched a road map for peace in Haute-Kotto on 19 December.

The (re-)establishment of state authority was one of the main goals of both the government and minusca. The progressive deployment of trained faca battalions was only one element of this strategy. On 8 September, a concept note was published and four days later Touadéra appointed new prefects to all 16 prefectures, nine of them with a military background (and none of them Muslim). In October, he corrected that balance somewhat: among the 71 sub-prefects (i.e. district officers), various rebel movements and the Muslim community were represented. At year’s end, 14 of the 16 prefects and 63 of the 71 sub-prefects were installed. The fprc and mpc were initially opposed to the redeployment of state authorities in Bamingui-Bangoran, Vakaga and Nana-Grebizi prefectures. In some cases, extensive consultation with armed groups preceded the deployment, showing the nature of the local balance of power.

Fighting impunity was another important challenge; both a restoration of the formal justice system and establishing internationally sponsored transitional justice organs were on the agenda. On 23 February, President Touadéra signed a decree naming a military judge from the neighbouring drc, Colonel Toussaint Muntazini Mukimapa, as the prosecutor of the Special Criminal Court (scc). In May, two female international investigating judges were appointed, as were five national judges, but the scc was still not operational by year’s end. In parallel, 19 of the 24 first instance and appellate courts started to function, though with reduced capacity. In the last two months of the year, eight Anti-Balaka members were sentenced by a court in Bouar (in the west) to up to 20 years’ imprisonment for criminal association, unlawful possession of homemade arms, murder and theft. On 11 September, President Touadéra created a preparatory committee for a truth, justice, reparations and reconciliation commission, which had been asked for in the aforementioned Sant’Egidio declaration. On the other hand, the government did little to implement an asset freeze for a number of individuals, who were still able to receive their state salaries despite being under international sanctions.

The Lord’s Resistance Army (lra) continued to pose a threat in the south-east. In late October, the group stepped up its attacks on villages. ai, referring to other ngos, calculated that there were 113 attacks, 12 civilian casualties and 362 kidnappings over the year. The withdrawal of Ugandan forces (which had officially fought the lra) ended in August, and this also enabled various Ex-Séléka factions to gain ground in the south-east.

Foreign Affairs

In the competition for international public attention, the car again fell into the background compared to other crisis areas including Syria and Mali, but arguably also Yemen and Myanmar (with the Rohingya crisis), which had consequences for levels of assistance. Potentially, it was in this context that un Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O’Brien repeated the warning of precursors to genocide, although no criteria for genocide were given, and neither was this a mainly interreligious conflict. It was true that in individual cases mosques and Muslim traders were targeted by some armed groups: in one instance, Anti-Balaka attacked a mosque in Bangassou on 13 May, killing the town’s imam, amongst others. The Catholic Church in the town subsequently hosted 1,500 Muslim civilians in their premises. But there was certainly not any systematic move to kill entire religious or ethnic groups on a national scale.

At the margins of the un General Assembly session, un Secretary General António Guterres co-presided with President Touadéra and the chairperson of the au at a high-level meeting on 19 September on the political, security and humanitarian situation in the car. At a press conference, Touadéra deplored the departure of France’s Operation Sangaris in 2016, and also the withdrawal starting in April–May of about 2,000 us and Ugandan forces that formed part of the au-led Regional Task Force that was fighting the lra. Guterres also visited the car on 24–27 October as the first country in a series of further visits to peacekeeping operations worldwide.

minusca peacekeepers continued to be met with hostility and were not unopposed even within government. The local population in Bangui repeatedly attacked staff and property. On 10 May, Anti-Balaka allegedly kidnapped and killed peacekeepers in the deadliest attack on a minusca convoy since the establishment of the mission. Five peacekeepers were killed and ten were injured on the road between Bangassou and Rafai. On 24 November, a crowd threw stones at un vehicles after a fatal road accident attributed to minusca: three peacekeepers were injured and three minusca vehicles destroyed in the event. On 9 December, a rocket was launched into the minusca camp in Kaga Bandoro, probably as part of the protest against the arrival of the new prefect; nobody was killed or injured. Facing the upsurge of violence, the unsc renewed the minusca mandate on 15 November for another year and authorised an increase of the troop ceiling by 900 to a maximum of 11,650 military personnel in order to bolster one core task in particular – the protection of civilians. Accusations of misconduct remained common. Most significant was that, in June, Congo was pushed to withdraw its 629 troops in response to sexual abuse allegations. A leaked memo stated that six accusatory letters had been sent to the battalion commander regarding not only alleged sexual abuse, but also fuel trafficking and lack of discipline. Several allegations of sexual abuse dating back a number of years involving French forces deployed under Operation Sangaris were dismissed by French judicial authorities.

In search of international support, Touadéra did not limit himself to the car’s traditional partners. A state visit to France on 25 September did not bring about new prospects of military cooperation. He also met with eu High Representative Federica Mogherini and President of the European Parliament (ep) Antonio Tajani in Brussels on 22 November ahead of the ep conference ‘Towards a renewed partnership with Africa’, in which he also participated. At the margins of the event Touadéra called for material support for the scc.

Less conventional was his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 9 October in Sotchi (Russia). In November and December, Russia lobbied the unsc to lift the arms embargo on the car in order to equip the faca with small arms and light weapons. This had been a constant request from Bangui authorities during the transition period but it had not been favourably received by most international partners, who did not trust the faca. This assessment clearly changed with the progressive training of new faca personnel by the eutm-rca and an exemption to the arms embargo was granted after reinforced security on warehouses was promised. Russia began almost immediately with the first shipment of arms for 1,300 soldiers including, inter alia, 900 pistols, 5,200 assault-rifles, 840 Kalashnikovs and 270 missile-launchers, plus ammunition. Russia also signalled its readiness to train the faca on these weapons.

