See also African-European Relations 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022.
European awareness that Africa was changing fast and that many dimensions of the Africa-Europe relationship would also have to change deepened in 2011. The dawning realisation that the tired stereotype of ‘rich’ Europe and ‘poor’ Africa was becoming less appropriate began to be reflected in the tone of policy statements and the placing of new emphasis on business relationships in European and African capitals. The influential British publication ‘The Economist’ even led its 3 December edition with a piece entitled “The hopeful continent: Africa rising”. Nevertheless, for many Europeans, relations with the rest of the world were overshadowed by the ongoing sovereign debt crisis and existential questions about the EU’s future that the crisis forced them to face. Such navel-gazing was not conducive to long-term European policymaking in a momentous year marked by the ‘Arab Spring’, which toppled several North African governments and sent shock-waves through the rest of Africa. Major events in Sub-Saharan Africa from a European perspective included the post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the devastating famine in the Horn of Africa, the independence of South Sudan, and ongoing instability in Somalia and the Sahel. From an African perspective, if introspectiveness prevented Europeans from responding adequately to fast-moving events and taking steps to deepen relationships with African countries and institutions, there were other options for partnerships – most notably China.
The post-Lisbon Treaty reforms to the EU’s external policy bureaucracies continued. On 1 January, the merger of former Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) for Development and EuropeAid took place, and a new organisational structure, DG EuropeAid Development and Cooperation (known as DG DEVCO), was formed. Although the former country desks for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries had previously been absorbed by the European External Action Service (EEAS), DEVCO was launched with an Africa directorate to manage relations between the European Commission, the AU and the African group in Brussels. The merger meant that DEVCO would be both a policy and an implementation organisation, but it raised coordination challenges between DEVCO and the EEAS regarding which organisation would perform which tasks. Given that many non-Europeans see the EU as a single actor and consider the finer points of the EU Treaties as less important than what is actually delivered, these complex institutional reforms were not well understood by many people outside Europe, including in Africa.
The ‘Arab Spring’ took European policymakers by surprise, and gave them cause to reflect on their strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa as well as long-standing policies in the EU’s neighbourhood. The Arab Spring did not fit with the models of change that European aid programmes were designed around. Rather than being driven by donor civil services and ministries in aid recipient countries, change in Tunisia and Egypt was brought about by ordinary people. Popular uprisings toppled long-standing leaders despite their countries’ strong recent performances against human development indicators. For European development agencies, events in North Africa signified that seemingly immovable autocratic regimes were vulnerable to collapse, and that economic growth did not equate to development if political institutions did not mature at the same time. Moreover, the Arab Spring also signified that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) may have outlived their usefulness. Youth unemployment and lack of a political voice were cited as the major grievances behind the uprisings north of the Sahara, but neither was targeted by the MDGs.
The European Council meeting held on 11 March announced that the EU would work with the UN, the Arab League, the AU and other international partners to respond to the regional upheaval. Despite these belated efforts to bring multiple partners on-side, European responses to the Libya crisis in particular aroused mixed feelings in Sub-Saharan Africa. While few Africans shed tears at the demise of Muammar Kadhafi, there was discomfort at the way in which his dictatorship ended. As one newspaper report put it, exasperation at Kadhafi’s meddling in Africa was often offset by admiration for his defiance of the West. Germany’s abstention from UNSC Resolution 1973, which legitimised NATO air strikes in support of a no-fly zone, was not perceived by many Africans as a principled division in Europe, as was the case before the 2003 Iraq invasion. Indeed, with the USA taking a back seat, ‘Europe’ was seen to be intervening militarily in support of a rebel movement waging a civil war against a sitting African head of state – and thereby disregarding the AU’s own ‘roadmap’ to end the Libyan crisis, even if this document was widely considered unrealistic. Following Kadhafi’s death at the hands of a lynch mob in Sirte, AU Commission Deputy Chairperson Erastus Onkundi Mwencha said, “The AU has never believed in force to settle disputes.” While such a statement may have reflected the disquiet of less democratic AU member state leaders, the feeling that former colonial masters were seizing the chance to rid themselves of the troublesome leader of an oil-rich state was widespread.
