Domestic Politics

Latent political tensions persisted throughout the year. The widespread civilian and military unrest that followed the killing of student Justin Zongo in Koudougou by police in February 2011 still strongly permeated the political atmosphere, though without escalating into large-scale protest. In this calm after the storm, many indicators suggested that the underlying causes of the initial protests had not been resolved.

As an immediate consequence of the behaviour of security forces in 2011, more than 170 police officers and 566 soldiers were punished or prosecuted. Four policemen were taken to court over the killing of Justin Zongo and the minister of the interior dismissed 136 for mutiny. The government appointed Roger Zongo as new head of the national police in place of Paul Sondo. Military tribunals were packed, dealing with some 300 cases of mutiny. President Blaise Compaoré retained direct control of the Ministry of Defence. These short-term measures were intended to demonstrate the state’s ability to act and restore order. The government further reinforced subsidies and initiated institutional reforms.

The ‘Conseil Consultatif sur les Réformes Politiques’ (CCRP) proposed several modifications to the constitution. The smooth translation of these proposals into law on 11 June was hardly surprising, given the dominance of the ruling ‘Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès’ (CDP) in the CCRP, the government and the legislature. The so-called radical opposition – those political parties that refused collaboration with the presidential movement – boycotted the CCRP and, consequently, abstained from the parliamentary vote, so appraisal of the reforms was ambivalent. The constitutional amendments appeared at first glance to be extensive, with more than 60 articles modified. However, the vast majority of changes were linked to the introduction of a senate, which necessitated numerous editorial adaptations. This was the second time that Burkina Faso had provided for a second parliamentary chamber designed to represent sub-national administrative units, religious and traditional leaders, employers and trade unions and the diaspora, as well as personalities the president considered deserving of a seat in this largely consultative chamber. With regard to the new senate, neither the number of senators, nor the exact distribution of seats among the specified groups, nor the precise electoral system was stipulated in the constitution. Most senators would be elected by “their respective structures” (article 80, section 3), which were not further defined. Even if there was currently a consensus on the relevant organisations, the ambiguities concerning the senate increased the risk of future political conflict over its composition. The senate was scheduled to be established in 2013.

Another constitutional amendment formally strengthened the National Assembly’s power vis-à-vis the government. It committed the president to dismiss the prime minister automatically after a successful vote of no confidence. In addition, an upper age limit of 75 was introduced for presidential candidates, although this rule was largely symbolic in practice. Article 37 of the constitution laid down a two-term limit for the office of president, and Compaoré was currently in his second term, even though he had served as president for more than 25 years, so he was due to leave office in 2015. However, leading members of the CDP and other associations that supported Compaoré promoted the idea that a democratic decision could lift the two-term rule, and so the age limit would not debar the 61-year-old president from running for re-election until 2025, when he reached the age of 75. Given previous manipulations of the constitution in Compaoré’s favour and in light of public statements by his supporters, the opposition did not expect his departure from office.

Two further state organs were now inscribed in the new constitution: a national ombudsman (‘Médiateur de la République’) and an independent media regulation authority, ‘Conseil Supérieur de la Communication’ (CSC). Unlike the senate, these bodies were established long before the June amendments.

Further amendments potentially strengthened the Constitutional Court (‘Conseil Constitutionnel’, CC). Access to the CC was made easier – including for ordinary citizens (“question prioritaire de constitutionnalité”) – and the CC was given the right of self-referral. In addition, its composition was modified; notably, former heads of state now had the right to sit on the CC and the president of the future senate was given the right to appoint three judges. This was certainly inspired by the French model, but would also serve as a source of immunity for outgoing presidents. The new composition of the CC – which, if implemented, would increase the number of judges to 14 – could therefore also be read in conjunction with the newly introduced constitutional guarantee of a full amnesty for all heads of state in office from 1960 to 2012. Only three presidents would enjoy both privileges: Saye Zerbo (1980–82), Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo (1982–83) and Blaise Compaoré, as all the other former presidents had already died. The absence of serious accusations against the military regime leaders Zerbo and Ouédraogo strengthened the assumption that the amnesty was designed to preclude any potential prosecution of Compaoré for corruption or, worse, for the murder of Thomas Sankara in 1987. The radical opposition deemed Compaoré responsible for the killing that ended Sankara’s populist, leftist and socially revolutionary regime. Compaoré had returned the country to a more market-oriented economy and restored the influence of traditional chiefs, whose status was also provided for in the new constitution, with traditional and religious leaders now represented in the senate and their moral authority being acknowledged in the constitution’s preamble, which underlined their political importance. Whereas Sankara had tried to abolish traditional authority in the mid-1980s, Compaoré accepted high-ranking members of noble families into the ruling CDP.

