Domestic Politics

In the course of the year, the question of whether President Joseph Kabila would run for a third term in 2016 became the biggest political issue in the drc. Article 70 of the Constitution only allows for two terms and Article 220 explicitly prohibits any revision of the term limit. Various means to prolong Kabila’s hold on power – most importantly a revision of the Constitution – were discussed throughout the year, polarising the political debate in Kinshasa. Supporters and opponents of a third term were not easily located in either the presidential or opposition camp, but could be found on both sides. Among the loudest supporters were Evariste Boshab, the head of Kabila’s ‘Parti du Peuple pour la Réconstruction et la Démocratie’ (pprd), Monseigneur Marini Bodho, the head of the largest Protestant church, the ‘Eglise du Christ au Congo’, and Kin-Kiey Mulumba, the minister of telecommunications. The president of the Senate, Léon Kengo wa Dondo, openly opposed a revision of the constitution. So did the Catholic Church, first and foremost Cardinal Monsengwo, who had repeatedly in the political history of the drc openly challenged ruling elites and advocated for democracy. The political opposition launched a coalition against any constitutional revision under the slogan ‘Don’t touch my constitution’. On 4 August, important parliamentarian opposition parties such as the ‘Union pour la Nation Congolaise’ (unc) and the ‘Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social’ (udps) organised a demonstration in Kinshasa, after which the unc’s General Secretary Jean-Bertrand Ewanga was arrested and sentenced to one year in prison for contempt of state institutions. In September, around 650 Congolese ngos, including the most important associations, signed a declaration against a constitutional revision and protesters took to the streets. Kabila himself remained silent on the issue. However, many political manoeuvres suggested that he planned to stay in power – among others a reshuffle in the military that allowed for his closer personal control over the armed forces, as well as the eventual establishment of a government of national cohesion, meant to strengthen Kabila’s own coalition and satisfy opponents of a third term (see below).

Given the polarised situation concerning a potential third mandate, the publication of the first part of the electoral calendar on 26 May by the national election commission (‘Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante’ – ceni) caused a controversy. The political opposition criticised the electoral calendar on various fronts. The document was silent about presidential and legislative elections and only presented a strict time schedule for the election of councillors and mayors. Local elections had been promised since 2006 but had been repeatedly postponed. Despite the fact that the opposition and international partners had for years been urging the government to keep this promise, they feared that the financial and organisational challenge of local elections in 2015 would be used as a reason to postpone the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2016, effectively prolonging Kabila’s hold on power. The opposition claimed that the first elections to be held should be the provincial elections, but it was not even clear whether the basis for elections would be the current 11 provinces or 26 provinces as foreseen in the constitution of 2006. ceni also remained silent on the question of a national census, as recommended by the national consultations of 2013. Instead, ceni’s only comment on the problem of the hitherto chaotic and unreliable electoral register – and the de facto absence of a voters’ register on the local level – was that voter registration should be externally monitored. This was especially worrisome to parts of civil society, as they feared that simmering communal conflicts would be exacerbated by badly planned local elections. In fact, it was only in November, that the ‘Office National d’Identification de la Population’ (onip) was created, staffed and tasked with conducting a national census. According to the head of onip, Adolphe Lumanu, the census would only take one year but would cost around $ 500 m. He said the Chinese company Huawei EximBank would carry out the census with financing from the state-lender ChinaEximBank. The plan immediately came under heavy criticism by the opposition. They feared that the census would take many years because of logistical and financial constraints and so would be used as yet another means to delay presidential elections for many years. In a reaction to the publication of the electoral calendar, the special envoys of the un, the au, the eu and the usa, as well as the eu election observer mission, urged the government to publish a complete and detailed calendar. However, the head of ceni, Apollinaire Malu-Malu, said in July that he was waiting for the election budget to be passed before announcing the complete calendar. Kabila assured the opposition and the international community on 15 December that all elections would take place according to the Constitution. However, no complete calendar had been presented by year’s end. On 21 September, two important opposition parties, Vital Kamerhe’s unc and Etienne Tschisekedi’s udps, and their allies announced the suspension of their participation in all ceni activities as well as promising their presence in parliament whenever the electoral law or calendar was discussed.

