au-eu Summit

In November, the fifth au-eu summit took place. The regular summit process had been set in motion by the inaugural summit in Cairo in 2000. Seven years later, the Joint Africa-eu Strategy (jaes) was adopted, accompanied by an action plan to guide exchange and cooperation in the periods between the following summits. The starting point of the jaes had been an eu strategy for Africa adopted in 2005, which reflected above all the eu’s desire to address Africa as one entity for the first time. Despite covering everything from basic education to space travel, the implementation of the jaes did not reflect the ambition it had generated. Two key factors explain the gap between intentions and results: (1) limited engagement of member states of both the eu and the au, and (2) lack of its own means of implementation. Instead, the partnership in practice shrank to a ‘Commission to Commission’ relationship and relied on the edf, an inter-governmental fund linked to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

eu High Representative and Commission Vice-President Federica Mogherini visited the au on 17 March and discussed preparations for the summit with au Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat. This was the first of three visits Mogherini made to Africa; she also attended the G5 Sahel ministerial meeting in June and the au-eu summit in November. During her speech at the au, Mogherini stressed that the au and eu had a relationship of close cooperation, particularly with regard to peace and security, and that the eu was committed to intensifying its support for investments through the External Investment Fund.

At the summit on 29–30 November, the eu sought to move away from the jaes and open a new chapter in the partnership. Influenced by Rwandan President Kagame’s report on au reform, a key signal was given by the au when it requested the eu to change the name of the summit from Africa-eu summit to au-eu summit. The eu complied and a new logo and accompanying social-media hashtag were issued. On the eu’s side, the official discourse strongly claimed that the above-mentioned ambition of the Cairo summit had been realised. As Mogherini had argued in September, “the European Union and the African Union have moved to a different kind of relationship, not donor recipient, but two political partners covering all aspects of our relationship”.

But had they really? An International Crisis Group report detected strong feelings of frustration within Africa over the eu’s frequent assertion of an equal partnership whereas in reality the relationship remained asymmetrical: the summit was used to discuss African challenges and opportunities, while the eu did not allow discussion of its own, such as Brexit and the democratic challenges in some of its member states. The report also noted that the two groups had fundamentally different views on migration: the eu focused on preventing irregular migration and returning migrants, while the au was mainly interested in increasing legal migration. Moreover, au members were disappointed both by the size of the eu’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, and by the tying of projects to European implementation organisations.

The succession to au Commission Chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, whose critical stance towards the eu’s colonial past had strained relations, by Chad’s Moussa Faki Mahamat was regarded by the eu as an opportunity to strengthen relations. In his inaugural speech to the au, Faki identified the eu as its main strategic partner. Although high-level relations improved, preparations for the summit were not much different from earlier ones, being mainly dominated by eu institutions, with ideas for the summit revolving mostly around expressing positive views about the partnership and launching new initiatives.

The summit itself, however, did not go according to plan at all. Despite the new au-eu label, both regional organisations had great difficulty in orchestrating their membership. Instead, member states dominated the proceedings, with North African states blocking civil society organisations from taking the floor, and some eu member states presenting hawkish views on migration. Since the summit took place in Africa, the au was in charge of uploading the summit conclusions document. It delayed doing so for a full week, to the frustration of the eu, which had to report back to several European Council working groups in Brussels before receiving that core document. It was even suggested that the au had unilaterally changed the following sentence in a hard-fought paragraph about the readmission of migrants by including a reference to its own constitutive act: “We underline the importance of working jointly and swiftly on all aspects linked to irregular migration, in accordance with international law, the au Constitutive Act, its regulations and instruments, including return, readmission and reintegration of own nationals in accordance with international law and standards, the principle of nonrefoulement [i.e. the practice of not forcing refugees or asylum seekers to return to a country in which they are liable to be subjected to persecution] and applicable due international legal processes.” Since the au had already uploaded and circulated the document, there was nothing the eu could do about it. The eu was taken aback by the strong pushback from au members, even though this could be seen as being part of the equal partnership they had desired for so long.

eu-Africa Cooperation on Migration

Throughout the year, the eu strengthened its cooperation with African countries on migration. On 25 January, the European Commission published a Communication on “Migration on the Central Mediterranean Route: managing flows, saving lives” to urge member states to take action in order to curb the likely increase in uncontrolled migration flows during spring and summer. The Communication called on eu institutions and member states to coordinate their actions and cooperate more closely. In particular, the eu and member states should increase support for the Libyan coast guard, enhance the fight against smugglers and human traffickers, strengthen support for the protection of migrants, particularly those who returned voluntarily, increase efforts to secure the eu’s southern borders and intensify cooperation with North African countries.

