Domestic Politics

While there was considerable relief that the change in government that occurred after the March 2012 election had happened peacefully, there was also considerable uncertainty about how the new government under Tom Thabane would cope. Lesotho had never previously seen a coalition government, and there was concern as to whether what was essentially an alliance of convenience between the three parties would hang together. The Democratic Congress (DC) under former long serving Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, with 48 seats in parliament, remained the largest party, but was faced by a majority patched together by the ABC (30 seats), LCD (26 seats) and BNP (5 seats), with 16 other seats split between nine parties. Lacking any significant ideological differences, the three parties had been brought together by their determination to wrest power from Mosisili, who had been in office for 14 years and had fallen out with the leaders of both the ABC and the LCD (Mothetjoa Metsing) when they had served under him. Given the fluidity of party structures and affiliations, Thabane had sought initially to achieve a careful balance of power between the coalescing parties, the ABC’s 11 seats in cabinet being offset by the LCD’s nine and the BNP’s one. Furthermore, alongside Metsing being appointed deputy prime minister (as well as holding responsibility at the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftainship), Dr Leketekete Ketso of the LCD was appointed to the Ministry of Finance. For the moment, the government looked firm – yet it was widely acknowledged that, if future political differences were to lead to a rapprochement between either of the larger parties and the DC, Lesotho might see another change of government. Unsurprisingly, given the past history of military intervention in political affairs, Prime Minister Thabane also chose to double up as minister of defence, police and national security.

Governments in Lesotho, a country with little control over its own economic destiny and with the large majority of its citizens living in poverty and many lacking access to basic services such as sanitation and electricity, were always likely to run up against disappointed expectations. All parties had made the customary promises about promoting agriculture and industry and tackling poverty and unemployment, and Thabane had vowed to stuff his cabinet with technocrats in order to ensure implementation of his plans. Ultimately, however, he had been forced to appoint a bloated cabinet in order to achieve political balance, with concern for greater efficiency and service delivery taking second place. In any case, with Lesotho’s economic prospects overwhelmingly dependent upon those of South Africa, and with the latter’s economy also in the doldrums, the new government had little room for manoeuvre.

However, what the new government could do was to send out a strong message that it would clamp down on corruption and waste. Within a short space of time, responsibility for oversight of the Directorate on Criminal and Economic Offences (DCEO) had been transferred from direct control by government to control by parliament, a move presented as furthering its independence. A number of high profile actions followed. One was the seizure on 28 February of property from the home of Osman Moosa by the Lesotho Revenue Authority (LRA) because of his failure to pay tax owed as a result of a court order. Moosa had already been convicted of fraud but had recently been confirmed by the High Court as chairperson of the Private Sector Foundation of Lesotho. The LRA also seized control of the premises of his firm, Salkol Trading, an action which Moosa contested. Another move was a clampdown on maladministration of the government pension scheme. The minister of finance claimed in March that civil servants were receiving pensions for at least 6,300 dead people. Money stolen on pretence that claimants were still alive amounted to M (maloti) 26.5 m, while theft of unclaimed pensions amounted to M 6.5 m. In August, ten persons including four Standard Bank officials were arraigned in court for the theft of M 18.5 m after transfers of money from dormant government accounts to various company and individual accounts between October 2011 and April 2012. The government also announced that it would be claiming major damages from Avis Fleet Services, responsible for running the government’s vehicle pool, after a report by a World Bank consultant indicated irregularities in the award of a contract to the firm by the Department of Public Works in 2007. Avis Fleet Services was a subsidiary of Seahlolo Transport Logistics, which was reportedly one-third owned by Principal Secretary for Public Works Lebohang Phooko, and one-third by one of his relatives. In yet another case, Retselisitsoe Khetsi, a former principal secretary for home affairs, was charged with accepting a bribe for facilitating the award of a contract to Nikuv International Projects Ltd to produce Lesotho’s new identification documents and electronic passports.

However, while all such moves were designed to rattle the cages of those feeding unjustly off official largesse, the case with most political implications was that concerning Timothy Thahane, a former minister of finance and one of the most influential and experienced members of cabinet. Thahane had, since assuming responsibility for energy and water affairs, facilitated the go-ahead of Phase II of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, involving the construction of the Polihali Dam and gravity transfer tunnel to the Katse Reservoir, which would therefore have more water to transfer to South Africa via the ‘Muela Hydropower Station in Lesotho. This would significantly increase Lesotho’s electricity generating power, and there were strong hopes that this could be linked to a vast energy storage scheme at Kobong Ha Mallane on the banks of the Katse Reservoir. However, Eskom, South Africa’s government-owned electricity supplier, decided that the Kobong scheme would be uneconomic (given other alternative supply possibilities), and in reality, Thahane had had little option but to go ahead with Phase II without it. Nonetheless, the decision seemed to have poisoned relations between the two major parties within the government, and the prime minister initially removed responsibility for water affairs from Thahane, before subsequently backing down and restoring it. However, on 4 November, Thahane found himself hauled in front of a magistrate to hear charges brought against him by the DCEO, which alleged that when he was minister of finance he had been party to defrauding the government of M 19 m in relation to various agricultural development projects. He was immediately dismissed from the cabinet in a move that rocked cabinet unity. Although his dismissal prompted a cabinet re-shuffle whereby Thabane sought to paper over party differences, some wondered whether the days of the coalition were numbered. Meanwhile, the political temperature had also been raised by the appearance in court of Monyane Moleleki, deputy leader of the DC, who was charged with fraud in a case relating to his earlier period in office as minister of natural resources.

