Domestic Politics

The year began auspiciously for the Sassou Nguesso government. In late January, Euronews announced that it would launch its Africanews subsidiary in Brazzaville in late 2015. The announcement marked a diplomatic victory for Sassou Nguesso. Africanews would reportedly occupy half of Télé Congo’s newly christened headquarters in northern Brazzaville. Given the regime’s declining rating from Reporters Without Borders, the announcement was met with widespread surprise; it also generated suspicions that Sassou Nguesso had lured Euronews with a significant financial subsidy. Euronews insisted that the pan-African news network would espouse an independent editorial line.

Sassou Nguesso’s supporters began openly campaigning for a constitutional revision in April. As public criticism grew, the regime signalled that it might be willing to employ violence to suppress mass protests. Between April and July, the government deported as many as 250,000 drc citizens, often brutally. The government justified the operation, dubbed Operation ‘Smack of the Elders’, by citing the crime rate, drc nationals often being regarded as petty criminals in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. But the political opposition interpreted the deportations very differently and considered that, by ignoring appeals from un Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the regime signalled it might be willing to employ force against protesters, even at the risk of becoming an international pariah. The mass deportations devastated Brazzaville’s working class. With National Route 1 – between Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, and thus crossing Congo’s most fertile agricultural land – still devastated by the 1997 civil war, the urban poor had historically purchased food imports from Kinshasa (drc). When the borders closed following the deportations, the cost of food increased fivefold.

The regime soon targeted Congo’s few independent journalists and most ardent pro-democracy activists. Elie Smith served as the chief reporter for the mntv television channel – owned by Maurice Nguesso, the president’s elder brother and one of Congo’s wealthiest citizens – from which he occasionally criticised the constitutional revision On 10 September, five armed men broke into Smith’s Brazzaville home, physically assaulted him, and raped his younger sister. Smith was expelled to his native Cameroon on 26 September. Sadio Kante Morel, a stringer for Reuters who reported the assaults, was expelled to Mali on 22 September, although she was born to West African parents in Brazzaville and entitled to Congolese citizenship. In October, a group of 35 opposition activists who comprised the Citizen Movement for the Respect of Constitutional Order were arrested and held, without trial, for four weeks. Patrick Eric Mampouya, well known for the opposition website he had once run from Paris, was among them.

On 28 September, voters went to the polls to elect departmental and municipal counsellors. With several prominent opposition leaders, including Mathias Dzon and Clement Mierassa, calling for a boycott, Sassou Nguesso’s ‘Parti Congolais du Travail’ (pct) claimed a crushing victory. Of 850 seats, the pct alone claimed 402. The ‘Union Panafricaine pour la Démocratie Sociale’ (upads), founded by former president Pascal Lissouba and the only significant remaining opposition party, won but 54 seats. The remaining seats were divided among political parties allied with the pct. Senatorial elections were held on 12 October, and again the pct dominated. Of 38 seats, the pct claimed 30. Of the remaining eight seats, pct allies received six, leaving but two for the opposition. Both went to upads. In the wake of defeat, several prominent upads figures formed a new party, the ‘Congrès Africain pour le Progrès’.

André Okombi Salissa, a deputy from Lekana, Plateaux and perhaps Congo’s most viable opposition leader, returned to Congo in June after 15 months of voluntary exile in Paris. He came back ostensibly to attend a budgetary session in the National Assembly, but virtually all observers interpreted his return as confirmation that he would seek the presidency in 2016. During a trip to the usa in May, Okombi Salissa had signed a contract with Rasky Baerlein Strategic Communications, a public relations firm that would be responsible for burnishing his relationships with American policymakers. This would be critical, as most State Department officials regarded him as a leading architect of Sassou Nguesso’s mass violence in Brazzaville following the 1997 civil war. Okombi Salissa remained the unofficial leader of the Téké axis, which included Colonel Ntsourou, Dzon and Jean Martin Mbemba, formerly Sassou Nguesso’s justice minister.

The pct political bureau was expected to formally announce its support for a constitutional revision following its 8 November meeting. Having watched Burkina Faso’s President Compaoré fall to a mass uprising in late October, however, Sassou Nguesso quietly deferred the pct’s decision to 31 December. On 8 December, the Catholic Church, long opposed to the regime, criticised the constitutional revision in unusually harsh terms. Even some within the pct openly dissented. Dubbed the party’s ‘intellectual’ wing, this group quietly advocated not only Sassou Nguesso’s departure in 2016, but also a demographic shift in the party’s leadership away from the Mbochi ethnic group. Led by long-time minister Isidore Mvouba and Charles Zacharie Bowao, Sassou Nguesso’s former defence minister, this ‘intellectual’ wing attracted support from Likouala and Plateaux natives. In July, Bowao even published an essay that criticised the pct’s “ethnocentrism” and “tribalism”, serious accusations in a country that had fought a series of civil wars along ethnic lines less than 20 years before. Although the pct ultimately endorsed the constitutional revision on 31 December, the spectre of an alliance between this ‘intellectual’ current and the Téké axis – in conjunction with the mass revolt that brought down Compaoré in October – had the potential to compel Sassou Nguesso to eventually jettison the constitutional revision.