During an informal summit in Malta on 3 February, eu leaders discussed the external dimension of the eu’s migration policy and, in particular, cooperation with Libya. In the Malta declaration, eu leaders emphasised that they aimed to take additional measures to reduce migration flows, which increased further in spring and summer, and to cooperate more closely with the Libyan authorities in this regard.

On 13 June, one year after the establishment of the eu’s migration partnership framework, the European Commission published the fourth progress report on its implementation. The eu highlighted that cooperation on migration with all five pilot countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) had intensified, and pointed out that cooperation with Niger in particular had made progress: border controls had been enhanced, smugglers arrested, and human trafficking reduced, and voluntary returns of migrants from Niger to their countries of origin had increased. Independent research pointed out that in other cases, particularly Ethiopia, the eu’s insistence on (a small number of) returns had not led to tangible results but had instead soured relations. The better results of the partnership framework in the case of Niger were explained by differences in interests. Niger was mainly a country of transit, not of origin of migrants, and so its incentives to cooperate with the eu were different from those of the countries of origin.

A specific Action Plan “to support Italy, reduce pressure and increase solidarity” was published by the European Commission on 4 July. The objective of the Action Plan was to accelerate efforts by the European Commission, eu member states and Italy itself to manage the increasing number of migrants arriving through the Mediterranean route. The fifth progress report on the migration partnership framework, published on 6 September, highlighted intensified cooperation with North and West African countries and a reduced number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea.

The eu Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (eutf) scaled up its activities throughout the year. According to the eutf’s annual report, 40 new programmes were approved for North Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad region, as well as the Horn of Africa. Even though the eu acknowledged that challenges in project contracting remained, the impressive sum of € 900 m had been contracted to project implementers during the year. Resources from the eu’s budget to the eutf (mostly from the edf) increased by € 525 m to € 2.9 bn. eu member states, together with Switzerland and Norway, also slightly increased their contributions from € 152 m in 2016 to € 340 m by December. Member states’ contributions were mostly directed towards the North Africa window, as for legal reasons the edf funds were earmarked to ssa and could not be spent in North Africa.

Peace and Security

The eu supports peace and security in Africa and elsewhere through missions and operations as part of the eu’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. There were eight missions and operations deployed in Africa – three of them in the Sahel region, three in the Horn of Africa, one in the car and one in Libya. Most of them were military training missions or civilian capacity building missions.

The eu’s financial support for peace and security in Africa remained a contentious issue throughout the year. The eu passed amendments to its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) to allow for financing Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (cbsd) measures. The revised regulation now allowed the eu to provide financial support for providing training, equipment and infrastructure to military actors in African countries. This move was criticised by civil society actors, researchers and European Parliamentarians, who cautioned that the reform of the regulation would contribute to a securitisation of the eu’s development policy. The eu was also criticised because cbsd might further bolster security forces in authoritarian regimes.

In December, during a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, Mogherini proposed the creation of a new European Peace Facility (epf). She did not explain the proposal in more detail, but experts assumed that the epf would be an off-budget instrument to provide financial support for peace support operations and capacity building in African countries (and beyond) that could be a successor to the African Peace Facility (apf) in the next eu-Multiannual Financial Framework. The apf was funded through the edf and represented the eu’s most important instrument to provide financial support to African-led peace and security operations. Since 2004, the eu had channelled about € 2.4 bn through this instrument, by far the greater part of it to amis in Darfur and amisom (about 90%). Another challenge for the apf had been to provide long-term predictable funding for African-led missions. From the eu’s perspective, one challenge faced by the apf was that it could only fund African regional operations and not military actors in individual African countries (e.g. to support African members of the G5 Sahel initiative). Mogherini’s initiative to develop an epf could therefore be seen as a response to the critical debates around the IcSP as well as a response to some of the shortcomings of the apf.

