Domestic Politics

Domestic politics in Côte d’Ivoire was shaped by the ups and downs of the government-opposition dialogue, negotiations on political participation, the return of exiles, malfunctions of justice and mismanagement of the reconciliation. There also were debates and tensions within the major political parties.

Talks between the ‘Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix’ (rhdp) government (a coalition of four parties: the ‘Rassemblement des Républicains’ [rdr], the pdci-rda, the ‘Mouvement des Forces d’Avenir’ [mfa] and the ‘Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire’ [updci]) and the opposition fpi began in January in Abidjan and were made possible by a number of measures taken by the government: individuals on bail could now access their bank accounts again and numerous individuals were reinstated as public sector workers. The two parties agreed on the need to ensure security for political leaders and freedom of political action for the opposition, oversight of party political finance, and the evacuation of illegally occupied houses. In spite of this progress, the dialogue was suspended on 29 March after the fpi criticised the government’s failure to implement points agreed measures. Tension also rose when the opposition party called for a boycott of the general census and accused the government of trying to naturalise foreigners in order to influence future elections. In addition, the transfer of Charles Blé Goudé, former leader of the Young Patriots, to the icc on 22 March led to the opposition’s withdrawal from the discussion. The Ivorian government kept appealing to the opposition to return to the negotiating table and, thanks to Aïchatou Mindaoudou, the un Secretary-General’s special representative, the dialogue was resumed in May.

President Alassane Ouattara regularly called on exiled Ivorians to return and, in response to these appeals, a dozen prominent exiled supporters of the ousted president Laurent Gbagbo came home. The first returnee was Marcel Gossio (former ceo of Abidjan Port) in January. Notable other examples included Alain Dogou (former defence minister), Voho Sahi (former special adviser to Gbagbo), Koumoué Koffi Augustin (former minister of mines and petroleum), and Navigué Konaté (president of the youth wing of the fpi), who all returned to Abidjan in January and February. They were followed by another dozen executives including three former ministers (Hubert Oulaye, Odette Sauyet and Assoa Adou) and Michel Guédé Zadi (former ceo of Hotel Ivoire) and, in November, another group including former mp William Atteby and the former minister of culture, Lia Bi Douayoua. Even though the fpi agreed to these returns, it was still concerned because they took place outside the national framework for dialogue and commitment, which envisaged not only an organised return of exiles but also the release of prisoners. Both were seen as critical conditions for national reconciliation.

The Ivorian justice system was criticised during the year for beings politically biased. It continued to indict individuals who had sided with Gbagbo while former supporters of current President Ouattara walked free. In December, a joint report issued by the International Federation for Human Rights, the ‘Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains’ and the ‘Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l’Homme’ stated that individuals suspected of human rights crimes by ngos enjoyed special protection and therefore never appeared before the ‘Cellule Spéciale d’Enquête et d’Instruction’ (csei), an investigation team set up by the government. Most of them had fought for Ouattara during the post-electoral war of 2011. In addition, they had been promoted by the regime to the very the top of the country’s military and administrative hierarchy. The ongoing legal proceedings were very slow. The first trial for post-election crimes, set to be held in October, was postponed indefinitely. As a result, more than 300 pro-Gbagbo detainees in Abidjan prison initiated a hunger strike in protest against their three years of imprisonment without trail, demanding that they be tried or released. In early December, the trial of Simone Gbagbo, the former first lady, who had been indicted by the icc, and 82 others got underway at the Abidjan Criminal Court.

Institutions such as the csei and the ‘Commission Dialogue Vérité and Reconciliation’ (cdvr), which had been created to overcome the post-election crisis and advance national reconciliation, did not operate effectively. The csei ran into budget issues, while the cdvr concluded its work in October without proposing a clear methodology. The Commission failed to explain the various stages of its work, which most people were not familiar with. In addition, important parts of the dialogue process were not implemented. For example none of the 70,000 victims’ hearings (around 80 public hearings) were televised. On 21 November, the president of the cdvr submitted the final report to president Ouattara, but did not disclose any of the content to public.

Military reforms also failed, leading to two major mutinies by former ‘Forces Nouvelles’ soldiers, who had been integrated into the ‘Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire’ (frci). The first mutiny occurred in November in Bouaké and Abidjan but soon ended when the government offered negotiations. However, serious unrest broke out in December in military camps in Abidjan, Bouake, Korhogo and Daloa and lasted two days. The rioting units claimed that the government had not complied with promises made after the first mutiny, including the payment of salary arrears and their integration into the national army. Taking this threat seriously, on 18 December, the government arrested a former warlord Traoré Salif, known as ‘Commandant Tracteur’. The authorities accused Traoré of being the instigator of the mutiny because most arrested mutineers were linked to his unit and some of those interrogated implicated him. Instability among the military worsened the Ivorian political crisis.