Within Africa, Touadéra made notable visits to neighbouring countries that had at least tacitly supported some rebel movements in the past. Most prominent was a trip to Chad on 29 June, where he met also au President Alpha Condé of Guinea and the chairperson of the au Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat (from Chad) alongside Chad’s President Déby. There was press speculation that Touadéra was put under pressure on this occasion to issue amnesties to rebel leaders. A new African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the car, established at the au summit on 30–31 January, led to the adoption of a new ‘roadmap to peace’ by a ministerial conference held in Libreville (Gabon) on 17 July. The document was signed by representatives of the car government (Foreign Minister Doubane), the au, ceeac, icglr, Angola, Chad, Congo and Gabon. The roadmap was quite vague and did not provide for clear milestones. It claimed to include the contents of the previous (failed) attempt to establish a peace accord by Sant’Egidio in Rome, but clearly was meant to put African actors in the driver’s seat for future negotiations. Subsequently, France affirmed that the African Initiative and this roadmap would constitute the main framework for a political solution, while the un stressed the need for coordination with minusca. All those efforts looked sterile as long as all the armed movements remained internally fragmented – self-nominated leaders could often speak only for a battalion of fighters. Chad was a key player in this new turn of events. In November, a National Assembly delegation went to N’Djamena and signed a parliamentary cooperation agreement. Touadéra participated at the cemac summit in N’Djamena on 31 October and he also visited Sudan on 10–11 December. Together with the presidents of Niger and Djibouti, Touadéra was one of the few African heads of state to come to Kigali for Rwandan President Kagame’s inauguration ceremony on 18 August. On his return trip, he was accompanied by 40 of the 200 faca soldiers trained by the Rwandan army. Touadéra, accompanied by Defence Minister Koyara and Chief of Staff General Luc Ngaifei visited Equatorial Guinea at the end of the training phase of 144 faca soldiers on 28 October, mostly to witness a demonstration of their newly acquired military skills in the presence of President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo.

Socioeconomic Developments

gdp growth was slower than expected at around 4% (imf projection), so that the losses resulting from years of turmoil (2012/13) were still not recovered. The on-going violence in parts of the country significantly hampered agricultural production. Insecurity and repeated displacement led to a 58 % decline in crop production and increased food prices. Roughly every second person was in a food-insecure situation. The rare good news was that the economically central Bangui-Douala (Cameroon) corridor remained open, enabling a projected growth in export volume of 17.7%. Timber, cotton and official diamond exports saw significant increases. Nevertheless, there was little reason for optimism.

The upsurge of violence, first in the south-east and towards the end of the year in the north-west, led to an increase in the number of idps, bringing the total to 688,700 – a 60% increase compared with 2016. The number of refugees increased by 26% to over 545,000 hosted in neighbouring countries, although 45,000 refugees from earlier episodes of war returned to their villages of origin. This meant that, by year’s end, the overall number of those forcibly displaced was higher than ever. Humanitarian assistance was stepped up, but the official humanitarian response plan of the un’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was underfunded (61.3 % of the needs were not covered). One particular problem was the dangerous work environment for humanitarian assistance: during the year, 14 aid workers were killed and 297 humanitarian workers were temporarily relocated because of the lack of security.

On 15 December, the imf’s executive board completed the third review under the ecf arrangement. Most importantly, this exercise enabled the disbursement of sdr (special drawing right) 28.41 m (about $ 40.2 m). The difficulties of running a reform agenda in parallel with efforts to gradually restore security in additional urban centres – and not only Bangui – were acknowledged. Overall, the imf expressed satisfaction with the authorities’ efforts in many fields, which even led to the approval of an augmentation of the ecf by sdr 38.99 m (about $ 55.1 m). As important was the assessment of needs as part of the national strategy for recovery and peace, as well as for a more solid backing of economic growth.

One source of concern was the high risk of debt distress. An updated so-called debt sustainability analysis suggested that the government should rely on grant financing with strict limitations on highly concessional financing for critical projects only.

State revenue growth in 2016 and 2017 was lower than projected, close to the African average of 2.2% of gdp. The state was able to reduce some of its domestic debt arrears. However, it was clear that only a higher productivity and income from taxes and customs would help matters. On 22 June, Global Witness published a report (‘A Game of Stones’) that described the continued possibilities for smuggled diamonds to fund armed movements in the car. The government rejected the report only a few days later and stressed the importance of diamond exports for economic recovery. In fact, many sources in the report predated the newly established policies, but it was undisputed that a good part of the diamond production left the country illegally. The readmission of diamond exports produced in so-called green zones under government control also led to a slow upturn in legal diamond exports as part of the processes foreseen in the so-called Kimberley Process. The World Diamond Council, an important body of the worldwide diamond industry, officially reaffirmed its support for efforts to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds originating from the car. The Ministry of Mining and minusca undertook a joint mission to Berberati, a green zone designated by the Kimberley Process, to explore possibilities for national oversight and taxation of income generated by the illicit exploitation of natural resources. On 20 July, the General Court of the eu upheld an asset freeze imposed on two Belgian-based diamond companies that had procured diamonds from the car. It was clear that the main stakeholders in the war economy could count on partners outside the country.