European Reactions to Crises in Mali, the CAR and South Sudan

French attacks on Malian rebels who had taken control of the north of the country began on 11 January, following an appeal for help from the Malian government to the former colonial power after rebel forces advanced on the important regional town of Mopti. French fighter jets and helicopters stopped the rebel advance and attacked bases behind the front line in Aghabo, Douentza, Gao, Kidal and Lere. France also deployed around 500 troops in the capital city, Bamako, to protect the 6,000 French citizens living there. One French helicopter pilot died in the operation, codenamed ‘Serval’, the name of a sub-Saharan wildcat. Other EU member states provided logistical support to the French intervention. The UK lent two cargo planes to fly armoured vehicles from France to Mali, but the British government was quick to announce that its soldiers would not take part in the fighting.

While generally recognising the need to intervene, the European press was wary of the risks of such a military operation. French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said that France had been forced to take action by the prospect that a terrorist state would be created near Europe and France, but several commentators pointed out that the intervention might actually increase the terrorist threat if radical Islamists could successfully spin the narrative as an attack on Islam. A rebel commander in Gao told US news agency Associated Press that “no French person can feel safe anywhere in the world” following the attacks. Later in the year, two journalists from Radio France Internationale were kidnapped and murdered in Kidal, northern Mali. French newspapers warned that, although Malians, exhausted by the rebel conflict, may have been glad of France’s intervention, their welcome would quickly wear thin if France’s behaviour in any way resembled neo-colonialism. Some commentators pointed out that France’s reasons for intervening were unlikely to have been purely altruistic. France’s interests in stability in Mali and the rest of the Sahel region were linked to its own interests in securing resources, especially oil and uranium, which French energy company Areva was mining in neighbouring Niger. One UK newspaper found it disturbing that UK Prime Minister David Cameron involved Britain in Mali’s conflict without consultation, and warned of the possibility of ‘mission creep’, which might trigger deeper British involvement. Another widely discussed reaction was that, although the Islamist rebels were clearly the bad guys, the Malian government in Bamako was not exactly known for its human-rights-loving democratic credentials.

In part to downplay accusations of neo-colonialism, France did not want to be seen to be acting alone in Mali. The UNSC approved the military intervention, and the EU promised to train Malian soldiers through its European Union Training Mission (EUTM) to Mali. France also called for a multilateral intervention from African countries, involving African troops. These signals of support from Brussels, other European capitals, and from African countries, were very important for legitimising France’s intervention. Not all French voices agreed: a senior French military officer said France was better off without NATO or EU help to “reconquer” northern Mali, because cumbersome decision-making procedures, half-hearted commitment and incompetence would limit France’s freedom of action and the efficiency of the military operations. But he recommended that French soldiers pull back after prevailing in the initial assault and let African soldiers, especially desert specialists from Chad, take over the long-term campaign to drive jihadists out of the Sahel region’s vast deserts.

The sudden escalation of the Malian crisis caught many Europeans by surprise. Former European Commission president, Romano Prodi, was in Bamako on 10 January when rebel forces surged towards the capital. He recalled that he had been at a meeting at 1pm to discuss the country’s future, upcoming elections and governance and that, shortly afterwards, he was told that the Malian army had fallen into disarray and the government had asked France to intervene. “Three hours later,” he told an interviewer, “the [French] decision was taken and I don’t think anybody [at UN-level or EU-level] was consulted.” The crisis kick-started regional and EU-level plans to build and train an international force to recapture rebel-held areas. Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Togo quickly pledged to send 500 troops each to help Mali’s war effort and Algeria allowed French jets to use its airspace. EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Catherine Ashton announced that the EU would accelerate preparations for the deployment of a military training mission to Mali. On 17 January, the EU Foreign Affairs Council met in an extraordinary session to discuss events in Mali. It announced that it had decided to allocate € 50 m from the African Peace Facility to support the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali. The Council’s extraordinary session also resulted in the establishment of the already-planned EUTM to Mali. The mission, commanded by French General François Lecointre, was launched on 18 February, with a commitment to provide around 500 European military personnel.

