Domestic Politics

Much attention went into peace negotiation efforts in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). Numerous deadlines in the negotiations, mediated by igad, came and went. President Salva Kiir Mayardit, for the Government of South Sudan, and Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (splm-io), signed another ceasefire agreement in February. It did not work. Nor did further face-to-face talks between the two leaders. While diplomacy continued in Addis Ababa, fighting continued in South Sudan and often the two were connected. The two parties again failed to come to an agreement by an igad deadline of 5 March, leading to a new ‘igad-Plus’ initiative.

After the political process collapsed, government and allied forces mounted an offensive from April against the splm-io in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile. The surge in fighting in Upper Nile saw heavy clashes around Malakal, its capital and gateway to the state’s main oil installations. The town changed hands repeatedly and there were defections and shifting alliances. Shilluk forces commanded by General Johnson Olony, for example, defected from the government forces (the Sudan People’s Liberation Army [spla]) and then fought with the splm-io, which brought significant quantities of materiel to io forces. In southern Unity state, the spla – and those forces working with it – engaged in the worst, most destructive campaign of the civil war to date, enabling the government to recapture a significant amount of territory. In the process, some of the war’s worst atrocities were committed, including gross sexual violence.

Internal divisions and political strife characterised the splm-io . In April, it convened a conference in Pagak, its general headquarters, to discuss the peace negotiations. In July, Machar removed two senior commanders, Peter Gadet and Garouth Gatkouth; fearing arrest, Gadet fled to Khartoum (Sudan). Internal opposition to Machar’s leadership grew, and included a section of the Nuer Council of Elders. On 2 August, the splm-io started a further Pagak consultation about the proposed igad agreement. Not long afterwards, Machar relieved Gabriel Changson Chang of his position as chair of the National Committee for Finance and Resource mobilisation; he later formed his own splinter group.

Throughout the year, there were efforts to reunify the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement ( splm ) following the events of December 2013. These were led by Tanzania’s ruling party, the ‘Chama Cha Mapinduzi’ (ccm) and South Africa’s ruling African National Congress, who facilitated dialogue. Kiir, Machar and Deng Alor Kuol, the former cabinet affairs minister representing former detainees, signed a Reunification Agreement on 21 January in Arusha (Tanzania). On 1 June, five former detainees, including Kuol and former justice minister John Luk Jok, returned to Juba to meet Kiir. This advance guard was accompanied by South Africa’s Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, the ccm secretary general, and the foreign ministers of Ethiopia and Kenya. On 3 June, Kiir revoked his previous orders and reinstated Kuol and Jok in the splm. In November, other members of the group, including Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior, widow of the late splm leader John Garang de Mabior, Majak Agot, former deputy defence minister, and Oyah Deng Ajak, former minister of national security, returned to Juba.

Despite efforts to mend the splm, Kiir consolidated his position in the party. In January, the government announced that it would postpone elections, which had been scheduled for 30 June. In March, Parliament agreed an extension of tenure for the president, the National Legislature and the State Legislative Assemblies by three years, until 9 July 2018. The splm-io and former detainees rejected these extensions as unconstitutional. In October, the splm was reformed following an extraordinary meeting of its National Liberation Council. The party dissolved its leadership structure and removed splm officials from their positions, with the exception of Kiir, who remained as chairman.

Beyond such elite politics, the political climate deteriorated. In March, a controversial new National Security Service Bill became law, despite lacking the president’s signature. The authorities systematically sought to co-opt, capture or coerce civil society organisations and to enshrine control in legislation. In May, the National Legislative Assembly passed the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill, creating a regulatory framework for ngos, but Kiir returned the bill for parliamentary scrutiny following concerns raised by civil society and members of the diplomatic community.

