Domestic Politics

It became ever more evident that Bozizé relied heavily on personal relations and even family bonds to control strategic sectors of the state. Shady incidents included the awarding of a diamond concession to a Doha-based holding that would develop the infrastructure on an island on the Oubangui river, a project supported by the minister of tourism, Yvonnne Mboissona, who is a cousin of the president. In the first of a series of cabinet reshuffles, the president's nephew, Mining and Energy Minister Sylvain Ndoutingai, was also given the finance and budget portfolio, hitherto Prime Minister Doté's responsibility (16 July). In response to donor criticism, Bozizé felt obliged to change tack on 8 October, giving the post to Emmanuel Bizot. The interior ministry went from Michel Sallé to the prefect of Ouham-Pende, General Raymond Ndougou (18 July). He had negotiated the peace agreement with one rebel group. A few days later, Bozizé sacked his justice minister, Paul Otto, without naming a replacement. This action resembled the sacking of Communications Minister Karim Meckassoua on 19 May for showing a film of the assassination of Burkina Faso's Thomas Sankara. This action, Bozizé explained, could jeopardise relations with the current president, Compaoré.

A peace agreement between the government and two rebel movements was signed in Syrte in the presence of Libya's President Kadhafi on 2 February. On the margins of a CEN-SAD summit on 28 January, Bozizé for the first time met rebel leaders. Abdoulaye Miskine, a warlord once in the service of former President Ange Patassé, signed on behalf of his ‘Forces pour la Démocratie du Peuple Centrafricain’ (FDPC) and in parallel for the ‘Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement’ (UFDR). This action was rejected by exiled UFDR leaders Abakar Sabone and Michel Djotodia. Since the FDPC had hardly been in action since 2006, the impact of the peace agreement seemed limited. During a second trip to Libya on 26 February, Bozizé invited Miskine to convince the UFDR leaders to accept the agreement.

The UFDR's leading figures were former supporters of Bozizé, who had been disappointed about the spoils granted by their patron. UFDR support among the Gula, the ethnic group straddling the border with Sudan, increased after the violent reconquest of Birao in 2006, which had resulted in numerous civilian casualties. The UFDR attacked Birao a second time on 3–4 March and took control of the airport. The government ‘Forces Armées Centrafricaines’ (FACA) embarked on a brutal orgy of destruction. After the rebels' defeat, local UFDR commander Zacharia Damane agreed to negotiate a peace agreement. This was signed in Birao on 13 April and stipulated the integration of UFDR combatants into the army. A vague reference was made to “the participation of the UFDR in the management of state affairs, in a spirit of reconciliation and in conformity with the Constitution”. A bag of money changed hands and allowed for the payment of CFAfr 50,000 per combatant. The UFDR respected the agreement by confining its combatants and mounting joint patrols with FACA. In July, Bozizé named Miskine and Damane as presidential advisors. Miskine declined the offer, pointing to non-fulfilment of some of the agreement's provisions, while Damane did not take up his post either.

Former Patassé officials were probably the masterminds behind the ‘Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie’ (APRD), the main rebel movement in the north. An APRD attack on Patassé's hometown of Paoua in January was followed by army reprisals against the civilian population. In mid-April and mid-May, the APRD launched attacks on Ngaoundaye on the frontier with Chad, killing the local district officer during the second incident. Again, retaliation by the army was excessive and included the destruction of food stocks. A volunteer from ‘Médecins sans Frontières’ (MSF) was shot dead by APRD rebels in June, apparently accidentally. MSF temporarily suspended its activities in the northwest. On 13 September and 27 November, new confrontations took place between FACA and APRD forces in the Bocaranga region and around the border town of Bang.

The Syrte agreement was brokered by Pastor Isaac Zokoué, who was initially charged with preparing a comprehensive political dialogue. When Zokoué met Patassé in Lomé (Togo) on 23 February, apparently without Bozizé's consent, he fell from grace. A panel of wise men nevertheless submitted a report calling for dialogue. Bozizé consulted the constitutional court, the National Assembly and various political parties. One of his advisors held talks with armed groups, including the Zaraguinas (highway robbers). Negotiations ensued on the composition of a preparatory committee for the dialogue process and resulted in a list of 23 members. These names were finally accepted by the main alliance of civilian opposition parties, the ‘Union des Forces Vives de la Nation’ (UFVN), which included two former government parties. The committee comprised five representatives each of the presidential majority, the civilian opposition, civil society and public authorities (National Assembly, president's office, government) and only three for the main rebel groups. The head of state appealed to APRD on 6 November to join the dialogue, apologising for acts of violence committed by the army. Talks between government and APRD were held on 10 December (after further armed clashes). APRD wanted the dialogue to take place in Libreville under the auspices of Gabon's President Bongo, while government insisted on Bangui as the venue. On 7 December, the UFDR rejected the committee's composition. Bozizé had finalised the committee by decree only a few days earlier, adding two more positions for the civilian opposition outside the UFVN and entrusting its presidency to a Swiss NGO. The UFDR leader (Djotodia) and spokesman (Sabone) continued to be held in detention in Benin. In mid-February, Zokoué had declared that the authorities had lifted the demand for their extradition and prosecution. As they did not support the Birao agreement, however, Bozizé asked Benin to keep them in custody. By year's end, it was unclear whether the dialogue would proceed any time soon.

