Political Developments

Sudan continued to experience horrendously violent conflict in Western Darfur, now in its fifth year. There were also persistent uncertainties about the durability of the two-year old peace agreement that had ended the long civil war in the South and made possible the installation of a new semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Despite these challenges, the central government in Khartoum, on the back of an oil-driven economic boom and with international support mainly from China, felt sufficiently secure to persevere with its confrontational course against domestic adversaries and to obstruct international efforts to stop the fighting and human suffering in Darfur. The AU peacekeepers continued to be far too weak to protect the civilian population effectively or to reduce the level of hostilities. The planned deployment of a larger hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force, mandated by the UN Security Council, encountered delaying tactics from Khartoum and did not get under way before year's end. Various new peace talks proved fruitless, due both to the intransigence of Khartoum and the utter, and ever more confusing disarray among the many Darfur rebel groups, with repeated splits by various leaders, at times more for criminal gain than for political goals. No political solution was thus in sight. New strains between Khartoum and GoSS in Juba, specifically over the demarcation of the North-South boundary, which had implications for control of important oil-producing areas, seriously threatened the 2005 peace agreement. In October, the Southern leadership withdrew from the national government, but rejoined in December after some progress was made in the tough negotiations on the key sources of discord. In the North, tensions grew among the major political parties in advance of crucial elections scheduled for 2009.

The generally repressive political situation in Eritrea remained largely unchanged and even deteriorated further. There was no escape from the pervasive militarisation of society, and the population suffered many human rights violations at the hands of the regime. The exodus of young Eritreans to neighbouring countries increased. External opposition groups remained weak and without realistic chance of changing the current situation. All hopes of gradual democratisation appeared as illusory as they had been for years. The military regime was internationally isolated and continued to focus primarily on its confrontation with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia 's domestic situation saw only slight improvement with the release of most leaders and supporters of the political opposition that had been jailed after the highly controversial 2005 elections. However, this in no way hindered the ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front and Prime Minister Zenawi in maintaining full control over the entire political landscape. No meaningful reconciliation between the ruling elite and its opponents was initiated. Expressions of social and ethnic unrest continued in various parts of the country, in particularly violent form in the Ogaden region. The ruling party was generally able to monopolise the political space at the national level, while opposition forces remained weak and internally fragmented. The authoritarian regime showed no indication of moving towards gradual political liberalisation.

In Djibouti , the ruling multiparty alliance of President Guelleh remained in full control, with no serious challenges from the notoriously weak political opposition. Scheduled parliamentary elections in early 2008 presented no foreseeable problem. The mini-state enjoyed a continued influx of foreign investments and an improved economic situation, and it also benefited from the presence of French and US military bases.

The three distinct parts of Somalia experienced widely differing political developments during the year, and, as a result, drifted further apart in respect to their general socio-political situation. Somaliland had all the features of a fairly stable independent state and was able to consolidate its political institutions and the economy further, but remained internationally ostracised, with no formal diplomatic recognition by the rest of the world. The semi-autonomous Puntland region also largely managed to keep out of the violent conflict in southern Somalia, although it became embroiled in a brief and violent border conflict with Somaliland. Moreover its institutional arrangements were less secure and it faced greater economic problems. Southern Somalia continued to endure unabated political conflict and turmoil, with violent insurgency campaigns being mounted by different regrouped Islamist factions opposed to the struggling Transitional Federal Government, which was unable to exert its full authority throughout its territory, despite strong protection from Ethiopian forces. No political solution that would enable the re-establishment of viable state institutions was in sight.

Parliamentary elections on the tiny island state of Seychelles confirmed the political situation that had emerged since the return to a multi-party system in the early 1990s. The ruling Seychelles People's Progressive Front, already in power without interruption for 30 years, was again victorious, but had to acknowledge the continued existence of a significant opposition. There was some optimism for better cooperation between the two camps, since both had learned to accept the underlying differences in Seychellois society.

The unity of the notoriously fragile island state of Comoros was again seriously threatened by a conflict over the elections of the presidents of the three semi-autonomous islands that make up the Union. While orderly elections were held in June on two islands and brought new leaders to power, this was not the case on Anjouan. Incumbent Anjouanese President Mohamed Bacar refused to accept a ruling by Union President Abdallah Sambi and engineered his own re-election in the absence of any opponents. The ensuing conflict between Union and island authorities escalated sharply over the balance of the year. Several external mediation attempts proved unsuccessful. Fearing another de facto secession by Anjouan, Sambi adamantly demanded support from the AU for the forceful removal of Bacar's authoritarian regime. By the end of the year, this prospect appeared to be almost imminent.

