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View full image in a new tabThe failure to establish a dialogue between the government and the opposition dominated the political climate. Elections for one-third of Senate seats were postponed and the major opposition group, the ‘Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques’ (rfd), ignored the government’s initiative for a national dialogue. Instead, the rdf organised street campaigns trying to exploit public frustration over the government’s inability to reduce poverty and unemployment. Regional security remained problematic. Potential security threats arising from terrorist groups in neighbouring countries dominated the foreign policy agenda. Mauritania reasserted its role as a regional mediator as President Aziz remained chairperson of the ‘G5 du Sahel’. Although the government’s main economic policy focus was on macroeconomic stability and attempts to boost the role of the private sector, it failed to agree a new three-year programme with the imf. A four-year fisheries accord with the eu was signed and was expected to boost the fishing sector considerably.
Domestic Politics
Opposition fragmentation meant that the ruling ‘Union pour la République’ (upr) was able to consolidate its grip on power. President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz had little need to cooperate with the opposition.
The government announced on 4 February that elections for two-thirds of the Senate, planned for March 15, would be postponed. Most of the opposition parties had expressed their intention to boycott the vote. At the end of February, rfd leader Ahmed Ould Daddah demanded that the president should, as a precondition for the long-awaited national dialogue between government and opposition, dissolve the electoral commission (ceni) and promise to adhere to the Constitution and to agree on a government of national unity. As this did not happen, the rfd rejected the government’s call for dialogue on 25 September. This was regarded as a setback for President Aziz’s efforts to build a wider consensus on Mauritania’s political future. The rfd continued to criticise the government for undermining the country’s unity, destroying Mauritanian traditional values, tolerating drug trafficking and mismanagement of agriculture and food security policy. The rdf further highlighted the government’s failure to provide healthcare and education.
A new national dialogue was scheduled for 7 November, but the government opted out hours before the first meeting with the opposition. The government refused to meet the demands of the ‘Co-ordination de l’Opposition Démocratique’ and the ‘Forum National pour la Démocratie et l’Unité’ (fndu) for the release of political prisoners and the dissolution of the security apparatus, although the fndu announced its readiness to resume the dialogue. The election of Ahmed Salem Ould Bouhoubeiny – former dean of the ‘Batônnier de l’Ordre National des Avocats’ (Mauritanian Bar Association) – as fndu chairman on 16 October probably contributed to this new approach. Nevertheless, the opposition did not accept the president’s invitation to join the government.
Although Mauritania did not experience any terrorist attacks, the regional terror threat dominated the security discourse. Many state resources went into the military instead of being invested in infrastructure or social welfare. On 21 April, international media reported that Younis al-Mauritani, a senior al-Qaida leader, had been jailed for 20 years in Mauritania for “terrorist activities”. On 17 June, international media reported that a court in Mauritania had convicted three men of “belonging to a terrorist organisation and possession of terrorist propaganda”; they were sentenced to between five and ten years in prison. The names and ages of the men were not specified. On 27 June, a jihadist group, ‘Ansar Dine’, claimed responsibility for an attack in the Malian city of Nouara close to the Mauritanian border.
On 15 January, Biram Dah Abeid, president of the ‘Initiative pour la Résurgence du Mouvement Abolitionniste’ (ira) and a prominent candidate in the 2014 presidential elections, ira vice president Brahim Bilal Ramdhane and Djiby Sow, president of ‘Association Kawtal Djélitaré’, were sentenced to two years in prison by a court in Rosso for their involvement in a peaceful ‘La Caravane de la Liberté’ protest on 11 November 2014. The purpose of the protest had been to draw attention to landowners’ exploitation of marginalised citizens, and to educate marginalised groups about land ownership rights. The judgement was regarded as a signal of the authorities’ determination to constrain the activities of the country’s anti-slavery movement. The un expressed its deep concern and urged an independent investigation, and ai called for the prisoners’ immediate release. However, the case did not cause any major foreign protests.
