Domestic Politics

The report of the sadc Commission, chaired by Botswana’s Judge Mphaphi Phumaphi, into instability in Lesotho was made public in February. Its principal purpose had been to enquire into the killing by soldiers of Brigadier-General Maaparankoe Mahao in June 2015. Mahao had been appointed commander of the Lesotho Defence Force (ldf) by the then prime minister Tom Thabane in place of Tlali Kamoli, only for Kamoli to be re-appointed to his position in May 2015 by Mosisili after the latter had resumed his post as prime minister. The ldf had claimed that Mahao had been killed in a skirmish after he resisted attempts to arrest him for alleged involvement in plotting a mutiny within the army. The Commission, which first met in Lesotho on 20 July 2015 under an initial 60-day mandate (later extended by a further 30 days), had heard testimony from government officials and civil society, as well as from opposition parties, the Lesotho Mounted Police Service and the ldf themselves. During this process, Judge Phumaphi had clashed repeatedly with members of Mosisili’s government and senior army officers over what he deemed to be their evasiveness in failing to answer questions about matters they should have known about or their refusal to allow soldiers implicated in Mahao’s death to testify. In turn, the government had publicly criticised the judge for hearing testimony from former prime minister Thabane and other opposition politicians (who had fled Lesotho following Mahao’s death) in South Africa (claiming that the Commission had been established under Lesotho’s domestic law).

It was against this fraught background that the findings of the Commission concluded that “on a balance of probabilities”, Mahao had not resisted arrest; that the degree of force used to arrest him was not commensurate with the danger he had posed by his possession of a pistol; and that there had been a failure by the ldf to properly preserve evidence of what had occurred. The Commission concluded that Mahao had been murdered, rather than shot and killed. Indeed, it reported that it was extremely doubtful that Mahao had been involved in the alleged mutiny plot, “bearing in mind that before he was shot and killed, there had been threats to his life coming from the ldf”. Furthermore, there were divisions within the ldf, and anomalies relating to the charges of mutiny. The report went on to recommend that the 23 soldiers facing mutiny charges should be granted amnesty from criminal prosecution. Indeed, given that soldiers charged with mutiny had been subject to torture, it concluded that “the alleged mutiny might have been a fabrication”. The report went on to endorse Mahao’s appointment as commander and the removal of Kamoli from the same post by Thabane as legal. In contrast, while the subsequent removal of Mahao by the incoming Mosisili government had also been legal, it had been accomplished in a flawed manner, as had been the re-appointment of Kamoli. The Commission further found that Kamoli’s re-appointment had imperilled security, not least because Kamoli had perpetuated divisions within the ldf by vowing to deal with those who had celebrated his removal. The flight of opposition leaders to South Africa and subsequent boycotts of parliament by the opposition parties was a further manifestation of political instability.

The recommendations of the Commission included: first, that the government should ensure that criminal investigations into Mahao’s death be pursued vigorously; second, that Kamoli should be relieved of his duties as commander of the ldf, and all army officers implicated in cases of murder, attempted murder and treason should be suspended immediately while investigations into their cases were carried out; third, given that some of the country’s political and security problems emanated from its constitution, deficiencies and overlaps within the latter should be addressed urgently; and fourth, that implementation of reforms (of the constitution, security sector, public service and information services and media) should be accelerated, as recommended by the sadc Mission to Lesotho, which had been headed by Cyril Ramaphosa during much of 2015.