The human rights situation reached new lows. Aside from the fighting, National Security and spla Military Intelligence forces made arbitrary arrests and detained many suspected of supporting the opposition. A climate of fear, intimidation and violence greatly restricted the scope of independent media and civil society. Journalists were arrested and detained. At least six were killed, including a reporter, Peter Julius Moi, shot in August not long after Kiir threatened to kill journalists “working against South Sudan”. There was a sharp deterioration in the state of freedom of the press and association. National Security shut down a number of media outlets, including the print edition of the ‘Nation Mirror’, ‘The Citizen’ and ‘Al Rai’.

Relations between the government, armed opposition and the international presence deteriorated. Criticism of the belligerents from outside South Sudan was matched by criticism of the international community from within the country. The tone was set in January, when un Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon criticised Kiir and Machar for putting their own interests first and failing to agree a power-sharing accord. In June, the head of the un’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations accused the Kiir government of refusing to cooperate with the un and harassing its personnel; the un resident humanitarian coordinator, Toby Lanzer, was declared persona non grata and branded an ‘enemy’ of South Sudan. After March, the obstruction of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations escalated. By December, at least 43 humanitarian workers had been killed since mid-December 2013.

International pressure on the warring parties to stop fighting continued. In March, unsc resolution 2206 created a system to impose sanctions against those contributing to the conflict. The sanctions committee created by the resolution designated six individuals for targeted sanctions. In June, the au appointed former the Malian president, Alpha Oumar Konare, as au High Representative for South Sudan, and the au Peace and Security Council (aupsc) called for “urgent steps” by the un sanctions committee to take measures against warring parties in South Sudan who continued to defy efforts to end the conflict. On 24 July, igad-Plus proposed a new draft compromise agreement peace agreement and gave the two South Sudanese parties until 17 August to sign a final deal. There was further American pressure to get a deal signed. In early August, us President Barack Obama warned Kiir and Machar that, if they failed to meet the 17 August deadline to sign the proposed compromise agreement, it would be necessary “to move forward with a different plan, and recognise that those leaders are incapable of creating the peace that is required”. The usa submitted a draft resolution to the unsc, calling for an arms embargo and further sanctions if peace was not agreed by 1 September.

This contributed to the headline event of the year, the so-called ‘August peace agreement’. Machar signed this igad-mediated Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan on 17 August on behalf of the splm-io, together with Pagan Amum Okiech on behalf of the ‘former detainees’. This followed an igad Heads of State summit featuring a meeting between Kiir and Machar. Bending under heavy international pressure, Kiir eventually signed on 26 August. The agreement committed both parties to a permanent ceasefire, a power sharing Transitional Government of National Unity, and other provisions, such as the creation of a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, a Compensation and Reparations Authority, and a Hybrid Court. Even as Kiir signed, however, the government circulated a document outlining detailed objections. These included opposition to central provisions of the agreement, such as the demilitarisation of Juba and the power-sharing structure of the executive.

Opposition to the agreement continued and deepened after its official signing. Divisions amongst South Sudan’s political and military elite extended well beyond those formally negotiating on behalf of the government and the splm-io, and arose in local settings in many parts of the country. Within government ranks, Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Paul Malong Awan was vehemently critical and many also opposed the agreement within the splm-io. One of the fiercest critics was the president himself. On 15 September, he said the agreement “attacked seriously the sovereignty of our country”. Ominously echoing Sudan’s former president Jaafar Nimeiri’s critique of the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement when he was reneging on its terms, Kiir said that: “The igad proposed Compromise Peace Agreement is neither a Holy Bible nor Quran.”

Despite generating hope in some quarters, in practice the agreement only created a formal framework for peace. The day after Machar signed, forces loyal to the splm-io attacked a government garrison in Pageri, Eastern Equatoria, and, despite the formal ceasefire and ratification of the agreement by South Sudan’s parliament on 10 September, spla conduct did not change in southern Unity, where government forces continued to attack splm-io units. Nonetheless, implementation of the peace deal became a priority. The international community mobilised to support it, with reluctant, stop-start moves by the two parties to begin to implement selected aspects. In October, igad appointed the former president of Botswana, Festus Gontebanye Mogae, to lead the body created to oversee implementation of the agreement, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (jmec). The government and the splm-io signed a permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, committing both to demilitarising Juba and other towns. In late November, the spla started to withdraw troops from Juba. Not long afterwards, the first meeting of the jmec convened in Juba, but without splm-io representation.