On 15 May, the EU hosted the ‘Together for a New Mali’ international donor conference in Brussels. Participants included 13 heads of state and government, delegations from 108 countries and international institutions, and several ministers of foreign affairs, together with representatives of local authorities, civil society, the Malian diaspora and the private sector. The Malian government presented its Sustainable Recovery Plan for 2013–2014 and requested the support of the international community in financing it. Donors duly pledged € 3.25 bn for Mali over the following two years for priority areas including governance, regional cooperation, the private sector (which was expected to take on the burden of developing infrastructure and the agricultural sector), social sectors and inclusivity. The EU institutions pledged € 520 m, which Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said would help Mali become “stable, democratic and prosperous” and would benefit Europe as well as Africa. The German government promised a further € 100 m on condition that Mali’s political leaders continue on the way to the return of credible democracy. The EU council also stressed the importance of re-starting political dialogue with the Malian government under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement.

Central African Republic

Europeans kept a close watch on the turmoil in the CAR throughout the year following the overthrow of President François Bozizé in March. The EU expressed its deep concern at the turn of events on 5 December, when widespread violence caused heavy civilian casualties and a dramatic worsening of the humanitarian situation. EU leaders noted the risk posed by the CAR conflict to neighbouring countries and commended the rapid deployment by the AU of the International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA), supported by France’s Operation Sangaris in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2127. France stepped up its troop deployment to 1,600 in a bid to disarm the rival Christian and Muslim militias. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said that Europe should pay more of the costs related to the military mission. EU development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs responded by allocating € 50 m from the African Peace Facility to support the African-led International MISCA mission, a force of about 4,800 soldiers. EU emergency relief aid also increased to € 76 m over the year, € 39 m of which was humanitarian aid. € 23 m was mobilised in December in response to the crisis and the EU organised several airlifts of relief material and personnel into the country.

In announcing the French troop increase, French President François Hollande said that the CAR operation did not “have the vocation to last long” and that it would be smaller than the one in Mali in January. As in the case of in Mali, Hollande was quick to reject suggestions that French-owned uranium mines in the resource-rich country had anything to do with his decision, insisting that he had “no other objective than to save human lives” and to “show solidarity with a small country, a friendly country, the poorest in the world, who is asking for our help”. The US State Department welcomed France’s decision amid reports of the murder of civilians throughout the country.

South Sudan

From an outside perspective it appeared that South Sudan’s year followed a similar pattern to the CAR’s, in that simmering tension boiled over into widespread violence in December. European concerns were, however, focused more on South Sudan’s international relations than on its domestic travails. In June, High Representative Ashton expressed the EU’s concerns at the Sudanese government’s announcement that it would shut down oil exports from South Sudan through Port Sudan, and freeze the nine cooperation agreements with the government of South Sudan signed in Addis Ababa in September 2012. The oil shutdown was seen as resulting from a spat between elites in the two countries’ ruling parties, and Ashton urged both sides to prioritise the interests of their citizens by pursuing mutually beneficial relations between the two states.

In December, it became clear that some senior figures in the South Sudan government were more concerned with internal politicking than with the country’s development. The violence that started on 15 December received extensive media coverage in Europe, but muted official reaction from Europe’s political leadership, despite concerns that it could lead to a full-scale civil war. Germany’s new Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier warned that the conflict must not spread to the rest of the country. On 20 December, the EU Delegation in Juba issued a statement together with the heads of mission of the EU member state embassies and of Switzerland and Norway. The Delegation condemned the violence and appealed to all parties to use the good offices of IGAD and the AU to resolve the conflict. It called on the South Sudan government to release arrested politicians so that they could participate in a peaceful settlement.

The EU Commission’s focus turned from long-term development programming to providing short-term emergency relief. It announced that it would make an extra € 50 m available for responding to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, bringing total EU aid for South Sudan in 2013–14 to € 259 m. The extra emergency aid included assistance for IDPs, refugees, local host communities and returnees. Many aid workers were evacuated during the Christmas period, but the Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department, DG ECHO, sent humanitarian experts to liaise with partner organisations in South Sudan on how best to contribute. At the diplomatic level, special envoys from the EU supported IGAD in attempting to broker talks between key leaders in the crisis.

A ‘Joined up’ European Crisis Response?