On 7 December, Kabila announced a major government reshuffle, 13 months after his promise of a government of national cohesion. Prime Minister Matata Ponyo kept his post, contrary to much speculation. He had initially enjoyed a good reputation as a result of his pragmatic stance towards economic reform, but had come under criticism for not being able to handle the M23 crisis in the east. The posts of three deputy prime ministers were created and given to the secretary-general of the ruling pprd, Evariste Boshab, the ‘Mouvement de Libération du Congo’ secretary-general, Thomas Luhaka, and the permanent secretary and speaker of the ‘Parti Lumumbiste Unifié’, Willy Makiashi. The political opposition got some high-ranking positions in terms of protocol, most notably the state minister for budget (Michel Bongongo, ‘Union des Forces du Changement’), but the most powerful ministries were given to political heavyweights from the ‘Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle’ coalition and Kabila’s home base of Katanga was over-represented. This was largely interpreted as a means to strengthen the coalition, satisfy political allies and appease potential troublemakers. The new government replaced the rather technocratic no-name government that had been warmly supported by international partners. Only three women were appointed to the new government, which consisted of 38 members (the prime minister, his deputies, and ministers, not including vice ministers). Notably, key positions related to the question of a third term for Kabila were filled by Kabila loyalists: Boshab became minister of the interior (combined with his position as deputy prime minister), a key position in the run-up to elections in 2016; Tryphon Kin-Kiey Mulumba became minister for relations with Parliament – the latter being the institution that would be decisive for an eventual constitutional amendment.

The early days of January were marked by the aftermath of simultaneous armed attacks on the national television station, the military headquarters and the international airport of N’djili in Kinshasa province, as well as attacks in Lubumbashi (Katanga) and Kindu (Maniema). The government attributed the attacks to followers of the self-proclaimed prophet and presidential candidate of 2006, Joseph Mukungubila, who denied any involvement. According to the government, 103 people – most of them attackers – were killed during the clashes. In a report published on 22 May, the Paris-based human rights organisation ‘Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme’ (fidh), together with the drc ngo ‘Ligue des Électeurs’, accused the security forces of killing more than 250 followers of Mukungubila, arresting more than 100, wounding dozens of civilians and pillaging many homes on 30 December 2013 and the days that followed. On 2 January, the federal secretary of the udps in Kasai-Orientale, Bruno Kabangu, was arrested in Kinshasa for complicity with Mukungubila and sentenced to 12 months in prison on 20 June. On 15 May, Mukungubila, in exile in South Africa, was briefly detained under an Interpol arrest warrant and had his first hearing before a court in Johannesburg on 15 July.

On 18 September, Kabila announced a major reshaping of the ‘Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo’ (fardc). Instead of organising the army in 11 provincial commands, three broad defence zones were established in the west, south and east. Gabriel Amisi Kumba would now command the west, Jean-Claude Kifwa the south and Mushale Tshipamba the east, all three being close allies of Kabila. The head of the ground forces, François Olenga Tete, was replaced by Dieudonné Banze Lubundji, the former head of the Republican Guard – Kabila’s de facto private army. It was not till 16 November that Kabila announced the appointment of Ilunga Kampete Gaston-Hugues as the new head of the Republican Guard, after months of rumours as to whether the former head of police, John Numbi, would be appointed to the post. The appointment of General Amisi was particularly noteworthy. Amisi, better known under his war name ‘Tango Fort’, was an influential ex-‘Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma’ rebel commander who had fought against the Kabila government in the second Congo war, but had then become integrated into the fardc. He had been commander in chief of the land forces, but had been suspended in late 2012 over accusations of providing arms to rebel groups, basically helping M23 rebels to capture Goma in November 2012. A military commission presided over by Kabila acquitted him of all charges in late July. Amisi had been accused of orchestrating a massacre in Kisangani in 2002 and repeatedly mentioned by the un Group of Experts (UNGoE) in the context of large-scale corruption and illicit mineral exploitation. Kifwa had also been under UNGoE observation for his relations with the Mai Mai Morgan rebel group and his involvement in illicit resource trafficking. The reshuffle was largely interpreted as a means to tighten Kabila’s direct control over the fardc and thereby as a potential sign that he would not leave power in 2016. Furthermore, the reform was a serious reversal with regard to the professionalisation of the fardc. Many reform-oriented officers – such as Olenga, who had been instrumental in the success against the M23 – were replaced by notoriously corrupt individuals close to Kabila, including the above mentioned Kifwa and Amisi, as well as many others, who were returning after their temporary removal, which in 2013 had spread hope of improved army performance.