The political landscape in Kenya was characterised throughout the year by constant infighting, mutating alliances and various questionable manoeuvres across the gamut of political actors in the run-up to crucial presidential and parliamentary elections on 27 December. Eventually, a pattern of confrontation emerged between two major multi-faceted political camps, one led by incumbent President Mwai Kibaki and the other assembled around veteran politician Raila Odinga, with a third camp as the obvious outsider. As usual in Kenya, ethnic mobilisation played a major role during the heated election campaign, which by and large unfolded smoothly, but not without violent incident. Although the result was generally expected to be close, there were no serious warnings of possible problems and election day itself remained rather uneventful. This situation changed dramatically with the announcement on 30 December of a narrow Kibaki victory in the presidential elections, while a clear lead for Odinga's camp in the parliamentary race had already been established and generally accepted. Suspecting deliberate fraud by the incumbent political authorities, immediate protests by opposition followers turned violent and plunged the country into entirely unexpected turmoil that escalated into an orgy of violence over the following weeks. The year thus ended with widespread desperation over the turn of events and with Kenya confronting its most fundamental crisis since independence.

By contrast, neighbouring Tanzania had an uneventful year with the long-ruling dominant party remaining in full control without serious challenge from weak opposition forces. President Kikwete, in his second year, further consolidated his power over the party machinery during a party congress. Some public disappointment over the government's performance and revelations of apparent high-level corruption did not seriously undermine the political stability that has long characterised the country. Even semi-autonomous Zanzibar experienced much less open antagonism between the ruling party and the main opposition than in the recent past. The political climate was calm and largely collaborative, while both sides continued their rather secretive negotiations to overcome their past confrontations. Although promised, the results of the talks were not made public before the end of the year.

After the controversial elections in 2006, Uganda experienced only its second year as a relatively unrestricted multi-party political system. President Museveni and his National Resistance Movement were still absolutely dominant and held all the reins of power largely unchallenged, but the opposition was now far better able to express public dissent and to play a notable role in parliament. An active, lively civil society contributed to a fairly liberal political climate, but without endangering the real and long-entrenched power-holders. All hopes of a definite end to the two-decade-old civil strife in the north were again disappointed when the drawn-out peace negotiations with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels dragged on into 2008.

Rwanda 's domestic political situation remained practically unchanged. President Kagame and his ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front continued in full control and clearly dominated the political landscape, leaving very limited space for other political forces and the weak civil society organisations. In view of the parliamentary elections in 2009, there was no indication of any challenges to the well-entrenched and stable, but authoritarian set-up, despite the lifting of a ban on party structures and activities at local and district level.

Neighbouring Burundi , by contrast, had a rather tumultuous political year, which raised serious doubts about the stability and authority of President Nkurunziza and the ruling ‘Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie’ (CNDD-FDD) that had so convincingly won the multi-party elections in 2005 after 12 years of civil war. The powerful party chairman, Radjabu, was removed from office in February and subsequently imprisoned and charged with treason. This led to a serious split in the party, including among CNDD-FDD's parliamentarians. For most of the year the government was left without a working majority in a blocked parliament that was unable to pass any laws. It was only in November that a new coalition government was put together after lengthy negotiations with the country's two major traditional parties, while the internal split in CNDD-FDD persisted and the general political situation remained shaky. No breakthrough was achieved in the peace negotiations with the last active rebel group ‘Forces Nationales pour la Libération’ (FNL), and violent rebel ambushes on a limited scale were still recorded.

In the Eastern African sub-region, there have been virtually no changes in 2007 in respect to Freedom House's widely used but not undisputed annual assessment of political rights and civil liberties. For civil liberties, all country ratings remained unchanged, whereas the political rights index for both Comoros and Kenya was lowered from 3 to 4 (on a scale of 1 at the top to 7). While none of the twelve sub-regional countries rated as ‘free’, the top category, four countries (Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Rwanda) remained in the ‘not free’ category. Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea were among the lowest rated countries worldwide, while Rwanda was given a positive trend indicator. The remaining eight countries (plus Somaliland) were categorised as ‘partly free’ (with both political rights and civil liberties in the 3–5 index points range). Among these, Seychelles was judged the best, followed by Kenya and Tanzania (tied) and then Comoros and Somaliland (tied).