Cracks in the EU’s unanimity with regard to African crises had started to appear by year’s end. In mid-December, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told the European Council that the EU would not provide funding for French military missions in Africa. French President Hollande’s request for a joint fund to support military operations conducted by individual states was declined by the other 27 EU members, who decided only to “rapidly examine” the ways in which European-led military operations were financed. Merkel’s statement implied that the decision was based on France’s propensity to launch interventions without consulting other EU members.

The Lampedusa Tragedy

The number of sub-Saharan Africans attempting to cross the Mediterranean continued to grow. Every week, hundreds of people risked their lives to try to enter the EU in unseaworthy boats. July saw 1,500 arrivals in Malta, a new monthly record. For those who reached Europe, life was extremely precarious – most boat people ended up being deported back to their country of origin, while those who escaped from detention centres and refugee camps condemned themselves to a life of homelessness and vulnerability on the edges of society.

Many did not make it safely across the sea. On 3 October, 359 people – mostly citizens of Somalia and Eritrea – died when a migrant ship caught fire and sank off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa. Europe’s political leadership equivocated on the issue. Pope Francis prayed for the victims of the latest tragedy and paid homage to the desperate people who risked their lives by leaving Africa for Europe. European Parliament President Martin Schulz called for more channels of legal immigration to be opened. The Italian and Maltese governments called for the rest of Europe to step up and help them process migrants. The EU Commission pointed out how complicated it would be to decide which country migrants should go to and how the numbers should be fairly allocated.

The disinterested response to the tragedy by African leaders attracted criticism from some African news sites. Jean-Baptiste Natama, a senior AUC official, expressed the AU’s sincere condolences to victims’ families on 7 October and stressed the AU’s intention to work with international partners on solutions to prevent such tragedies. He called on AU member states to create opportunities for young people to find decent jobs in their home countries. African heads of state and government eventually declared 3 November a continent-wide day of mourning and the AU advised member states to fly their flags at half mast.

In the wake of the Lampedusa tragedy, some EU leaders reacted by calling for aid to be targeted at African countries that were major sources of illegal immigration. French President Hollande said in October that he would propose a policy based on “prevention, solidarity and protection”, better cooperation with countries of origin and a more active Euro-Mediterranean policy. Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta said the EU response should include a re-launch of development cooperation, with more attention given to countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia. UK Prime Minister Cameron spoke of the need to “invest” in countries “before they get broken” instead of dealing with immigration problems later. The EU Commission agreed that there was a link between giving aid and containing migratory flows but insisted that the two policy areas had different rationales, especially as the MDGs did not mention migration.

AU-EU Relations and the Future of the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy

In May, EU Commission President Barroso congratulated the AU on its 50th anniversary at the celebrations held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Barroso reaffirmed the EU’s support for the intercontinental partnership under the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy (JAES). For the rest of the year EU-AU relations were dominated by discussions over the future of the partnership amid questionable commitment on both sides. In April, the AU and the EU jointly published a statement reaffirming their vows, entitled ‘2 Unions, 1 Vision’. The document outlined some of the challenges facing the relationship in a rapidly changing global geopolitical setting, and called on member governments on both sides to commit fully to the partnership. Readers were reminded of successes in all of the eight JAES partnerships and called for the JAES to become more visible and better at outreach. The document also contained more information about the Commission’s proposal for the ‘pan-African Programme’ for financing the JAES under the next EU budget for 2014–20. It was noted that the AU had embarked upon the definition of its own policy agenda and the reappraisal of its relationships with strategic partners, including the EU. Significantly for the future of the JAES, the statement pointed out that these crucial processes would call for a “refocusing” of the Africa-EU Partnership in the coming years.

The European External Action Service and EU member state governments discussed reducing the number of partnerships in the JAES from eight to three, focusing on peace and democracy, sustainable growth and ‘global issues’. The proposal was discussed on the African side at a brainstorming meeting held in Zanzibar, Tanzania, in June. Participants included representatives from 15 AU member states, the chefs de file for each thematic partnership, representatives from the various AU organs (the Panafrican Parliament, the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights, NEPAD and the AU’s Brussels office), the RECs and other stakeholders including UNECA and the AfDB. The meeting helped prepare African positions ahead of a joint brainstorming in mid-September and the AU-EU Joint Task Force meeting in late October, both held in Brussels. The AU Commission for its part proposed five priorities: peace and security, democracy and governance, regional integration, sustainable and inclusive development, and the development of human capital.

