Domestic Politics

The year started with the fallout from the decimation of the Mujuru faction. Throughout the year, there were endless purges of perceived allies of ousted Vice President Joice Mujuru. On 14 January, the sacked political heavyweight, former zanu-pf secretary for Administration and Presidential Affairs Minister Didymus Mutasa, issued a scathing press statement “on behalf of all the loyal members of zanu-pf who are determined to restore the image of our party”. The statement accused President Robert Mugabe and his wife of fanning hatred and division in the party. Mutasa described the congress that sacked him and other party members allegedly loyal to Mrs Mujuru as illegal, and the sackings as therefore null and void. He threatened legal action. Critics interpreted Mutasa’s venomous statement as a case of sour grapes for his ouster. Quoting legal experts, state-controlled media ridiculed Mutasa’s legal bid as “an exercise in futility”, claiming that the planned application had no legal merit. In the face of attacks by his erstwhile colleagues, Mutasa continued his fight against his former party. On 30 January, he hinted that Mujuru would be filing a lawsuit against the president’s wife, Grace Mugabe, over attacks that had led to the former’s expulsion from the party. On 2 February, he said he would attend zanu-pf’s planned disciplinary hearing against him, out of his “enduring respect” for President Mugabe. The hearing had been delayed by Mrs Mugabe’s absence. The disciplinary committee was led by Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko. Other committee members were secretary for Women’s Affairs Grace Mugabe, zanu-pf national commissar Saviour Kasukuwere, secretary for legal affairs Patrick Chinamasa, Secretary for Youth Pupurai Togarepi and politburo member Kembo Mohadi.

Unconfirmed reports of Mugabe’s poor health, which were traditionally voiced at the beginning of the year, this time included his wife. On 22 January, Mugabe reported that she had undergone an appendectomy in Singapore. The following day, there were reports that Mugabe had undergone a major prostate cancer operation, also in Singapore, but this was denied by Mugabe’s spokesperson, George Charamba, who said he had gone for “an annual review of his eyes”. On his return, Mugabe did not mention his own operation, but disclosed that he and his family had undergone medical check-ups during their holiday. Rumours about Mrs Mugabe’s health intensified with her continued absence from the country. On 9 February, the presidential spokesman denied reports that she was in a coma. In March, unconfirmed reports in the private media reported that she had received treatment for colon cancer. Amidst the reports and speculation about his wife, Mugabe’s own health continued to be the subject of rumours, fuelled by his frequent trips to Singapore. After his return from annual leave in February, he had flown to the city-state three times by the end of April. Mrs Mugabe disappeared from public view and was not fulfilling her party obligations and other duties as head of the zanu-pf Women’s League, amid reports that she was ill. She was said to be seeking treatment abroad. On 3 June, she reappeared on the political scene and scoffed at reports of her poor health, insisting that she was as fit as a fiddle. Mugabe’s fall at the airport escalated speculation on his health: on 4 February, on his arrival from Ethiopia, he missed a step and tumbled off the podium at Harare International Airport. The incident quickly became major news. According to reports, journalists at the scene were forced to delete pictures of the president lying on the ground. With videos of the fall going viral, the fallout from the incident lasted for some time, with government spin-doctors and detractors tussling over what actually happened. It was also reported that up to 27 members of the presidential security and advance team who stood by as Mugabe fell were suspended on 6 February. The opposition unsurprisingly capitalised on the event, using it as evidence to support their questioning Mugabe’s fitness to rule.