Legislative and municipal elections took place on 2 December. The National Assembly elections were postponed by a few months after formal objections were raised when the CC reviewed the relevant electoral law. Observers were surprised by the CC’s objections, which were unusual, and interpreted this purely formal action as a step towards greater judicial independence. Eventually, the electoral law was corrected and passed.

Prior to the election, the ‘Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante’ (CENI) computerised the electoral roll. As in many African states, the register had been a contentious issue in previous elections. Even though CENI had run out of time and was unable to complete its work, the trust placed in the updated roll was much higher than before. This was partly due to the role played by the new CENI president, Barthelemy Kéré, who managed to build trust in the Commission’s independence. Estimates suggested that around 55% of potential voters had been registered, of whom roughly 76% participated in the polls.

The country was divided into 45 provinces, all of which now became multimember constituencies contrary to the previous situation when 15 provinces had been single member districts. Of the 127 seats, 111 were allocated at the provincial level and the remaining 16 were distributed at the national level. The government had decided to increase the number of seats in the Assembly in response to criticism that the election of only one MP in a significant number of constituencies in 2007 effectively turned the system of proportional representation into a simple first-past-the-post system causing a higher degree of disproportionality between votes and seats. However, only eight constituencies returned more than two MPs, so the system continued to favour large parties – in particular the ruling CDP – and parties with substantial provincial strongholds, but disproportionality was still less than in previous elections.

In the legislative elections, the ruling party CDP won 70 seats, followed by the ‘Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération/Rassemblement Démocratique Africain’ (ADF/RDA) with 19 seats, which was thus on a level with the strongest opposition party, the ‘Union pour le Progrès et le Changement’ (UPC). The ‘Union pour la Renaissance/Parti Sankariste’ (UNIR/PS), formerly the largest opposition party, won four seats. The ‘Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme/Metba’ (PDS/Metba), a newly created amalgam of smaller leftist parties, won only two seats, even though it received more votes than either the pro-presidential ‘Union pour la République’ (UPR; four seats) or the ‘Convention des Forces Démocratiques’ (CFD; three seats). Six other parties took one seat each. Speculation that the ruling CDP would suffer high losses did not materialise; public discontent did not translate clearly into election results. The CDP lost three seats compared with 2007, but still secured an absolute majority. Although its best results were in rural areas, it was also able to win 44% of the vote in the capital province, Kadiogo, 24 percentage points more than the UPC. In total, the presidential camp won five out of nine seats in Kadiogo, where one seat went to the ADF/RDA, which as a self-declared moderate opposition party nonetheless participated in government. The UPC’s success showed that the electorate preferred a new opposition party, which had largely invested in nation-wide party structures, over established opposition forces such as the UNIR/PS and even the PDS/Metba, which represent the old guard of Sankarist and socialist politicians.

While the opposition’s inability to unite certainly contributed to its unimpressive performance, the election results could be largely attributed to the CDP’s enormous administrative and financial resources. The party and its preceding revolutionary structures had ruled the country for almost three decades. Particularly in rural areas, the party was often confused with the state, since representatives often served as the local leaders of both. Although the structural advantages of the ruling party were the most important factors, however, it could not be excluded that fraud played a role in the electoral outcome.

Well before the elections, both the CDP and the civil society ‘Fédération Associative pour la Paix et le Progrès avec Blaise Compaoré’ (FEDAP/BC) made changes to their leadership. The personal background of those voted into leading positions indicated that links between the party and the association had grown stronger. For instance, the CDP mayor of Tanghin-Dassouri, Adama Zongo, became the new chairman of the FEDAP/BC. The association’s resources made it one of the strongest pillars of Compaoré’s re-election campaign in 2010. Many perceived the FEDAP/BC as the main political vehicle for the head of state’s younger brother François Compaoré, who might make the powerful association ‘his’ political party, but François instead assumed a leading position on the CDP executive board at the party congress on 4 March. The president’s cabinet director, Assimi Kouanda, who was the chief of the political staff in the presidential palace and the head of state’s main political adviser, became the party president. Long-standing party barons, such as outgoing party chairman and head of the National Assembly Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, former prime minister Paramanga Ernest Yonli, outgoing mayor of Ouagadougou Simon Compaoré (not related to the president), and the former political heavyweight, Salif Diallo, were sidelined.