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007 also revealed wide discrepancies between countries of the sub-region. Among 179 countries listed, Seychelles again easily achieved top position with an overall rank of 57 and a score of 4.5 points (out of 10) as proof of some improvement since the preceding year. By contrast, Somalia was listed as the worst country, ranking 179 and scoring 1.4 points) while Sudan was ranked 172 with 1.8 points. The remaining countries, like most other African countries, ranged between 3.2 and 2.1 points: Tanzania (rank 94), Djibouti (105), Eritrea, Rwanda and Uganda (all ranked 111), Comoros (123), Burundi (131), Ethiopia (138) and Kenya (150).

Similar divergences between countries were discernible in regard to press freedom, as expressed in the 2007 Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders. Of 169 listed countries, Eritrea for the first time took last position (score 114), behind even North Korea. Somalia (ranked 159), Ethiopia (150), Rwanda (147) and Sudan (140) were also judged to be general offenders against the principle of freedom of the media. The relatively best marks for press freedom went to Tanzania (ranked 55), Kenya (78), Comoros (96) and Uganda (96), while Seychelles (104), Burundi (127) and Djibouti (132) comprised an intermediate group.

A similar ranking system for general human rights in different countries has not yet been attempted, since the fairly wide range of relevant phenomena cannot easily be compressed into a quantitative scale. However, based on regular reporting by AI, Human Rights Watch, other NGOs and the US State Department, the worst politically motivated offences against human rights occurred once again in Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Serious human rights violations were also recorded in practically all the sub-regional countries, but not on the same scale and often arising from uncontrolled interventions by state security agents, without a specific political agenda, and from deplorable prison conditions.

Transnational Relations and Conflict Configurations

The precarious domestic political situation in Sudan continued to have important direct or indirect repercussions on relations with most neighbouring countries. This was particularly the case in eastern Chad , where the conflict in Darfur had a noticeable spill over effect due to close ethnic linkages across the border and the constant influx of refugees into the relative safety of the camps on Chadian territory. As in previous years since the Darfur rebellion began in 2003, each government accused the other of actively interfering in its affairs by supporting rebels and permitting them to operate across the common borders. Bilateral relations remained strained throughout the year. In April, the Chadian army pursued rebels across the border and engaged in battle with the Sudanese army. In January, Chad threatened to withdraw from the AU if the Sudanese president was chosen as the next AU chairman, as was expected. Since 2006, northeastern Central African Republic (CAR) has also been affected by cross-border refugee and rebel movements stemming from the Darfur conflict. New French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner almost immediately proposed an initiative to establish militarily protected humanitarian corridors in the affected areas, but was rebuffed on all sides. He then mooted the deployment from November of an EU military mission, EUFOR, to protect the refugee camps in Chad and CAR. The response by other European countries was lukewarm and the operational start had to be postponed until early 2008.

The Government of Southern Sudan had in mid-2006 begun facilitating a cessation-of-hostilities and peace process for the long and devastating rebel war involving the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda . LRA rebels had in previous years been able to retreat on to Sudanese territory and to largely avoid open confrontation with the much better-equipped Ugandan army. GoSS no longer permitted the use of its territory as a safe haven and was determined to put an end to the LRA as an active force. LRA movements and activities had already been severely curtailed, and it had also been forced to retreat into the territories of neighbouring CAR and DR Congo , where no state security authorities existed. The peace negotiations in Juba, formally chaired by GoSS Vice-President Riek Machar, dragged on inconclusively throughout the year, since LRA leader Joseph Kony remained elusive and would not allow his negotiating team to sign a peace deal.

Sudanese relations with Eritrea had considerably improved in 2006 after years of tension and remained positive and stable throughout the year. This was largely due to the 2006 peace agreement between Khartoum and the Eastern Front opposition that had been active in the border region with Eritrea. The rapprochement between the two governments threatened to make the activities of Sudan-based Eritrean opposition groups much more difficult.

There was again no progress towards a lasting solution of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia that had been simmering ever since the Algiers peace agreement of 2000 after two years of war. Despite further verbal belligerence on both sides and intermittent fears of renewed full-scale war, only a few minor skirmishes occurred in the border areas. The vicious accusations both governments exchanged were further fuelled by the fact that each of them supported opposing sides in the conflict in Somalia . As one consequence, Eritrea in April gave notice suspending its membership in IGAD, the sub-regional organisation of countries in northeastern Africa.