Numerous human rights violations were committed by rebels and state agencies. The government rejected a report by Human Rights Watch as grotesque and untrue. While the report noted human rights violations by the rebels, its criticism of FACA and the presidential guard was harsher and well documented. An AI report focused on the plight of the civilian population in the north, accusing the presidential guard of brutality and exposing the government's inability to protect Mbororo children from abduction by bandits. The office of the prosecutor of the ICC decided to initiate investigations into alleged crimes against humanity in May, including numerous cases of sexual violence. Bozizé assisted in the opening ceremony of the local ICC office in Bangui on 18 October. In this context, the Central African Human Rights League (LCDH) criticised the return as a free man of rebel leader Abdoulaye Miskine to Bangui in February, even though he was believed to be responsible for several of these crimes. It was feared that peace agreements would lead to impunity for war criminals. One reason cited by Miskine for not taking up the position of presidential advisor was the absence of an amnesty for his acts.

Foreign Affairs

Relations with Sudan remained problematic. On 26 May, the government protested against the presence of “armed men”, apparently Arab militias from Sudan, on its territory. About 2,500 refugees from Darfur had fled to CAR. Relations improved when Bozizé visited Khartoum on 29 August. The common border (closed since April 2006) was reopened, a symbolic gesture as only two regular customs posts exist along its undemarcated 1,200 km length and there is little cross-border trade. Visiting Kinshasa on 23–24 August, Bozizé declared his country would persist with its case against DRC 's opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba in the ICC for the crimes against humanity perpetrated by his ‘Mouvement de Libération du Congo’ when it intervened in CAR on the side of Patassé in 2002. The border between both countries was reopened. Chad 's President Déby visited Bangui on 9–10 November. In a communiqué, both heads of state admonished nationals who had fled to the other's country to respect the law, an allusion to a number of deadly incidents involving Chadian nationals in Bangui. A group of 400 Ugandan rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) reportedly entered the CAR in February over its border with the DR Congo. When Bozizé travelled to Uganda (22–24 August), he denied any LRA presence in his country.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recommended the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to the border triangle between Chad, CAR and Sudan (23 February). While the Chadian government disapproved, Bangui appeared to be in favour. During the summer, France pushed for the organisation of an EU-led operation with a UN mandate. In June, a second UN assessment mission toured both countries and on 10 August the secretary-general unveiled a revised concept, including the deployment of an EU military mission. On 25 September, the Security Council decided on the establishment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), with a one-year mandate to protect civilians with the support of EU forces. On 15 October, France secured joint action of the EU Council in nominating an Irish commander, but it had difficulty in persuading its European partners to commit troops. By year's end, concrete preparations for the multinational mission were under way.

Louis Michel, the EU commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, visited Bangui and the war-affected town of Kaga-Bandoro (6–8 March). He signed an agreement, inter alia, to finance a road infrastructure project connecting Bouar (west) with Garoua Boulai in Cameroon. In late October, Bozizé participated in a donor round-table in Brussels. The EU's high representative for foreign affairs, Javier Solana, urged Bozizé to speed up reforms in the security sector and announced European assistance in this field.

Relations with France became more difficult. Without massive French help, it would not have been possible to hold Birao in March. However, the regime had several issues with the French firms Total and Areva, the nuclear energy company. The Quai d'Orsay invited CAR to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a hint that Paris suspected government corruption in this sphere. Bozizé had a working visit with the new French President Sarkozy on 18 November. France's military support mission to CEMAC peacekeepers, ‘Opération Boali’, initially mounted to protect French and other nationals after the 2003 military take-over, was more firmly established, with a full colonel in command of a 200-strong detachment, but the mission was criticised at home. French media complained about the news blackout on the major Birao operation, during which six Mirage fighter jets, helicopters and an additional 100 elite troops stationed in Gabon were used. UN coordinator Toby Lanzer visited Birao two weeks after the French raid and reported that few of its 14,000 inhabitants had returned to their homes. Of the houses, 70% were destroyed. Human Rights Watch accused French soldiers of standing by as state security organs committed human rights violations. Paris invoked the bilateral defence agreement to justify its engagement. South African specialists were brought in to form Bozizé's presidential guard. In August, about 50 South African military personnel arrived. Later, Paris and Pretoria began to harmonise their involvement in CAR's crisis.