A new anti-slavery law was adopted on 21 August, replacing the previous law of 2013. The law made slavery a crime against humanity and doubled the prison term for slave owners to 20 years. The law was welcomed by the un Human Rights Council but anti-slavery and human rights organisations expressed concerns that new draft legislation threatened the freedom of ngos to operate independently and might undermine the new anti-slavery law and the ability of ngos to work with victims. The level of slavery in Mauritania remained the highest in the world, with some 150,000 people living as slaves, according to the Global Slavery Index. On 10 December, Justice Minister Brahim Daddah announced that the government had ordered the creation of three special courts to try slavery cases. However, the main challenge remained the reluctance of state officials to use these legal tools.
Despite a government-sponsored national commission to fight corruption (launched in September 2014), the government was subject to minimal scrutiny as a consequence of the extremely fragmented state of the opposition. While the government continued its efforts to convince international partners and investors that it was committed to fighting corruption, there were no clear signs that it was being reduced.
Foreign Policy
Mauritania’s engagement with international partners on issues other than security remained limited, while efforts to enforce security cooperation with Western and Arab countries continued. On 9 April, President Aziz made an official visit to Saudi Arabia. The Nouakchott Process on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture continued. A 34-state (including Mauritania) Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism was announced by Saudi Arabia on 15 December.
On 29 January, the Mauritanian centre for crisis monitoring, alerts and management (‘Centre de Veille, d’Alerte et de Conduite des Crises’) was inaugurated. The project is funded equally by nato and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs as part of a national system for crisis management and disaster monitoring, and it covered in its first stage the areas of Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, Rosso and Nema.
With regard to cooperation with the Maghreb region, Mauritania maintained a precarious balance between the two major regional powers, Morocco and Algeria. A minor diplomatic dispute with Algeria occurred on 15 April, when news articles in the Mauritanian online news portal ‘Al-Bayan’ accused Morocco of flooding Mauritania with drugs. Belkacem Cherouati, first counsellor at the Algerian embassy in Nouakchott, was expelled and accused of interference in Mauritania’s internal affairs and of jeopardising a possible rapprochement between Morocco and Mauritania. In addition, the website’s editor, Moulaye Brahim Ould Moulaye M’Hamed, was questioned by police and accused of damaging Mauritania’s relationship with Morocco by spreading lies and false allegations. The official explanation given by the Mauritanian authorities was that the article published by ‘Al-Bayan’ misrepresented a report on Western Sahara presented by un SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon to the unsc on 10 April. During a regional tour by Ban’s envoy Christopher Ross in February and March, President Aziz had drawn attention to some negative impacts of the conflict, particularly the arrival of a considerable amount of cannabis. Aziz stressed that cannabis posed a serious threat to the security of all countries of the Sahel-Saharan region because it financed criminal groups, extremists and terrorists.
Mauritania’s decision on 3 August to release Sanda Ould Bouamama, a prominent spokesman for ‘Ansar Dine’ and also closely associated with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, caused resentment in neighbouring Mali. Bouamama had dual Mauritanian and Malian citizenship and had been delivered to the Mauritanian authorities in 2013. It was speculated that the release was actually part of an effort to consolidate Berabiche support for the recent northern Malian peace agreement. On 28 August, officials from Mauritania and Mali agreed on an increase in joint patrols, the sharing of intelligence and the pursuit of radicals across their shared border.
On 16 June, the International Organisation for Migration launched a two-year project on enhancing the collective capacity for managing borders and for protecting border communities between Mauritania and Mali. The project would be financed by the government of Japan through a grant of $ 3 m for conflict prevention and peace building.
On 26–28 July, Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir took part in the two-day regular summit in Nouakchott on the Great Green Wall initiative, aimed at planting a wall of trees in Africa to combat desertification. The visit took place despite the icc’s arrest warrant issued against him in 2009 on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Mauritania is not a signatory to the Rome Statute.
On 9–16 September, President Aziz visited China and discussed enhanced capacity cooperation through building steel and cement plants and increased cooperation in animal product processing and exploitation of marine fisheries. On 7 December, the Senate adopted a bill authorising the ratification of a cooperation agreement in the field of security, signed on 26 May between Mauritania and Spain, which focused on information and communication technologies, specialised vocational training and exchange of information. The agreement was expected to be an important tool for reducing illegal migration.