The opposition newspaper ‘L’Événement’ argued that the FEDAP/BC masterminded these leadership changes in order to take power in the party and serve Compaoré family interests. Whether or not this was the case, such speculation pointed to a concern that François Compaoré might be preparing for his own succession to his brother’s office in 2015. It was rumoured that the president was becoming weary, although another popular view had it that Blaise Compaoré might seek his fourth re-election.

Parallel to the National Assembly elections, local elections took place in all 367 municipalities. The CDP was the only party that fielded candidates in all except one district. The ruling party outdid all its rivals and CDP politicians won roughly two-thirds of the 18,645 council seats. As in the parliamentary polls, ADF/RDA and UPC won the second and third places almost neck and neck, with 1,746 and 1,615 seats, respectively. This ultimately meant that only a few mayors did not belong to the ruling block. Many of the election results were contested and so partial by-elections in 123 municipalities were scheduled for early 2013.

Despite the CDP’s secure position, the drawing up of the electoral lists was not achieved entirely peacefully. Local factions struggled publicly and sometimes violently for the positioning of candidates. In the provincial capital, Tougan, the house of Saran Sérémé, an incumbent MP, was burnt down in an attack presumably carried out by hostile party members. When she was then placed on the list behind her inner-party rival, Sérémé left the CDP in rage.

Other local protests were directed against state or party officials. The Economist Intelligence Unit counted dozens of outbreaks of violence in the first half of the year. On 21 June, residents of Boussouma defending the authority of local chiefs clashed with security forces over the mayor’s behaviour. The arrival of Prime Minister Tiao in support of the CDP mayor failed to calm tempers. Also in June, crowds freed an imam who had been jailed for insulting the local prosecutor. Similar clashes with state representatives occurred in Ouagadougou (over alleged abuse of office by security personnel), Bobo-Dioulasso, Diapaga and Pouytenga (over various decisions by government officials). The protests and clashes underlined the state’s loss of authority and the persistence of socio-political tensions. Furthermore, despite the country’s reputation for peaceful interethnic relations, it was not completely free of ethnic tensions. In May, 25 people were killed in clashes between Dogon farmers and nomadic Peul herders in the Malian-Burkinabè border region. On 14 August, local Lobi people in Gaoua protested over the police failure to find the killers of a Lobi boy. Since the protesters believed that a member of a non-indigenous group had murdered the boy, they attacked migrant Peul and Mossi, leaving three dead. In both cases, economic causes underlay the violent clashes.

Foreign Affairs

The crisis in neighbouring Mali dominated Burkina’s foreign affairs. The situation was already tense in January, and led to regional talks. President Compaoré was almost permanently occupied by concerns over security in the Sahel and particularly in Mali, and he engaged in talks with the foreign minister of Benin on 12 February, at the ECOWAS summit in Abuja (Nigeria) on 16–17 February, at an extraordinary AU summit in Cotonou (Benin) on 18 February, with the French foreign minister on 25 February, with the UN’s special representative for West Africa on 13 March, and with the Danish minister for development on 22 March.

Only five days after the coup d’état in Bamako (Mali) on 22 March, an extraordinary ECOWAS summit in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) elected Compaoré to serve as the regional organisation’s official mediator in the Malian crisis. Between April and December, Compaoré received no fewer than 14 official delegations from Mali and participated in 12 regional as well as 13 international talks and conferences dedicated to ending the crisis. Visitors from Mali included military junta members (31 March, 14–15 April, 2 May, 7 July), the transitional prime ministers (Cheick Modibo Diarra on 25 May, 22 June, 7 July, 18 November; Diango Cissoko on 26 December), the foreign minister (7 July, 3 November, 3–4 December), the Tuareg rebel groups ‘Ansar Dine’ (6 November, 16 November, 3–4 December) and ‘Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad’ (16 November, 3–4 December), and religious leaders (3 April, 14–15 April), as well as other politicians and civil society actors. On 4 December in Ouagadougou, Mali’s northern rebels and transitional government agreed on the need to establish a framework for an inter-Malian dialogue. The political conflict in Bamako had still not been resolved and the basis for dialogue was weak since other armed Islamist groups were not accepted as dialogue partners. Burkina’s Foreign Minister Djibril Bassolé also played a major role in the mediation process, contributing his experience as a former AU mediator in Darfur (Sudan). On 24 April and 19 July, Burkina Faso helped to free four Europeans held hostage in Mali. For its own security, Burkina Faso sent 1,000 troops to the northern border zone with Mali on 11 October.