Furthermore, the reform came after the death of two other officers key to improving professionalism, discipline and performance within the fardc – Mamadou Ndala and Lucien Bahuma. The Ndala Affair was especially sinister. On 2 January, the commander of Operation Sokola, carried out by the fardc, was killed in Beni. His murder was quickly attributed to the rebel group adf and on 17 November a military court in Beni ruled that the adf had made common cause with elements of the fardc. The court sentenced Colonel Nzanzu Birocho and a number of rank and file soldiers and members of the adf (including in absentia the adf leader Jami Mukulu) to death or long prison terms. According to the court, the adf had paid army officers to kill Ndala in order to prevent the offensive against the adf, but lack of evidence and the sudden death of a key witness in October fuelled the perception that the trial was staged and that the assassination was related to internal power struggles within the fardc. On 30 August, Major General Lucien Bahuma Ambamba, the army commander of the military region covering North Kivu and a key player in the reformist wing of the fardc died – allegedly from a stroke – causing rumours that his death was not as natural as officially announced.

On 2 May, one-and-a-half years after the mass rape of around 130 women and girls in Minova by fardc soldiers, a military court in Goma handed down the verdict. Of the 39 indicted troops, only two low-ranking soldiers were found guilty for rape; 23 were convicted of pillage and 13 were acquitted. Human rights organisations, such as the fidh and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office denounced the judgement as weak and discouraging for rape victims. The un Secretary-General nevertheless stated in his report of 24 September that the judgement offered constructive lessons for future prosecution of crime in the region.

After the defeat of the M23 and separate declarations by the rebel movement and the drc government of December 2013 (in Nairobi, Kenya), progress in dealing with the remaining M23 ex-combatants and implementing the Nairobi Declarations was slow. According to the UNGoE’s interim report of 25 June, the exact numbers of ex-combatants remaining in Uganda was still unclear due to inconsistencies in the lists drawn up by Ugandan officials and the M23 themselves. It was only after months of delay that the drc government became involved in identifying M23 combatants through a technical team sent to Uganda and Rwanda in April and July. Evidence emerged that the M23 were reorganising in Uganda. Furthermore, dozens were said to have fled from camps in Rwanda. In November, M23 president Bertrand Bisimwa stated from exile in Uganda that the M23 were willing to continue fighting if the drc government did not fulfil its part of the peace deal. One crucial accusation was that the government had not complied with the amnesty agreement and continued to detain M23 fighters in prison. Exiled M23 combatants would therefore not be willing to return to the drc. The granting of amnesty had been part of agreements between the government and the M23 in 2013, in which, however, the concrete procedure for granting amnesty remained ambiguous. On 11 February, parliament passed a law granting amnesty on a case-by-case basis to members of armed groups for crimes committed between February 2006 and December 2013 (except in the case of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity). The deadline for applications was set to mid-August, but applications were still considered afterwards due to delays in the process. The government published several lists of individuals subject to the law, naming M23 elements, including many, but not all, of those who were awaiting repatriation from Uganda. The lists also included combatants of the Kata Katanga rebel group, members of the ‘Armée de Résistance Populaire’ of Faustin Munene and Mobutists close to Honoré Ngbanda, as well as individuals implicated in attacks in Kinshasa on 27 February 2011. The M23 criticised the procedure as violating the agreements of December 2013; they requested a general amnesty for their members and rejected the government’s right unilaterally to decide who would be granted amnesty. The amnesty law also included political offences, as agreed during the national consultations in October 2013. The law did not apply, however, to most political opponents facing legal prosecution, as they had usually been charged for real or invented criminal offences and not on political grounds.