Following the purging of Mujuru loyalists, zanu-pf factional fighting took on a new dimension. By the second half of the year, it was being speculated that the alliance between Grace Mugabe and Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa that had annihilated the Mujuru faction was unravelling. The increasingly influential Mrs Mugabe was said to be working with zanu-pf’s ambitious Young Turks, known as Generation 40 (G40). As in previous years, the factional wars were associated with zanu-pf’s fractious succession politics. There was speculation that rather than helping Mnangagwa become president, Mrs Mugabe was preparing herself for the position. Phelekezela Mphoko, the other vice president, was reported to be in the Grace Mugabe camp. On 8 August, President Mugabe denied for the first time speculation that he was lining up his wife to succeed him. The factional fighting pitted two formations against each other: the Mnangagwa-aligned ‘Team Lacoste’ and the Grace Mugabe-aligned G40. The most vocal members of the G40 formation were Higher Education Minister Jonathan Moyo; party national commissar, Saviour Kasukuwere; and Mugabe’s nephew, Patrick Zhuwao. They were openly opposed to Mnangagwa, viewing him as unfit to run the party and country.

One of the high-profile public battles between the factions involved choosing a candidate for the Harare East constituency. The factions picked rival candidates and the case went all the way to the High Court. On 6 May, the court ruled that both candidates could contest the 10 June election. On 16 May, it was reported that the G40 faction had upstaged Mnangagwa’s camp in the battle for the constituency. zanu-pf officially chose G40’s preferred candidate, Terence Mukupe, to represent the party over Mnangagwa loyalist Mavis Gumbo. Mnangagwa’s woes were not helped by his political gaffes. In an interview with ‘New Africa’ magazine in September, he described the immensely popular late vice president Joshua Nkomo as a sell-out. This damaged Mnangagwa’s image and presidential ambitions because it alienated Ndebele people both within and outside the ruling party. As the factional fighting intensified, the Mnangagwa camp reportedly tried to outflank the G40 when, on 12 November, it was reported that the Masvingo provincial executive was planning to be the first to endorse Mnangagwa as Mugabe’s official number two ahead of the party’s December conference. This was apparently in response to the G40’s strategy to oust Mnangagwa. In October, the G40 were reported to be plotting to push for a constitutional amendment to re-introduce a clause that would compel zanu-pf to have a woman in the party presidium. What fuelled speculation that this was targeted at Mnangagwa was the fact that Mphoko, the other vice president, appeared to be safe as his appointment was in accordance with the 1987 zanu-zapu Unity Accord. The G40 appeared to have secured the support of two influential organs of the party: the Youth League and the Women’s League, headed by Grace Mugabe.

The drama in the factions of the mdc (Movement for Democratic Change) spilled over into 2015. On 17 March, 17 opposition mps and four senators were expelled from parliament by order of the Speaker of Parliament, Jacob Mudenda, after they broke away to form a new party. The 21 had been elected or nominated on mdc-t (Tsvangirai) tickets. They later split to form mdc Renewal, led by former finance minister Tendai Biti. As 14 of the mps had been directly elected in the 2013 election, the expulsions triggered by-elections in their constituencies. The mdc-t would be able to appoint replacements for the other seven seats, which were allocated according to the proportion of votes cast in the 2013 election. Also on 17 March, Biti responded by vowing to challenge the expulsion in court, although his legal challenge would be unlikely to succeed. Biti also made allegations that mdc-t was working with zanu-pf to destroy his mdc Renewal. This was hardly a believable allegation, given the tensions between mdc-t and zanu-pf.

In a series of by-elections triggered by the expulsion of the mps and senators, deaths of legislators, and the elevation of Mnangagwa to the vice presidency, zanu-pf secured easy victories, beginning on 28 March, when it won Chirumhanzu-Zibangwe and Mount Darwin constituencies. On 10 June, zanu-pf won all 16 contested seats in parliamentary by-elections and, on 20 December, won in Nkulumane, thereby improving its political presence in Bulawayo. The mdc-t boycotted all the by-elections, vowing not to take part in any future elections before the alignment of the Electoral Act with the new Constitution. The minor parties that contested the by-elections lost by huge margins.