The end results of these meetings were inconclusive, with both sides reaffirming the value and potential of the JEAS for structuring inter-continental relations, but at the same time noting that they were not very happy with how things had worked out thus far. Some key weaknesses of the partnership were not addressed head on, most notably the lack of member state political will to make it work. Participants agreed that future cooperation should focus on results in areas such as continued security cooperation (including surveillance of criminal and terrorist groups in the Sahel region), economic partnership, investment aimed at easing Africa’s youth unemployment crisis, and the development of markets. It was agreed that work would continue on defining exactly what these results might be, and how they might benefit the lives of ordinary citizens of both continents, in the run-up to the AU-EU Summit scheduled for April 2014.

Death of Nelson Mandela

The news of Nelson Mandela’s death was received in Europe with the dignity befitting a man of his stature. European leaders universally praised his leadership, vision, humility and determination to live up to the values he espoused. EU institutions flew their flags at half mast, and European leaders hurried to South Africa to attend Mandela’s funeral. EU High Representative Ashton said in a statement that Mandela had provided an inspiration for democrats on all continents, including Europe, by showing that the moral force of democracy could triumph even in the face of the most brutal opposition. Nevertheless, a tinge of hypocrisy that was evident in some statements did not go unnoticed: upon Mandela’s death, UK Prime Minister Cameron tweeted: “A great light has gone out in the world. Nelson Mandela was a hero of our time.” This was somewhat different from the position taken in the 1980s by Cameron’s predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, who once described the ANC “as a typical terrorist organisation”.

European Reactions to African Elections

Following the Kenyan elections held on 4 March, European governments were silent on how they would work with the new government headed by President Uhuru Kenyatta. Britain and the EU praised Kenyans for holding peaceful elections but avoided naming Kenyatta and only offered blanket congratulations to all those elected. The head of the EU observer mission, Alojz Peterle, said Kenya had demonstrated “impressive commitment to democratic elections”. When Prime Minister Raila Odinga contested the results at the Kenyan Supreme Court, High Representative Ashton cautiously called upon Kenyans to respect the rule of law. Kenyatta’s Jubilee Coalition accused the British high commissioner in Kenya of “canvassing to have rejected votes tallied”, an accusation the UK Foreign Office described as “entirely false and misleading”. Other partners were less reluctant to accept the outcome. The Chinese government extended its congratulations to Kenyatta for winning the elections and praised Kenyans for voting peacefully, as did South African President Jacob Zuma. The ICC in The Hague postponed Kenyatta’s trial on charges of crimes against humanity.

The European Union “took note” of the results of Zimbabwe’s elections, held on 31 July, but did not congratulate Robert Mugabe on his election victory. High Representative Ashton expressed the EU’s concern about alleged irregularities, but the EU nevertheless decided to respect the assessments of the SADC and AU observers. The EU congratulated the people of Zimbabwe on a peaceful poll and for turning out in high numbers. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle was very critical of the lack of transparency in Zimbabwe’s presidential elections, which he predicted would cast a long shadow over the country’s political and economic future. Germany joined UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in calling for a comprehensive investigation into allegations of manipulation and voter exclusion.

The heavy European investment in stabilising Mali extended to the troubled country’s democratic process. Former EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel headed the EU’s observer mission for Mali’s presidential election in August and parliamentary elections held on 24 November and 15 December. He said that all of the polls had met international standards for democratic elections. High Representative Ashton called on all candidates and parties involved to accept the verdict of the ballot box. Former federal president Horst Köhler represented Germany at President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s inauguration ceremony in September, and German Chancellor Merkel invited the new Malian president to Berlin soon afterwards. For his part, President Keïta declared Germany to be “Mali’s most important partner in the world”, a statement that was no doubt less than popular in Paris.