Following the defeat of the M23, the un Stabilization Mission in the drc (monusco) and the fardc turned their attention to other rebel groups operating in the drc. Although the fdlr were supposed to be at the centre of operations, the second large joint offensive by the fardc and the un Force Intervention Brigade (fib), called Operation Sokola, was launched against the Ugandan rebel group adf. The offensive – now under the command of General Muhindo Akili Muondos – started on 16 January and by 13 March the army had declared victory against the group. The adf had for years held relatively stable strongholds in Beni territory in North Kivu and had extended its reach during 2013. Despite the declared victory, over 80 civilians were allegedly killed by the adf in Beni during a series of attacks in October. The massacres were largely seen as revenge attacks by surviving adf elements, whose command and control apparatus had remained intact, despite the dismantling of operational bases. Also, after the trial in the Ndala murder case began, a series of attacks on civilians in Beni occurred without much interference by either the army or the un soldiers deployed in the city. Contrary to earlier assumptions, the UNGoE found no links between the adf and al-Shabaab or al-Qaida. With the support of monusco, the fardc also launched operations against ‘Ndumba Defense of Congo’/Cheka, Raia Mutomboki and May-May Kifuafua elements in Walikale (South Kivu), as well as making smaller efforts to dislodge some fdlr splinter groups in Rutshuru (North Kivu) and marginal moves against fdlr road blocks. However, no large-scale operations against the fdlr took place during the year.

In fact, since the military victory by the fardc and the fib over the M23 in late 2013, the fdlr had become increasingly nervous and was keen to hint at voluntary disarmament before becoming the next target of military action. On 30 December 2013, the fdlr had already declared their willingness to lay down their arms and engage in a political struggle. On 12 January, the group announced the “start of activities” of the new alliance ‘Front Commun de Libération du Rwanda’ (fclr-Ubumwe), founded in 2012 and intended as an umbrella for (exiled) Rwandan opposition parties. On 30 May and 9 June, 193 fdlr fighters – a small segment of the militia, which was suspected to have around 1,500–2,500 troops – handed in their weapons. After these first two disarmament events, a Joint Technical Commission of the drc government, the fdlr and monusco was set up for the Kivu provinces, tasked with overseeing the demobilisation process. While the fdlr had repeatedly stressed their willingness to disarm, they continued to insist on peace talks with the Rwandan government, while the latter continued to refuse any negotiations with the rebels. On 26 June, however, negotiations took place in Rome between an fdlr delegation, the head of monusco, the special envoy of the un Secretary-General for the Great Lakes, the special envoys of the us, Belgium and the eu, along with delegates of the drc government, marking the highest level talks with the fdlr since their creation. sadc, the icglr, the au and Rwanda rejected the invitation. The fdlr presented their political demands, including dialogue with the Rwandan government and integration into the Rwandan security forces. The event was facilitated by the French un Under-Secretary General responsible for peacekeeping operations, Hervé Ladsous, at the invitation of the Sant’ Egidio religious community, which had already been involved in talks with the fdlr in 2005. The acting president of the fdlr, Victor Byiringiro, was also brought from Goma to Kinshasa by monusco in order to go on to Rome. However, a request from the un Department for Peacekeeping Operations (dpko) for the lifting of the un travel ban on Byiringiro, who had been under sanctions since 2010, was effectively blocked by Rwanda and rejected by the un Sanctions Committee. Rwanda fiercely criticised the action of the un and threatened in a letter to the unsc of 26 June to withdraw from the Framework Agreement if the dpko continued to “sanitize the fdlr genocidaires”.

On 28 December, another round of disarmament operations took place in North and South Kivu, where 151 fdlr combatants voluntarily disarmed and handed over 67 weapons. As in May and June, the surrendering combatants were of low rank and the weapons old, suggesting that the rebels were not serious about demobilisation. Also, the time schedule agreed on by the Joint Technical Commission was not met. The drc government nevertheless gave much publicity to all disarmament events.