After the reorganisation of the ‘Commission Electorale Independante’ (cei) in May, some civil society organisations and political parties (especially the pro-Gbagbo ‘Alliance des Forces Démocratiques’ [afd], an opposition coalition that included the fpi) alleged that the cei was tailored to favour Ouattara. Although allied with other small parties in the afd, the fpi, as the principal opposition party, continued to act independently, while the others increased their negotiating power by appointing a joint representative. By splitting their representation in this way, the afd coalition seemed to increase its chances of controlling the cei. Various opposition groups either wanted to appoint the chair of the cei themselves or called on the government to appoint a chairperson acceptable to all parties. Despite their protest, Youssouf Bakayoko, a member of the pdci-rda and former president the cei during the 2010 crisis, was re-elected by 12 to 17 cei members in September. Various opposition leaders, including Fr Boni Martial, representative of the Catholic Church, Koné Marguerite Yoli Bi from the non-confessional ngos, Anaky Jacob, representative of the mfa, Alain Doghou, representative of fpi, and Bertin Ganin N’Goran of the afd,) boycotted the election. The fpi representative then claimed that the government was not committed to reaching a consensus and that it had re-elected a cei president who had been a prominent figure in the post-electoral war of 2010. As a result, the fpi suspended its participation in the cei in September, but returned in November, after the government modified its structure by including representatives of the opposition on the executive board.

Crises also broke out within the two most important political parties, the pdci-rda and the fpi. Inside the pdci-rda, a member of the governing rhdp alliance, criticism of the party president, Konan Bédié, grew after he decided unilaterally to support Ouattara. On 17 September, Bédié used the occasion of Ouattara’s visit to his village, Daoukro (Centre), to address a message to pdci-rda activists, asking them to endorse Ouattara as the only rhdp candidate in the 2015 presidential election. This became known as the ‘appel de Daoukro’ and it triggered sharp reactions from prominent party leaders, including the representative Kouadio Konan Bertin, who accused Bédié of betraying the resolutions of the 2013 party congress, which stated that the pdci-rda should appoint one of its own members as the presidential candidate. In the wake of this protest, three party leaders, Essy Amara (former minister, former president of the 49th un General Assembly and former secretary of the au), Konan Banny (former prime minister) and Kablan Brou declared their intention to stand as pdci-rda candidates in the 2015 presidential election. Bédié denied their right to be supported by the party and stated that if they wanted to run, they would have to do so without the pdci-rda.

The fpi was also torn by internal conflicts. In July, pro-Gbagbo members contested the authority of the party’s president, Pascal Affi N’Guessan, when he modified the composition of the fpi’s national bureau and dropped some influential members who had refused to engage in dialogue with the government as long as Gbagbo was detained at the icc. Three years after its fall from power, the fpi remained profoundly divided. The crisis heated up after Gbagbo’s mother died a few days after she had been sent back to Côte d’Ivoire from her exile in Ghana and reached its height when militants called for Gbagbo to stand for party president. Affi N’Guessan argued that Gbagbo’s candidacy would go against the fpi constitution and its bylaws. The party’s central committee, which was responsible for party elections, nevertheless allowed Gbagbo to run for the party presidency during the party convention, scheduled for December. In response, Affi argued that the letter of interest presented by the pro-Gbagbo activists was a fake and he filed a lawsuit in the Abidjan civil court on 18 December. The court banned the convention and asked the protagonists to wait for the court to arrive at a decision. On 29 December, the court rejected Gbagbo’s candidacy.

Foreign Affairs

Côte d’Ivoire intensified its cooperation with ssa and the rest of Africa. President Ouattara’s term as chairman of ecowas ran until March. In addition to its active role in the war against terrorism in Mali, the Ivorian government signed several bilateral agreements with ssa countries. On 28 January, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria signed a number of cooperation agreements. On 31 March, the Prime Minister of Cabo Verde visited Côte d’Ivoire. On 29 July, Ouattara went to Ouagadougou to attend the 4th Conference of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Côte d’Ivoire further strengthened its relations with the Kingdom of Morocco and King Mohammed vi was in Côte d’Ivoire for the second time in February, following an earlier visit in March 2013. These visits led to 26 cooperation agreements and Ouattara visited Morocco in October. High-ranking Ivorian officials, including the president of the National Assembly, made official visits to Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo.