European policymakers and media followed the post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire closely and were ready to intervene to support the winner of the November 2010 poll, Alassane Ouattara. On 14 January, the EU Council extended asset freezes and visa bans originally imposed in December 2010. EU leaders condemned the violence and killings as ex-president Laurent Gbagbo clung to power, and backed African-led efforts in the first months of the year to ensure respect for the election results. The EU election observation mission to Côte d’Ivoire released its final report on 1 February. It praised the Ivorian people, noting that the ballots took place in a well-ordered and peaceful atmosphere with high voter turnout. The report identified irregularities but noted that they did not affect the result. The report was highly critical of Gbagbo for stimulating an atmosphere of tension and of the Ivorian Constitutional Court for unlawfully annulling the result.
Following Gbagbo’s arrest on 11 April, after days of heavy fighting during which French and UN helicopters fired rockets at the presidential residence, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Catherine Ashton deplored the high price the Ivorian people had had to pay. She praised the actions of the UN and French forces, and announced that the EU would help bring peace back to the country. The EU Council welcomed President Ouattara’s commitment to national reconciliation and promised support for the proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It also urged the international commission of inquiry into human rights violations, established by the UN on 25 March, to investigate allegations swiftly and thoroughly, and to hold those found responsible for crimes accountable. As was the case with regard to Libya, military intervention by European countries in Côte d’Ivoire was sometimes equated with a return to colonial rule by African intellectuals and media.
The devastating famine in the Horn of Africa brought images of starving Africans back to European television screens, evoking memories of the 1980s and prompting politicians and NGOs to respond. Many Europeans were deeply disturbed by the realisation that such a tragedy could happen in 2011 and joined Africans in asking how, given that the disaster was widely forecast, the situation could have been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent.
Aid agencies responded to criticism that they were slow off the mark with a major collective endeavour. The Commission allocated € 184 m in humanitarian aid to drought-affected populations in the Horn of Africa in several tranches during the year. EU funds provided food aid, targeting malnourished children, as well as healthcare and clean water, sanitation facilities and supplies. The Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection directorate (ECHO) coordinated these activities from its regional support office in Kenya, from where ECHO experts liaised with aid organisations and monitored relief projects.
Following the deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti in July, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and Development Minister Dirk Niebel issued a statement expressing their deep concern about the famine and announcing a € 5 m increase in emergency aid, bringing the total German contribution to around € 30 m. The Ministers also appealed to the German people to show their willingness to help through private donations to German aid NGOs. The French government was also spurred into action and doubled its contribution to € 10 m. On 16 July, the UK government pledged £ 52.25 m, on top of £ 38 m pledged earlier that month and £ 57 m raised by the Disasters Emergency Committee.
The independence of the Republic of South Sudan on 9 July was greeted with enthusiasm in Europe, tempered with awareness of the magnitude of the challenges that lay ahead. Europe had six months to prepare for South Sudan’s independence after the resounding result of the 9 January referendum. EU Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs told the AU Summit in late January that he considered the division of Sudan to be Africa’s greatest challenge, despite the turmoil in North Africa. He visited Khartoum and Juba in May, stressing to both governments that the Commission was ready to do all it could to support the world’s newest country. On a similar note, during his June visit to Sudan, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle said that South Sudan’s independence “must not be allowed to fail on the home stretch”. As it turned out, the major conflict between the North and South that many Europeans expected following the referendum did not materialise, despite violent incidents in the disputed border areas. The initial response of the Sudanese government in Khartoum was well received by Europeans and there were whisperings that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir would receive a reprieve from the indictment of the ICC. Such talk petered out when border conflicts escalated in November.
