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View full image in a new tabThe April elections at federal and state levels dominated the political scene. The run-up to the elections soon became a legal battlefield, while the seriously flawed elections produced a large number of petitions before the election tribunals. Although the tribunal dealing with the petition on the presidential election had not reached its verdict by year's end, other tribunals had already declared some gubernatorial and National Assembly elections null and void. By the end of the year, there were additional indications that more governors and parliamentarians would be sacked the coming year. In the light of these decisions, the prospect that the elected president might suffer a similar fate was no longer unimaginable. Notwithstanding this situation, this was the first time in Nigeria's history that an elected government had taken over from a previously elected one, a circumstance that gave some hope of stabilising the still infant democratic system.
Domestic Politics
The salient issue over the course of the year was the general election, scheduled for 14 April (gubernatorial and state assemblies) and 21 April (presidential and National Assembly), and its aftermath. All eyes were fixed on the run-up to the elections, which was packed with drama. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) could not meet the deadline of 30 January for completing the electoral register and had to extend the exercise for a third time, to 2 February. Eventually, the National Assembly amended the Electoral Act to allow the register, which included 61.3 million eligible voters, to be completed 60 days before the start of the elections, instead of 120 days. In addition, the amended act made it mandatory to display the voters' list 45 days prior to the election instead of 60. On 15 March, the commission disclosed the list of presidential candidates. To the consternation of his followers and the public, the list of 24 names did not include that of vice president and Action Congress (AC) candidate Atiku Abubakar, on account of corruption charges by the anti-corruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Reacting swiftly, Atiku challenged the decision in court. Earlier, on 6 January, President Olusegun Obasanjo had already reversed the sacking of his vice president, whom he had removed from his post on 23 December the previous year, on account of a pending decision by the court of appeal on the case filed by Atiku on the matter.
On 20 February, the court of appeal ruled Atiku should remain in his post despite his defection from the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) to the AC. The supreme court confirmed the verdict on 24 April, taking the view that floor-crossing, though unethical, could not be grounds for the removal of a sitting vice president. He could, in fact, only be removed through impeachment by the National Assembly. Notwithstanding this, at the 11th hour the court handed down another landmark ruling on 16 April by deciding that INEC had no power to disqualify a candidate submitted to it by a political party, thereby setting aside an earlier judgment of the court of appeal and temporarily putting the poll in doubt. However, the many more than 100 candidates who had been screened by INEC and were subsequently dropped by the parties for alleged wrongdoing were no longer able to seek redress for their disqualification because events had overtaken them.
The presidential and National Assembly elections took place as scheduled on 21 April. Umaru Yar'Adua won a landslide victory with 24.6 million votes, well ahead of his two main rivals: retired Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) won 6.6 million and Atiku Abubakar 2.6 million. The PDP, which had held power since the beginning of the democratic transition in 1999, consolidated its grip on power and won two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the National Assembly. The wins for the other candidates and parties were negligible. These results mirrored the voting patterns in the earlier gubernatorial and state assembly elections on 14 April. The ANPP held on to its strongholds in five predominantly Muslim states in the far north, while PDP won all but three of the other 31 states. Interestingly, the small Progressive People's Alliance (PPA) and its gubernatorial candidates, Theodore Orji and Ikedi Ohakim, won in Abia and Imo state in the Igbo heartland, decisively thwarting the ambitions of former Biafran leader Chukwuemeka Ojukwu and his All Progressive Grand Alliance (AGPA). Last but not least, Lagos state was taken by the AC and its candidate Babatunde Fashola. However, according to independent observers, voter turnout for the presidential elections was 20%. Even allowing a 10% margin of error, that was still 25% less than the 55% turnout claimed by INEC.