Ethiopia 's military invasion of Somalia in December 2006 had created a new element of insecurity and confrontation with far-reaching implications for much of the sub-region, since all IGAD member states were forced to take positions on the highly complex situation in Somalia. This scenario persisted throughout 2007. Ethiopian troops stayed on in Somalia to prop-up the shaky transitional federal institutions in Mogadishu that could not have withstood attacks by Islamist forces without them. The initially defeated Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) militia forces, on the other hand, supported by Eritrea , regrouped in new guise and mounted increasingly successful guerrilla attacks against the transitional government in various parts of the country, including Mogadishu. In September, Eritrea hosted a major congress of Somali opposition leaders in Asmara. Djibouti initially showed sympathy for the UIC, objecting to the Ethiopian invasion and trying to mediate among the opposing Somalian groups, but after some months was forced to accept the geopolitical realities of Ethiopia's dominant position, backed up by the US. The Somaliland authorities refused to be drawn into the latest round of internecine Somali conflict, by and large successfully. Uganda , a member of IGAD, was the first (and until December only) country to send troops for a AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Inter-state relations in the Great Lakes region showed further improvement, as they had in 2006, but remained somewhat precarious, with the sudden resurgence of tensions always a possibility. The installation of a new government in Kinshasa after the national elections in DR Congo in 2006 gave new legitimacy to Congolese state institutions, but did little to reduce serious conflict in much of the eastern provinces of DR Congo, bordering on Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. As had been the case for years, various cross-border linkages and movements were inevitable. Compared to previous years, both Rwanda and Uganda refrained from openly interfering in local political events in the DR Congo and established regular, albeit sometimes acrimonious, contacts with all levels of the Kinshasa government. The Uganda-DR Congo border area along Lake Albert witnessed some military skirmishes as a result of unclear boundary delimitations in an area where oil exploration was just commencing. Rwanda remained chiefly concerned about the presence of anti-government rebel movements (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, and others) on Congolese territory and demanded serious efforts by Congolese authorities to finally neutralise and demobilise them.

Under the US-facilitated Tripartite Plus Joint Commission (Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda), meetings involving diplomats and security personnel were held to find solutions that would address the insurgencies and armed militias in the Great Lakes region. In principle, there was agreement that ‘negative forces’ threatening the security of any member state should be disarmed and demobilised, but there was no consensus about what groups and individuals to include on the list. Nevertheless, important progress was made at a commission meeting on 17 September and with the signing of a joint communiqué in Nairobi on 9 November. This was further confirmed on 4 December at a meeting of the presidents of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and the Congolese internal affairs minister with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Addis Ababa. The agreement stipulated that signatories would demobilise the identified ‘negative forces’ (with most attention on the FDLR) by 31 March 2008, but there was immediate scepticism about the realism of this target.

No tangible progress was made in Burundi to conclude a peace agreement between the government and the FNL rebel group, despite pressure from neighbouring countries and South Africa (the official mediator) to reach a compromise in the protracted negotiations that had started in 2006. Violent attacks by small FNL groups still occurred, but were much reduced. Tanzania was determined to achieve quicker repatriation of Burundian refugees from the camps on its territory, despite opposition from the Bujumbura government. FNL groups were still able to retreat into neighbouring DR Congo when pursued by the Burundian army.

The political crisis in Comoros over the Anjouan elections again prompted repeated mediation efforts under an AU mandate by sub-regional actors led by South Africa, but to no avail. As in previous years, Comoros remained a little-noticed test case of the AU's ability and commitment to contribute significantly to the resolution of a (relatively minor) political conflict in a member country.