All 27 EU member states officially endorsed the independence of South Sudan, a significant step, given their differences about the recognition of Kosovo. High Representative Ashton attended the independence celebrations in Juba. The EU and the ACP group of states decided to use a “flexible procedure” to enable South Sudan to become a party to the Cotonou Agreement, which Khartoum had not ratified due to a clause referring to the ICC. The Commission was subsequently able to increase development assistance to South Sudan by around € 200 m for 2011–2013. In consultation with the South Sudan government and in coordination with international partners including the UN, the EU announced that it would lead on the joint programming of development assistance in the areas of justice/rule of law, education, health, water management, urban development and the rural economy. A draft joint programming document centred on South Sudan’s national development plan was drawn up to serve as a reference for EU member state development programmes in the country. The EU also committed to deepen cooperation with South Sudan on trade and to ensure duty-free and quota-free access to EU markets under the ‘Everything But Arms’ regulation as soon as conditions were met. Commissioner Piebalgs visited Juba again in November and EU representatives took part in the Washington international conference on South Sudan in December. An Establishment Agreement between the EU and the new Republic was signed in Brussels on 9 December, allowing for recognition of the South Sudanese Embassy to the EU and the new EU Delegation in Juba.
EU-AU Relations
Commissioner Piebalgs announced ahead of his trip to the January AU Summit that the EU intended to support Africa’s evolution towards more integration, democracy and good governance. This theme was stressed repeatedly throughout the year. The 4th consultative meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the EU Political and Security Committee in Addis Ababa on 11 May expressed the joint intention of the two continental organisations to work together on Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan and Somalia. The EU Council General Secretariat published a large brochure in May that mapped out the implementation of the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy’s (JAES) 2011–2013 Action Plan, with heavy emphasis on governance issues. The AU Commission’s Mission to the EU hosted a conference in Brussels on 24 May on “The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Africa-EU political dialogue”. Questions centred on the extent to which the Charter would be implemented by AU member states. A week later, several AU and EU Commissioners met with chief executives from the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Brussels to discuss cooperation on short-term challenges and long-term structural change. The meeting concluded with the usual promises to enhance cooperation further and invited EU and AU member states, RECs, parliaments, the private sector, civil society and media to join in and deliver results that would be visible to ordinary people on both continents.
The AU Mission in Brussels organised another conference on the implementation of the JAES on 22 September. Discussions mainly focused on the financing of the Joint Africa-EU Action plan; the role of the EEAS and of DEVCO in Africa relations, and alternative sources of finance for the AU. There was an exchange on the EU Commission’s proposal for a new pan-African financial instrument. The ‘Pan African Programme’ emerged from the Tripoli Declaration at the Third Africa-EU Summit in November 2010, which announced the intention to expand cooperation into new areas and promote the common interests of Africa and the EU on the international stage. The financial proposal was officially submitted to EU member states and the European Parliament on 7 December as part of the Commission’s post-2014 EU budget.
The 8th AU-EU Human Rights Dialogue was held in Dakar on 11 June. Participants reaffirmed joint commitment to the promotion of human rights on both continents and the importance of AU-EU collaboration on the protection of human rights defenders, human rights in democratic transitions, and women, peace and security. They took note of positive developments in both Africa and Europe, such as the adoption of the Human Rights Strategy for Africa, AU member states’ commitment to accelerate the ratification of international and continental human rights agreements, the AU Assembly’s decision to establish the African Governance Platform, the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights through the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, and progress made on the EU’s accession to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The meeting noted achievements in the Africa-EU Partnership on democratic governance and human rights, particularly the holding, on 9 June, of the first working group meeting on governance of natural resources, including in conflict and post-conflict situations.
On 3 May, Europe’s ACP partners finally backed the EU’s bid to be granted enhanced observer status in the UN General Assembly, giving it the right to speak in debates, to submit proposals and amendments, the right of reply, to raise points of order and to circulate documents. These rights were also made open to other international organisations that requested them. In order to win the vote, the EU had to agree to changes to the resolution so that the same arrangements could be adopted for other regional organisations allowed to speak on behalf of their member states. Potential candidates for similar status included the AU, the Caribbean Community, the Arab League and the South American Union.
EU Relations with ECOWAS
The EU stepped up its support to ECOWAS’ own efforts to create a borderless region in West Africa with the March launch of an EU-funded cross-border project that would seek to set up a regional customs union and a common market. Liberia’s Vice President Joseph Nyuma Boakai launched the six-month project in Monrovia. The project aimed to train state law enforcement officers, including port and city police, immigration, customs and commerce inspectors, anti-drug agents and forest rangers. This was part of a strategy aimed at boosting inter-African trade, estimated to constitute only around 10% of overall African trade in 2011. On 4 February, the EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS jointly hosted a ceremony in Abuja to mark the signature of contracts worth € 37 m for the construction of three joint border posts in West Africa.
