Domestic Politics

All three islands having supplied a president of the Union, the constitution required that the cycle start again with a president from Ngazidja. The first round of the presidential election, held on 21 February, was restricted to the electorate of Ngazidja and had a field of 25 candidates.

The voters faced a choice between experienced politicians and personalities from civil society, both representatives of political parties and independents, including Mohamed Daoud, the mayor of Moroni, Hamidou Bourhane, who had been president of the National Assembly until January 2015, former chief of staff, General Mohamed Amiri Salimou, and the prominent Franco-Comorian lawyer Said Larifou, leader of the ‘Rassemblement pour l’Initiative de Développement de la Jeunesse Avertie’ (ridja). However, four other candidates ultimately dominated the vote. Dhoinine’s preferred candidate was the sitting vice president for finance and the economy, Mohamed Ali Soilihi, the official candidate of the ‘Union pour le Développement des Comores’ (updc), the largest single party in the National Assembly, with eight out of 24 seats. For Soilihi, the advantages of incumbency were offset by a faltering economy, unpaid public sector salaries and rumours of corruption. Another confidant of Dhoinine, the governor of Ngazidja, Mouigni Soilihi Said Baraka, faced the challenge of appealing to voters from Nzwani and Mwali, where he was little known. Sambi’s party, Juwa (meaning ‘Sun’ in Shikomori), gave its backing to a former foreign minister under Sambi, Fahmi Said Ibrahim, who, though leader of the ‘Parti de l’Entente Comorienne’ (pec), stood as an independent. Finally, Azali Assoumani, the former president, sought to play down the coup that had originally brought him to power, rather accentuating his role in devising the electoral system that had underpinned the relative stability of the past 15 years, and his unique experience as the only former president in the electoral field.

The role of the large Comorian diaspora was more pronounced than in previous elections. Based mainly in mainland France, the number of Comorians living abroad was estimated at 150,000. Increasingly influential in the electoral process largely as a result of its financial influence – with the diaspora contributing around a quarter of the Union’s total gdp – the original intention for the elections was to extend the franchise to expatriates. Ultimately, however, citing ‘technical reasons’, the ‘Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante’ (ceni) blocked this decision, so the role of the diaspora in the election, notably its money and influence, remained significant but was no longer crucial.

The provisional results of the first round were announced by the ceni on 24 February. The turnout was 74.4% of a registered electorate of 159,000 and the result was tight, with Soilihi winning 17.6% of the vote, Baraka 15.1% and Assoumani 15%, leaving Ibrahim, with 14.5% of votes cast, excluded from the second round. The peaceful conduct of the election was commended by the au. Claims from the Ibrahim camp, and from 18 other candidates, that the vote had been fraudulent did not gain traction and calls for a general strike were ignored.

As the election from then on encompassed the other two islands of the archipelago, the tenor of the campaign became more charged. A fire bomb attack on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moroni just before campaigning began for the second round evidenced a deep-seated frustration amongst the electorate, particularly young voters, with the political class’s inability to resolve the high unemployment rate, shortages of food and energy, and chronic inadequacies in infrastructure, as well as inadequate health and education provision. Nzwani saw the most disruption, with violent confrontations between rival supporters erupting after former president Ahmed Abdallah Sambi came out in favour of Assoumani.

The result of the second round was very close. The turnout was 69.1% of a registered electorate of 301,000 across the three islands. Assoumani came out the winner with 41% of the vote, followed by Soilihi with 39.9% and Baraka third with 19.2%. The outcome was rejected by Soilihi, who claimed that the vote on Nzwani was seriously flawed with voters prevented from participating and incidences of fraud. These objections were upheld in part by the Constitutional Court and a repeat of the second round of voting was ordered in 13 constituencies on the island. This partial re-run, held on 11 May, resulted in Assoumani increasing his majority to 41.6%, with Soilihi dropping to 39.7% and Baraka dropping to 18.9%.

As well as voting in the presidential poll on 10 April, the three islands also voted in the gubernatorial run-offs. The results were disastrous for Dhoinine’s updc. On Ngazidja, the ruling party’s Hamada Moussa took 38% against 62% for Hassan Hamadi, who benefitted from splits in the Assoumani camp to get to the run-off, and ultimately received Assoumani’s backing. On Mwali, Dhoinine’s wife Hadidja Aboubacar received 37% of the vote against 67% for Mohamed Saïd Fazul, a former president of Mwali and fervent opponent of Dhoinine.

The fractious presidential campaign on Nzwani was mirrored in the gubernatorial elections. In the run-off, the updc’s candidate and sitting governor, Annisi Chamsidine, faced the Juwa party candidate, Abdou Salami Abdou. During the campaign, frequent violent confrontations took place in front of the ‘Commission Électorale Insulaire Indépendante’ (ceii) offices in the island’s capital, Mutsamudu. There was confusion over the outcome, with first Chamsidine and then Salami Abdou being declared the victor. Both candidates alleged incidences of fraud on polling day and the Constitutional Court ordered re-runs of the gubernatorial vote in the same constituencies where re-runs in the presidential vote had been ordered. Salami Abdou was ultimately declared the winner, meaning the updc failed to win the governorship of any of the three islands.

Neither the presidential nor the gubernatorial campaign was conspicuous for novel approaches to the Union’s longstanding economic and social problems. However, it was clear that whichever candidate won, with six political parties and three independents represented in the National Assembly, and with no single dominant party, discrete alliances would need to be formed in order to pass each piece of legislation. The increasing fragmentation of Comorian electoral politics left Assoumani, who received just 15% of the first round vote compared with Dhoinine’s 28% in 2010, and whose party, the ‘Convention pour le Renouveau des Comores’ (crc), had only two seats in the National Assembly, less able to dictate the legislative agenda than his predecessor.

