Domestic Politics

A foiled coup attempt in April recalled memories of Comoros’ unstable past, with more than 20 coups or coup attempts since independence in 1975, but had no lasting negative effect on the prevailing political situation. On 19–20 April, a total of 16 persons (including seven foreigners, mostly Congolese) were arrested for an alleged attempt to destabilise the country. The evidence that was officially put forward remained rather opaque, and the trial process had not begun by the end of the year. The alleged plot was to assassinate President Ikililou Dhoinine and replace him with Mahmoud Ahmed Abdallah, a son of Comoros’ first president Ahmed Abdallah, who had been murdered in 1989 by the French mercenary Bob Denard. Recruitment and preparations for the plot had allegedly been undertaken in France by Patrick Klein, a notorious mercenary formerly associated with Denard.

The sacking of the transport and communications minister in late June on account of serious corruption charges, and the subsequent public uproar about the wider implications of a financial scandal, obliged Dhoinine to carry out a cabinet reshuffle on 13 July. This was the first change in the government team since the government had taken office in May 2011. Six of the ten cabinet members, including two women, were new, but all three vice presidents kept their positions as representatives of their respective islands, although Vice President Fouad Mohadji (from Mohéli, like the president), lost the important production and energy portfolio and was moved to health since he had on several occasions openly sided with the positions of critics of the government.

During the year, former president Ahmed Abdallah Sambi expressed increasingly sharp criticism of the government’s performance, despite having been personally instrumental in the selection of Dhoinine as his successor in the 2010 presidential election. In mid-February, having returned from a lengthy stay in Dubai after the end of his mandate, Sambi used the occasion of a religious ceremony to make his first public appearance in Moroni, criticising the government before a large audience. It became evident that he wanted to regain influence and was ambitious to return to active politics. A final rupture between the two men then occurred in mid-August when Dhoinine intervened to stop Sambi from holding a public rally on Anjouan, but he was unable to prevent him from making a scathing speech on private premises. Sambi strongly attacked Dhoinine as being responsible for an alleged general regression in the country. He announced the creation of a new party and claimed, “We are on the way to regain power.” On 30 October, Sambi’s party ‘Juwa’ (sun) was officially launched in the presence of prominent politicians such as Vice President Mohadji and Parliamentary Speaker Bourhane Hamidou. Thus it was clear that an important new political alignment was in the making. Sambi announced his intention to run for president in the 2016 elections, although it was not at all clear whether this was constitutionally possible. According to the rotation principle, the next president should come from Ngazidja island (Grande Comore), whereas Sambi originated from Anjouan.

From September onwards, much political attention centred on discussions about the date of the next parliamentary elections (as well as island council elections). According to a ruling of the Constitutional Court (on 12 September), the mandate of the Union National Assembly was to end in April 2014, while other interpretations put the date at April 2015. Irrespective of constitutional ambiguities, the majority of politicians were in favour of extending the assembly’s term from four to five years. Months of controversial discussions finally culminated on 8 November in a meeting of all ‘grands élus’ (top office holders from Union and the islands), where a compromise on the holding of harmonised elections was agreed that satisfied most members of the political class. Elections for three levels of representatives (National Assembly, island councils, local communities) were thus to be held simultaneously in November 2014. The necessary changes to Article 20 of the constitution were then passed in parliament on 20 December, while formal approval still remained to be sought from the majority of island councillors.

Parliamentary discussions about regularising the hitherto unregulated status of political parties led on 21 November to the passage of a new law on political parties, which stipulated clear criteria for their official recognition. This had, however, no immediately noticeable effect on the long-standing fragmentary existence of a multitude of loosely organised political parties and movements that were mostly geared to gathering the supporters of individual politicians. Not surprisingly, this political environment encouraged frequent new alignments and dissensions within the various camps. Overall more than 50 political parties were estimated to exist, although the vast majority were without any real significance. In March, several groups supporting the president re-formed as two new organisations, the ‘Union pour le Développement des Comores’ and the ‘Mouvement pour la Majorité Presidentielle’, while another new grouping, the ‘Alliance pour la Justice et le Développement’, brought together Sambi’s supporters. In September, the pro-government Orange movement was established as a political party and a congress attended by over 4,000 followers elected Mohamed Daoud, aka Kiki, as its president. Subsequent to the evident schism between Dhoinine and Sambi, emerging cracks and internal divisions became apparent in all the major political camps, including the main opposition party, the ‘Convention pour le Renouveau des Comores’.