EU-South Africa Relations
The fourth South Africa-EU Summit, held at Kruger National Park on 15 September, was a chance to discuss a broad range of issues including global governance, climate change, trade, development, the JAES, the South Africa-EU strategic partnership and peace and security in Africa. The EU was represented by European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, Commission President José Manuel Barroso, Development Commissioner Piebalgs and Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht. South Africa was represented by President Jacob Zuma, accompanied by Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Planning Minister Trevor Manuel, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, Science Minister Naledi Pandor, Trade Minister Rob Davies and Environment Minister Edna Molewa. Delegates discussed South Africa’s preparations for the UN climate conference (COP 17) to be held in Durban in November and December and the ‘Rio+20’ conference on global sustainable development scheduled for 2012. Discussions about coordination on development cooperation in the framework of the EU-South Africa strategic partnership were timely, given South Africa’s intention to become active as a donor itself.
Bilateral Relations
President Nicholas Sarkozy addressed the AU Summit on 30 January, the first time since 1963 that a French head of state had done so. He noted that France was also president of the G8 and G20, and he promised to involve Africa as closely as possible in this double presidency. He said that he had been convinced for a long time that Africa had not had its rightful place in international governance, and he urged the UN Secretary-General to reform the UNSC by expanding its membership. He did not say whether France would be willing to give up its veto as part of these reforms. Sarkozy also spoke of the opportunities recent growth in Africa provided for Europe, and stressed the two continents’ common values and joint destiny.
South African President Jacob Zuma accepted Sarkozy’s invitation to make a state visit to France on 2–3 March. During their meeting at the Elysée Palace, the two presidents discussed global issues as well as bilateral relations. They resolved to strengthen their countries’ strategic partnership through regular consultations and high level exchanges. As South Africa was a major player on the African continent and a G20 member, the priorities of the French G20 Presidency and South Africa’s hosting of the COP17 climate change convention were also discussed in detail.
Although French attention was concentrated mainly on the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and its aftermath, France was also active in East Africa, French Minister for Cooperation Henri de Raincourt visited Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania in early December. The purpose of the trip was to reaffirm bilateral ties and de Raincourt visited several project sites co-financed by France through the AFD , including the Bujagali dam in Uganda and the Kenya-Ethiopia Interconnection power-line project. The French minister met with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, with whom regional cooperation between the Great Lakes countries and security in Somalia were discussed. In Kenya, he met with Prime Minister Raila Odinga, and talked about the crisis in the Horn of Africa and the fight against maritime piracy. In Tanzania, the minister met with President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete and discussed the opportunities and challenges of integration in the East Africa sub-region.
Germany announced a new Africa policy on 15 June. The ‘Africa concept’ was divided into six categories: peace and security, economics, human rights, environment, energy and development. Foreign Minister Westerwelle presented the plan to African diplomats in a ceremony in Berlin. “What we are experiencing in Africa is possibly the most fascinating sign of our world in flux,” he said. “Our aim is to use the potential of our cooperation for the good of the people in Africa, but also, and let’s not forget this, also for our own good, also in our own interests.” The concept envisaged increased trade ties with Africa and promised closer cooperation between the various German ministries whose work concerned Africa. The German government’s openness about economic interests in Africa troubled some critics, who considered that the concept prioritised markets for German exports, rather than overcoming poverty in Africa. It was also noted that, at around 30 pages, the policy document was short on detail, particularly regarding its timeline for implementation.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Kenya, Angola and Nigeria in July. Her aim was to show support for inclusive and sustainable development in Africa as well as to promote German engagement in the energy sector. Merkel visited several projects supported by Germany, including a livestock research facility in Kenya, Africa’s largest photo-voltaic solar energy system, and media organisations in Angola. While she was in Nigeria, ECOWAS Commission President James Victor Gbeho asked Merkel for a bigger German contribution to the $ 108 m electricity programme for Conakry.