The year witnessed several important political appointments. Bonaventure Engobo, former National Protocol director, became adjoint secretary general of the National Security Council, the regime’s chief domestic intelligence service. In July, Sassou Nguesso appointed Louis Patrice Ngagnon, an ethnic Téké and an engineer by training, to head the national water distribution company. With the 50th African Games coming to Brazzaville in 2015, the city’s frequent water scarcities threatened to become a serious embarrassment for the regime. In October, Pascal Ngotene, an ethnic Mbochi, was named head of the Pointe-Noire port authority, replacing Jean-Marie Aniélé, who had occupied the post since the 1997 civil war. Ngotene’s appointment marked the persistent influence of Minister for Great Projects Jean Jacques Bouya, Sassou Nguesso’s nephew. Bouya also successfully positioned his brother, Bernard Serge Bouya, as Ngotene’s deputy. In November, Sassou Nguesso named Benjamin Makaya, a native of Pointe-Noire, as adjoint director general of the ‘Société Nationale des Pétroles du Congo’ (snpc) to oversee production.

Foreign Affairs

Diplomatically, Sassou Nguesso sought to establish himself as Central Africa’s elder statesman by positioning himself as the chief mediator for the car crisis. On 20 January, Catherine Samba-Panza, regarded as the ‘civil society candidate’, succeeded Michel Djotodia as car president. She had been vocally supported by Sassou Nguesso and her victory marked a triumph for him and secured him a strategic partner in Bangui. Moreover, by advocating for a candidacy that most donors viewed as a milestone for civil society activism and gender equity, he hoped to earn a measure of goodwill in Paris and Washington in advance of the constitutional revision. His efforts were not entirely in vain. Virtually reviled by the government of French President François Hollande upon its election in 2012, by July Sassou Nguesso had emerged as France’s indispensable partner in the car. But even so, his efforts were not as successful as he had hoped. In November, France prevailed upon Sassou Nguesso’s African counterparts to elect Michaëlle Jean as secretary-general of La Francophonie, rather than Henri Lopès, Sassou Nguesso’s long-standing ambassador to France and effectively the dean of the African diplomatic community in Paris.

Sassou Nguesso also sought to play kingmaker in Gabon. In April, he met discretely with Jacques Adiahénot, a minister in several governments of the late Omar Bongo, president of Gabon until 2009, and former head of the ‘Parti Democratique Gabonais’ (pdg) of current President Ali Ben Bongo. On 6 March, Adiahénot resigned from the pdg to help coordinate Jean Ping’s nascent presidential campaign to unseat Ali Bongo. Observers in Brazzaville and Libreville alike interpreted the meeting as a signal of support for Ping’s candidacy, despite the long-standing alliance between the Bongo and Sassou Nguesso families. The meeting came less than a month after Ali Bongo had chosen not to attend an event in Oyo to mark the fifth anniversary of Edith Lucie Bongo’s death; the first lady of Gabon until her death in 2007, Edith Lucie was also Sassou Nguesso’s eldest daughter. Ali Bongo’s absence was made all the more conspicuous by the host of African presidents who chose to attend: Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta of Mali, and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone.

Unsurprisingly, the spring deportations damaged Congo’s bilateral relations with the drc , and with Joseph Kabila’s few allies. Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, whose military support during the 1997 civil war had been decisive for Sassou Nguesso’s victory, cancelled their meeting in Luanda on 23 April. Just two weeks later, in an effort to calm tensions, Congolese security forces captured Udjani Mangbama, a former drc rebel leader and long-time rival of Kabila. A close ally of Jean-Pierre Bemba, currently imprisoned in The Hague for crimes against humanity, Mangbama had fled the drc for Brazzaville in 2010 and had been sentenced to death in absentia by a Kinshasa court in August 2011; Sassou Nguesso’s government refused Kinshasa’s request for extradition. Mangbama died from wounds suffered during his capture in Brazzaville on 10 May. The bilateral relationship had recovered somewhat by August, when Sassou Nguesso and Kabila were photographed touring Kinshasa, hand in hand.

