Domestic Politics

Months of controversial discussions in 2013 had ended with a compromise agreement to hold harmonised elections for three levels of representatives, and the necessary changes to Article 20 of the constitution had been passed in parliament on 26 December 2013. These constitutional amendments were also confirmed by a meeting of all ‘grands élus’ (top office holders from Union and the islands) on 14 February and then formally approved on 25 February by a two-thirds majority of the councillors from the islands. These amendments extended the parliament’s term to five years (as for the president and island councils) and prolonged the term of the current legislature to 22 December (instead of April). Simultaneous triple elections were thus expected to be held in November, while presidential elections were due in 2016. Election dates were decreed on 2 August, but the dates (for two rounds of voting) were subsequently twice postponed to the end of December and eventually to January and February 2015. Few observers raised fears about a coming institutional vacuum in view of the fixed expiry date of the current parliament.

From September, doubts were repeatedly raised about serious problems with the preparation of the elections, quite a familiar phenomenon in Comoros, caused by insufficient funds, technical inadequacies and quarrels and delays in setting up an independent electoral commission. Attempts to alter the constituency boundaries for the 24 directly-elected mps remained unsuccessful. The closing date for the submission of candidatures for the elections was 24 November. A number of candidates were disqualified after scrutiny by the electoral commission and/or by the Constitutional Court. According to the electoral commission, 275.000 voters (fewer than in 2010) had been registered under a new biometric system and a total of 805 candidates were allowed to enter the electoral contest (204 for the National Assembly, 353 for the island councils and the rest for the municipal councils). The official campaign period started on 25 December in a rather lacklustre atmosphere. Twenty-three political parties, most of them of only marginal importance, and a substantial number of independent candidates entered the fray for the first election round.

In mid-April, 28 political parties and civil society organisations, representing practically all members of the political class, had agreed on and signed a ‘historical consensus’ on common principles for the running of public affairs in Comoros, placing particular emphasis on the safeguarding of national unity. Nevertheless, the political scene remained characterised by a plethora of small parties, practically all based on loyalty to particular individual leaders and not on articulated party programmes or specific ideologies. Only a few of the political parties were of significant importance at the national level, although they had varying degrees of support on particular islands. The political groups supporting President Ikililou Dhoinine had in 2013 joined forces as the ‘Union pour le Développement des Comores’ (updc), while the president’s predecessor, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, had six months later created his own party ‘Juwa’ (Sun). Another former president (and a putsch leader in 1999), Azali Assoumani, was in turn the leader of the ‘Convention pour le Renouveau des Comores’ (crc), which had been a main opposition party during Sambi’s period in office. The 4th crc congress in early May confirmed Assoumani’s renewed political ambitions, but internal quarrels also led two of his close collaborators to create a splinter group, the ‘Rassemblement pour un Développement Harmonisé et Integré’ (radhi). Mouigni Baraka, the governor of Ngazidja, was the undisputed leader of the ‘Rassemblement Démocratique des Comores’ (rdc), while Mohamed Daoud, aka Kiki, had formed his ‘Orange’ party to pursue his personal ambitions (as mp and/or mayor of Moroni). updc, Juwa, crc and rdc were considered to be the main contenders in the coming 2015 elections, with radhi and Orange having lesser prospects.

All political discussions and the formation of personal and party alliances were already strongly focused on the upcoming presidential elections in 2016. President Dhoinine was constitutionally barred from seeking another term and the field for any potential candidates appeared wide open. The constitutional principle of a presidency rotating among the islands had been adhered to in one full cycle with consecutive presidents from Ngazidja, Anjouan and Mohéli; the next president was consequently expected to hail from Ngazidja. In 2013, former President Sambi had started to strongly criticise the performance of Dhoinine’s government and went on to clearly voice his ambition to return to the presidency; a good showing by Juwa in the parliamentary election was to buttress this goal. Hailing from Anjouan, Sambi was constitutionally not eligible to be the next president, but there were rumours that he might try to force another change in the constitution (as he had before) if Juwa won a parliamentary majority. Assoumani had also expressed his intention to run for the presidency, while Baraka was expected to have the same ambitions. Changing alliances ahead of the parliamentary elections were strongly linked with the strategies of the main presidential contenders. Juwa was only aligned with several minor parties, while updc, crc, radhi and Orange intended to form shifting alliances at the local constituency levels for the second round elections.

Anjouan governor Anissi Chamsidine had initially joined Juwa and supported Sambi, but fell out with the latter during the year and eventually backed his own candidates for the elections. This was partially linked with a regrouping of followers of the secessionist leader Mohamed Bacar, who had been defeated in 2008 by the Sambi-initiated invasion and forced into exile in Benin. Speculation arose about Bacar’s eventual return and there were indications of a rapprochement between Chamsidine and Bacar’s followers, who even created their own political party, ‘Génération Nouvel Ensemble Comorien Rénové’, which desisted, however, from fielding candidates in the election. Dhoinine appeared undecided about Bacar’s possible return, while the antagonism between Bacar and Sambi clearly lingered in the background.