United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron hailed the potential of aid, trade and democracy to lift millions of Africans out of poverty during his visit to Nigeria in July. He spoke at the Pan African University in Lagos, arguing that the continent had a real chance to end aid dependence. Cameron paid tribute to fast-growing economies and democratic transformation in Africa, which he said was happening in a way no one had thought possible 20 years ago. He urged African students to “seize these opportunities, grab them, shape them”. Cameron reiterated that trade, not aid, was the key to Africa’s future prosperity and could be better enhanced through economic restructuring, inward investment, improved infrastructure and good governance. He quoted research that argued that an African Free Trade Area could increase continental GDP by as much as $ 62 bn a year, $ 20 bn more than the world gave Sub-Saharan Africa in aid.
Cameron’s speech echoed Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell’s address to a London audience a week earlier, entitled “Africa is open for business”. Mitchell announced that Britain would increase its support for businesses in Africa in a bid to boost economic growth and break aid dependence. Three new business projects (the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund, the Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund and the Business Innovation Facility) were launched, which aimed to create thousands of jobs in food production, deliver low-cost energy to African businesses and help supermarkets bring ethically traded African food products to UK consumers.
In May, the UK foreign office announced that Minister for Africa Henry Bellingham spent ten days in Africa promoting British interests. His visit started in Côte d’Ivoire, where he attended the inauguration of President Ouattara. He then travelled to Ghana where he met parliamentarians and discussed Ghana’s success in good governance. In Kenya, he discussed shared interests, including counter terrorism, piracy and regional security. Bellingham spent four days in Tanzania, where he promoted British trade and investment in meetings with members of the Tanzanian government. He also gave a speech to a British business group on the UK government’s prosperity agenda.
The Netherlands’ government announced a new development cooperation policy in June, focussing on 15 countries and four themes in which the country supposedly had proven success: security and the rule of law, water management, food security, and sexual and reproductive health care. Emphasis on human rights goals was to be maintained. Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation Ben Knapen told the Dutch parliament that development spending in the areas of sexual and reproductive health and HIV/AIDS would be aimed at prevention and human rights. This would enable the Netherlands to heighten its profile as an advocate of human rights for all. The DRC was removed from the list of countries with which the Netherlands had a bilateral development relationship. However, Knapen was quick to note that this did not mean that the Netherlands had abandoned the DRC, and he said that it would continue to support the country through UN programmes and international trust funds.
Knapen told African ambassadors to the Netherlands in September that the image portrayed by some news reports of the Horn of Africa famine that Africa was a continent that could not provide for itself was false, and disregarded the impressive economic growth Africa had experienced in recent years. He said that the continent’s élan and potential were such that it was time to think further than aid. Knapen said that he wanted to see development cooperation used as a catalyst for sustainable economic growth, ultimately enabling Africa to be self-reliant, and for the relationship to evolve into a mutually profitable economic partnership. The Netherlands announced that it would invest in long-term improvements in the business climate in African countries, and Dutch businesses would be encouraged to use their knowledge and experience in Africa to help bring about lasting improvements in living standards.
The principal focus of Italy’s policy towards Africa was in stemming migration across the Mediterranean following the downfall of North African governments with which Italy had closely cooperated. Italy made several efforts to solicit Europe’s help in confronting illegal immigration, not only in terms of economic aid but also in terms of a plan for the distribution of refugees among EU member states. In late March, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini drew a distinction between “real refugees” from Eritrea and Somalia, and Tunisians who were not fleeing war and should instead be proud to go home and help their country’s democratic transition.
The Italian government was also active in supporting famine alleviation efforts in the Horn of Africa. Frattini stressed the need for measures in Somalia that addressed push-factors for piracy on land and trials for pirates caught at sea. Two additional contributions were made to drought-stricken Somalia: € 1 m to FAO for a project in Puntland, and € 600,000 for the UN Office for Project Services for regional hospitals. Political, environmental and social turmoil in Africa were the main focus of Frattini’s speech at the Italian Cooperation Steering Committee meeting in October. € 530,000 was earmarked for the training of Libyan port authority and coast guard staff and Italy made a voluntary contribution to the ILO for the social reintegration of former female inmates of Ethiopian prisons.