On 14 April, the leader of the Mai Mai Morgan rebel group operating in Ituri, Paul Sadala, was killed after surrendering together with 42 fighters. The incident, in which several more Mai Mai and two fardc soldiers were also killed, occurred while he was being transferred by the fardc to Bunia. According to the government, Sadala tried to escape. However, the exact circumstances of his death remained unclear and the UNGoE found evidence for disproportionate use of force and mistreatment by the fardc. Sadala was known for his close links to fardc officers in Beni territory with whom he had traded resources for arms, including Jean-Claude Kifwa, who was appointed commander of the western military region in September (see above). The incident sparked wide-spread criticism as it discouraged combatants from surrendering.

Disastrous conditions in a demobilisation camp in Kotakoli in Equateur Province added to this impression. According to hrw, over 100 ex-combatants and their family members had died of starvation and many more had been affected by serious illnesses in the camp as of October. The fighters came from various armed groups and had been transferred from the east of the country to Kotakoli in September 2013. They were meant to stay there for only three months before being integrated into the armed forces or put into a ddr programme. The remoteness of the area and the poor infrastructure hindered adequate provision for the camp residents. The special representative of the un Secretary-General and head of monusco, Martin Kobler, visited the camp on 11 September.

There were security problems in other parts of the country, too. The southern province of Katanga had already made headlines in 2013, with increasing attacks by various rebel groups (most notably the Kata Katanga under the command of Kyungu Mutanga) and clashes between a self-proclaimed prophet and security organs that had caused the death of around 40 people on 30 December 2013. On 10 January, more clashes between rebels associated with the Kata Katanga and security forces occurred. The rebels became known for their ‘scorched earth’ policy, in which whole villages were burnt to spread fear. Kobler stated in February that monusco would look at deploying more troops to Katanga but underlined that the problem had to be solved by the drc government. By year’s end, monusco had presented neither a timetable nor figures for the reinforcement of the 450 blue helmets already deployed from Benin. Conflicts in Katanga revolved around the sharing of income from natural resources between the province and the central state. The resource-rich province is not only the economic engine of the country but also the stronghold of Kabila and his regime, so unrest in Katanga has long had a strong influence on national political stability.

State failure to prevent man-made disasters was also a source of unrest. On 13 December, a boat accident on Lake Tanganyika left at least 129 people dead. The boat was going from Kalemie (Katanga) to Uvira (South Kivu). Only ten days later, more than 30 people died and hundreds went missing when a boat from Kisangani to Isangi (Orientale Province) capsized. In reaction, riots occurred in Isangi, with youths setting fire to government buildings. Accidents of this kind had long been common, due to poor maintenance of the vessels, frequent overcrowding and a lack of life jackets – a particular risk, as many people do not know how to swim.

Foreign Affairs

Progress with the implementation of the sub-regional Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement (pscf) was mixed. The agreement, signed by 11 countries of the region in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in February 2013, addressed two main points: the non-involvement of neighbouring countries in the drc’s internal affairs and the reform of drc institutions, notably the security and justice system and local administration. On 12 July, the National Oversight Mechanism, established in May 2013, developed more than 50 benchmarks and 300 indicators of progress to monitor the implementation of the commitments of the drc government within the pscf. However, apart from the approval of a national ddr plan and other minor developments, important aspects of the commitments as laid down in the agreement, such as decentralisation and sustainable security sector reform, remained unfulfilled. With regard to the commitments of the regional partners, the un Secretary-General stated in his report of 24 September that, despite hints to the contrary, leaders in the region by and large adhered to the principles of non-interference and refrained from supporting armed groups within the drc.

unsc Resolution 2147 of 28 March extended the mandate of monusco and the fib to 31 March 2015. The focus of monusco now turned towards the electoral process, which led to a souring of relations with the fardc. However, the fib continued to support the fardc in their fight against armed groups in the troubled east of the drc, albeit with less direct combat involvement. Shortly after the declared victory against the adf, the fib supported the fardc in operations against the ‘Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain’ with aerial attacks. The rebel group clashed with other Mai Mai groups in Masisi (North Kivu) in February. Up to the end of the year, monusco repeatedly confirmed its readiness to engage in military action against the fdlr but made it clear that the fib would only take action if explicitly mandated by the government. The fib had been created in March 2013 with around 3,000 troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi and tasked with neutralising armed groups in the drc.