China's foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, visited Bangui on 5 January, offering a debt write-off (€ 8.4 m) and tax exemptions for CAR exports. He declared Bozizé a “big friend of China” and CAR “an important country playing a role of weight in international and regional affairs”. The visit came shortly after the inauguration of a Chinese-built sports stadium in Bangui.

Socioeconomic Developments

Late in 2006, the IMF cleared the way for a three-year PRGF of $ 54.5 m. The Fund concluded article IV consultations in October. The government had fulfilled the requirements to reach the decision point under the enhanced HIPC initiative, thereby qualifying for new debt relief. Critical remarks were made about the broadening of the tax base by eliminating exemptions and improving taxation in the mining and forestry sectors. The Fund also urged improved transparency of revenues from natural resources, a reference to presidential favouritism. In June, the IMF managed to convince authorities to stop the intended tapping of the regional financial market through issuing bonds on commercial terms to finance higher expenditures of about € 69 m.

The Paris Club completely rescheduled the country's bilateral debt in April. This amounted to $ 36.1 m, of which $ 28.4 m were arrears and interest. At the donor round-table in Brussels on 26 October, the government received more aid promises than expected, i.e., $ 600 m for the next three years. Donors accepted the PRSP for 2008–10 issued in September. It envisaged a reduction between 2003 to 2010 of the population living in poverty from 67% to 58%. GDP improved by around 4.4%.

Salary arrears continued to bedevil the public sector. In September, civil servants received their salaries for December 2006. The six union federations called for joint strike action in late September for eight months of pay, a call strongly heeded, especially in the education sector, leading to a late start for the school year. Promises were made to reduce the arrears gradually. Cumulative arrears from the Kolingba and Patassé eras amounted to 24–36 months and new arrears continued to mount up. The strike was called off after the government paid salaries for two consecutive months. At the University of Bangui, professors went on strike from August to October demanding arrears in allowances and overtime, and took strike action again in December after the promised payments were not made.

The humanitarian situation remained chaotic. The number of refugees and IDPs continued to rise. In August, UNHCR started an initiative to help 26,000 refugees, mainly Mbororo who had crossed from Cameroon to escape abductions of children by bandits intent on ransom. Later, this number increased to 45,000. In September, UNHCR estimated that more than 290,000 people had been uprooted (212,000 people internally displaced: 80,000 as refugees from Chad, Cameroon and Sudan's South Darfur region). In October and November, Zaraguinas attacked and burnt down villages on several occasions, leading to new waves of displaced people.

Canadian UraMin bought 97% of the shares of the Bakouma uranium mine in 2006 and sold it to Areva in July for $ 2.5 bn. The government declared that this transaction required its approval and complained it had not been informed. Areva's predecessor, French state-owned Cogema, worked the mine before it was considered unproductive. At that time, few precautions were apparently taken to protect workers and the local population from radiation. This accusation was made by the mining and energy ministry in reference to similar allegations against Areva in Niger. Areva's vice president visited Bangui but could not resolve the impasse. Sources hinted that authorities were holding out for an undisclosed sum before they would approve the deal. It was revealed only at this time that UraMin had transferred CFAfr 1 bn to the government the preceding year. Local media doubted that those funds had been used appropriately and asked for full disclosure of the earlier deal with UraMin. In October, the government asked UraMin to pay CFAfr 800 bn as compensation for the ‘illegal’ transfer of Bakouma to Areva. The desire by producing countries to capitalise on rising uranium prices by renegotiating contracts formed the backdrop to these events. In the oil sector, the government tried to split up local petrol distributor SOGAL, 51% of which is owned by Total. The World Bank, Gabon's President Bongo and others were called in to mediate.

In the cotton sector the government aimed to give production a new impetus by creating the ‘Société des Fibres Centrafricaines’ (SOFICA), with the state holding 96% of shares. From 12,500 tonnes for the current season production should rise to 30,000 tonnes in 2010. The new company replaced the former ‘Société Centrafricaine de Développement des Textiles’ (SOCADETEX). Plans were also put forward to revive coffee and tobacco production.