Throughout the year, there was intense speculation about ousted Vice President Joice Mujuru’s political intentions. Her allies, Rugare Gumbo and Didymus Mutasa, had indicated that she was going to form her own political party and in April Mutasa claimed that efforts were underway to form a party to be called Zimbabwe People First (zpf), with Mujuru as its leader. Mutasa insisted the party would be the ‘original’ zanu-pf. For some time, Mujuru maintained her silence and all political statements were made by Mutasa and Gumbo. Finally, in September, Mujuru came into the open about her future and gave the strongest indication that she would challenge President Mugabe. On 8 September, she unveiled her party manifesto, entitled Blueprint to Unlock Investment and Leverage for Development (build). She claimed that build reflected her party’s ‘proposal to translate our vision for a better Zimbabwe into reality’. In addition to economic issues, the manifesto contained other important provisions, including acknowledging dual citizenship and promoting and supporting press freedom. zanu-pf loyalists ridiculed the manifesto, though it received favourable reviews from some commentators.

President Mugabe announced a cabinet reshuffle on 11 September, adding to the bloated cabinet. He appointed four new ministers and 10 deputies. Jonathan Moyo was moved to the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education from the Information, Media and Broadcasting Services Ministry, where he was replaced by Christopher Mushowe. Saviour Kasukuwere was moved to the Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing, being replaced at the Water and Climate Ministry by Oppah Muchinguri. Ignatius Chombo was moved from the Local Government Ministry and re-assigned to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Nyasha Chikwinya was appointed to take the lead at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. There had been speculation that Mugabe would bring his wife into the cabinet, to take over the Women’s Affairs Ministry. Mugabe’s nephew, Patrick Zhuwao was named minister of youth development, indigenisation and economic empowerment.

zanu-pf’s 15th Annual National People’s Conference opened on 11 December in Victoria Falls. As expected, the party’s factional in-fighting escalated, with accusations and counter-accusations of plots between the two camps. So vicious were the conflicts that Mugabe openly admitted that factionalists were “threatening to tear each other apart at this conference”. There were reports that the G40 was trying to force Mnangagwa out of the race for the presidency by demoting him and replacing him in the presidium with Grace Mugabe. The influential Women’s League had demanded in its resolutions to the conference that a woman be incorporated into the presidium by 2016. However, on 12 December, President Mugabe, in his closing speech, seemed to scuttle the plot by dismissing any plans of leadership change as ‘dreams’. It is believed Mugabe saved Team Lacoste. In a departure from the norm, the conference ended on 12 December with no announcement of final resolutions. This was seen as an indication of the bruising factional in-fighting that had characterised zanu-pf’s succession politics throughout the year. Another significant development at the conference was the call by some delegates for a return to the Zimbabwe dollar.

Partly because of the factional conflicts in zanu-pf, the human rights situation remained relatively stable during much of the year. However, there were reports that the government continued to violate human rights in defiance of protections enshrined in the new Constitution. According to hrw, the expected legislative framework and new or amended laws to improve human rights in line with the Constitution did not materialise. The organisation reported that police violated basic rights, such as freedom of expression and assembly, “using old laws that are inconsistent with the new constitution”. Later in the year, there was some progress in the harmonisation of some pieces of legislation with the Constitution. According to the Zimbabwe Human Rights ngo Forum, by the end of the year the General Laws Amendment Bill of 2015 had addressed 125 Acts of Parliament and 51 Acts had been amended under the National Prosecuting Authority Act. An outstanding 116 Acts still required minor amendments, while 49 required substantial amendments.

Police harassment continued. Human rights activists faced severe restrictions on their work. Police frequently applied draconian laws such as the Public Order and Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act to ban public meetings and gatherings. Journalists and opposition and other activists were prosecuted under these laws. Between October and December, the Zimbabwe Human Rights ngo Forum reported a cumulative total of 998 human rights violations. On 9 March, five armed men abducted 36-year-old journalist Itai Dzamara, a human rights activist, vocal Mugabe critic and leader of a protest group known as Occupy Africa Unity Square. At year’s end, he had still not been found. The authorities consistently denied any government involvement. On 13 March, Dzamara’s wife approached the High Court to compel the state to search for her husband. Judge David Mangota ordered the home affairs minister, the police commissioner-general and the director-general of the Central Intelligence Organization “to do all things necessary to determine Dzamara’s whereabouts”. The judge ordered the government to report to the court every two weeks on its progress with the case until Dzamara was found. They did not comply with the order.