UN peacekeeping initiatives in the sub-region again ran up against severe constraints and obstacles in their attempts to at least contain the worst violence in the many instances of intra- or inter-state confrontation. In Burundi , the UN military mission closed in December 2006 after playing an important role in the political transition, while further support for that process continued at a much reduced level. The continued presence in the Eastern Congo of the large UN Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) had some effect in containing the overspill of rebel activities into neighbouring East African countries, but could not prevent this completely. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) encountered even greater problems than in the past in monitoring the fragile ceasefire along the contested border between the two countries, and in December was practically immobilised when Eritrea refused further diesel supplies. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was considerably expanded and continued to monitor the implementation of the precarious peace process in southern Sudan without major confrontations, but in an atmosphere of growing concern during the last quarter that the whole process would collapse. Nearly two years of diplomatic wrangling to find a generally acceptable UN role in the Darfur conflict was finally concluded in late July by a Security Council resolution to create a hybrid AU-UN force (UNAMID) with an intended strength of 26,000 military and police, the biggest-ever peacekeeping mission. This mission was to build upon and greatly enhance the existing AU Mission to Sudan (AMIS), but deployment had to be postponed to 2008 because of delaying tactics by the Sudanese government and problems in mobilising the required contingents and equipment from supplier countries. Again, no UN peacekeeping role was even contemplated for the raging conflict in Somalia .

The AU continued to struggle within its limited resources to play an effective role as peacekeeping and monitoring agent in Darfur, Somalia and Comoros. AMIS in Darfur remained underfinanced and underequipped in relation to its enormous task and the size of the territory, thus greatly limiting its impact as a protection force for the suffering civilians. A new AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), created in lieu of a proposed IGAD mission, faced the same serious problems and was barely able to move beyond its bases in some areas of Mogadishu and had practically no stabilising influence. In Comoros a ‘Mission d'Assistance Electorale et Sécuritaire de l'UA aux Comores’ (MAES) was initially deployed to safeguard public security during elections, but then stayed when a new crisis developed on Anjouan.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) finally succeeded in April in issuing arrest warrants for two Sudanese leaders, from a much larger list, for serious human rights violations against civilians in Darfur. It had proven extremely difficult to assemble enough evidence against individuals to warrant starting international prosecutions. There was, however, no chance the Sudanese government would arrest the wanted persons and hand them over for trial. In Uganda, the issuance in 2005 of ICC warrants against five LRA leaders continued to be a major stumbling block in the peace negotiations between the government and the LRA, since no way could be found to circumvent the warrants.

The sub-region continued to be more severely burdened by refugees and IDPs than almost any other part of the world. Sudan had by far the highest number of IDPs as a result of the dual conflicts in the south and in Darfur. However, IDPs were also much in evidence in northern Uganda and Somalia, while Tanzania still hosted the greatest refugee population by far. In response to the new post-conflict situations in Burundi and DR Congo, substantial repatriations had commenced, but refugees were likely to remain a burden for some time. Kenya and Uganda also hosted substantial numbers of refugees, and many civilians from Darfur took refuge in Chad.

Socioeconomic Developments

The countries of the sub-region again showed rather divergent but moderately satisfactory macroeconomic performance, although generally still not enough to overcome structural poverty and lay the foundation for dynamic and sustainable growth. Only two countries, the same two as in 2006, achieved markedly higher GDP growth than the average of 6.6% for all of sub-Saharan Africa (according to preliminary 2007 figures): Ethiopia had a fourth exceptional year with 11.4% growth, made possible by weather favourable to agriculture, and Sudan achieved 10.5% growth as a result of further expansion in its booming oil sector, despite political turbulence in Darfur and the south. Tanzania (7.3%), Kenya (7%), Uganda (6.5%) and Rwanda (6%), the core countries of EAC, performed relatively close to the sub-Saharan average and maintained the generally satisfactory growth pattern of the last few years. The small economies of Seychelles (5.3%) and Djibouti (5.2%) showed considerable improvement as result of determined government policies, whereas the reverse was true of Burundi (3.6%) in a disappointing year without clear governmental directive. Again, the least satisfactory results were for Eritrea (1.3%) and Comoros (−1%), in both cases largely the result of adverse political conditions and civil conflict. No figures were available for Somalia.

Most countries continued their cautious monetary policies and contained inflation at comparatively modest levels, markedly lower than in Africa during earlier periods. Only Ethiopia (17%) had exceptionally high inflation as a result of years of unrestrained economic growth. Comoros (3%), as usual, experienced the lowest inflation due to its firm institutional ties with the Franc zone. All other countries had average price increases of between 5% and 9.8%.

All countries of the sub-region (bar Comoros) had a negative balance of payments on current account (including grants), in contrast to a practically balanced African average of 0.1% of GDP (due to the substantial surpluses of the major oil and mineral exporters). The largest deficits were recorded in Seychelles (−38.7% of GDP), Djibouti (−25.2%), Burundi (−12.4%) and Sudan (−11.8%, despite soaring oil revenues), while Comoros even experienced a small surplus (1.9%) and the remaining countries had smaller deficits ranging between −3.5% (Kenya) and −9.2% (Tanzania).