France remained one of Côte d’Ivoire’s major trading partners, and French trade with Abidjan intensified. French President François Hollande spent two days in Côte d’Ivoire in July, and signed several agreements on debt relief and development. Ouattara participated in the August commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the allied landing in Provence and met with Hollande in France in December. As a sign of this good relationship, the French embassy offered computer equipment to Côte d’Ivoire’s universities within the framework of France’s ‘support for university governance and reform of higher education’.

In Europe, in addition to France, Côte d’Ivoire made efforts to revitalise its cooperation with Italy, with which it has partnerships in the infrastructure, food and energy sectors, and received the Italian minister of foreign affairs in January. Côte d’Ivoire further deepened diplomatic relations with Turkey. In August, President of the Ivorian National Assembly Guillaume Soro attended the inauguration of the new Turkish president. The partnership with Turkey envisaged cooperation in the field of political and military intelligence and preferential trade agreements were signed to strengthen the presence of Turkish business groups in Côte d’Ivoire.

Partnerships with China, South Korea, Japan and India were also invigorated. With China, a visa abolition agreement for official passport holders was signed in December. In addition, the China Eximbank provided a loan of CFAfr 395 bn to the Port Autonome d’Abidjan to finance the first phase of its major infrastructure construction projects. With South Korea, cooperation was strengthened through mutual visits by officials from both countries. In January, the government of South Korea opened the office of the Korean International Cooperation Agency (koica) in Abidjan, signalling an increasingly positive relationship between the two countries. At the end of the year, koica agreed to provide technical assistance to Côte d’Ivoire to improve the water distribution system in Abidjan. A Japanese-Ivorian summit took place in January in Abidjan attended by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Also in January, two major bilateral cooperation agreements were signed with India, when Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Pareenet Kaur visited Côte d’Ivoire.

Côte d’Ivoire worked to improve its relations with the usa and Canada. In December, the country was selected to benefit from aid to the value of CFAfr 6 bn to CFAfr 11 bn within the Millennium Challenge Corporation ‘Threshold’ programme funded by the us Congress to promote inclusive and sustainable economies in Africa. In addition, Côte d’Ivoire collaborated with the us government on issues of regional maritime security and border terrorism in Mali.

Apart from bilateral cooperation, Côte d’Ivoire benefited from the financial support of several international institutions to advance social stability and economic recovery. In June, the AfDB granted CFAfr 20 bn to support various programmes for peace and social cohesion and an additional CFAfr 22.2 bn for the cdvr, the National Social Cohesion Programme and the Observatory of Solidarity and Social Cohesion. The World Bank provided CFAfr 18 bn to partially fund the development and rehabilitation of the Boulevard de France and the Lagoon Boulevard in Abidjan and, in December, approved a credit of $ 70 m (CFAfr 35 bn) to strengthen public administration and foster private sector growth.

In June, the imf approved a disbursement of CFAfr 37.5 bn as part of its support for the Ivorian post-crisis reconstruction programme. Following a performance review in December, the imf scheduled payment of a further $ 94.7 m, bringing the total allocated to Côte d’Ivoire to $ 615.9 m. In addition, the imf granted an extension to the Ivorian credit line (up to $ 190 m).

Socioeconomic Developments

According to the imf, Côte d’Ivoire’s macroeconomic outlook was positive at the start of the year. In March, Michel Lazare, deputy director of the imf’s Africa department, announced that, with an 8.7% growth rate and a controlled inflation rate of 2.5% in 2013, Côte d’Ivoire offered strong positive economic prospects. Annual growth was estimated at 9% by the Ivorian government, the high rate being due to strong public investment. From January to December, the Centre for Promotion of Investments in Côte d’Ivoire recorded the creation of 5,983 companies, which generated a total investment of CFAfr 400 bn. As in previous years, an Investment in Côte d’Ivoire Forum took place from 29 January to 1 February to attract international investments and business. This Forum revealed that 38 projects totalling CFAfr 1,694 bn had successfully completed. This economic performance grew out of a series of government measures taken to facilitate entrepreneurship and improve the business environment.

According to Reuters, between October 2013 and January 2014, Ivorian cocoa production increased from around 721,000 tonnes to 932,000 tonnes. The 28% increase in production was an important economic indicator and the country continued to be the world’s leading cocoa producer. According to the International Coffee and Cocoa Organization, about 520,000 tonnes of cocoa (30% of national production) were processed within the country during this same period, 10% more than during the previous season. This performance placed the Côte d’Ivoire just behind the Netherlands for cocoa processing.