Although Umaru Yar'Adua had already been declared the winner in the presidential elections by the chairman of the electoral commission Maurice Iwu on 23 April, INEC had to organise by-elections in several states for both state and federal constituencies and these took place on 28 April. Imo state, however, was the only one in which the poll for the governorship was re-run. Most foreign observers from Europe and the US, among them former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and EU parliamentarian Max van den Berg, as well as domestic observers, such as the transition monitoring group, the Catholic Church and – after the poll – opposition parties, vigorously criticised the handling of the polls, which cost some 200 lives. According to them, the polls lacked all credibility. They focused especially on the gubernatorial and presidential elections, which were marred by violence, widespread voter intimidation, seizure of ballot boxes, procedural irregularities, fraud and organised rigging, which caused observers to call for re-runs in the worst cases. While the Commonwealth was rather cautious and ECOWAS observers even declared the polls relatively free and peaceful, the two runners-up in the presidential election rejected the results and vowed to pursue the matter in court. Western governments, however, indicated their readiness to work with the new government and invited Yar'Adua to the forthcoming G8 summit in Germany.
On 29 May, Umaru Yar'Adua was sworn in as the first president to take power from a previously elected one through the ballot box. Goodluck Jonathan became vice president. In his inaugural speech Yar'Adua at least acknowledged the lapses and shortcomings in the electoral process and promised that future elections would meet international standards. As a result, he swiftly (22 August) inaugurated the electoral reforms committee comprising 22 eminent Nigerians, including former Chief Justice Mohammed Uwais as chair.
To save costs and ensure speedy justice, the presidential election petitions tribunal took over the petitions of Buhari and Atiku (16 October), but later declined a request by Atiku to subpoena certain witnesses, among them civil servants, foreign election observers and media chiefs, whose evidence he described as crucial. Consequently, on 27 November, he filed an appeal on this issue with the supreme court.
While state election petitions tribunals annulled the election of PDP governor Ibrahim Idris in Kogi state (10 October), PDP governor Saidu Dakingar in Kebbi state (20 October) and retired vice-admiral and former chief of naval staff, Governor Murtala Nyako of the same party, in Adamawa state (15 November), the supreme court handed down two further important verdicts on the elections. On 14 June, in a constitutionally and politically highly complex issue, the court unanimously decided that the newly inaugurated PDP governor Andy Uba in Anambra state should step down in favour of his predecessor Peter Obi of the All Progressive Great Alliance (APGA). The court maintained that there was no vacancy at government house when INEC conducted the gubernatorial election in that state. The judges supported the argument that Obi's four-year term of office began with the oath of office and the oath of allegiance, which he took on 17 March the previous year. Consequently, on 19 July the election tribunal nullified the gubernatorial election. However, Obi had been impeached by the state assembly in November 2006. The high court in the state capital of Awka declared the impeachment null and void, a ruling that was upheld by the court of appeal on 9 February. Thus, the new governor Virginia Etiaba handed back power to her former boss.
On 25 October, the highest court of the land voided the governorship of Celestine Omehia (PDP) in Rivers state and ordered that Rotimi Ameachi be sworn in immediately in Omehia's stead. The court held that Ameachi was wrongly substituted by the party and that the indictment on which his disqualification was based could not be upheld in law. Moreover, the immunity clause, which Omehia clung to in order to stay in power, was considered irrelevant since the case was a pre-election matter.
On 27 April, the supreme court put an end to the impeachment saga of the previous year and upheld the ruling of the court of appeal (8 March), which had declared the impeachment of Plateau state governor Joshua Dariye in 2006 to be unconstitutional.
During the elections, outgoing President Obasanjo renewed the state of emergency in Ekiti state on 18 April. He extended the tenure of sole administrator, retired Maj. Gen. Adetunji Olurin, until the end of his second term on 29 May to prevent any repeat of the violence that had erupted in the state after the gubernatorial election and its spread to neighbouring states. In a nationwide broadcast, Obasanjo justified the decision and accused impeached governor Ayodele Fayose of having instigated the crisis. Despite this decision, the National Assembly turned down Obasanjo's request to endorse the extension (24 April), thereby forcing the sole administrator to hand over power to the speaker of the state assembly, Tope Ademiluyi, who thus became acting governor.