Unsurprisingly, the Phumaphi Report met with a hostile reception in Maseru. The sadc leadership met with Mosisili to discuss the report on 18 January, only to be faced with a refusal to receive it. sadc promptly threatened to suspend Lesotho from the regional organisation, whereupon the government reluctantly accepted the report, formally tabling it in parliament on 8 February. However, the tabled version omitted the names of certain ldf officers who were implicated in human rights violations, including torture and other ill-treatment, and the killing of Brigadier Mahao. In addition, the legitimacy of the report was directly challenged by a court case whereby Lieutenant Colonel Tefo Hshatsi, one of those implicated in the murder of Mahao, sought to nullify its findings on the grounds, first, that the Commission, especially Justice Phumaphi, had been biased against him and had violated his constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a competent court; and second, that the Commission had violated its terms of reference by hearing evidence in South Africa. In response, sadc reiterated that any court decision against the Commission of Inquiry would have no legal effect. The Mosisili government was further alienated by what it regarded as sadc’s threat to Lesotho’s sovereignty and lack of impartiality, and had sought to delay publication of the report to give time for editing out anything deemed likely to threaten the country’s peace and security. In this regard, the government had met a particular opponent in South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma, who had stated on 19 January on the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s ‘Morning Live’ programme that sadc would unilaterally release the report and push for the complete suspension of Lesotho from the regional body. Zuma’s remarks met with no surprise in Maseru, where it was felt that he had aligned himself with Thabane, who when he was prime minister had appointed as advisers the controversial Indian Gupta family, who were close to Zuma. In turn, Mosisili, on his return to office, had terminated the arrangement with the Guptas, and revoked their diplomatic passports. Mosisili was naturally vocal in his rejection of any suggestion that Lesotho be suspended from sadc, claiming that any such move would be invalid while a case concerning the legitimacy of the Phumaphi Commission was still before a court of law.

Meanwhile, Mosisili was facing other pressures. There was particular opposition to an Amnesty Bill that the government was seeking to process through parliament, which would grant amnesty to any members of the army, police, national security services, correctional services and ‘other persons’ for any offences committed between January 2007 and December 2015. The amnesty would extend to any members of the ldf whom the Phumaphi Commission had recommended should be subject to prosecution. Civil society organisations objected to what they considered the government’s attempt to construct a “culture of impunity”. More forcefully, us diplomats warned that the passing of the Bill would imperil Lesotho’s continuing favourable access to the us market under agoa, thereby endangering the jobs of the 30,000 workers in Lesotho’s textile industry.

Tensions between the government and sadc continued, with the former missing a deadline to file an update on progress in implementing the Phumaphi report. However, on 20 June, Mosisili presented an update in parliament, while stating that sadc’s recommendations were not binding. At a further sadc meeting on 28 June, it was resolved that sadc would assist the government to develop a “comprehensive road map” with clear time frames for the implementation of all sadc decisions and recommendations, notably those pertaining to reforms of the security sector and the constitution. It also called upon all opposition leaders in exile to return to Lesotho to participate in the reform process.

The appeal met with no response, opposition leaders having received no guarantees of their safety. Meanwhile, the political situation remained tense and volatile. Media repression increased. Journalists working in the broadcast, print and social media faced threats, and some were physically attacked. On 23 June, ‘Lesotho Times’ reporter Keiso Mohloboli was interrogated at police headquarters and pressured to disclose her sources for an article alleging that Tlali Kamoli would receive an exit package of M (maluti) 50 m (around $ 3.5 m). She was arrested the following day, along with the newspaper’s editor, Lloyd Mutungamiri. The newspaper’s owner, Basildon Peta, was charged in turn with criminal defamation following publication of a column that had satirised Kamoli. On 9 July, gunmen attacked and injured Mutungamiri in his home driveway. Mohloboli fled the country, fearing for her life.

The sadc meeting on 28 June had given Lesotho until August to start implementing the reforms, but August came and went. Subsequently, Cyril Ramaphosa met with the three exiled opposition leaders (Thabane, Theselle Maseribane of the Basotho National Party, and Keketso Rantsho of the Reformed Congress of Lesotho) in Pretoria (South Africa), where they were joined by opposition leaders from within Lesotho. Ramaphosa briefed the leaders on sadc’s efforts to consolidate peace and stability, highlighting the appointment of a sadc committee to oversee the recommended reforms, notably those of the security sector and the constitution. He further indicated that he would soon pay a visit to Lesotho to introduce members of the oversight committee to all relevant stakeholders.