Sub-regional countries also differed markedly in their capacity to raise government revenue domestically to carry out state functions. The ratio of government revenue (excluding grants) as a percentage of GDP (sub-Saharan average 23.4%) fluctuated between 49.3% for Seychelles and only 12.1% for Comoros, 12.4% for Rwanda, 12.8% for Ethiopia and 13.5% for Tanzania and Uganda, with the rest around 20%.

UNDP's 2007 Human Development Index (based on 2005 data) clearly pointed out wide variations in the sub-region. Only Seychelles attained the high human development category and ranked 50 out of 177 countries. Comoros (ranked 134), Sudan (147), Kenya (148), Djibouti (149) and Uganda (154) appeared in the lower half of the medium category, with index values somewhat above the sub-Saharan average, while the other countries remained in the low human development category, with Burundi and Ethiopia almost at the bottom, ranking 167 and 169.

Sub-regional Cooperation and Sub-Regional Organisations

The long-awaited enlargement of EAC became effective on 1 July when Burundi and Rwanda became full members after signing the accession treaties on 18 June during the EAC summit in Kampala. This was the culmination of protracted negotiations and the beginning of another lengthy period as both new member states adjust to the historically well-evolved integration and sense of identity among the three original countries. This presented a major challenge, but also offered opportunities for a larger EAC.

The presidents of the five member states met at two extraordinary EAC summits in 2007, the latter on 20 August in Arusha. It was agreed in principle that the top leadership positions in the EAC secretariat should not be altered due to the enlargement, but that procedures should be adopted for the equal rotation of top positions among all member states. The Arusha summit discussed the reports from the wide-ranging consultations with the general population undertaken since October 2006 about fast-tracking the integration process and creating a political federation. While East African public opinion supported the idea of federation in the medium-term, considerable scepticism and fear had been expressed in Tanzania in particular. Against the wishes of Kenya and Uganda, but responding to Tanzanian and Rwandan reservations over the lack of compensation for unequal economic development processes, the summit decided to shelve fast-tracking for the time being. However, the secretariat was mandated to make suggestions for a structural fund, and the consultations confirmed the need to re-brand EAC more vigorously in the eyes of the public.

After years of discussion, an EAC Partnership Fund, conceived as a basket for the joint financing of technical cooperation projects by donors, became effective on 1 July. In December, a new EAC Development Fund was approved by the council of ministers. This was intended to facilitate the financing of regional infrastructure projects and investment ventures, including measures to compensate for regional imbalances. The approved EAC budget for 2007–08 rose considerably to $ 28.3 m, of which 76% was expected to come from partner states' equal contributions and the rest from external donors. Delays in the disbursement of national contributions continued to hamper the functioning of the secretariat. A proposal for a new funding formula, based on an integration tax commensurate with the relative strength of national economies, was still under discussion.

In the EAC Customs Union, in force since 2005, several changes and adjustments were made to the common external tariffs in response to requests from national governments and specific industries. Despite competing interests, compromises were generally agreed much more easily than initially anticipated.

On 27 November, trade ministers of the EAC states signed an interim framework agreement for an EPA with the EU. This had been negotiated under extreme time pressure only after the EAC summit in August had stressed the sub-regional identity and decided to pursue a separate EPA, whereas until then Tanzania had participated in the EPA negotiations within the SADC grouping and the other four countries within the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) configuration under the coordination of the COMESA secretariat. In the absence of a full EPA before the end of the year, the interim agreement provided a general framework for trade between the EAC and EU over the next 25 years. The EPA decision was not intended to affect existing memberships in different sub-regional organisations, but again underlined the inconsistency of overlapping memberships in potentially competing organisations (EAC, COMESA and SADC). Tanzania, largely for political reasons, showed no intention of leaving SADC, while some business interests continued to lobby for rejoining COMESA.

The members of the Second East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) were only sworn in on 5 June, although the term of the preceding First EALA had already lapsed on 29 November 2006. This delay arose from a dispute over the legality of the selection of the nine members from Kenya that had been challenged in the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) by a Kenyan MP. Contrary to the regulations, the Kenyan EALA members had originally not been elected by the national parliament but nominated by political parties. The EALA opening was thus delayed by about six months until Kenya had held a proper election. While Rwanda subsequently elected its nine EALA members, the Burundian parliament in November failed to muster a quorum and the election was postponed until 2008.