There were violations of freedoms of assembly and expression. On 25 April, activists organised a car procession to raise awareness about Dzamara’s disappearance. Police arrested 11 of the activists and detained them for six hours. They were released without charge. On 8 November, Highfield East mp Erick Murayi (mdc-t) and 16 others were arrested on charges of public violence and for holding a rally without police clearance. On the press freedom front, on 2 November police arrested three state media journalists who had published a report implicating senior police officers and Parks and Wildlife Authority rangers in the killing of elephants in Hwange National Park. On 12 November, the journalist Andrison Manyere was arrested in Harare for covering a demonstration by mdc-t activists against what they saw as reluctance by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to implement electoral reforms. He was later released without charge.

Foreign Affairs

With no major change in the country’s domestic and foreign policy, there was little change in foreign relations. Relations with most African and Asian countries and organisations continued to be friendly. Relations with the oecd countries experienced some slight shifts. As had become the norm, zanu-pf and the government blamed the country’s deteriorating economic situation on ‘illegal’ western sanctions.

President Mugabe began the year as Chairman of sadc , a position he had assumed in August 2014. This role continued to be celebrated among his supporters and was used as an indication of his stature as a statesman. During his watch as sadc chairman, the crisis in Lesotho arose following the killing of the army commander in June. Mugabe expressed concern and worked to resolve the situation. His bid to diffuse the crisis included meetings with South Africa’s Defence Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, President Jacob Zuma’s special envoy, in Harare on 30 June. As chairman of the bloc, Mugabe travelled extensively to countries in the region. This generated controversy with the opposition and critics complained about what they asserted was a waste of resources. In August, Mugabe handed over the sadc chairmanship to President Ian Khama of Botswana. While critics dismissed Mugabe’s chairmanship as a non-event, his supporters defended his legacy at the helm of the organisation and the benefits to the country’s international standing. Ironically, despite having its leader as chairman of sadc, Zimbabwe failed to pay its $ 2 m contribution for the year. Officials blamed the banking system, claiming that banks were “reluctant to conduct transactions from the country”.

On 30 January, President Mugabe was appointed as the new chairman of the au . While his supporters predictably celebrated, Mugabe’s appointment drew criticism from Zimbabwean opposition parties and Mugabe critics. The mdc-t argued that he lacked “the political legitimacy to lead an Africa that should be looking to consolidate democracy and good governance”, while the head of the icg pointed out that the “elevation sends a negative signal of African solidarity with leaders who’ve misruled their countries”. As was the case with his chairmanship of the sadc, Mugabe’s tenure at the au drew mixed review. His supporters hailed it as a success: the state-owned ‘Sunday Mail’ newspaper said that he had introduced processes and implemented plans that helped steer the au into its current form. Critics, dismissed his tenure as a disaster, with ‘The Zimbabwean’ newspaper describing Mugabe as the au’s weakest leader in history. As head of the au, Mugabe travelled extensively. During March, he made five trips to other African countries. Predictably, this brought criticism from people who saw it as a waste of money that the country could ill afford. Mugabe also faced harsh criticism from abroad. On 29 May, journalists confronted him during the inauguration of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari in Abuja and questioned him about his long stay in power. His supporters did not take kindly to this embarrassing encounter and the state media went into overdrive to denigrate the journalists.