At the senate's inaugural session on 5 June, re-elected PDP-senator David Bonaventure Mark from Benue state emerged as senate president, while Ike Ekweremadu (PDP) from Enugu state was elected as his deputy. The new senate president was a retired major general who had served as military governor, minister of communications and member of the Armed Forces Ruling Council under different military regimes. Patricia Etteh (PDP) from Osun state was elected speaker of the house of representatives, making her the first woman to assume this position. Meanwhile, Babangida Nguroje (PDP) from Taraba state became deputy speaker. However, by November, both were removed from their posts following an in-house investigation which revealed they had breached house rules in awarding contracts worth $ 5 m for the renovation of their official residences and the purchase of several cars. On 1 November, Etteh was succeeded as speaker by Dimeji Bankole (PDP) from Ogun and Nguroje as deputy speaker by Usman Bayero Nafada (PDP) from Gombe state.
The distribution of power among the top three positions in the Nigerian political system was well balanced among the six geo-political zones. While these zones have never been formally entrenched, implicit recognition of their relevance serves as a yardstick for securing a certain balance of power. With the exception of the northwest, all the other zones were represented. However, despite the fact that 83 members of the senate and 271 of the house of representatives had been elected for the first time, some of them were well-known politicians. Seven former governors from the PDP and ANPP, who had served the maximum of two terms and had not been indicted for embezzlement at the time of nomination, used their local networks to secure election and featured most prominently in the senate: George Akume (Benue), Chimaroke Nnamani (Enugu), Ibrahim Turaki (Jigawa), Ahmed Makarfi (Kaduna), Mohammed Adamu Aliero (Kebbi), Bukar Abba Ibrahim (Yobe) and Ahmad Rufai Sani (Zamfara). Two retired senior officers, Maj. Gen. Abubakar Tanko Ayuba (Kebbi state) and Brig. John Nanzip Shagaya (Plateau state) were also elected to the senate as PDP candidates. However, the latter was one of the first members of the National Assembly, along with retired Major Satty Gogwin (AC), Ayogu Eze (PDP) and Patrick Asadu (PDP), whose election was voided in December by election tribunals.
On 28 July, President Umaru Yar'Adua swore in his cabinet, reappointing four of his predecessor's cabinet members. In addition, he retained the governor of the central bank, Chukwuma Soludo, chief of staff within the presidency Abdullahi Mohammed, and the national security adviser Sarki Murktar, both retired major generals. However, Yar'Adua assigned key portfolios to new staff with reasonable professional credentials: secretary to the government of the federation (Babagana Kingibe), justice (Michael Aondoakaa), finance (Shamsuddeen Usman), defence (Mahmud Yayale Ahmed), foreign affairs (Ojo Maduekwe), state security service (Afakriya Gadzama) and national intelligence agency (Emmanuel Imohe), while retaining the most important ministry, energy, for himself, the portfolio his predecessor had relinquished to Edmund Daukoru on 10 January. The finance minister, for example, was a former deputy governor of the central bank, while Kingibe was a well-known civil servant who had served under different military regimes and was the running-mate of the winner of the 1993 annulled elections, Moshood Abiola. Shortly thereafter, he changed sides and became foreign minister under military dictator Sani Abacha.
Just moments after he was sworn in, Yar'Adua replaced the inspector-general of police, Sunday Ehindero, with the most senior deputy inspector-general Ogbonna Onovo, an Igbo. Despite this decision, Onovo was removed three days later in favour of another deputy inspector-general, Mike Okiro from Rivers state, who soon undertook a major shake-up as a result of which at least 35 police commissioners changed positions.