A political earthquake occurred on 2 October, when Kiir issued a decree announcing the division of South Sudan’s ten states into 28 new states. Modifying a proposal initially made by an influential group of Dinka leaders, the Jieng Council of Elders, this massively controversial redrawn political map was seen to create a form of ethnic partition, isolating Nuer communities in their own states and leaving Dinka in control of much of South Sudan. Unity and Upper Nile were each divided into three separate states, with the oil fields in Upper Nile coming, in effect, under Dinka control. The splm-io and many other political parties condemned the announcement. In October, a new, predominantly Shilluk, group based in Wedokona, Upper Nile, formed to fight the ‘unconstitutional’ decree. igad also declared it to be against the spirit and letter of the peace agreement. Despite widespread opposition, Kiir continued with his plan.

The geography of conflict expanded as the year progressed, partly driven by the redrawn political map and other, inter-communal tensions. Fighting resumed in central and southern Unity in October, but low-level conflict was also spreading in other regions. New rebel groups appeared in Western Equatoria. The Arrow Boys mobilised amidst increased clashes between the spla and armed youths. Eastern Equatoria saw tensions. The situation in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Western Bahr el-Ghazal deteriorated, with government air strikes on 6 December and insecurity around Wau. Conflict also worsened in Jonglei in late December, especially in Pibor, after the appointment of a former deputy governor of Jonglei as governor of the proposed new Boma state.

The long delayed report of the au Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, created by the aupsc in 2014, was finally released on 27 October (with a Separate Opinion by one member). A January meeting of the aupsc had deferred consideration of the report. Finding no evidence of the alleged coup attempt against Kiir in December 2013, it concluded that “widespread and systematic” killings had occurred in Juba in December 2013, later spreading to other parts of South Sudan, and that these were coordinated and “could have been planned”. South Sudan’s Foreign Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin rejected its findings, insisting that the conflict had been started by a coup attempt.

The August agreement failed to produce a meaningful reduction of violence. The year ended with continuing efforts to implement the agreement, ongoing low-level conflict and a worsening humanitarian situation. An splm-io advance team entered Juba on 21 December led by Taban Deng Gai, its chief negotiator. Machar was supposed to return but did not. On Christmas Eve, new governors for the 28 states were appointed, and sworn in on 29 December. A lack of political will meant there had been minimal progress towards establishing the Transitional Government of National Unity.

Foreign Affairs

Much of South Sudan’s foreign relations revolved around and concerned the conflict and the politics of fighting or negotiating peace. International conflict mediation backed by strong regional input evolved over the year. Early in the year, and in what it styled as supporting igad, China convened a consultative meeting of the two parties in Khartoum. The revised, expanded igad-Plus process, announced in March after 15 months of unsuccessful mediation, included the un , the eu , the Troika (usa, uk and Norway), China and an igad Partners Forum (comprised of donor partners, with ministerial, ambassadorial and technical membership). The guiding approach appeared to be recognition that, without pressure, South Sudan’s main warring parties would be unwilling to agree a peace deal and, in order to exert the necessary and coordinated pressure to push a deal through, igad needed wider international support. In June, igad-Plus was formally launched and supplied a ‘synopsis’ document to the parties setting out ‘key provisions’ of an agreement: power-sharing, transitional governance and security arrangements.