In May, in response to the refusal by the island commissioners to answer councillors’ questions, a majority of the Ngazidja councillors expressed their dissatisfaction with the island government in a vote of no confidence and presented Baraka with an ultimatum to change the team of commissioners. In mid-June, however, the Constitutional Court declared the censure motion null and void since it had not been passed by the necessary quorum.

No visible progress was made with the investigations into the foiled coup attempt in April 2013. Several dates for court hearings were postponed. On 31 December, the Supreme Court rejected an objection brought by the defence lawyers against the continued detention without trial of the 13 suspects.

Foreign Affairs

The key international event was the ioc summit, held on 23 August in Moroni. This rare meeting of heads of state and government was the first for nine years. During a ministerial council meeting in April, Comoros had passed on the ioc chairmanship to Madagascar, but had retained the privilege of hosting the summit. The most prominent participant was French President François Hollande, who stayed in Moroni for only a few hours. In the run-up to the summit, Comoros strongly objected to proposed suggestions that the name of the ioc should be changed to the Community of Indian Ocean States (or Islands), fearing that this might enable Mayotte to become a separate member as an autonomous French entity. The question was postponed for further deliberations. The summit declaration underscored the value of deepening the connectivity between ioc members and of further enhancing their cooperation, particularly with respect to environmental and security issues, but did not launch any significant new initiatives.

The summit changed nothing regarding Comoros’ long-standing conflict with France over the status of Mayotte, the archipelago’s fourth island. The issue continued to be a national focus, but without materially jeopardising the delicate relations with the former colonial power. As of 1 January, Mayotte was fully recognised by the eu as its 9th peripheral region. Although all Comorian governments had always insisted that Mayotte remained an integral part of the Comoros under international law, the completion of Mayotte’s integration into France and the eu had by now been reluctantly accepted as inevitable by most politicians and the general population. Bilateral Comorian – French relations thus continued to be characterised by considerable ambivalences between the Mayotte conflict and a traditional substantial dependence on France as a major economic partner and aid donor. A meeting of a new ‘Haut Conseil Paritaire’, intended as a dialogue platform, was very discretely held in December in Paris. In his speech at the un General Assembly in September, Dhoinine focused as usual on the Mayotte issue, but equally stressed the existing good relations between Comoros and France.

Within the generally very limited scope available to it, the government continued to pursue an open-door policy and attempted to maintain equally cordial relations with Western powers (particularly France and the usa) and with China, Iran and many Arab countries in the expectation of attracting aid or commercial investments from these diverse sources, although not many investments had so far actually materialised. Efforts were made to strengthen links with Arab countries, such as by opening an embassy in Qatar and welcoming resident ambassadors from Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Moroni. Regarding its geographical neighbours, cooperation agreements were concluded with Mauritius (January) and with the French Overseas Département Réunion (October), in the latter case deliberately signed by the three island governors and not by the government for fear of creating a diplomatic precedent with France. A high-profile visit by the Zanzibar President Ali Mohamed Shein in September underscored the close cultural and historical links with that semi-autonomous island; Dhoinine had attended the 50th anniversary celebrations of Zanzibar’s revolution in January. In February, Comoros hosted the 18th policy organs meetings of the East African Standby Force and a unit of 150 men was later declared ready to serve under the Force. In July, the government signed a military cooperation agreement with the usa. During the year, Dhoinine participated in the au, Arab League and au-eu summits and attended the conference of the Small Island Developing States in Samoa (September) and the un climate conference in Peru (December).

November brought the announcement of a proposed deal between Comoros and Kuwait by which tens of thousands of stateless residents of Kuwait (known as Bidun) would be offered Comorian passports under the Economic Citizenship Program, while continuing to live with work permits in Kuwait. The plan flopped miserably, however, since the Bidun were not willing even to consider this offer.