While relations with most of Africa were good, the same could not be said of Zimbabwe’s relations with Botswana. On 17 August, when Botswana’s President Ian Khama took over as sadc chairman, he said he wanted the region “to be a beacon for democracy for Africa”, and blasted “leaders who cling to power”. Such were the relations between the two countries that observers interpreted the remarks as being directed at Zimbabwe. Relations with South Africa remained good. In April, President Mugabe paid his first state visit to South Africa since 1994 and the two countries strengthened bilateral relations with the signing of five agreements on 8 April. The agreements comprised the establishment of a binational commission to be led by the two heads of state; a memorandum of understanding on diplomatic consultations; a memorandum of understanding on trade cooperation; an agreement on mutual assistance between customs administrations; and an agreement on cooperation on water resources management.

On the international stage, Zimbabwe maintained good relations with China. On 1 December, China’s President Xi Jinping arrived in Zimbabwe. He was easily the most prominent global leader to visit the country in many years. In an article in the state-controlled ‘Herald’ newspaper, Mr Xi said the two nations had a “deep and firm” friendship. On 22 December, Zimbabwe announced that the yuan would become the latest currency to be approved for public transactions in Zimbabwe. This was seen as part of the country’s plans to increase trade with China. The decision was made following Beijing’s confirmation that it would cancel $ 40 m of debts.

Zimbabwe strengthened relations with Russia, one of its traditional allies. On 4 January, state media reported that a high-powered Russian delegation would visit Zimbabwe that month to finalise some multi-million dollar projects aimed at improving water infrastructure in Harare and surrounding towns. They were aimed at dam construction, irrigation development and water management. In May, it was reported that Russian investors would be financing a $ 4 bn platinum mine in the Great Dyke. The investors said they would also carry out exploration for other minerals, which could add to their investment. This was in line with a ‘roadmap’ agreed in September 2014 during the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Outside its circle of traditional allies and friends, Zimbabwe forged relations with Belarus. The two countries stepped up cooperation in sectors ranging from agriculture to mining. On 18 November, Mugabe approved a number of investment deals after his meeting with the visiting Viktor Sheiman, President Lukashenko’s chief property manager. The deals covered agriculture, mining and agricultural equipment. Mugabe and Sheiman also discussed cooperation in electricity, road and bridge construction, housing and education.

There was no major shift in relations with the eu . The thaw continued, with the eu announcing a resumption of aid to Zimbabwe. On 16 February, the eu unveiled a $ 270 m aid package to support Zimbabwe’s agriculture and health sectors. This marked the resumption of direct funding after more than ten years. However, the eu maintained its asset freeze and a travel ban on Mugabe and his wife, as well as an arms embargo. During the signing ceremony, eu Ambassador to Zimbabwe Philippe Van Damme cautioned that this move did not “mean that everything is suddenly sorted out and that we are entering a new honeymoon”, pointing out that, although some obstacles had been cleared in the eu-Zimbabwe partnership, “new problems may emerge, old problems may reappear”.

Zimbabwe’s relations with the uk saw some activity. On 12 February, a uk private sector-led International Investor Delegation arrived in Zimbabwe to explore investment opportunities. The British Embassy claimed this signalled “the strengthening of business ties between the two countries”. In March, dfid launched a programme to increase incomes and reduce poverty among smallholder farming households in chronically food and nutrition insecure districts and, on 7 September, approved new funding to support Zimbabwe’s education sector. On 17 September, uk Foreign and Commonwealth Office Head of Central and Southern Africa Department Danae Dholakia, who was visiting Zimbabwe, met Minister of Water, Environment and Climate Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri. According to the British Embassy in Harare, the two discussed, among other things, combating the illegal trade in wildlife; the uk’s ongoing support to the water sector in Zimbabwe; and mitigating the impacts of global climate change on Zimbabwe in the context of the 21st Conference of Parties in Paris.