The splm-io sought to secure regional and international support for its cause via diplomacy of its own. Machar was active in travelling to seek support. In mid-September, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda visited Khartoum for talks about South Sudan’s peace agreement but, shortly before he arrived, Machar was transported to Khartoum from Gambela, in western Ethiopia, by a Sudanese government plane. He then went to New York to participate in a un high-level meeting on South Sudan. In October, he visited Washington, where us National Security Advisor Susan Rice cancelled a White House meeting citing the lack of commitment to implementing the peace process.

If much international engagement with the government of South Sudan concerned the quest for peace, much of Juba’s foreign relations was aimed at addressing and circumventing international pressure, including over the issue of an arms embargo. On 10 September, for example, in an effort to secure Russian support at the unsc, South Sudan’s foreign minister and his Sudanese counterpart held talks with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow. South Sudan wanted help in preventing the imposition of an arms embargo and widening sanctions. On 16 September, Russia and two non-permanent members of the unsc blocked us moves to widen un sanctions.

Kiir attended the au Summit in South Africa in June. Vice-President James Wani Igga was sent to participate at the un General Assembly in September. In early October, amidst ongoing friction, the White House cancelled a meeting with him and Pagan Amum. In late October, Kiir visited South Africa to brief President Jacob Zuma on the peace deal, amidst stories that he was seeking medical treatment. Shortly afterwards, Kiir flew to India with a large delegation to participate in the India-Africa Forum Summit hosted by India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi. In November, Kiir, a Catholic, met Pope Francis in a private meeting in Kampala (Uganda). In early December, he went to Johannesburg (South Africa) to participate in the 6th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

Juba’s public diplomacy also sought to help address the domestic economic crisis. This included efforts to secure loans and renewed efforts to join the eac . In March, Sudan and South Sudan’s Joint Border Commission agreed to establish an escrow account to pay for border demarcation. As a measure of its economic stress, and with its payments to Khartoum falling behind, South Sudan tried to persuade Sudan to reduce the fees paid as part of its oil agreement. It signed an agreement to supply Sudan’s Kosti power station with crude oil in return for electricity imports.

A further aspect of Juba’s foreign relations was more difficult to pursue since it concerned military cooperation. Following the cooperation agreement with Egypt in March 2014, Juba continued military links with Cairo. In April, Chief of Staff Paul Malong Awan went to Cairo and met the Egyptian Defence Minister and Commander in Chief of Armed Forces General Sedki Sobhi. South Sudan’s Minister of Defence Kuol Manyang Juuk followed up with a visit to Cairo in September.

In a year of further revelations and concern about the use of child soldiers in the conflict, South Sudan ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It also became a party to the un Convention against Torture and its Optional Protocol, and the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol. In April, a hardly surprising announcement by South Sudan’s justice minister stated that South Sudan would not sign the Statute of Rome and become a member of the icc.

There was agreement to continue a cross-border humanitarian aid corridor, amid renewed accusations by South Sudan and Sudan about cross-border intervention and support for rebels in each other’s territory. In October, after a meeting of their Joint Political and Security Mechanism, South Sudan and Sudan agreed to accept a proposal from the au High-Level Implementation Panel for a safe militarised border zone along the South Sudan-Sudan border. South Sudan’s military alliance with Uganda was renewed yet again in February. In October, however, Uganda announced that it would remove its forces and the withdrawal was finally completed in November. Apart from clandestine aid from Khartoum, regional support for Machar dwindled.

It was an acutely challenging year for un peacekeeping. In May, the mandate of the un Mission in South Sudan ( unmiss ) was renewed to November, providing for a military component of up to 12,500 troops of all ranks and a police component of up to 1,323 personnel. In mid-December, the unsc extended its mandate further to July 2016. It also extended the mandate of the un Interim Security Force for Abyei until May 2016. unmiss was challenged to implement its Chapter vii mandate to protect civilians. This included – but was by no means confined to – umiss protection of six civilian sites housing more than 185,000 idp s. unmiss faced increasing requests for armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, a barometer of the levels of insecurity and danger facing international aid.

