Domestic Politics

President Yahya Jammeh and his government reacted harshly to the foiled coup of 30 December 2014. Its leader, Lamin Sanneh (an ex-army colonel and commander of the Presidential Guard, who had left the Gambia with his family in 2012 to seek asylum in the usa), was killed with three other assailants during the operation. Another attacker died the following day, while the rest of the plotters sought refuge in Senegal and Guinea Bissau. Jammeh confirmed the position of the Gambian army by declaring that the coup was a terrorist attack by Gambian dissidents based in Germany, the uk and the usa. However, contrary to this, on 30 March, a court martial convicted six members of the Gambian army. Private Modou Njie, Lieutenant Colonel Sarjo Jarju, Lieutenant Amadou Sowe and Lieutenant Buba Sanneh, Captain Buba K. Bojang and Captain Abdoulie Jobe were sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Their appeal at the Banjul High Court was rejected on 10 June on the basis that it should have been made through the Gambia Court of Appeal. On 8 April, the Banjul High Court issued arrest warrants for Cherno Njie, the Gambian-American Texas-based businessman accused of financing and masterminding the foiled coup, together with eight other alleged plotters: Mustapha Faal, Alhajie Saidy Barrow, Papa Faal, Baboucarr Bai Lowe, Musa Sarr, Landing Sonko, Lamin Njie and Aisha Jallow. The charges included multiple counts of treason, concealment of treason and other offences. Online media reports and rumours suggested mass arrests of their relatives and friends. As us residents, Cherno Njie, Papa Faal and Alagie Saidy Barrow were also charged in the usa for allegedly violating the us Neutrality Act in their attempt to overthrow Jammeh.

The failed coup prompted cabinet reshuffles. On 5 January, Neneh Mcdouall Gaye returned to the cabinet as minister of foreign affairs, replacing Bala Garba Jahumpa, who was reassigned his former portfolio of works, construction and infrastructure. Sheriff Bojang, an independent journalist, editor and proprietor of the ‘Standard Newspaper’, was appointed minister of information, communication and technology. On 8 January, Lamin Nyabally replaced Kalilu Bayo as secretary general and minister of presidential affairs. In the same announcement, the president relieved Basiru Mahoney of his duties as minister of justice. Until the reappointment of Mama Fatima Singhateh as attorney-general and minister of justice, the Ministry of Justice fell under the purview of the Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology headed by Babucarr Senghore. On 14 January, Lamin K. Mboge, a private legal practitioner, was appointed solicitor general at the Ministry of Justice, and his appointment was revoked the same day without reason or explanation. At the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Kebba Touray was relieved of his duties as cabinet minister on 16 March. Abdou Colley, the former minister of finance and economic affairs was reinstated. Aki Bayo was relieved of his cabinet duties as minister of lands and regional government on 15 November but was reinstated in the same post 11 days later. On 23 November, Deputy Secretary General Sulayman Samba was promoted to secretary general and head of the civil service, and minister responsible for presidential affairs in place of Lamin Nyabally, who had been relieved of his duties and appointed as the new minister of fisheries on November 18. In a twist of events, a 29 December press release from State House announced the dismissal of Sulayman Samba and of Minister of Agriculture Ismaila Sanyang.

The repressive grip of Jammeh’s regime did not spare media houses, members of the judiciary and religious leaders. Immediately after the foiled coup, on 1–4 January, the Gambian authorities ordered ‘Teranga fm’, an independent radio station, to stop broadcasting. Its managing director, Abdoulie Ceesay, was detained overnight on 1 January before being given conditional bail. He had to report daily to the police station. On 2 July, he was picked up and detained by the National Intelligence Agency (nia). He was released on 13 July but, on 17 July, he was forced into a vehicle by agents suspected to be from the nia. On 25 August, Ceesay was charged with six counts of sedition and publication of false news with intent to cause public alarm. On 26 November, the arrest and removal of Ebrima Jaiteh, the magistrate of Brikama Magistrates Court, provided a stark example of Jammeh’s efforts to control the judiciary. Jaiteh had presided over two landmark cases: the trials of two senior managers of the Gambia Ports Authority and of Imam Moheideen Hydara, who had been arrested in 2014 for allegedly disobeying a presidential order to observe the Muslim Eid prayer on a prescribed date. In both cases, Jaiteh discharged the accused, to the displeasure of the government. Three imams were also arrested and detained: Sheikh Omar Colley, an imam of a mosque in Jabang Borehole, was arrested on 15 October, Alhaji Ousman Sawaneh, the imam of Kanifing South Mosque, on 19 October, and Imam Gassama of Dasilami village in Lower Fulladou West District, Central River Region, on 2 November. The reasons for these arrests remained unknown.