West Africa

The eu adopted the Rapid Action Plan for the Sahel in June, to be implemented under the aegis of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The G5 Sahel agreed to take action on four priorities: 1) Preventing and countering radicalisation, 2) Creating appropriate conditions for youth, 3) Migration and mobility, 4) Border management, including the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime. The eu pledged funds for the five countries of around € 8 bn, albeit managed through a wide range of programmes and instruments (including the Trust Fund for Africa), and expressed strong support for and priority to the countries concerned. On 4–5 June, at a ministerial meeting in Bamako (Mali) of G5 countries, Mogherini emphasised that “Ensuring the security, stability and development of the countries of the Sahel is in the interest first of all of the local populations but also of European citizens.”

Towards the very end of the year, West Africa continued to be the “African region of European hope” when the opposition candidate George Weah won Liberia’s run-off presidential elections. Following the positive example set in response to the Gambian presidential elections in 2016, this was an important result for the region and its governance standards. This may have concealed the eu’s lack of engagement in relation to Togo, where protests intensified against President Faure Gnassingbe, who had been ruling Togo since 2005 (after his father had run the country from 1967).

The eu Election Observer Mission (eu eom) in the Gambia, one of only three eu eoms in Africa in 2017, was deployed on 13 March with about 50 observers from eu member states, Norway and Switzerland to observe the parliamentary elections. The mission’s final report, released on 1 October, urged the Gambian authorities to conduct extensive legal reform, enhance the independence of the Electoral Commission and strengthen civic and voter education in order to improve democratic development in the country.

The eu also sent 74 election observers to monitor the election in Liberia on 28 December. The chief observer, Member of the European Parliament Maria Arena, said that the election day was “calm and benefited from organisational improvements made by the National Electoral Commission”.

Central Africa

The eu took a distinctly non-interventionist approach to Cameroon and its long-term ruler Paul Biya, following the increasingly tense situation in the Anglophone north-western and south-western parts of the country. A 93-word eu statement was issued in September, calling for abstention from violence and an open and inclusive dialogue. No direct eu mediation was offered.

Shortly after the Brussels donor conference on the car on 17 November 2016, violence there had intensified. The eu, together with the ceeac, au, oif and un, published a joint statement on 19 February to express its concern regarding the security situation, particularly in the prefectures of Ouaka and Haute-Kotto. The statement condemned the violence committed by the ‘Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique’ and its allies, as well as by the ‘Mouvement pour l’Unité et la Paix en Centrafrique’, and called for an immediate end to the violence. The eu and its partners highlighted the importance of the initiative for peace and reconciliation led by the au, ceeac and icglr. On 25 July, the eu General Court rejected a case brought by the Badica and Kardiam diamond dealing companies, who had challenged the un sanctions list implemented by the eu and its condemnation of the illicit trade in diamonds mined in the car in defiance of the export ban imposed as part of the Kimberley process.

The eu continued to follow closely the situation in the drc . Political tensions had been on the rise since President Kabila had overstayed his second presidential term without preparing a date for the next presidential elections and despite the fact that the Constitution only allowed for two terms. A political agreement for a transition period leading to the holding of peaceful and credible elections by December had been signed on 31 December 2016. This deal broke down, however, following the unexpected death in February of opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi, who had been set to oversee the transition of presidential power. In response to the situation, the eu, together with the au, un and oif, issued a joint statement on 16 February, reaffirming the need for all parties to rally behind the mediation efforts led by the ‘Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo’ (cenco) and calling on all parties to implement the agreement that had been reached in December 2016. On 6 March, the eu’s Foreign Affairs Council stated that the eu remained seriously concerned by the drc’s political situation, given the stalemate in agreeing a date and timetable for presidential elections and the disproportionate use of force in some parts of the country. The Council further expanded the eu’s Common Foreign and Security Policy sanctions against the drc and, on 29 May, decided to expand the list of restrictive measures to be implemented against high-level Congolese officials and added nine individuals to the list. The eu had first introduced restrictive measures against seven Congolese individuals on 12 December 2016 in response to their obstruction of the electoral process and implication in human rights violations. The Council stressed that the eu was seriously concerned by the crisis in Kasai Province, the deteriorating security situation and the disproportionate use of force and human rights abuses by the Congolese security forces.

The Electoral Commission finally announced on 5 November that presidential elections would take place on 23 December 2018. In response, the eu Foreign Affairs Council issued a statement on 11 December stressing that the Congolese government and the Electoral Commission were responsible for implementing the agreed measures and ensuring that the new election date would be respected.