Relations with both the icglr and sadc revolved around the approach to rebels in the Kivus, most importantly the fdlr. Both South Africa and Tanzania – who were providing the bulk of troops to the fib and had tense relations with Rwanda – supported the drc’s approach of voluntary disarmament and political negotiations between the fdlr and Rwanda. On 3 July, the second joint icglr-sadc ministerial meeting in Luanda (Angola) gave the fdlr a six-month ultimatum to disarm. In light of the lack of progress in disarmament, the ultimatum was reiterated in August and October. It was said that, in case of non-compliance, military action would follow in January 2015. Rwanda (together with Uganda and Kenya) was highly sceptical of this strategy, and pressured the government and the un to take military action. The conflict over what approach to take towards the fdlr brought to the fore the fragility of the cohesion of multilateral organisations – which formed the basis of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement signed in 2013. Throughout the year, Rwanda criticised Kabila for not doing enough against the fdlr, while the drc opposition accused Kabila of having been too ‘pro-Rwanda’ in his stance against the M23 (and former Rwandan-backed rebel groups). At the 20 years genocide commemoration event in Kigali (Rwanda) on 7 April, President Kabila was persona non grata. On 11–12 June, the drc and Rwandan armies clashed at the border north of Goma (North Kivu). Both sides reported fatalities and accused each other of initiating the battle. At year’s end, the exact circumstances of the clashes remained unclear. The icglr Expanded Joint Verification Mission reported that they had found five dead drc soldiers on Rwandan territory and that Rwanda had occupied parts of drc territory prior to the incident. Rwanda’s government strongly criticised the report, while the drc government even claimed the dead soldiers had been taken alive to be murdered in Rwanda. New visa requirements for Rwandan citizens (see below) added to the already tense relation between the two countries.

Relations with Angola also soured after they had seemed to improve in 2013. The long-simmering row over their maritime border heated up when drc Foreign Minister Raymond Tshibanda wrote a letter to the un Secretary-General rejecting a map drafted by Angola in December 2013 to clarify rights to territorial waters. The un Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf had to postpone any assessment of the map scheduled for July and September due to the ongoing dispute. At stake in the conflict between the two countries were large offshore oil fields.

Rumours of the presence of the Burundian army in South Kivu, as well as the arming of the Imbonerakure – the youth wing of Burundi’s ruling ‘Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces de Défénse de la Démocratie’ (cndd-fdd) party – on drc soil caused much debate in the east. In October, the un Secretary-General’s deputy special representative to the drc, Abdallah Wafy, confirmed the presence of the Burundian army in Kiliba (South Kivu) in an interview with Radio France International. The government acknowledged that information exchange had taken place but denied any long-term presence of the Burundian army on its territory. On 30 December, around 200 unidentified armed fighters tried to cross the border from South Kivu into Burundi but immediately clashed with the Burundian army. The ensuing fighting lasted around five days and left about 100 rebels dead. Burundian rebels – mostly of the ‘Forces Nationales de Libération’ (fnl) – had been present in South Kivu since the 1990s and repeatedly formed alliances with other rebel groups, such as the fdlr. The December attacks, however, were probably not related to the fnl but to internal frictions in the cndd-fdd and the Imbonerakure.

The conflict in the car continued to have its spill-over effects in the northern part of the drc. car soldiers and defunct Séléka elements fleeing across the border into Orientale province created an atmosphere of insecurity. The number of refugees from the car increased, reaching an estimated 75,000 by the end of the year. Most refugees were stranded in Zongo (Equateur Province), which is situated directly across the border from the car capital, Bangui. From December 2013, the drc had 850 soldiers and 150 police in the car as part of the international force ‘Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique’ (misca). The deployment gave rise to some polemic within the drc, as a part of civil society considered the intervention unimportant given the drc’s own problems with armed groups. The situation in the car and the drc’s on-going support for misca was the main topic at a meeting between Kabila and French President Hollande in Paris on 21 May.