In August, Sassou Nguesso attended the us-Africa summit in Washington hosted by President Barack Obama. He arrived a full week before the summit began. He hoped to generate support in Washington for his constitutional revision, an effort that included a speech at the National Press Club. By all accounts, the project failed, as the us State Department remained resolutely opposed to the revision and Congressman Eliot Engel, a Democrat from New York, called on Sassou Nguesso to step down in 2016. This diplomatic failure coincided with the Congo National Conference for Democratic Alternance, a four-day affair in Paris that was hosted by several prominent opposition leaders in the Congolese diaspora. Held at a small Catholic church in the 13th arrondissement, the Conference attracted just over 100 people; Dzon was not among them, for the prominent opposition leader had been detained at Brazzaville’s Maya-Maya airport by Sassou Nguesso’s security services, forbidden to leave the country. The summit was designed as much to unify the Paris-based opposition as to mobilise support within the French government, which was represented at the summit by several officials from the Quai d’Orsay. In response, Sassou Nguesso dispatched pct Secretary General Pierre Ngolo to Paris immediately after the Conference ended. Along with several other high level representatives, Ngolo held a ‘citizen meeting’ with Sassou Nguesso’s partisans in France on 22 June. The meetings took place at the Hotel Pullman Paris-Bercy, bordering the Seine, a setting that underscored the vast financial disparity between Sassou Nguesso and the opposition.

With bilateral relationships with Paris and Washington still tense, China continued to emerge as perhaps Sassou Nguesso’s most important ally. In June, he visited China for nearly two weeks, ostensibly to celebrate the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. On 30 September, the prc government celebrated the 65th anniversary of its founding. The event was toasted in Brazzaville by the Chinese ambassador, surrounded by a handful of Sassou Nguesso’s most trusted ministers, including his uncle Aimé Emmanuel Yoka.

Socioeconomic Developments

Congo’s gdp reached $ 14.09 bn, representing a growth rate of 3.4%. This was a significant decline, for just four years earlier, in 2010, it had reached nearly 9%. Congo’s slowing growth rate was driven almost entirely by its declining oil reserves and global market prices. Oil production continued its long-term decline, down to 265,000 b/d, from 305,000 b/d in 2010, although Congo was still Africa’s fourth-leading oil producer, behind Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. With most analysts anticipating an even further decline, the government accelerated its search for new reserves. It focused on the 16,000 km² Ngolo block in the Cuvette basin, with Eni responsible for exploration. The oil sector again accounted for approximately 90% of Congolese exports, with timber and cement comprising the balance. Congo’s total exports continued to decline as well, from $ 10.53 bn in 2013 to $ 9.91 bn. China and the usa remained Congo’s chief export partners, accounting for just over 50% of total exports. After it reached the hipc completion point in 2010, Congo’s external debt was largely forgiven by bilateral and multilateral creditors. The country’s external debt now totalled $ 3.45 bn, or roughly 25% of gdp. Its inflation rate increased rapidly, reaching 6% after a low of 1.3% in 2011.

Sassou Nguesso sponsored a series of international conferences that sought to attract foreign investors. In February, he welcomed the first Build Africa Forum, a two-day event billed as an opportunity for international investors, donors and ngo leaders to discuss how infrastructure improvements might stimulate sustainable growth across the African continent. The Forum was organised by Richard Attias, the Moroccan businessman who had been organising the New York Forum africa each year in Libreville (Gabon). Attended by potential investors from Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa and other middle-income countries, it was an extended advertisement for Congo’s economic potential and part of Sassou Nguesso’s ongoing bid to shift the economic centre of Central Africa from Libreville. In late July, Sassou Nguesso welcomed the Forbes Africa Forum, at which he persuaded former French president Nicholas Sarkozy to speak, as well as other well-known French media personalities.

Notwithstanding these conferences, Congo’s business climate remained among the least attractive in the world. The World Bank found that firms could expect to spend 602 hours per year – or fully 75 working days – filing taxes alone. The effective tax rate was nearly 60%. Enforcing a contract in the Congolese court system cost, on average, nearly 55% of the total claim. Reflecting this, Congo’s fdi continued to decline, falling to roughly $ 2 bn from a high of just over $ 3 bn in 2011. The government did little to ameliorate these persistent weaknesses. As a result – and despite the country’s vast oil wealth – Congolese citizens remained mired in poverty. Life expectancy held constant at 58 years, while nearly 73% of the population subsisted on less than $ 2 per day. The government continued to neglect public services, allocating just 2.5% of gdp to health care and 6% of gdp to education. Congolese citizens continued to migrate to Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire from the rural hinterlands, pushing the country’s urbanisation rate to 65%.