Socioeconomic Developments

Although the Comorian economy continued to grow slowly and key macroeconomic indicators turned out to be moderately satisfactory, it was nevertheless a difficult year for most of the population. Dissatisfaction grew markedly with what was widely perceived as poor government performance. The gdp growth rate was projected to have slightly slowed down to 3.3%, but was still close to the 3.5% rate in 2013, which had been the highest for a decade. The average inflation rate for the year was estimated at 2.9%, somewhat higher than in 2013, but considerably down from 5.9% in 2012. This was again largely due to the restraining effect of membership of the franc zone, whereby the franc comorien (FrC) remained pegged to the euro and supported by France (at FrC 492:€ 1). Record remittances from the large Comorian diaspora (contributing 26% of gdp) and inflows of aid revenue remained essential to counterbalance the traditional enormous structural trade deficit. The value of imported goods and services was about 3.5 times higher than export income (practically all from cloves, vanilla and ylang-ylang), and remittances were considerably higher than export proceeds. The import bill was mainly burdened by Comoros’ heavy dependence on importing food staples and all of its energy requirements. The current-account deficit was forecast to fall to 7.4% of gdp (compared with 11.3% in 2013) as a result of a contraction in the cost of imports (due to lower global fuel prices and a reduced volume of investment goods) and higher remittances. Foreign exchange reserves of around $ 170 m continued to provide a comfortable safety cushion of almost six months import coverage. Comoros’ risk of debt distress was re-assessed by the imf and the World Bank as moderate rather than high (as before) due to the full inclusion of remittances and the comprehensive 2012 debt relief.

In the 2014 hdi , Comoros was ranked 159th (out of 187 listed countries) in the ‘low human development’ category. The nominal per capita income was given as $ 923. With an annual population growth rate of around 3%, economic growth in per capita terms was only minimal. The incidence of poverty was considered quite severe, but no valid poverty data had been assembled for a decade. There was nevertheless some evidence of modest improvements in some social indicators (primary education, health) in recent years. Comoros’ practically unchanged position in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015 report (159 out of 189) was again indicative of the country’s enduring unfavourable business climate. Only a fraction of remittances were therefore invested in productive activities. A new second-generation prsp ‘Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable’ for the period 2015–19 was in the final stages of preparation. The strategy aimed to achieve economic stability and inclusive growth, promote sectors with high growth potential, strengthen governance and social cohesion and enhance human development. The critical challenge remained a realistic implementation approach.

imf missions assessed the Comoros’ financial and economic performance, but no new ecf arrangement was concluded after the previous ecf expired in December 2013. The imf acknowledged that the country had made notable progress in recent years and that macroeconomic policymaking and economic performance had improved since the adoption of the new constitution in 2009, but underlined that much remained to be done to consolidate and accelerate inclusive economic growth through continued focus on policies that emphasise macroeconomic stability and improvements in infrastructure, and foster structural reforms that improve the competitiveness of the economy and strengthen the business environment.

Sticking to agreed fiscal policy goalposts and implementation of the 2014 budget proved a major challenge for the government, particularly after mid-year. While revenues were broadly on target, finance was inadequate to cover the higher-than-budgeted wage bill resulting from an increase in teacher salaries (approved in March) and other un-budgeted expenditure (such as ioc summit and elections). State-financed investment projects had to be curtailed and debt-service obligations and public sector salary payments ran temporarily into arrears. This had been a quite common feature in the past, but its recurrence was a major cause of popular dissatisfaction. August salaries were not paid until late October. Recurrent government spending for the year was projected to be about 20% higher than budgeted. A better balance between available financial resources and expenditure clearly had to be found.

Frequent outages of electricity and water, sometimes for several weeks, made life difficult for most of the population and were another major cause for dissatisfaction with the government. On 30 September, several civil society organisations organised a peaceful protest march in Moroni and formulated a petition to the government about the power and water problem. On 29 October, various ngos organised a successful operation ‘île morte’ (dead island) on Ngazidja, which brought public life to a standstill. In late May, in a measure to obtain more revenue, the government unexpectedly introduced a new 5% tax on the purchase of cell phone credit cards. This was met by wide public protests and was consequently quickly withdrawn.

Again, no tangible progress was made on a fundamental reform or privatisation of notoriously badly managed parastatal companies, particularly key public utilities (electricity, water and telecoms). This had been demanded by the imf and the World Bank for years, but without success. Renewed efforts to restructure and improve the performance of Ma-Mwe, the ailing power and water company, remained futile throughout the year and could not prevent the repeated failure of Ma-Mwe’s standard services. The situation was further aggravated by the difficulties of the ‘Société Comorienne des Hydrocarbures’, the public oil importer and distributor, which ran temporarily out of supplies and was hard put to pay for the needed oil imports. The long-planned and very controversially discussed privatisation of ‘Comores Télecom’ was once again blocked by continued resistance from politicians and trade unions, who feared the inevitable loss of up to 1,000 jobs. The government finally capitulated and withdrew the relevant bill from parliament in late April. No further initiative was undertaken during the rest of the year. In May and June, a new conflict arose over the controversial import of alcohol, which ended with a deregulation of the prevailing restricted system.

Neither was any marked progress made with regard to hopes for eventual success in oil and gas exploration in Comoros’ extensive coastal waters. Expectations had recently risen following substantial hydrocarbon finds along the East African coast, but the start of concrete exploration activities was very slow to materialise. In March, new exploration licences were awarded to two consortiums for six offshore blocks, but dreams of a possible bonanza had to be extended into a distant future.