With the settlement of the Ivorian crisis, relations between Ouagadougou and Côte d’Ivoire’s new president, Alassane Ouattara, acting president of ECOWAS, were good and certainly helped establish a common ECOWAS position on Mali. Consultations on the Ivorian situation nevertheless continued (e.g., on 27 September). Compaoré also retained close ties with France, Burkina Faso’s most important political and trading partner. Given the situation in the Sahel, Burkina continued to intensify security and military cooperation with France and the US. As in the previous year, US AFRICOM commander General Carter Ham visited Ouagadougou on 13 August.

Burkina Faso continued to recognise the government of Taiwan as the only diplomatic representative of China. Taipei thanked Ouagadougou for its loyalty with an increase of bilateral development aid to € 40 m.

Socioeconomic Developments

The situation in Mali also had an impact on the domestic situation in Burkina Faso. Refugee camps emerged in the far north of the country. Up to 100,000 refugees crossed the frontier, but the number had fallen to about 40,000 by the year’s end, according to UNHCR. The influx of such large numbers of Malians into the northern drylands deepened the domestic food crisis. Erratic rains in the 2011 season had led to poor harvests and to significantly higher food prices in 2012. On 20 June, Al Jazeera English reported social tensions in Djibo where the population had grown by about 50% and where both locals and refugees depended on humanitarian aid. There were no acts of violence against refugees, but tensions were likely to rise as long as the difficult situation continued. On 1 December, UNHCR issued requests for $ 62.5 m to help displaced Malians in Burkina Faso. On 2 August, the US donated $ 34 m to improve general food security beyond the necessities of humanitarian aid for refugees. The Burkinabè government estimated the total costs of meeting the food crisis at more than $ 200 m; around 1.6 m people in the country would need humanitarian assistance.

On 23 October, the National Assembly approved a revision of the national budget. With revenue almost a third higher than budgeted in the original legislation, the state was able to increase spending by 14.4% to roughly CFAfr 1.6 trillion (approx. € 2.4 bn) and to close the previous deficit. The social sector, including healthcare, social assistance and education, and the rural development sector, including agriculture, water supply and food subsidies, received about a quarter of the budget each. The 2013 financial bill that was passed in November foresaw a moderate increase in spending to some CFAfr 1.64 trillion, i.e. about € 60 m more than in the corrected budget of the ending year. Budget aid contributed significantly to the government’s resources. In recent years, overall ODA stabilised at around $ 1 bn. Analysing the budget, one of the leading newspapers, ‘Le Pays’, recalled that up to a quarter of the national income was estimated to be lost as a result of corruption, and called for effective prosecution of those involved, as uncovered by civil society organisations such as the ‘Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption’ or the national agency ‘Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat’. Similarly, the IMF, which largely applauded macroeconomic performance, emphasised in its Fifth Review of the ECF for 2010–13 on 19 December that the elimination of fraud would help the state to contain public wage costs.

The economy grew by a disappointing 4.2% in 2011 as a result of a bad harvest and the costs of social protests. The Economist Intelligence Unit and the IMF estimated a recovery of growth to 6%–8% for 2012. Sceptics emphasised that growth depended on two highly vulnerable and volatile markets: gold and cotton.

Revenue from gold production continued to surge owing to an increase in mining (from 32.2 tonnes in 2011 up to an estimated 36.6 tonnes in 2012) and a further rise in the world market price, which had doubled in less than five years. As a result, gold accounted for more than 60% of Burkina’s export revenues in recent years. In June, the US mining company Newmont paid CFAfr 6 bn (approx. € 9 m) for exploration rights at the Poura mine, 150 km west of Ouagadougou. Newmont was newly arrived in Burkina, joining Canadian, Australian and other mining companies. A new tax regulation improved the state’s control over private mining activities by making asset speculation more expensive. Cotton remained the second most important export commodity. After a poorer harvest in the 2010/11 season, production recovered with the 2011/12 harvest. However, the 410 000 tonnes of output remained more than 200 000 tonnes below that of earlier years. It was only due to rising world market prices that cotton contributed to about 15% of export revenues. In social respects, cotton was more important than gold, as 20% of the employed labour force worked in this agricultural industry.

On 2 April, petrol prices increased by a third to more than CFAfr 600 (more than € 0.90) per litre, only days after the prime minister had announced that the state was willing to reduce fuel subsidies to relieve the budget, which had an almost immediate impact on the prices of staple products requiring transport.