The familiar inter-island rivalry and that between the Union and island administrations had by no means disappeared, but caused less concrete frictions than in most recent years. Internal conflicts and problems on each of the islands had only limited ramifications for the national political scene. Early in the year, the Mohéli governor, Mohamed Ali Said, was faced by public discontent and low-level unrest and was accused in an open letter to Dhoinine, himself from the island, of bad governance practices. Following a meeting between Dhoinine and the opposition, the situation calmed down, but some tensions remained. In late December, the governor of Ngazidja only narrowly survived a motion of censure in the island council, based on allegations of irregularities and non-respect of laws.

Charges of widespread corruption repeatedly served as a rallying point for opposition forces. In September the Franco-Comorian lawyer Said Larifou, president of the opposition party ‘Rassemblement pour une Initiative de Développement avec la Jeunesse Avertie’, started a comprehensive anti-corruption campaign, detailing a number of specific cases in a complaint memorandum. Particular controversies centred on the shadowy accounting of revenues from the Economic Citizenship Programme (ECP) initiated by Sambi, whereby Comorian passports were offered to foreigners in return for commitments to substantial investments. (The ECP was intended to be targeted mainly at Arabs.) On 12 November, civil society organisations conducted a big public demonstration against corruption and impunity.

Foreign Affairs

The long-standing conflict with France over the status of Mayotte, the archipelago’s fourth island, continued to be a national focus, but without materially jeopardising the delicate relations with Comoros’ former colonial power. Mayotte had become France’s 101st regular département in 2011 and was set to be fully recognised as a peripheral territory of the EU by January 2014. Although all Comorian governments had always insisted that Mayotte remained an integral part of the Comoros under international law, the completion of the integration of Mayotte into the French state had by now been reluctantly accepted as inevitable by most politicians and the general population. Bilateral Comorian-French relations thus continued to be characterised by considerable ambivalences between the Mayotte conflict and Comoros’ traditional substantial dependence on France as a major economic partner and donor. During his first official visit to France, Dhoinine met French President Hollande on 21 June. While there was clearly no progress on the political disagreements, a friendship and cooperation declaration was signed, together with three bilateral agreements on aid and debt relief. The partnership framework document also included a substantial section on security and defence, thus safeguarding continued French support. A new ‘Haut Conseil Paritaire’ was to be established to serve at regular intervals as a dialogue platform. In a speech at the UN General Assembly on 25 September, Dhoinine once again naturally focused on the Mayotte issue, but equally stressed the good relations that existed between Comoros and France. The celebration of the annual ‘Journée Nationale Maore’ on 12 November served to publicly underline the claim to Mayotte, with some agitators even suggesting that someone from Mayotte should be elected as the next president in 2016 in accordance with the inter-island rotation principle.

Otherwise, the government continued to pursue an open-door policy within the very limited scope available to it, and attempted to maintain equally cordial relations with Western powers (particularly France and the USA) and with China, Iran and many Arab countries (particularly Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar), in the expectation of attracting aid or commercial investments from these diverse sources. Most of the quite substantial investments promised at a 2010 investment conference in Doha (Qatar) had, however, so far not materialised. Some new openings were also pursued with Southeast Asian countries. Visits to Moroni by the president of the Pan-Arab parliament in May and by the Iranian foreign minister in July underscored the priority given to existing links with the Middle East. In January, Dhoinine attended the 3rd Arab Economic Summit in Riad, and his mid-December official visit to the Sultanate of Oman also served to widen the spectrum of Comoros’ friendly Arab donors. Also in December, he participated in the summit on African peace and security in Paris. In August, a trade agreement was signed with Vietnam over rice imports of 60,000 tonnes per year, which provided an assuring element of food security, rice being the second-largest import after petroleum.

In January, Comoros assumed the annually rotating chairmanship of the IOC from Seychelles and held a number of senior officials’ meetings during the year in Moroni.

Socioeconomic Developments

The year opened with unusually optimistic prospects for the economy in the wake of the mid-December 2012 declaration of the IMF and the World Bank that Comoros had at last reached the long-awaited completion point under the HIPC initiative, making it eligible for comprehensive debt relief under both HIPC and the MDRI. This had marked the end of the country’s HIPC process, which had only started in June 2010 with the attainment of the decision point. As the 35th country to have reached the completion point, Comoros was very much a latecomer compared with other countries, since necessary reforms and adjustments of economic policies had been neglected for many years as a result of recurrent political turbulence. The expected significant easing of the future debt burden offered the prospect of allowing more room for genuine development-oriented efforts and investment on the part of the government. In February, further debt cancellations were authorised by the AfDB and cancellations of debts amounting to $ 8 m were arranged with creditors of the Paris Club. The Islamic Development Bank and Kuwait also followed suit with debt cancellations in June. Despite these significant measures, the IMF still judged that the country remained vulnerable to renewed debt distress.