Peace and Security Cooperation

Aside from the crisis responses discussed above, peace and security cooperation revolved around instability in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes area and the Sahel, and on the threat posed by piracy to European and African shipping in Africa’s coastal waters and sea lanes. The major continental-level peace and security meeting took place in Addis Ababa on 11 June, when the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee held their 6th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting. Discussions focused on the security situation in Mali, Guinea Bissau, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, the DRC and the CAR, as well as the regional implications for the Sahel, Great Lakes and Horn sub-regions. The international campaign to eliminate the Lord’s Resistance Army was also on the agenda, as was ongoing cooperation in a number of peace-building operations, especially the AU Mission to Somalia.

Sahel

EU-Africa cooperation in addressing the regional implications of conflicts in Sahel countries was pushed to a new level by the Mali crisis. European leaders issued several statements during the year underlining the importance of stability in the Sahel and reiterating Europe’s commitment to supporting Mali’s neighbouring states’ security and development under the aegis of the EU’s Sahel Strategy. Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn accused the Mali rebels of atrocities against women and children, and raised the spectre of terrorists “creating hell on earth for people” in Niger and Mauritania as well. On 17 January, EU foreign ministers held a crisis meeting after 41 foreigners – mostly Europeans, Japanese and Americans – were taken hostage at the British-Norwegian In Amenas gas plant in Algeria. The hostage takers claimed that their attack on the gas plant was in retaliation for France’s intervention in Mali. The actions of the Algerian security services in ending the bloody hostage crisis received only muted criticism in Europe, even though several hostages were killed.

The EU took several steps to strengthen its Sahel strategy during the year. On 18 March, the EU Council appointed former French ambassador to Mali and Chad Michel Reveyrand-de Menthon as EU Special Representative for the Sahel. Reveyrand-de-Menthon’s mandate was to lead the EU’s diplomatic contribution to regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace in the Sahel. He was also asked to coordinate the EU’s comprehensive approach to the regional implications of the Mali crisis. Also in March, the EU launched a new project to fight organised crime and money laundering in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Cape Verde. The project, funded by the EU’s Instrument for Stability, aimed to increase regional cooperation between countries on the ‘Cocaine route’ used by South American drug cartels to ship drugs to Europe, which runs through the Sahel. Also targeting organised crime, the EU Capacity Building (EUCAP) Sahel mission in Niger stepped up its activities during the year, especially regarding building the capacity of regional governments’ security agencies to collect and share intelligence on the activities of organised criminal networks and terrorist groups. In November, the EU announced that it was reinforcing its support for the Sahel for the years to come. Development Commissioner Piebalgs visited the region as part of a delegation with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, AU Commission Chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and AfDB President Donald Kaberuka. Piebalgs offered around € 5 bn, allocated from the 11th EDF for 2014–20 to help the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad tackle some of the complex challenges of the Sahel region, especially security, stability, governance and economic development.

Horn of Africa

The EU’s Horn of Africa strategy received a lot of praise during the year for reflecting an approach to the regional dimensions of conflict that addressed complex issues in a sensitive way. In January, the EU Parliament passed a resolution welcoming the Horn of Africa strategy and its comprehensive approach based on tackling security and stability concerns. The UK Parliament complimented EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, Greek diplomat Alexander Rondos, for his “creditable performance”. The implementation of the Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience initiative, aimed at improving the region’s food security, was stepped up with the announcement that the EU would provide € 50 m to build resilience to drought in southern and eastern Ethiopia.

The focus of the major EU security mission in the region, EUTM Somalia, changed as its mandate was extended until March 2015. During the year, attention turned to training the trainers. Some older, more experienced Somalian soldiers returned for a second time to the training camp at Bihanga in Uganda. The Bihanga camp was handed back to the Ugandan army in December, and EUTM Somalia was transferred from Uganda to a new camp near Mogadishu, due to open in early 2014. Italian Brigadier-General Massimo Mingiardi was appointed EUTM Somalia’s new mission commander.

The UK also returned to Somalia. Foreign Secretary William Hague opened a new British embassy near Mogadishu airport, restoring British diplomatic presence in Somalia for the first time since 1991. The UK was the first EU member state to reopen an embassy in the country since the Somalian Federal Government was established in 2012. Hague said that the embassy was testament to the close ties between the UK and the Somalian government, with which he promised to continue to work on shared priorities including conflict resolution, counter terrorism, piracy, humanitarian assistance, and promoting UK interests in Somalia.