Relations with the neighbouring Republic of Congo revolved around the mass deportations of drc citizens across the Congo River from Brazzaville to Kinshasa. On 4 April, a large-scale operation against crime and illegal immigration started in Brazzaville and continued for several months. An estimated 400,000 drc citizens, around 10% of the city’s population, were said to be living in Brazzaville, many of whom, according to the Congo government were involved in crime and disturbing public order. The exact numbers of deportees remained unclear because, when the expulsions began, many drc citizens crossed the border voluntarily in fear of being deported. In a press statement on 26 May, the un spoke of 130,000 people and urged Brazzaville to stop the forced deportations. Kobler visited a transit camp close to Kinshasa and said he was shocked by the many accounts of human rights violations committed by the Congolese authorities during the deportations. Thousands of deportees were stranded in the national stadium in Kinshasa, lacking adequate provision of food, health care and sanitation. The deportations caused a veritable diplomatic crisis between the drc and Congo.

On 4 May, us Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kinshasa – the first time a secretary of state had been in the country since 2009. Kerry acknowledged the progress made with regard to the demobilisation of armed groups in the east, but called on Kabila to respect the Constitution and leave office in 2016. He promised a $ 30 m grant earmarked for funding the elections. On 5 June, us Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region Russ Feingold reiterated the negative us position on a potential third term.

The investigations against drc rebels at the icc made some progress during the year. On 10–14 February, a hearing took place to confirm the charges against Bosco Ntaganda. On 9 June, the pre-trial chamber of the icc confirmed 13 charges against him of war crimes allegedly committed in Ituri between 2002 and 2003, and sent the case to trial, to start on 2 June 2015. The notorious rebel leader, who was key in founding the M23 in 2012 and had been wanted by the icc since 2006, had surprisingly turned himself in to face charges in the Hague in late 2013. On 1 December, the icc confirmed the 14-year prison sentence on Thomas Lubanga, who had been found guilty in 2012 of enlisting child soldiers in his rebel group ‘Union des Patriotes Congolais’. Lubanga appealed after the verdict on grounds of breach of his right to fair process. On 23 May, Germain Katanga was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment on one count of crimes against humanity and four counts of war crimes committed in 2003 in Ituri. On 13–14 November, the closing oral statements were read in the case against Jean-Pierre Bemba (a drc war-lord and Kabila’s fiercest opponent in the 2006 presidential elections, but tried for atrocities committed in the car in 2001). The verdict was pending.

Investigations into the fdlr leadership in exile continued throughout the year. On 5 December, a court in Düsseldorf (Germany) sentenced three individuals to four, three and two years in prison for participation in and support of a terrorist organisation (the fdlr). All three were German citizens of Rwandan origin and had been arrested in Germany in December 2012. According to the court, they had helped with propaganda after the arrest of former fdlr president Ignace Murwanashyaka and vice president Straton Musoni in 2009, whose trial for crimes against humanity and war crimes, begun in 2011 in Stuttgart, continued throughout the year.

Socioeconomic Developments

Macroeconomic development continued to show positive trends, with low consumer price inflation at 1.6% and a constantly high gdp growth rate of 8.5%, largely due to a continuous rise in mining outputs, especially copper. Tax revenues were projected to increase in the budget planning of 2014, but essentially fell owing to lack of control, resulting in an increased fiscal deficit. The year also saw a rise in foreign investor caution, given the unstable political environment and lack of transparency in economic decisions. The fact that the drc did not have an economic programme with the imf – after it was first temporarily suspended in 2012 and the suspension confirmed in 2013 – had a serious negative effect on the investment climate. In the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index, the drc fell from 183rd in 2013 to the bottom place, at 189th.