East-Africa / Horn of Africa

The eu’s relations with Ethiopia continued to be tense. The upsurge in demonstrations against the Ethiopian government since the end of 2014, which accelerated in 2016 and 2017, indicated strong popular dissatisfaction with government policies, a level of public dissent, and increased ethnic tensions. The government’s violent response illustrated the extent to which the regime was shaken by the protests. According to human rights organisations, several hundred people were killed. The situation hardly improved after the government formally ended the state of emergency at the end of August. On 17 March, Mogherini visited Ethiopia and met with Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. During her visit, she emphasised the eu’s readiness to help to address the humanitarian crisis and the drought, as well as eu-Ethiopia cooperation on migration. She also lauded the government for establishing a political platform and entering into dialogue with the opposition, while avoiding open criticism of the Ethiopian authorities for their violent response to the anti-government protests. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 18 May, highlighting the strategic importance of Ethiopia while urging the Ethiopian government to cease human rights abuses against members of the Oromo community and other ethnic groups. On 12 December, the eeas spokesperson highlighted that the eu was deeply concerned about violent clashes that had taken place at universities and called on the Ethiopian authorities to investigate the incidents and work towards an inclusive political dialogue with all stakeholders.

On 23 October, the Council of the eu renewed its sanctions against Burundi for another year. These measures were taken in the context of the eu’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and included a travel ban and asset freeze against four high-level Burundian politicians whose engagement was deemed to be undermining democratic governance and the search for a peaceful political solution. On this occasion, the eu called again upon all parties to refrain from any acts of violence and instead to end the cycle of impunity of perpetrators. In addition, the eu maintained the suspension of parts of its development aid in the context of the Article 96 mechanism of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. While members of the European Parliament sought to table a resolution to condemn Burundi’s authoritarian turn at the 22nd session of the eu-acp Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 19–21 June, the acp parliamentarians did not agree to sign the critical statement.

In Rwanda, President Kagame secured a third term with a landslide victory of 98.8% of the votes at the presidential elections in August – a third term only made possible by an amendment to the Constitution in 2015. While Rwanda’s relations with the eu and other parts of the international community were tense after Kagame’s amendment of the Constitution, the eu did not come out with a strong statement after the August elections. The eeas spokesperson noted that the elections went off peacefully and were well organised but that Rwanda should improve the inclusiveness and transparency of the process and take steps towards achieving a level playing field, in line with recommendations of the au eom.

The elections in Kenya provided an uncomfortable reality check for the eu eom. Two days after the 8 August elections, the eu’s chief observer presented the mission’s preliminary statement and commended all the parties who had contributed to the electoral process. The statement further noted that election result forms were still being processed, and the eom urged the losing candidate to accept defeat graciously, and/or use legal means to challenge the process and outcome when appropriate. Though in effect legitimising the election, the statement did call for a critical assessment of the benefits and challenges of using digital technology in the process. The statement was immediately challenged by Kenyan stakeholders, and in October became a cause of controversy when the High Court annulled the election. The subsequent withdrawal of the opposition candidate delegitimised the process even further, and the eu eom could do no more than issue a one-page statement calling on all parties to enter into dialogue and redress grievances using legal means. The final report was not completed by the end of the year, and the case of Kenya may inform reflection in the eu on how to adjust observation processes to both new technologies and political crises resulting from elections.

The eu remained deeply concerned by the deteriorating security situation in South Sudan. The eeas spokesperson stressed on 7 November that the eu firmly supported igad in its efforts to promote peace and bring all actors to the table during the so-called High Level Revitalisation Forum. The eu welcomed the convening of the High Level Revitalisation Forum on 17 December and used the opportunity to stress that the eu was ready to support the peace process in various ways. Furthermore, the eu would not refrain from using restrictive measures (read: sanctions) against South Sudanese individuals who obstructed progress in the peace process.

Southern Africa

On 17 February, the eu extended its sanctions on Zimbabwe for another year. The measures mainly included travel bans and an asset freeze for seven high-level individuals who were responsible for human rights violations and obstruction of democratic reforms. The November au-eu summit was the first in more than a decade where the question of Mugabe’s attendance was no longer a dominant issue – for the simple reason that Mugabe was no longer president. Following the coup d’état in all but name, the eu could do little more than issue a brief statement calling for an orderly transition and inclusive dialogue. While the eu had already lifted its travel ban and restrictive measures against the new President Emmerson Mnangagwa in 2016, he was still subject to us sanctions.