The dominant international response in South Sudan remained focused on a humanitarian emergency. There was some concern that ‘development’ in states not directly affected by conflict was being neglected, but the South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan for 2015 focused almost entirely on humanitarian concerns. Efforts were made to scale up engagement to support the August peace agreement, and the unmiss mandate was adjusted to support its implementation. The reality of conflict and a humanitarian emergency remained, however, rendering any serious peace-building effort hostage to the fate of the agreement.

Socioeconomic Developments

The human consequences of the war were severe. Beyond direct casualties (there being no proper record of fatalities), the total numbers of those experiencing food insecurity and malnutrition increased, with over 3.9 m facing severe food insecurity across South Sudan. As well as increasing, this spread to include areas previously considered relatively food secure, such as greater Equatoria region, Lakes, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap. The conflict also had a massive impact on education and healthcare, with a significant contraction of what government role in these areas there had been in a country familiar with outsourcing such services to international agencies. In September, it was estimated that at least 55% of health facilities in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei were not functioning.

Government finances were badly affected by reduced oil production and exports. Oil production was lower than the approximate average for 2014 (around 165,000 b/d). Lower production resulted from the continuing complete shutdown of oil blocks in Unity and also from the further interruption of producing blocks in Upper Nile because of fighting. In May, for example, China evacuated some 400 workers from Paloch, Upper Nile, because of fighting; production later resumed when the spla regained control. South Sudan’s income from oil was reduced not only by lower production but also by lower international oil prices and its fixed oil transit fee agreement with Sudan.

Spending pressures on the government grew. President Kiir replaced Finance Minister Aggrey Tisa Sabuni with David Deng Athorbei at the start of the year. In September, a budget for the 2015/16 fiscal year was finally passed and set total expenditure at ssp (pound) 10.3 bn ($ 3.55 bn at the then official exchange rate), a reduction of some 6% from the 2014/15 budget figure of ssp 11 bn. Expenditure continued to be dominated by security (ssp 4 bn of total expenditure), budgeted at substantially higher than education (ssp 800 m) and health (ssp 300 m). The deficit remained, being put at around ssp 3 bn.

The government faced fundamental economic problems. In May, Vice-President James Wani Igga implored regional leaders to save South Sudan from economic collapse. The government ran a monthly shortfall of at least $ 220 m, and borrowed to pay the public sector wage bill and other budget commitments, especially the priority defence and security sectors, and connected tribal patronage networks. Public debt rose significantly. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning admitted in June that debt was running at $ 4.2 bn, an increase of $ 700 m from January.

Inflation, foreign exchange and the exchange rate continued to be serious problems. The National Bureau of Statistics reported that the annual consumer price inflation rate increased by 109.9% between December 2014 and December 2015 (based on data from Juba and Wau). The price of staple foods – sorghum, beans, maize – reached record highs. The shortage of foreign exchange had a wide impact and hit business. In October, SABMiller, operating a factory on the outskirts of Juba producing a popular White Bull beer, cut production and laid off workers. A major problem it faced – as in South Sudan more generally – was the difference between the Bank of South Sudan’s official exchange rate and the black market rate. While contributing to a major corruption scandal, the foreign exchange crisis finally led to the devaluation of the South Sudan pound on 15 December, and a floating rate was introduced. The official rate of ssp 2.96 : $ 1 moved to ssp 18.50.

In December, according to the un Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there were about 1.66 m idps and 3.9 m people classified as ‘severely food insecure’ in South Sudan, as well as 645,992 South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries. Despite such large numbers of South Sudanese idps, the country also saw an increase in incoming refugees caused by fighting and instability in neighbouring countries. South Sudan was hosting some 265,700 refugees from the drc, Ethiopia and the car, and importantly, Sudan. Forced out by fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, Sudanese refugees continued arrive in Pariang, Unity State, and Maban, Upper Nile, so that the vast majority were encamped in parts of South Sudan where the conflict had been most intense.