The humanitarian situation remained extremely challenging throughout the year while external funds remained limited. Only around 35% of the humanitarian appeal for the year could be funded. After the military defeat of the M23, many idps in North Kivu voluntarily returned to their homes. However, continued fighting by other armed groups in the area caused new waves of idps. As of December, the unhcr estimated the number of idps in North Kivu at 890,000. The total number of idps at the end of the year was estimated by unhcr at 2.6 m. Displacement figures increased most rapidly in Katanga due to fighting between the fardc and armed groups (including the Kata Katanga). Numbers of drc refugees in other countries remained high, with an estimated 430,000 residing mainly in Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi. This was despite the repatriation of large numbers of refugees from Congo (120,000) and the car (20,000).

On 24 August, the government confirmed an Ebola outbreak in Equateur province. On 27 August, who spoke of 24 suspected cases of Ebola; 13 of the victims had died. By 9 August, the number of reported cases had risen to 64, including 35 deaths. The strain was said to be independent of the virus in West Africa and easily controllable due to the remoteness of the area and the experience of the drc with small scale Ebola outbreaks in recent years.

On 25 June, the drc tightened its visa regime. While citizens of the neighbouring countries of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (drc, Burundi, Rwanda) had previously been able to travel with laissez-passer papers, the new requirements introduced relatively high visa fees for students, traders and workers. The changes seriously disturbed the very lively cross-border relations between the drc and Rwanda, which are essential for the survival of small-scale businesses, and were met with criticism from affected people (students, traders), Rwandan border personnel and the un special envoy to the Great Lakes Region. The move was largely interpreted as a reaction to the clashes between drc and Rwandan forces earlier in June (see above). On 10 July, Rwanda hit back by making drc citizens wait for hours at the new Rwandan immigration hall of the main Goma-Gisenyi border post. Although the drc government later postponed the full enforcement of the visa regime, cross-border movement continued to be disturbed.

Transparency continued to be an issue in the mining sector – the most important driver of growth in the drc, with cobalt and copper alone making up around 98% of exports and 44% of nominal gdp. On 2 July, the drc became a full member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. The drc’s candidate status had been suspended for a year in April 2013 due to flaws in its 2010 report, which it had since addressed. On 20 January, the drc launched its certification programme under the regional certification mechanism of the icglr’s Regional Initiative on Natural Resources, intended to align due diligence in supply chains for cassiterite, wolframite, coltan and gold in the region. Later in the year, other international efforts to achieve greater transparency in the mining sector came under criticism. On 14 August, the cabinet director of drc’s mining minister, Joseph Ikoli Yombo Y’Apeke, criticised international legislation aimed at greater transparency in the mining sector, such as the us American Dodd Frank Act, for being a “de facto embargo” on mining exports. On 11 September, the renowned Goma-based Pole Institute research centre published an open letter signed by 70 drc and international experts and academics criticising international legislation – in particular again the Dodd Frank Act – for misinterpreting the resource-conflict link and having disastrous effects on the local economy. The ongoing debate about a revision of the mining code continued throughout the year without tangible results. A statement by Prime Minister Ponyo in February that the government aimed to almost double tax revenues from minerals caused widespread criticism among mining companies.

On 26 July, the head of the state-run mining company Gécamine, Ahmed Kalej Nkand, was sacked for mismanagement. Gécamine had repeatedly come under criticism for dubious asset sales. The ousting occurred in the midst of a restructuring process that was supposed to increase copper production and required stable investments, and only two months after workers in the important Kolwezi mine in Katanga went on strike for a week over delays in salary payments. However, the dismissal seemed to be more a political account-settling than a move towards more transparency and good governance.

On 20 March, the World Bank agreed a $ 73 m grant to the drc government to develop an expansion of the Inga Dam – highly controversial due to lack of transparency concerning the financing and the final share of benefits, as well as outstanding compensations for the relocation of whole villages. South Africa and Katanga-based mining companies had expressed particular interest in the project, hoping for an ease in power shortages.

In early June, the uk-based oil company Soco International announced that it would not drill for oil in Virunga National Park for the time being, although they remained ambiguous about future endeavours. The unesco World Heritage Site in eastern drc is home to endangered mountain gorillas and unesco, conservationists and human rights groups had repeatedly warned of the ecological and human consequences – including armed conflict exacerbation – of oil drilling in the area.