The security of foreigners living and working in Africa came under the spotlight following the 21 September Nairobi shopping mall gun battle, in which 59 people were killed and another 175 wounded. Five British citizens were among the dead. European foreign ministries condemned the attack but offered only rhetorical support to the Kenyan authorities in dealing with the situation. High Representative Ashton said that the EU was “willing to do our utmost to help prevent such attacks happening in the future”, but this stopped short of concrete offers to help track the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The ambiguity was not altogether surprising once Somalian opposition group al-Shabab claimed responsibility for the attack, making it clear that this was no isolated incident and that bringing the perpetrators to justice would not be easy.

Piracy

Piracy continued to be a key area of mutual interest for Europe and Africa. On 10 January, a new EU initiative to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea was launched. The Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme initiative focused on boosting the security and the safety of shipping routes among seven African countries (Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Sâo Tomé and Príncipe and Togo) by training coastguards and establishing an information-sharing network between countries and agencies across the region. The European interest was clear: the Gulf of Guinea accounted for 13% of oil and 6% of gas imports to the EU. From the African perspective, the threats posed on several levels by piracy and related trade in drugs, guns and human beings, were also seen as strong reasons to support the EU initiative.

The EU Naval Force ‘Atalanta’ anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden continued during the year. Several observers commended the operation’s success after four years of naval deployment. In December, the US Office of Naval Intelligence reported that only nine vessels had been attacked by pirates during the year, with no successful hijackings. In May, the German Bundestag approved the government’s request to extend the mission for a further 12 months.

The Atalanta mission was complemented by the EU’s maritime security capacity building mission, EUCAP Nestor. Nestor was directed towards improving the capacity of the countries of the Horn region to prevent piracy in their own waters. The missions came together in an interesting way in December, when Atalanta’s French flagship, FS Siroco, hosted a meeting with senior Somaliland officials, including Vice President Abdirahman Abdallahi Ismail Saylici. The representatives of a country whose sovereignty no EU member state had recognised were welcomed on board. The official EU press release commended Somaliland for its important role in countering piracy and strengthening regional maritime security by deterring pirates’ activities on land. The event took place at sea off the coast of Berbera, Somaliland, and was an opportunity to highlight the complementary work of the two EU missions and how they worked together with regional actors to help strengthen security and local capacities.

Economic Development in Africa

Several high-profile events focussing on Africa’s economic development took place during the year. The overarching structure for EU support for development in Africa, the financial protocol of the Cotonou Agreement, was adopted on 28 May by the EU Foreign Affairs Council. The protocol allocated a total of € 31.5 bn in development aid to ACP states for the 2014–20 period, most of which would go to bilateral programmes with sub-Saharan African countries. High Representative Ashton and Development Commissioner Piebalgs issued a joint statement following the adoption of the protocol, which re-iterated the EU’s commitment to development cooperation. They pointed out that their efforts were backed by European public opinion: a Eurobarometer survey from late 2012 revealed that help for developing countries was supported by 85% of EU citizens. They also promised greater impact and better results from aid programmes through better targeting of resources at the poorest countries and at fewer sectors per country. The intention to focus on results was further confirmed by the EU Commission’s adoption in July of a policy paper proposing that all types of development aid in the post-2015 period be considered as “a whole”, with resources streamlined according to well-defined policy objectives.

After many years of deadlock, progress on EPA negotiations was finally made. The EU-West Africa EPA negotiations resumed after the Dakar ECOWAS Summit on 25 October. EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht predicted that the EU would be able to finalise a trade agreement with ECOWAS in three months’ time. Negotiations had previously broken down amid disagreement over the speed at which West African nations were willing to open their markets and lift tariff barriers. The EPAs required sweeping liberalisation of African markets, a stipulation that reminded many Africans of the World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes that had had destructive effects on African economies in the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, ECOWAS heads of state agreed in October to implement a single customs tariff regime from 2015, allowing talks with the EU to restart.