IMF missions in March and September performed the fifth and sixth (final) reviews of the three-year ECF ($ 13.5 m) approved in September 2009 and later extended to December 2013. It was expected that a new ECF would be arranged in 2014. Upon completion of the current ECF, the IMF commended the government for significant progress in stabilising the economy and implementing the IMF-supported adjustment programme. All but one of the agreed performance criteria and all indicative targets had been met. The main macroeconomic objectives had been achieved, growth with low inflation had been sustained, and the fiscal situation had strengthened. This positive assessment was a testimony to the Dhoinine government’s generally satisfactory economic performance, in stark contrast to most of the recent past. Difficult structural reforms, particularly with respect to restructuring key public utility companies and the bloated civil service, had, however, still not brought any lasting results.

Preliminary statistical data for 2013 confirmed a stabilised moderate macroeconomic performance, but were still quite far from portraying a dynamic surge in the economy. The GDP growth rate was projected to have slightly increased to 3.5%, moderately better than in 2012 (3.0%), but noticeably higher than earlier annual averages of around only 1%. A clear, although modest, acceleration in the growth of the economy seemed to be underway. The average inflation rate for the year of under 3% (compared with 6.3% in 2012) was largely due to the restraining effect of membership of the franc zone, whereby the Franc Comorien (FrC) remained pegged to the Euro and supported by France (at FrC 492:€ 1). Substantial remittances from the large Comorian diaspora (contributing over 20% of GDP) and inflows of aid revenue remained essential to counterbalance the traditional enormous structural trade deficit. Estimated export revenues of around $ 20 m (practically all from cloves, vanilla and ylang-ylang) covered just one-tenth of the estimated import bill of $ 208 m, due largely to the country’s heavy dependence on importing food staples. The current-account deficit was projected to widen to 8.7% of GDP, while foreign exchange reserves experienced a small drop, but continued to provide a comfortable safety cushion of over six months import coverage.

Despite progress in revenue administration and tax collection, the fiscal performance weakened somewhat during the latter half of the year, largely as a result of the temporary suspension of inflows from the ECP. Some public investments had been launched in anticipation of expected external funding, which did not materialise. Early in the year, some budget support funds were obtained from the AfDB and the World Bank. Public sector salaries were regularly paid, in contrast with the past, when salary arrears of several months were sometimes experienced. This improvement avoided the recurrence of frequent strikes, which had formerly been common. In late December, parliament approved the new budget for 2014, which envisaged a small fiscal surplus on the optimistic assumption that revenues would be obtained from the envisaged privatisation of some parastatals. An evaluation of the PRSP for the period 2010–14 revealed that most MDG objectives had not been achieved and that there had been no noticeable reduction in poverty. Work started on the preparation of a new poverty reduction and growth strategy document.

Demands for a fundamental reform or privatisation of notoriously badly managed parastatal companies, particularly key public utilities (electricity, water and telecoms) had for years been a prominent item on the IMF and the World Bank’s agenda in debt relief discussions, but little progress had been made because of resistance from powerful local vested interests. Recurring power and water crises were a constant burden in the daily life of the population and for the economy. Again no substantial progress was made during the year towards solid improvement of the situation. In September, grants were obtained from the AfDB and the World Bank to shore up the commercial management and financial performance of Ma-Mwe, the ailing power and water company. An attempt in 2012 to bring in a competent foreign partner to take charge of the company had failed due to conflicts between various political interests. The external funds were now intended to restructure Ma-Mwe, which was to keep its present parastatal status. Privatisation was generally hampered by the low level of interest on the part of potential external investors, who did not see much promise in the Comorian economy. In October, in a sequence of rapid management changes, the notoriously loss-making oil importer and distributor, ‘Société Comorienne des Hydrocarbures’, had a retired colonel appointed as its new director, supposedly in the expectation that he would execute tough reform measures. The much delayed planned privatisation of ‘Comores Télécom’ once again encountered severe resistance from politicians and trade unions, who feared the inevitable loss of up to 1,000 jobs. The government envisaged a formula of 51% of ownership going to a private investor, 34% to the government and 15% to the staff. This plan was expected to be approved by parliament in late December, but in view of persisting public anxieties MPs demanded social guarantees and refused to vote on the relevant bill. The issue thus remained in limbo, with the government now planning to license a second telecoms operator to bring in an element of competition.

Hopes for success in oil and gas exploration in Comoros’ extensive coastal waters were also dashed. Expectations had risen following substantial recent finds along the East African coast and Sambi made unsubstantiated claims in February that Comoros’ gas reserves might be bigger than Qatar’s. A first exploration licence had been awarded to a Kenya-based company in 2012, but there was continued intense quarrelling between two vice presidents over the responsibility for awarding licences. A parliamentary debate in late December on production-sharing contracts with foreign companies that had been drafted was suspended because it was blocked by some MPs. In actual fact, no exploration had begun by the year’s end.