In general terms, the eu had not come up with a comprehensive strategy to respond to the deteriorations in the governance situation in Southern Africa. In most Southern African countries, the liberation movements in power had recently been under severe pressure and had often responded by restricting political spaces for the opposition, civil society and the media. While in Angola the (peaceful) change of president in the August elections could be interpreted as a small positive sign, the security and governance situation in Mozambique deteriorated during the year. The mid-term implications of the change of presidents in Zimbabwe and tensions around the succession to President Zuma in South Africa were not yet clear. Even though there was recognition that political regimes in Southern Africa were entering a critical stage, the eu was left with few instruments and little sense of strategy to support democratic reforms across the region.

International Criminal Court

In 2016, South Africa, the Gambia and Burundi had sent letters of withdrawal from the icc. The Gambia and South Africa withdrew these letters in October. In the same period Namibia, Kenya and Uganda threatened to submit such notifications, but in the end did not. Discussions continued at the level of the au on this sensitive topic in Africa-eu relations. In January, the au adopted a non-binding resolution urging its member states to withdraw from the icc, but (not uncommonly for au resolutions) there was no follow-up. While heads of state and government avoided addressing the issue at the au-eu summit, it was likely to come up again during discussions on the future of acp-eu cooperation, given the inclusion of an expression of support for the icc in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

Africa as the New eu Investment Frontier?

The international discourse on the need for a ‘quantum leap’ in investment in Africa proved to have strong direct influence on eu cooperation with Africa too. A key initiative that was introduced at the very beginning of the Juncker administration concerned the Investment Plan for Europe (‘Juncker Plan’), which sought to improve the investment environment and dramatically expand private investment within the eu, combining reforms of the regulatory environment, advisory services to increase awareness of investment opportunities, and new funding to stimulate investment. In his 2016 State of the Union address, Juncker had announced the creation of an “external sister” to the plan, in the form of an ambitious Investment Plan for Africa and the Neighbourhood, which had the potential to raise € 44 bn in investments. The plan was to follow the same logic, orienting around the use of public funding as a guarantee to attract public and private investment to create real jobs.

The negotiations towards operationalising this plan claimed a substantial portion of the agenda of the key stakeholders in eu development cooperation: the eu Commission, member states, Parliament, national development banks and the eib. Following the practice of the eutf that had been launched in 2015, months of intense negotiation that ended in the summer did not involve any serious direct exchange with the intended investment subjects in Africa. This approach to developing the investment plan reflected a broader trend in which the eu was pursuing its interests towards Africa more directly, but the key question remained of the extent to which this relative neglect of ‘ownership’ among African recipients (or rather the assumption of ex-ante presence) would lead to effective cooperation.

eu Member States

Among the eu’s member states, Germany’s interest in cooperation with Africa continued to be high throughout the year. Within the G20 Finance Track, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble proposed developing ‘Compacts with Africa’ aimed at improving the business environment in selected African countries and thereby attracting fdi. Compacts were prepared by the World Bank, imf and AfDB. During a meeting of the G20 finance ministers in Baden-Baden in March, five countries expressed interest (Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia). During the G20 Africa Partnership Conference on 12–13 June, another two countries joined – Ethiopia and Ghana – and, at the annual meetings of the imf and the World Bank in October, Benin, Egypt and Guinea expressed interest in signing a compact. The G20 leaders’ declaration signed during the G20 summit in July highlighted that G20 countries intended to foster “sustainable and inclusive economic growth and development, in response to the needs and aspirations of African countries, contributing to create decent employment particularly for women and youth, thus helping to address poverty and inequality as root causes of migration”. In parallel to the G20 Compacts with Africa, German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Gerd Müller presented a ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’ with the objective of supporting long-term sustainable development on the continent. The plan, which was published in January, put a strong emphasis on Europe-Africa cooperation. The document developed three pillars for cooperation with Africa: economic relations, trade and development cooperation; peace security and stability; and democracy, rule of law and human rights. Through the Marshall Plan, Germany provided financial and technical assistance to some of the Compact countries to support their endeavours in complying with the Compact requirements. German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her continued interest in strengthening relations with the continent by joining the au-eu summit in Côte d’Ivoire despite being in the midst of complicated discussions on forming a new coalition government at home.