This formed the backdrop to the dramatic events of the next few days. On 8 November, the government announced that it had concluded negotiations with Lieutenant General Kamoli, who would retire as commander of the ldf on 1 December. However, hopes that this would stabilise the fragile political situation were immediately dashed by Mosisili’s redeployment of Monyane Moleleki, his party’s deputy leader, from the key post of minister of police to the prime minister’s office (where it was presumably felt he would be under firmer control). The National Executive Committee of the dc, which was controlled by Moleleki’s Lirurubele faction, responded by ordering Mosisili to pull out of the seven-party coalition, which they accused of corruption, nepotism and undermining relations with development partners. Subsequently, four ministers (and two deputy ministers) who were aligned with Moleleki were dismissed. When another dc minister joined them by resigning a few days later, it was clear that the end of the government was in sight. Moleleke’s faction declared that they were ready to form a new government, claiming that they had the support of at least 21 members of the ruling coalition, and that they were ready to go into coalition with Thabane’s abc. In response, the government sought to stand firm, insisting that the prime minister would only leave office if he lost a vote of no confidence, with Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing hinting that opposition mps who had been in exile for more than a year might be disqualified from participating in such a vote by their lack of attendance at parliamentary sittings. This threat was backed up by reports that police were arresting, or ready to arrest, mps who were attempting to cross the floor and rumours that the government wanted to clamp down on social media. Deputy Prime Minister Metsing meanwhile claimed there was no crisis in Lesotho, only a thriving democracy.

Foreign Affairs

The tensions between Lesotho and sadc were reflective of deeper undercurrents. Lesotho’s politicians were acutely aware of their country’s lack of effective sovereignty and of the determining influence of outsiders. The budget was hugely dependent upon development assistance; electoral and military affairs were heavily subject to sadc influence; employment was critically reliant upon agoa and the export of labour to South Africa; and Lesotho depended on imports from South Africa for virtually all consumer and capital goods. In addition, although benefitting financially from the export of water to South Africa via the Highlands Water Project, Lesotho was becoming increasingly subject to South Africa’s strategic security and political concerns. Further anxieties amongst Lesotho’s political elite were aroused by the activities of a People’s Charter Movement, which called for the incorporation of the country into South Africa.

In August, it was reported that South Africa’s Water Affairs Minister Nomvula Monkonyane had insisted on new terms of reference for the R (rand) 26 bn Polihali dam, originally scheduled for completion in 2018 but repeatedly delayed (now supposedly due for completion in 2025). Senior departmental officials with the South African ministry, who asked not to be identified, stated that Monkonyane was demanding that the main contractor chosen to design and build the dam should share 20% of the contract with a black empowerment partner. It was further claimed that the minister favoured lte Consulting, reportedly an African National Congress donor, for that role. lte was already the subject of a probe by the Special Investigating Unit relating to alleged flawed tendering processes regarding water and sanitation contracts in the South African province of Gauteng. Meanwhile, it was further alleged that Monkanyane had removed South Africa’s chief delegate to the Highlands Water Project, Dr Zodwa Dlamini, who had ten years’ experience in mega-water projects, to facilitate the inclusion of lte in the project, replacing him with Bheki Nkosi, who had served as her provincial minister for infrastructure when she had been premier of Gauteng. Ministers in Mosisili’s cabinet were said to be colluding with Mokonyane in their eagerness to use the Highlands Water Commission as a source of patronage.

Socioeconomic Developments

Minister of Finance Dr ‘Mamphono Khaketla presented her budget on 22 February. The total recurrent expenditure estimate of M 11,485.8 m was complemented by proposed capital expenditure of M 5,004.7 m. Partly because of the depreciation in the value of the rand (to which the maluti was tied), public debt had increased to M 867 m. She also noted that Prime Minister Mosisili had urged Basotho and development partners to respond to a need for M 585m in drought relief. Critics on the relevant parliamentary committee complained that the budget lacked creativity and failed to deal with the pressing problems of declining custom revenues from sacu, an increasing public sector wage bill, and a low capacity to spend the capital budget. They doubted that a budget deficit of 10% of gdp was sustainable and called for increased efforts to mobilise domestic revenues whilst cutting back on unnecessary expenditure, notably on travel and transport of government officials. The committee failed to mention that, were the unwieldy seven-party coalition to fall apart, the government would need to look well beyond its proposed budget to fund any consequent election.