Relations with the us remained frosty. This became clear on 13 March, when two visiting us diplomats ruled out a change of policy with Zimbabwe. Speaking to reporters in Harare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Shannon Smith said the us would not relax travel bans and other sanctions against President Mugabe and his leadership during the year. However, on 3 July, speaking at the 239th us Independence Day anniversary in Harare, us Ambassador to Zimbabwe Bruce Wharton said his government was committed to the development of Zimbabwe and had embarked on various projects mutually beneficial to both countries. In a move that did not help bilateral relations, Mugabe was excluded from an au meeting in July 2015 after he was snubbed by us President Barack Obama. Despite being the au chairman, Mugabe was not among the leaders who met Obama at the au headquarters in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on 28 July. Mugabe’s spokesman said Mugabe was unmoved by Obama’s visit to the au and dismissed the event as like “a visit by any other visitor”.

Relations with multilateral organisations were mixed. On 8 April, the management of the imf completed the first review under the Staff-Monitored Program (smp) with Zimbabwe. The imf described the smp as the “lynchpin of the authorities’ roadmap for building a strong track record towards normalizing the relationship with Zimbabwe’s creditors and mobilizing development partners’ support”. According to the imf, the main objective of the programme was to strengthen Zimbabwe’s external position as a prerequisite towards arrears clearance, normalisation of debt servicing, and restoring access to external financing. In September, the imf indicated that, even if Zimbabwe undertook economic reforms, it would take at least three years before it could expect loans from international lenders. Zimbabwe stepped up its reengagement with creditors by, among other things, increasing payments to the World Bank and the AfDB. On 19 May, the World Bank urged Zimbabwe to urgently clear its arrears with the Bretton Woods Institutions and the AfDB in order to access the extra lines of credit necessary to fund the economy. The executive director of the World Bank’s Africa Group, Louis Rene Peter Larose, pointed out that the resolution of Zimbabwe’s debt overhang and the clearance of arrears needed “to be treated with the urgency it deserves”.

Socioeconomic Developments

Zimbabwe faced some significant economic challenges during the year. Economic indicators reflected the challenges in the economy. Confirming signs of deflationary pressures, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe figures showed that the December consumer price index was 98%. The year-on-year price increase was –2.4% compared with –0.2% in 2014. According to Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu) estimates, the real gdp growth was 0.2%, a sharp drop from 3.8% in 2014. The eiu put the nominal gdp at $ 13.9 bn, down from $ 14.2 bn. The current account balance was –$ 2.5 bn, up from –$ 1.0 bn, while total international reserves dropped to $ 297 m. In the budget statement, the finance minister estimated public and publicly guaranteed debt burden at $ 8.3 bn. The external debt consisted of debts of $ 1.4 bn. The arrears amounted to $ 5.4 bn, giving a total debt of $ 7.0 bn.

Zimbabwe performed poorly in a number of world league tables. In the World Bank’s Doing Business 2016, the country was ranked 155th, down from 153rd in 2015 out of 189 economies. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2014–15 ranked Zimbabwe 124th out of 144 countries. The Human Development Index for 2015 gave a figure of 0.509, which placed Zimbabwe 155th – an improvement from 156th in 2014.

On the humanitarian front, the country faced a number of challenges. In April, Masvingo Provincial Affairs Minister Shuvai Mahofa said the government would embark on the second relocation of nearly 3,000 Tokwe-Mukosi flood victims from the Nuanetsi Ranch to seven farms that had been identified for them in Mwenezi district. Each of the families would be allocated six hectares at the new plots. Another cholera outbreak hit the country. On 9 March, Health and Childcare Minister David Parirenyatwa announced that confirmed cholera cases had risen to 12, while three more suspected cases at Birchenough Bridge were still to be verified. By April, the situation appeared under control. Government and partners remained on alert following one new suspected cholera case in Manicaland Province and one suspected case in Mashonaland East Province.

Food security challenges resurfaced. According to the Vulnerability Assessment Committee (zimvac) Report of 2015, maize production dropped by 49% from the average, with a likely cereal deficit of 650,000 tonnes. The crop production deficits were caused by poor rainfall distribution during the season. As a result 1.5 m people were at risk of food and livelihood insecurity. The zimvac 2015 rural livelihoods assessment indicated that approximately 10% of the rural population were projected to be food-insecure for the period of October–December and that 16% of the rural population were projected to be food-insecure for the period of January–March 2016.