In July, his first visit to Africa brought the new French President Emmanuel Macron to Mali, where French troops continued to fight Islamist terrorists. Macron implemented one of his election campaign promises in August by setting up a special council on Africa, composed of young business people with ties to France and Africa. The special council on Africa was meeting on a regular basis and was meant to advise Macron on how to improve France’s image on the continent. In November, Macron used his attendance at the au-eu summit in Côte d’Ivoire to make a visit to neighbouring Ghana and Burkina Faso. He deliberately did not travel to Senegal but to Burkina Faso in order to emphasise his intention to give a fresh start to French-African relations. Particularly in Burkina Faso, his visit was accompanied by tensions. Youth protests and grenade attacks on French troops hours before Macron’s arrival in Ouagadougou highlighted the challenges in developing a new approach in French-African cooperation.

Cooperation with Africa remained important for Italy, particularly as a result of the high number of migrants and refugees constantly arriving in the southern parts of the country. During its G7 presidency, Italy made cooperation with Africa an important subject, indicated not least by the symbolic choice of the venue for the summit in Sicily, where refugees and migrants were arriving in large numbers due to its proximity to North Africa. During his opening address, Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni called for a new partnership between the G7 and Africa with a strong focus on investment and aid. Heads of state and government from Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia, as well as the au chairperson, au Commission president and AfDB president took part in the meeting. The summary of the outreach session on Africa highlighted the importance for the continent of peace, security and investment. The only concrete initiative that emerged from the meeting was Italy’s announcement of a “G7 Exchange and Empowerment Program for Emerging African Innovation Leaders”, which was intended to contribute to innovation and science cooperation.

The New European Consensus on Development

At the annual European Development Days in June, the eu issued a new European Consensus on Development – a tripartite statement signed by the Council of the eu and the representatives of the governments of the member states meeting within the Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament. The new European Consensus replaced the previous Consensus adopted in 2005 and set out a vision for the development policies of the eu institutions and member states. This earlier 2005 document had been important for the negotiation of the current generation of eu financial instruments, as well as informing the development policies of the countries that joined the eu after 2004 as part of their accession trajectories.

While the statement was of a horizontal nature and not exhaustive in setting out regional priorities, ssa continued to receive most of the eu’s development funds. The Consensus aimed at aligning eu development policy with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals. The Consensus put the Agenda centre stage and discussed in detail how European development policy should contribute to the ‘five Ps’ – People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership. Moreover, having one strategy for the eu and its member states was an important step forward from the 2005 version, which was split into two parts, with a separate chapter for the eu institutions. However, while ensuring that all actors’ interests were well represented, the new Consensus failed to set clear priorities for where the eu should concentrate its efforts to support African and other developing countries in implementing the 2030 Agenda.

The Future of eu-acp Relations

This year saw continuing preparatory discussions in both the eu and the representation of the acp in the run-up to negotiations about how to govern relations between the eu and the states concerned after the Cotonou Partnership Agreement expires in 2020. In the eu, these discussions were mainly guided by a policy proposal (‘Communication’) that had been issued by the European Commission and the European External Action Service in November 2016. This Communication made the case for continuing to legislate the eu’s relations with acp and non-acp countries separately, as had been the practice since the first Lomé Convention was agreed to in 1975. Where the Cotonou agreement of 2000 reformed the partnership by ‘decentralising’ trade relations into bilateral and regional trade agreements as well as unilateral eu trade preference schemes, the 2016 proposal suggested a major reform in terms of strengthening regional dynamics.

While eu member state diplomats discussed with the eu throughout the year what the proposal’s implications for the future partnership might entail, the eu delayed publishing its detailed recommendation for a negotiating mandate until 12 December. That proposal described and proposed the basis for a new international agreement consisting of an ‘all-acp’ foundation and attached protocols setting out cooperation priorities and process towards Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. As the agreement stipulated that negotiations were due to start in August 2018, at the end of the year the eu was facing a considerable challenge to elaborate a negotiating mandate in half a year on the basis of an eu recommendation that was detailed on status quo, but silent or sketchy on reform. On the acp side, a Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels could have adopted an all-acp position that would build on the 2016 summit of heads of state, which argued for continuity in the relationship. It had in previous years prepared and deliberated on several studies on the future of the group and its cooperation with Europe. However, it was decided that a special session of the Council would convene in Togo on 27 May 2018, when such a position could be adopted.