Socioeconomic Developments
On 1 January, the National Assembly approved a $ 5.1 bn budget for 2015. The budget deficit stood at 2.6% of gdp. The budget foresaw a reduction in government spending on subsidies and goods and services. An imf report stated that employment in the formal sector represented only 13% of total employment. For the vast majority of the population who were not employed in the formal economy, safety nets were mostly provided by local underfunded state agencies, ngo programmes and extended family networks. Migrants also provided important support through remittances. However, the undp estimated that 42.8% of the population were living in “severe poverty”.
On 4 June, the imf concluded that Mauritania was facing a severe terms-of-trade shock as a result of the drop in iron ore prices on the world market. Accordingly, there was no progress in reducing the national debt burden. Economic growth slowed and the imf estimated gdp growth to be around 2%, down from 6.6% in 2014. Consumer price inflation was expected to rise to an annual average of 4.4%.
The prsp ended in 2015. The government was determined to design a new programme and was particularly committed to achieving fiscal stability. The ‘Banque Centrale de Mauritanie’ continued to manage a flexible exchange-rate regime in order to enhance the competiveness of the export sector. The main infrastructure projects were focused on overland electricity lines, a water supply system and a new airport, as well as highway construction.
Organisations representing formal sectors of the economy had the capacity to mobilise members and engage with the state. This was demonstrated by strikes, including large-scale strikes at the plants of the ‘Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière’ in Zouerate and Nouadhibou during the period January–March, including general strikes on 30 January and 3 March. The employees demanded a wage increase that had been promised in 2014. An agreement was reached on 2 April.
On 1 June, the us-based Kosmos Energy chief executive, Andrew Inglis, announced a major gas discovery in the deep offshore area, close to Senegalese waters. This was good news, especially since Ireland’s Tullow revealed in January that it would scale back its exploration activity in the Banda gas field, and the only producing oilfield, Chinguetti, had seen production drop. On 24 November, President Aziz opened the country’s first wind energy plant in Nouakchott. The overall cost of the project was estimated at $ 51 m and it was co-funded by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.
On 10 July, a new, four-year protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement with the eu was initialled and provisionally applied on 16 November. Annual compensation from the eu was limited to € 100 m ($ 114.5 m) per year, and the ceiling on fishing was set at 225,000 tonnes/year. This programme was designed both to protect local fish and to maximise fishing revenue. It was also expected to increase the European fishing companies’ interest in investing in local processing arrangements and in training or recruiting more local staff. The agreement required 60% of fishing crews on eu boats to be Mauritanian. A longer-term agreement was also expected to create more stability and avoid the previous almost continuous negotiation of two-year agreements. Fishing cooperation with China continued to play an important role. Three Chinese high-seas fishing companies were engaged in fishing product processing: China National Fisheries Corporation, Shanghai Fisheries General Corp. (Group) and Fuzhou Hongdong Pelagic Fishery Corporation.
With almost half of the population living in conditions of extreme poverty, environment changes presented a major threat to the livelihoods of many people. The unpredictable weather conditions continued to mean that agricultural production was impossible to predict. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification estimated that 1.3 m people were facing food insecurity. Of these, nearly half a million were expected to fall into severe food insecurity and be unable to meet their food needs without external assistance. Around 21,000 were estimated to be suffering extreme food insecurity, or the near complete loss of their livelihoods. The shortage of funding led to 50,000 Malian refugees receiving reduced food rations, which at times met only about half their nutritional needs, after wfp cut rice rations by more than half in June, from 12 kg to 5.4 kg.
In November, international media reported that a growing number of Syrian refugees were trying to escape to Europe via Mauritania. The new escape route included a flight from Syria to Mauritania (3,000 miles) and a subsequent overland trip on the ancient salt roads from Mali through the Sahara. Around 300–500 Syrian refugees and asylum seekers were estimated to be living in Mauritania, and around one in ten of them had tried to cross into Mali and head for Europe, according to the Mauritania representative for the unhcr, Sebastien Laroze. Mauritania was one of the few countries where Syrians could arrive without visas after Algeria imposed visa restrictions early in the year.
Efforts to strengthen the business environment led to some success following liberalisation policies. In the World Bank’s 2016 Doing Business report, Mauritania moved up eight places, to 168th (out of 189 countries). The tourism sector continued to suffer heavily from the fragile security situation. Most Western countries advised visitors against all travel to several provinces and against all but essential travel to the rest of the country, including the Nouakchott-Nouadhibou corridor, and to avoid all demonstrations.