In light of the strained relations with many development partners and the lack of donor funding to complete major development projects, Jammeh had developed a tactic of scapegoating members of his cabinet and other government officials for his failing policies or stalled projects. For instance, Ebrima Jawara, the son of former president Jawara, along with the former permanent secretary Ada Gaye and four other staff members on were charged 7 September with 13 counts of economic crime, five counts of abuse of office and six counts of neglect of official duty.

Presidential elections were scheduled for 1 December 2016. The opposition parties presented an electoral and constitutional reform proposal to the Independent Electoral Commission (iec), which included a term limit for the presidency, fresh demarcation of electoral constituencies and the involvement of civil society institutions in the selection of iec commissioners. The opposition also called for the neutrality and non-involvement of civil servants in the electoral process and the extension of the electoral franchise to Gambians in the diaspora. The iec vehemently rejected these proposals and introduced a new electoral law, which required presidential candidates to pay a fee of $ 12,630 for registration, a steep increase from the previous $ 252. The fee for National Assembly candidates was raised to $ 1,263. The reform was ratified into law by the president on 20 July. On 29 December, National Assembly members also passed a bill that sought to increase the number of National Assembly members from 48 to at least 53. As a component of the memorandum of understanding between the iec and the National Council for Civic Education, a community sensitisation exercise on supplementary voter registration was started in December. Lack of adequate resources rendered many opposition parties unable to appoint enough agents to oversee the voter registration process. This inadequate transparency of the process led many to fear duplication of voters and the registration of minors and ineligible people from across the border.

On 3 July, in contrast to the frequency and intensity of illegal detentions and sackings, the president, acting in accordance with his constitutional powers, pardoned over 250 prisoners serving time at the Mile Two central prison. The list of names included Modou Gaye, a former deputy inspector general of police, who was serving a life sentence for his involvement in an attempted coup. Other surprising moves followed. On 25 November, Jammeh banned the age-old traditional practice of female genital mutilation (fgm). Although a few pundits criticised the announcement as a political move to score dividends with young female electors in the 2016 elections, the ban was received well by prominent gender activists and fgm victims. On 10 December, Jammeh surprised the nation and the international community with a declaration that “as from today, Gambia is an Islamic Republic”. Although the official reason given was to preserve the country’s religious identity as a Muslim nation, critics in the Gambian diaspora alleged that Jammeh was trying to win foreign aid from the Gulf States, and also rebranding his image in time for the December 2016 elections. Opposition political leaders and some religious clergy condemned this statement as not only unconstitutional, but also divisive and threatening to peaceful co-existence between the Christian minority and their Muslim fellow citizens. The Peoples’ Democratic Organisation and Independent Socialism party in an editorial urged Parliament to commence impeachment proceedings against Jammeh.

Foreign Affairs

Relations with Senegal remained volatile throughout the year. The presence of the 30 December coup plotters in Senegal and the refusal of Senegal to extradite them to the Gambia brought simmering tensions to the boil. Senegal refused to comment, and Jammeh bitterly condemned the Senegalese authorities for their silence. The absence of Senegal’s President Macky Sall at the landmark Golden Jubilee Independence celebration on 22 February was a clear indication of the rift between the two heads of state. On 15 November, in the border town of Farafenni, Jammeh described Sall as a “puppet in Western hands” and urged Senegalese citizens to outvote their president for the benefit of their nation. The following day, Senegal closed the border without explanation. Contrary to ecowas agreements on the free circulation of people and goods, border restrictions became the default strategy the two governments use to settle diplomatic grievances.