Unsurprisingly, Spain’s main focus was also on upheaval in North Africa. The country nevertheless took steps to deepen its relationship with South Africa. The 7th Session of the South Africa-Spain Annual Consultations was held in Pretoria on 1–2 February. Spain briefed South Africa on its Africa Plan and commitment to the AU and NEPAD. The parties reviewed the latest political developments and issues of conflict resolution, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction programmes on the African continent, such as Sudan/Darfur, Zimbabwe, and developments in the Maghreb, Madagascar and Côte d’Ivoire. Both countries agreed to explore together further opportunities for triangular co-operation in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Portugal’s economic woes meant that Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho’s visit to oil-rich Angola in November was closely watched by other European countries. The IMF agreed to give Portugal a $ 107 bn bailout on condition that it introduced a wide range of economic reforms, including privatisation. Some commentators argued that this created pressure for a reversal of former roles, with cash-strapped Portugal considering selling shares in state-owned companies to its former colony. Coelho denied suggestions of opportunism on account of his country’s debts. Speaking at a press conference, he said Portugal was facing a difficult phase, but that Angola was a strategic partner and relations had nothing to do with Portugal’s problems. Anti-corruption campaigners warned that Portugal should be careful not to become a laundromat for Angolan cash.
Poland held the rotating EU Presidency for the second half of the year, and in this capacity hosted the 6th European Development Days, which did not focus on Sub-Saharan Africa to the same extent as in previous years. Instead, the forum, held on 15–16 December, concentrated on democracy and development in the context of the Arab Spring and the Commission’s new development policy proposals released in October. High-level panels discussed several issues of relevance to sub-Saharan Africans, including the Horn of Africa famine and strategies for modernising European development policy “beyond aid” The event provided Poland with an opportunity to stress its own experience of transition as an example for African countries north and south of the Sahara to emulate.
In Poland itself, Zambian born Killion Munyama became the second African to be elected to parliament after Nigerian-born John Godson. The economist and politician, who arrived in Communist Poland on a government scholarship in the early 1980s, lamented that few Africans know much about what Poland was capable of. He promised to facilitate interaction between Poland and Africa and encourage strong bilateral relations with African countries.
Development Cooperation
2011 may turn out to be the year in which European development cooperation started to react to several existential questions about its future. The Euro crisis increased pressure on European development budgets. In briefings to journalists, EU officials spoke of increasing public pressure to show that Europe’s aid programmes, totalling € 54 bn, are worthwhile at a time of economic crisis. Research published by the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex, UK) showed that three quarters of the world’s poor now lived in middle-income countries. More importantly for EU development policy, the shifting priorities of EU member state leaders described above began to be reflected in changes in the way the Commission set its own agenda.
Following almost a year of public consultation, internal negotiation and numerous drafts, the Commission published its latest mission statement on development policy. On 13 October, Commissioner Piebalgs presented the grandly titled ‘Agenda for Change’ together with a second paper setting out a new policy for EU budget support. The documents promised to re-prioritise Commission aid through more targeted funding allocations, both on sectors where aid could make a difference in reducing poverty and by targeting countries in the greatest need of external support. The Agenda announced the Commission’s intention to focus aid on good governance, including human rights and democracy; gender equality, civil society and corruption; social protection, health and education; support for a favourable business environment and deeper regional integration; and sustainable agriculture and clean energy for inclusive and sustainable growth. The Agenda announced that, in order to generate more resources, the EU would explore innovative ways of financing development, such as the blending of grants and loans. More controversially, the Commission said that it would encourage EU member states to jointly prepare country strategies (so called “joint programming”) and better divide labour among themselves to increase aid effectiveness. The Agenda also proposed to reassess aid to countries that seemed wealthy enough to fund their own development. This was welcomed by many, even though initial proposals to base aid allocation decisions on average per capita income failed to recognise that aggregates say little about a country’s capacity to address poverty, even if, like Ghana and Zambia, they were classed as ‘middle-income’ by some measures.
The Commission’s budget support proposals were welcomed by many African partner governments, even if some expressed scepticism at the declared intention to make funds more conditional on results. The Commission announced that “Good governance and Development contracts” would govern general budget support where the partner country could demonstrate commitment to “fundamental values” such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Commission also announced that budget support would be used in fragile countries on a case by case basis to ensure vital state functions and support transition through “state building contracts”.