On 1 July, EACJ was expanded to consist of two chambers, one with the same duties as before and the other to serve as a court of appeal. Each chamber was to comprise five judges, nominated by the national governments.

COMESA held its 12th summit (22–23 May) in Nairobi, again confirming its intention to create a customs union for its 19 member states by December 2008. In advance of that goal, a common external tariff with a four-band category of raw materials was adopted. The parallel COMESA business forum (18–19 May) underlined the importance of promoting private business initiatives. Enhanced cooperation with other regional economic communities (particularly EAC, IGAD and IOC) was stressed. Harare was chosen to host the 2008 summit.

In March, the Eastern and Southern Africa Trade and Development Bank ( PTA Bank), in recognition of the return of peace to Burundi, opened an office in Bujumbura which had originally been chosen as the bank's headquarters, but had never become operational. The longstanding temporary premises in Nairobi were nevertheless retained. The bank's authorised capital was raised fourfold to $ 2 bn during its annual meeting in Mauritius in June, making it the second-largest development bank in Africa after AfDB.

An extraordinary IGAD summit on 28 January in Addis Ababa, on the sidelines of the AU summit, was convened in response to the further heightened crisis in Somalia following the Ethiopian invasion. Regional leaders, except Eritrea's, called for support of the Somali transitional government and endorsed the creation of an AU peace mission (AMISOM) to stabilise the country, given that earlier ideas of an IGAD peace mission to Somalia had proved unfeasible. The situations in Somalia and southern Sudan also dominated the 26th IGAD council of ministers meeting on 13 April in Nairobi. On 21 April, the Eritrean government gave notice of suspension of its IGAD membership, which was expected to lapse one year after the notification. This step was in protest at IGAD's position on Somalia and in reaction to Eritrea's increasing isolation in the sub-region. In contrast to previous years, IGAD no longer played an active mediation role in ongoing conflicts.

IGAD had initially been mandated to coordinate the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) as one of five sub-regional components of the AU's envisaged African Standby Force. However, on 17 August sub-regional defence ministers announced the creation of EASBRIG as an independent institution for 13 participating states, with headquarters in Addis Ababa and a coordination and planning secretariat in Nairobi. On the same date, a SADC Brigade was launched in Lusaka with parallel participation by some countries (e.g., Tanzania) in both brigades.

The 23rd council of ministers meeting of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) was held on 3 April in Mauritius, with the rotating presidency for the following year passing to the foreign minister of Seychelles. Extraordinary council meetings were convened on 10 and 30 October to discuss the lack of progress in EPA discussions with the EU. It was decided to create a separate sub-group of the IOC member states (without France) within ESA to underline the specific interests of the island countries.

On 7 March, the 7th council of ministers of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) met in Tehran (Iran) ten years after the creation of this geographically vast organisation. With 18 members from Africa, Asia and Oceania, it had lost most of its momentum and was in need of new initiatives to remain meaningful.

The new permanent secretariat of the 11-member International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was launched on 3 May in Bujumbura during the first meeting of the regional inter-ministerial committee. By year's end, seven countries had ratified the relevant protocol, thus needing one more for it to come into force. A first parliamentary ICGLR meeting on 26–28 February in Kinshasa stressed support for the aims of the underlying security, stability and development pact.

The ‘Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs’ (CEPGL) comprising Burundi, DR Congo and Rwanda was officially re-launched on 17 April in Bujumbura by a council of ministers meeting with the active support of the EU's development commissioner, after it had been dormant for several years. The expected revival of infrastructural and technical cooperation with Kinshasa was seen as perpetuating some of Burundi's and Rwanda's long-established links with the DR Congo despite their new integration into EAC.

Water ministers from all ten riparian states of the Nile basin (Eritrea only as observer) met on 24–25 June for their 15th council of ministers meeting as part of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) at the NBI secretariat in Entebbe. Considerable progress had been made in the negotiations for a new cooperative framework to replace old colonial-era treaties (from 1929 and 1959) giving Egypt veto rights over upstream water utilisation by other countries and to enable the transformation of the NBI into a Nile Commission. A text had practically been agreed, but Egypt and Sudan held out against one contentious article. This deadlock was likely to be resolved only at the highest level by heads of state.