Amidst its economic concerns, the government was faced by serious disarray in the judiciary, where conflict between Chief Justice Mahapela Lehohla and President of the Court of Appeal Michael Radodibedi had severely impacted upon the administration of the courts, where the hearing of cases lagged seriously behind. In January, the prime minister had lamented that the system of law was also seriously undermined by widespread corruption among police and their excessive use of violence. Senior Inspector Lenkoane of the Lithoteng Police Station in Maseru warned the prime minister to be ready to compensate more victims of police torture, because he was going to intensify the torture of suspects. An official spokesperson distanced himself from these remarks, but civil rights organisations staged major protests and called for action to be taken against rogue police.

Foreign Affairs

Lesotho remained crucially dependent upon foreign financial support. In his budget, delivered on 22 February, Finance Minister Ketso indicated that 48% of project capital expenditure would be financed by donor grants (M 1,331 m) and donor loans (M 963 m). The largest recipient ministries would be: Energy, Meteorology and Energy Affairs (M 124 m); Public Works and Transport (M 351 m); Health and Social Welfare (M 429 m); Finance (M 428 m); and Education and Training (M 113 m). Significant donor funding included the 2007 Millennium Challenge Corporation grant of $ 363 m from the USA, provided for the health sector, sanitation, infrastructure projects, and climate change, although this was due to end in September.

Significant efforts were made to firm relationships with traditional aid partners such as the Irish and the British. The latter dispatched Prince Harry to the country to dispense royal charm and goodwill in February. A more unusual linkage was established by Prime Minister Mosisili’s visit to Algeria and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in May, prior to his travelling to Japan to attend the 5th Tokyo International Conference on African Development on 1–3 June.

Dependent upon and surrounded by South Africa as it is, the country’s most significant ties are with the neighbouring Republic. Although relations were ostensibly friendly and collaborative, there were continuing tensions. South Africa had tightened border controls in the lead-up to the 2010 soccer World Cup for security reasons, and these had never been adequately relaxed, resulting in massive congestion at the major crossing points, notably Maseru Bridge. Indeed, matters had been exacerbated by the South African Revenue Service’s demand since November 2012 that importers and exporters declare their transactions electronically, ahead of their arrival. More worrying for Lesotho, along with Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland, was the strong possibility that South Africa would force a renegotiation of SACU. Its arrangements provided for major subsidies to their budgets (about a 70% budget subsidy in the case of Lesotho). With South Africa currently making payments to SACU of R (rand) 48 bn annually, while running up a budget deficit approaching R 150 bn, the Republic appeared increasingly keen to replace SACU with what it euphemistically termed a ‘development community’.

Socio-Economic Developments

In presenting his budget, Dr Ketso sketched out worrying factors that made it unlikely that the government would achieve its goal of raising economic growth towards a sustainable level of 6% per annum. Lesotho expected its lowest income from SACU since 2008; the rand had dropped in value by nearly 10% over 2012, at a time when oil prices were expected to rise; and grain prices were rising, contributing to a higher rate of inflation (which Ketso estimated would rise to 6.9% in 2012/13). The growth rate for 2011/12 was estimated at 5.4%, but was expected to fall to 3.4% for 2012/13, in part because reduced rainfall levels had lowered domestic agricultural production.

The proposed budget for 2013/14, excluding principal repayments for the year, was set at M 14.6 bn (compared with M 13.9 bn in 2012–13), made up of M 9.7 bn recurrent and M 4.8 bn capital expenditure, an increase in the budget of 5.4%. Relating the budget to the government’s National Strategic Development Plan 2012/13–2016/17, Ketso announced the introduction of a new Revenue Management System, and raised concerns about the high level of expenditure on the public service wage bill, which had reached nearly 50% of the recurrent budget. Even so, he announced a 6% rise in public service salaries. However, along with a host of measures to curb rising costs in government and improve fiscal management, he announced an increase in the old age pension from M 350 to M 450 per month, as well as similar improvements in other social benefits. Although this announcement was welcome, social benefits in Lesotho compared poorly with those in South Africa where, even so, recipients continued to struggle to make ends meet.

New minimum wages, involving rises of between 7% and 10% in the private sector were prescribed from 1 October, slightly above the inflation rate of 5.4%. However, even while lamenting financial constraints, the government found enough money to increase salaries substantially for politicians, senior civil servants, judges and parliamentarians. These were backdated to 1 April, and generally ranged between 21% and 35%. MPs were awarded an increase of 31.5%.