European NGOs Bond and CONCORD expressed concerns that the most important change in the new agenda was that aid to the world’s poorest was being cut, diverting funds towards energy and private sector investments which were in the interest of the EU only. Critics noted that the Agenda was an “aid concept”, light on detail about how Europe intended to address “beyond aid” global public goods challenges, such as climate change, communicable diseases and food insecurity. However the proposals were cautiously welcomed by African officials as an indication of the EU’s continued commitment to development and its intention to improve performance on accountability and the timeliness of aid delivery.
Security and Development
The European Council adopted two strategic frameworks on which intra-European agreement had proved difficult due to disagreements over the balance between security and state capacity-building measures. The two strategies had also been difficult to discuss with African partners because of their overt emphasis on European security concerns.
The EEAS released the EU’s Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel in September, some three years after it was first requested by the 2008 French EU presidency. The Strategy had four key themes: first, that security and development in the Sahel could not be separated; second, that progress was only possible through closer regional cooperation, which the EU pledged to support; third, that all states in the region would benefit from capacity building in areas of core government activity; and fourth, that the EU had an important role to play both in encouraging economic development and in helping achieve a more secure environment in which the interests of EU citizens and companies were also protected. High Representative Ashton said that the strategy would help Europe coordinate its engagement in the Sahel, making more effective use of various instruments to foster security, stability, development and good governance in the sub-region. Nevertheless, some EU member states were sceptical about certain aspects of the strategy and remained unconvinced that it could be implemented, despite formally welcoming its release.
The strategy responded to long-standing European concerns about security in the Sahel, where organised crime networks had been able to take advantage of weak state control over desert areas and kidnap Europeans for ransom. In this environment, it had become highly risky for development actors to continue operations, while French energy company AREVA had to institute expensive security measures to protect its operations in Niger. The final draft of the strategy was negotiated following the kidnapping and murder of two young Frenchmen in Niger’s capital, Niamey, in a gun battle, which also killed several Nigerien security officers. Another five French citizens captured in Niger in September 2010 were held in northern Mali by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. One was released, but four remained hostage at year’s end. Late in the year, the same group claimed responsibility for the killing of a German man and the abduction of three other Europeans in the centre of the ancient tourist city of Timbuktu. Another Jihadi group abducted two French geologists from their hotel in the Malian town of Hombori in late November.
On 14 November, the European Council adopted the EU’s Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. The strategy aimed to establish a comprehensive framework for a range of policy proposals to address security and development challenges. It also openly stated Europe’s interests in the region, largely stemming from its geo-strategic importance. The strategy focussed on five priority areas for EU action: building robust and accountable political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth and supporting regional economic cooperation. Specific goals included tackling piracy and supporting stabilisation in Somalia and peaceful transition in Sudan. Greek diplomat Alexander Rondos was appointed as the new EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa on 8 December, a step taken to give the EU greater visibility and influence with other international partners. EU member states generally agreed that the Horn of Africa strategy presented a long-term perspective for European policy in the region and the next step would be to coordinate on its implementation.
In June, EU foreign ministers decided to make use of the Lisbon Treaty to widen and deepen Europe’s conflict prevention policy. They put their money where their mouth was in late August, when the Commission replenished the African Peace Facility (APF) with € 300 m for the period 2011–2013, to support continental and regional conflict prevention and resolution and peace building efforts. € 40 m of this envelope was earmarked for supporting the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), bringing total EU support for APSA to € 84.5 m since 2004. The AU announced that the funds would contribute to several areas of work, including enhancing synergies between the AUPSC and the RECs; increasing the capacity of the Continental Early Warning System; improving the functioning of the Panel of the Wise and mediation structures; supporting the operational capability of the African Standby Force; enhancing analytical and strategic capacity; and improving project and financial management capacity.