According to demographic indicators produced by the World Bank, the death rate for the period 2011–15 stood at ten deaths per 1,000 of population. Due to the worsening economic situation, there was an increasing flow of Zimbabweans into South Africa and Botswana in search of better economic opportunities. un estimates put the crude net migration rate at 4.35 migrants per 1,000 of population. Life expectancy for the total population was 51 years. The infant mortality rate was estimated at 47 deaths per 1000 live births (World Bank estimate). The literacy rate was a league-topping 91%, making Zimbabwe the leader in Africa.

According to the government, the hiv/aids epidemic remained “generalized, feminized and homogenous” and with continued declines in new infection rates, prevalence and aids-related mortality. unaids figures showed that 1.6 m people were living with hiv. The prevalence rate among adults aged 15–49 was estimated at 16.7%. About 150,000 children aged 15 or under were living with hiv. Deaths due to aids were estimated at 39,000. There were 570,000 children aged 0–17 who had been orphaned by aids.

The education and health delivery systems continued to experience problems of staffing, equipment and funding. Health and education personnel remained a substantial part of the brain drain. Industrial action and threats of industrial action arising out of salary disputes were a constant feature throughout the year, further compromising these sectors. In September, teachers’ unions threatened industrial action at the beginning of the third term. They wanted to force the government to address their concerns, which included working conditions and the withdrawal of salaries for more than 3,000 teachers found missing from their workstations during a human resources audit conducted by the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education. On 27 December, government doctors gave their employer a five-day ultimatum to pay their December salaries and bonuses, threatening withdrawal of labour in the new year.

Job losses spiralled in the second half of the year as companies took advantage of a shock court ruling by the Supreme Court on 16 July that companies could lawfully terminate employees’ contracts at any time without offering them packages, provided they had given them at least three months’ notice. There was a flood of employment terminations as companies saw the termination of contracts on notice as a cost-effective way of firing workers without the need to give any explanation or conduct disciplinary hearings or take the costly retrenchment option. Figures for those who lost their jobs in July alone ranged from 20,000 to 25,000 in both private and state-run firms. Faced with the massive job losses, the government rushed to amend the labour laws. On 26 August, new labour regulations came into force that made it harder to retrench workers. Retrenchments could now only be allowed in specific circumstances, with a minimum retrenchment package of one month’s pay for every two years of service. The regulations were backdated to July.

On 27 August, the ‘Financial Gazette’ reported that the government had abandoned its populist indigenisation policy “in a desperate attempt to lure offshore capital required to revive the country’s disintegrating economy”. The indigenisation law compelled foreign-owned companies to cede at least 51% of their shareholding in locally based companies to blacks or specific entities designated by government. However, it appeared there was a reversal in the reversal. In October, the combative new indigenisation minister, Patrick Zhuwao, announced that Zimbabwe would be imposing an additional tax burden on foreign-owned companies. The proposed 10% empowerment levy to fund indigenisation and economic empowerment would be raised to 12.5% in 2017. The change in policy appeared to reflect the factional struggles within zanu-pf. Zhuwao was a leading member of the G40 faction while Finance Minister Chinamasa was believed to be in the Mnangagwa camp.

On 26 November, Finance Minister Chinamasa presented the 2016 national budget with the theme “Building a Conducive Environment that Attracts Foreign Direct Investment”. Chinamasa proposed a $ 4 bn budget. At $ 3.7 bn, recurrent expenditure was 92.1% of the budget. Revenue was projected at $ 3.9 bn in 2016. The $ 150 m deficit (1.1% of gdp) was to be funded by local borrowing. Chinamasa projected a gdp growth rate at market prices of 2.7% for 2016. Although expenditure on wages was expected to fall to 80% of the total budget, it would still increase by 2.7% in 2016.