Relations between the Gambia and the West deteriorated further. On 5 June, Agnes Guillaud, the chargée d’affaires of the eu Delegation to the Gambia was declared persona non grata. No official reason was given for her expulsion from the country. In December, the eu announced the suspension of € 13 m in funding. After a lengthy diplomatic hiatus between Banjul and Washington, Ambassador-Designate C. Patricia ‘Pat’ Alsup arrived in the Gambia on 6 November. In December 2014, the usa had excluded the Gambia from agoa trade preference over allegations of illegal detentions and torture of citizens as well as Jammeh’s strong position against homosexuality.

Socioeconomic Developments

According to estimates, about 48% of Gambians were living below the poverty line. The rural-urban economic and development gap remained high. Low agricultural output due to climate change and erratic rainfall patterns significantly reduced the government’s export earnings and also widened the poverty gap, having particular effect in rural areas. The 2014 groundnut trade season did not start until 8 January. Farmers sold the greater part of their harvest at bargain prices to intermediaries across the border in Senegal. In addition to lack of civil and political liberties, high youth unemployment and low agricultural harvests continued to force many Gambian youths to attempt illegal migration to Europe. In his budgetary speech to the National Assembly, Finance and Economic Affairs Minister Abdou Kolley predicted that the 2016 fiscal year would be difficult, as the country would continue to grapple with growing levels of public debt. Domestic debt now accounted for almost half of the country’s debt stock. The economic impact of the regional Ebola outbreak on tourism and the delayed summer rains in 2014, together with unrestrained government expenditure, resulted in increased domestic borrowing and widened the country’s balance of payment and fiscal deficit, which increased from gmd (dalasi) 11.3 bn in 2013 to gmd 20.7 bn. Consumer price inflation fell to 6.7% in December, from 6.9% in December 2014. This was ascribed to the decline in food inflation to 4.8% in December from 8.4% in December 2014. The governor of the Central Bank announced that non-food inflation had increased to 5.2% in December from 4.8% in December 2014. Frequent border closures with Senegal and the disruption of trade between the two countries had a strong impact on the Gambian economy, which remained highly vulnerable to external shocks.

In order to spur economic growth and to curb the rapid depreciation of the dalasi against other the us dollar and the pound sterling, the government instituted a number of monetary reforms and fiscal consolidation measures. One was the requirement that approval be obtained from the office of the president for foreign currency exports exceeding $ 10,000. This directive, announced in a press release on 4 May, warned that violators would risk forfeiture of their money to the state and resulted in almost a week of interruption of Western Union transfer services to customers. On 25 February, the Central Bank of the Gambia introduced new dalasi currency notes, and new denominations of gmd 20 and gmd 200 notes. The image of Jammeh on the new notes raised eyebrows among many Gambians who remembered his condemnation of former president Jawara’s image on the old dalasi notes. The undue interference of government in the free market economy further lowered the trust of foreign investors in spite of official efforts to promote free trade. Bern Georg Diedrich, a German national, was deported by executive directive to Germany on 16 January. He had arrived in the Gambia in 1989 and bought land at Tranquil Wullingkama for investment purposes. After a land dispute with Alieu Barry, the High Court had delivered judgment in his favour in 2013. Nonetheless, officials from the Physical Planning Department, backed by about a dozen police personnel, had evicted him from his property on 18 December 2014. On 27 May, Hussain Tajudeen, the proprietor of tajco, was ordered to leave the country within 72 hours for allegedly engaging in unacceptable business practices. This decision was rescinded barely a month later. Tajudeen had already had a similar experience, having been expelled from the Gambia in June 2013, only to later be granted a ‘presidential pardon’ that allowed his return and the resumption of his business operations. According to the World Bank’s 2015 Doing Business report, the Gambia ranked 138th out of 189 countries.

Lack of public investment and donor support severely compromised the health sector. Gambians had to travel to the capital city for treatment and had to pay for examinations and medicines even in public institutions. Families who could not count on the financial support of relatives abroad faced severe difficulties in the management of their health problems, especially in rural areas, where health facilities continued to be few and poorly equipped.