In early April, the European Commission published a detailed report on activities funded by the APF. The report praised the APF’s support for the Early Response Mechanism’s mediation operations, including the AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan. The report noted that the bulk of funding went to support the operations of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). On 28 March, Commissioner Piebalgs confirmed the Commission’s support for the AMISOM mission by announcing an additional € 65.9 m to provide the peacekeepers with more medical care, transport and allowances. The Commissioner noted that EU support helped AMISOM provide protection for the transitional federal government, facilitate humanitarian operations and support disarmament and stabilisation efforts. In December, the Commission provided a further € 50 m to AMISOM, bringing the total EU contribution to € 258 m since 2007.
No new EU peace-building missions were launched, but several continued throughout the year. European Naval Force Somalia-Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR-Atalanta), the mission to patrol the pirate-infested shipping lanes off the East African coast, had its mandate extended until the end of 2012. The mission reported some success: EEAS Africa Managing Director Nicholas Westcott said in a speech in October that, in the previous three months, Atalanta had been directly responsible for foiling three attempted pirate attacks on merchant ships and had deterred many more. According to the BBC, there were 25 successful hijacks in 2011 compared with 47 in 2010. The business was, however, highly lucrative: pirates earned some $ 146 m in 2011, an average of $ 4.87 m per ransom payment.
To complement and support counter-piracy operations, the EU agreed to transfer suspected pirates captured by operation Atalanta to face trial in Kenya, the Seychelles and, after 16 July, Mauritius. The EU offered support through its Instrument for Stability for prosecution, and for court, police and prison services in the three partner countries. An apparent change in tactics by pirates during the year to cooperate with al-Shabaab in seizing Western hostages from the Kenyan coast led to calls to attack pirates in their bases. Unsurprisingly, this was not universally popular. German opposition politicians from the Green and Social Democratic parties warned against the unpredictable consequences of expanding the EU’s “military adventure” into Somalia’s coastal towns.
The EU Training Mission (EUTM) to Somalia celebrated its first anniversary on 11 April. The mission’s progress was followed closely and the Bihanga training facility in Uganda received visits from Members of the European Parliament, member state ministers and senior European military staff. Trainees were also reminded of Europe’s own wars. Representatives from EUTM Somalia attended the Armistice Day ceremony at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery in Jinja, Uganda, in November. During the first week of November, 869 Somali men and women went back to Mogadishu after ten months of training, and the return flights carried 619 new trainees to Uganda.
Trade and Development
The Commission started a major review of its trade and development agenda with a view to adjusting to recent global changes. In April, the Commission launched a public consultation for a Trade and Development policy paper, due to be published in early 2012. On 19 July, Commissioner Piebalgs represented the Commission at the WTO’s Third Global Review of Aid for Trade (AfT) in Geneva. The meeting was a key opportunity for donors and developing countries to discuss achievements since the launch of the AfT Initiative at the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong. The focus of the Third Global Review was on results, impact and how best to maximise the future potential of AfT.
EPA negotiations resumed after delays in late 2010 and continued on their tortuous path during the year. Optimism expressed early in the year that mutually beneficial agreements would be reached was not borne out by events. At the 4th EAC-EU EPA Negotiations Session held on 15 September in Zanzibar, parties agreed on a joint work programme for comprehensive negotiations until December 2011. However, at year’s end a range of issues still needed to be resolved, including provisions dealing with export subsidies and taxes, special agricultural safeguards, rules of origin and EPA-related adjustment support.
There were stumbling-blocks on both sides. For instance, EAC Secretariat Director General of Customs and Trade Peter Kiguta said that negotiators were not well informed about the interests of the African countries they were representing. In December, on the fringes of the WTO ministerial meeting in Geneva, EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht informed journalists that a comprehensive EPA with Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi would now be in sight. However, Ugandan trade negotiators were reported to be unaware of any deadline for concluding negotiations with the EU. At the ACP trade ministers’ meeting in Brussels, in early December, Kenya’s delegation described a Commission proposal of 30 September to amend market access as “not in good faith”.
After almost a decade of negotiations, the EU finally set a deadline for the EPA talks. In late September, the Commission announced that countries that had concluded an EPA but not taken the necessary steps to ratify and implement it by 1 January 2014 would no longer benefit from EPA market access. Although some countries would still qualify for tariff-free access without signing an EPA, under the EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative, countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya – not classified as ‘least-developed countries’ – would have to pay duty of between 8.5% and 15.7% on their exports to Europe.