In addition, Côte d’Ivoire increased its energy production (oil, natural gas) and privatised a mining company as part of its development strategy. Oil production amounted to 37,000 b/d, far behind the 100,000 b/d forecast for 2014. In January, the sixth gas turbine of the Ivorian Electricity Production Company (ciprel) was inaugurated and was expected to bring capacity up to 111 mw without any additional consumption of natural gas. The completion of both phases of ciprel iv would add 222 mw to the installed capacity. The mining sector experienced disengagement from the Ivorian state. The government viewed the privatisation of the mining sector as an economic growth strategy. In January, the Mining Development Corporation sold 9.1% of its activities to the La Mancha Precious Metals group. Important infrastructure improvements took place, although investment in basic infrastructure remained limited. The new section of the ‘highway of the North’ from the village of Singrobo to Yamoussoukro, the country’s political capital, had opened in December 2013 and the first supplementary section was renovated at a cost of CFAfr 35 bn, which was provided by local donors. Another major project, the Abidjan-Bassam Highway, was completed after 30 months of construction. It was financed (CFAfr 63 bn) by the btp China Machinery Engineering Corporation and the Ivorian state. Two major bridges were built: the so-called ‘third bridge’ or Henri Konan Bédié Bridge, built at a cost of CFAfr 125 bn, opened in Abidjan in December, and Marahoué Bridge, located in the town of Bouaflé, completed towards the end of the year at a cost of CFAfr 9 bn.

The Ivorian government concluded negotiations with a French-Korean consortium including the Bouygues group, Dongsan Engineering, and Hyundai Rotem Company to build a city train in Abidjan. The asphalting work for the Bouna-Doropo road (91 km) in north-east Côte d’Ivoire was launched in October. This work was projected to cost CFAfr 33.5 bn. Only two out of 12 scheduled drinking water infrastructure projects had secured funding by the end of the year. The government announced a CFAfr 9.4 bn project for the construction of a second national heart centre in Bouaké. Although the building of healthcare facilities was a major government concern, the sector received little investment.

According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015 report, Côte d’Ivoire was among the ten economies that drastically improved their business environment in 2014. However, the country was ranked 147th, which was only a mild improvement (from 158th in 2013). According to ti, Côte d’Ivoire had become slightly less corrupt and was now listed at 115th out of 175 countries with a score of 32 out of 100. After several controversies in 2013 about the procurement of public contracts, the government set up a new system.

In addition, the government took a series of initiatives to reduce social inequalities. For example, salaries for 121,382 out of a total public sector workforce of 153,021 increased by an average of 12%. The increase in the minimum wage would cost the Ivorian state CFAfr 78.9 bn according a statement by the previous minister of public service and administrative reform, Gnamien Konan on 16 January. The government also paid bonuses to health personnel and lowered the cost of fuel.

Despite some economic progress, the hdi ranked Côte d’Ivoire 171st out of 187 countries, reflecting the country’s weak medical and educational systems. According to the World Bank, nearly 50% of the population remained poor. The increase in the minimum wage failed to increase purchasing power, because over 90% of the employed population worked in the informal sector. Furthermore, the state was unable to enforce the implementation of the minimum wage or fight illegal and/or exploitative employment. The unemployment rate remained a major challenge. The official unemployment rate stood at 5.3%, but international estimates put it at 25% or more.

The government’s support for small businesses remained limited. Even though around 15% to 20% of the annual budget was spent on fostering small businesses, the government was heavily criticised for not doing more. The repayment of the national debt accumulated between 2000 and 2010 remained a contested issue. In total, the Ivorian debt stood at CFAfr 784 bn. The state’s failure to service its debt had placed numerous companies, including the national oil and gas company, petroci, under considerable financial strain. For example in October, the frci failed to pay off an estimated CFAfr 20 bn for gas supplied by petroci. In response, petroci looked for cash from financial partners such as the trader Glencore to solve its difficulties.

Following the catastrophic flood of 2013, the government evacuated large parts of the population from Abidjan’s at-risk neighbourhoods such as Attécoubé. At the end of the year, 997 families had been evacuated, a total of 3,623 people. Although these evictions were a positive move because they aimed at saving people’s lives, those displaced complained that they were left without better housing. There was no resettlement scheme in place.