Sustainable Development, Infrastructure and Energy

On 25–26 June, the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh hosted the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Africa (GMES & Africa) workshop on Long-Term Management of Natural Resources. Under the EU-Africa Partnership, the decision was made to formulate an Action Plan for enhancing the use of earth observation. The JAES Support Mechanism had contributed to the process by facilitating the development of priority chapters decided by African and EU stakeholders. A consultation platform was launched through a series of three thematic workshops, including one on long-term natural resources management in Egypt. Marine and coastal areas and water resources management were addressed in two other workshops held in Mombasa, Kenya, and Abuja, Nigeria. In October, South Africa hosted the final discussions on the Action Plan, to draw recommendations for the future of GMES & Africa that could be presented at the Africa-EU Summit in Brussels in April 2014.

The fifth special session of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment was held on 17–18 October in Gaborone, Botswana, under the aegis of the AU and was attended by European Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard. She called for strengthened cooperation between Europe and Africa to combat climate change. The ministerial session in Gaborone took stock of progress in Africa’s preparations for the 19th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 19), held in Warsaw, Poland, in November. The EU and several member states pledged € 5.5 bn in “fast start financing” to meet the urgent needs of the most vulnerable countries in facing climate change, an increase on the previous two years. Participants agreed that, in addition to financial questions, the post-Kyoto Protocol agreement should impose new obligations for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The 5th Steering Committee of the JAES Partnership on Infrastructure took place in Brussels on 28 October with participants from the AU Commission, RECs, EU member states, the AfDB, and EU Commission services. The purpose of the meeting was to take stock of achievements in infrastructure-related areas under the various thematic partnerships and to work out ways of increasing the impact of the Partnership through better coordination mechanisms.

Strategic sector papers on transport, information and communication technology, energy and transboundary water were presented by officials of the two Commissions, highlighting the major developments and strategic issues in each area. It was noted that the rolling out of the Programme for Infrastructure for Africa had started to gather momentum, especially on engagement with private sector players, whose participation was acknowledged by all parties to be key to achieving infrastructure goals in Africa. The EU Commission reported on the progress made on the establishment of financing instruments aimed at subsidising private sector involvement in infrastructure development ventures, especially in the energy sector. The meeting concluded that interventions in the main infrastructure sectors needed to be pursued and up-scaled.

The EU-Africa Chamber of Commerce held a high level conference on sustainable energy in Africa, in the context of the JAES Africa-EU partnership on energy, in Brussels on 27 June. The conference was part of the sustainable energy week organised by the EU Commission. Development Commissioner Piebalgs – who was the EU’s energy commissioner prior to taking over the EU’s Development Directorate-General in 2010, pointed out some challenges related to investment in the African energy sector, notably the risk posed by political instability. A related challenge was the cost of borrowing, money, an important constraint to investment in Africa. Other observers expressed rather different concerns about European investments in the African energy sector. In August, a World Wildlife Fund report warned that Africa’s oldest national park, the Virunga National Park in the DRC, was in danger of environmental destruction because of European oil concessions.

In February, Germany and South Africa agreed to set up an energy partnership focused on expanding renewable energy development and increasing energy efficiency in South Africa. They also agreed to cooperate on energy research, including research into carbon capture and storage technologies. This bilateral energy partnership built on prior agreements and placed emphasis on the promotion of private sector activity. As part of the agreement, Germany sent a delegation of representatives from German solar panel companies to Johannesburg to meet with South African partner companies.

The EU Commission also pushed harder for public-private collaboration by seeking the closer involvement of development banks in financing larger projects, especially in the capital-intensive energy and transport sectors. An example of this kind of cooperation was the EU’s offer of € 100 m in regional funding for what it called a “ground-breaking” infrastructure programme at the EU-South Africa summit held in Pretoria, South Africa, in July. The EU money was parcelled in loans for technical project assistance and direct grants to co-finance infrastructure projects in the energy, transport and trade sectors. The intention of the Infrastructure Investment Programme for South Africa was to leverage investments from financial institutions including the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the European Investment Bank, Germany’s ‘Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau’ finance bank, and the French development agency.

Africa’s attractiveness to international investors continued to improve due to expanding consumer markets, various structural reforms and economic growth. The increased interest on the part of European companies in investment in Africa was driven by two major factors: more risks in Europe as the economy declined, and the strong interest of small and medium-sized enterprises in investing in Africa for the higher returns on offer.