During his first months in office, Assoumani intervened to lower the cost of living by cutting domestic petrol prices, public transport fares and some foodstuffs. He also signalled his intention to reduce government spending by cutting the public sector workforce. This ambition would bring him into conflict with vested interests and the public sector trade unions. Paradoxically, despite his ambition to cut the national wage bill, Assoumani decided to raise the salaries of some ministers.

Foreign Affairs

As the former colonial power, France remained Comoros’ most important economic, political and cultural partner. Yet despite the closeness of the ties between the two countries – about 300,000 Comorians were living in France and the French treasury guaranteed the Comorian franc – the question of whether the archipelago’s fourth island, Mayotte, was Comorian or French remained seemingly intractable. From the Comorian perspective, France had reneged on the original rules of the independence referendum and opted to retain control of Mayotte. Since 2011, Mayotte had been a full department of the French republic. Moreover, since 1995, France had severely restricted visas for Comorians, leading to a crisis involving tens of thousands of migrants making the perilous sea crossing every year, many motivated by much higher living standards on Mayotte, but others simply seeking to visit family. Many drowned and others were held in migrant centres before being returned.

In his September speech to the un General Assembly, Assoumani called for a renewed dialogue with France over the sovereignty of Mayotte. He also raised the issue with President François Hollande in October, when he made his first official visit to France following his election. However, with successive referendums in Mayotte reaffirming an overwhelming commitment to remain part of France, there was no prospect of the island being returned to Comoros. Like previous Comorian heads of state, Assoumani had to tread a delicate path. National honour required Comoros pursue its claim to Mayotte, whilst diplomatic and practical efforts had to be made to cut the level of migrant deaths at sea. However, given the importance of the relationship with France on many levels, Assoumani had also to maintain constructive relations with the former colonial power.

Comoros continued its long-standing ‘open-door’ policy, seeking to maintain good relations with Western powers, Middle Eastern states and its regional neighbours. For many years, it had been one of the few countries to be on good terms with both the United States and Iran. However, in recent years, as the rivalry for hegemony in the Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia had intensified, so Comoros had come under pressure from Riyadh to break relations with Tehran. In January, the Dhoinine government officially severed diplomatic relations with Iran, citing that country’s interference in the internal affairs of some Arab states. This decision followed the injection of $ 40 m in budget support from Saudi Arabia in late 2015 to settle the unpaid salaries of public sector workers and clear the state’s debt to the central bank. Breaking diplomatic ties with Iran also had a theological dimension. Comorians being predominantly Sunni Muslims, the links forged with Shia Iran, notably under the Sambi presidency, were viewed with suspicion by many. In October, the minister of the interior restated the prohibition of non-Sunni Muslim rites in public and private places, re-emphasising Comoros’ support for Saudi Arabia with regard to Iran.

The decisive shift toward Saudi Arabia and the wider Arab Middle East was also emphasised by the opening in June of a secretariat dedicated to Comorian relations with the Arab world. In May, the then Minister for External Affairs Abdoulkarim Mohamed indicated publicly that Comoros was willing to discuss granting economic citizenship to Kuwait’s stateless ‘bidun’ population.

Apart from the rupture with Iran, the open-door policy remained in place. In particular, cooperation with China was courted. In May, in addition to a defence agreement and a port management venture agreed in 2015, it was announced that there were plans for Sino-Comorian collaboration in areas including infrastructure, health, energy and fishing.

Socioeconomic Developments

Economic growth continued to slow to an estimated 0.7%, down from 1% in 2015. This continued decline was caused by delays in infrastructural improvements, the shortfall in electricity production and a drop in the production of two key export crops, cloves and ylang-ylang, which contracted by 45% and 10% respectively. Mid-year figures indicated that fdi had fallen to $ 5 m in 2015 from $ 14 m in 2014 and a high of $ 23 m in 2011.

The imf released a report at the end of the year commending the new government’s commitment to stabilising the fiscal situation. Assoumani met with Comorian banking leaders to urge a simplification of international fund transfers to encourage fdi. At the same meeting, he assured them that the government should be treated like ‘any other client’ when it came to government lending.

The inflation rate for the year was 1%, the result of low international food and oil prices as well as the restraining effect of membership of the franc zone, with the Comorian franc pegged to the euro (cf 492 : € 1) and guaranteed by the French treasury.

Despite recording substantial current account deficits in the three preceding years, mid-year figures from the Banque Centrale des Comores (bcc) indicated that in 2015 the country had, for the first time, registered a surplus. The surplus of cf 2.6 bn was the result of a reduction in imports as a consequence of lower oil prices, a drop in equipment imports and a rise in secondary income, notably a 3.4% rise in remittances and the $ 40 m in budgetary aid received from Saudi Arabia.

However, the single largest shift in the current account, amounting to a drop in the services deficit of 90% from the previous year, was result of the cf 7 bn income from the sale by the Dhoinine government of a second telecoms operating licence to the Madagascar-based firm Telecom Malagasy (Telma), which brought to an end the monopoly held by Comores Télécom (Comtel), a government-owned company. The introduction of competition in the sector was applauded by the imf. The high cost of telecom services in Comoros – with broadband at $ 80.2 a month compared with an average for low-income countries of $ 44.9 – had been largely attributed to Comtel’s monopoly. Telma complained that Comtel had denied it access in Moroni to the Eastern African Submarine system (EASSy), the fibre-optic cable network that connected countries in the region. It was hoped that the fourth-generation and fibre-optic networks that Telma was promising to deliver would have the potential to increase Internet usage in Comoros, which in 2015 stood at 7.5% compared with 22.5% in Africa overall.