The military also experienced far-reaching shake-ups during the year. Obasanjo had already retired 13 top-echelon officers in early May, and close to the end of his presidency he changed the command structure by promoting Lt. Gen. Owoye Andrew Azazi to be chief of defence staff and Maj. Gen. Luka Nyeh Yusuf to be chief of army staff. This action was necessary, since Azazi's predecessor General Martin Luther Agwai was about to take over the international peacekeeping force in Darfur. Both retained their new positions under the incoming government and were even promoted to general and lieutenant general respectively. Nevertheless, in late July and early August, Yar'Adua retired some 40 top brass and redeployed several key officers, such as commandants in the general command, military intelligence and logistics.
There were also changes in personnel in the judiciary, government agencies as well as parastatals. Idris Legbo Kutigi succeeded Alfa Modibo Belgore as chief justice on 18 January after the latter reached the mandatory retirement age of 70, and swore in 17 senior lawyers into the prestigious rank of senior advocate of Nigeria. While Obasanjo's spokeswoman Remi Oyo was appointed managing director of the news agency of Nigeria in July, the group managing director of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Funsho Kupolokun, was replaced on 10 August by one of the company's top directors, Abubakar Yar'Adua, the president's namesake, but not related.
One day before the gubernatorial and state assembly elections, the prominent Muslim cleric Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam and two of his followers were assassinated in a mosque in Kano, the biggest northern city. He was a strong advocate of strict shariah law and fell out with the governor, sharply criticising him for his allegedly cautious approach and even resigning from his post on the Hisbah Board. On 17 April, however, in the aftermath of the killings, Islamist militants stormed a police station and the office of the federal road safety commission, killing at least 13 people, most of them policemen. In addition, they attacked inhabitants of Panshekara suburb. Eventually, with the permission of then President Obasanjo, Kano state Governor Shekarau requested the military to cordon off the area. According to military sources, the soldiers killed 26 militants and arrested nine. An unknown number of militants escaped. In November, the state security service arrested Islamic militants in the three northern states of Kaduna, Kano and Yobe who had been found in possession of fertiliser and bomb-making devices and were suspected of having links to al-Qaida. As in previous years, however, Nigerian authorities could not provide substantive proof of an al-Qaida presence in the country. Mayhem broke out in the local government of Tudun Wada, home to a substantial Christian minority. An alleged blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad caused Muslim youths to go on a rampage on Friday 28 September, burning churches and shops. At least nine people died and about 600 were displaced. For the umpteenth time that incident proved that Fridays have become potentially dangerous in the north for non-Muslims, who, for years, after noon prayers, have often been targeted by militants.
The case in Kano concerning the legality of religious marshals, known as ‘Hisbah’, took a surprising twist. The previous year, Kano state government had challenged the legality of a decision by the police inspector-general to outlaw Hisbah, which had been established under state law. The supreme court, however, dismissed the suit, pointing out that it lacked jurisdiction since there was no legal dispute between the federal government and the Kano state government. The court noted that jurisdiction in any such suit lay with the federal high court in Abuja. While Hisbah was still in evidence, in contrast to previous years its members were largely confined to barracks and assigned tasks such as directing traffic and helping sports fans to their stadium seats.
The Islamic spiritual centre Sokoto, home of the sultan, saw several sectarian clashes between mainstream Sunni Muslims and groups sympathetic to the Iranian revolution, and wrongly called Shiites. After high-profile Sunni cleric Umar Dan Maishiyya, well-known for his sermons against the Shiites, was shot on 18 July by four gunmen, the sect's headquarters were attacked by young Sunni men, who lynched one of the suspects. Two days later, the Shiite sect's leader Kasimu Rimin Tawaye and some 100 of his followers were detained and reportedly accused of assassinating the Sunni cleric. In the wake of the arrests, the state government ordered security forces to demolish the sect's headquarters; destroy a school, a clinic and some living quarters; and charged the detainees in court. In October, another three people were killed in what was believed to be an execution killing by members of the Shiite sect. Despite the latent sectarian tensions, the ceremony to inaugurate the spiritual head of Nigeria's Muslims took place in Sokoto on 3 March, when Sultan Muhammad Sa'adu Abubakar received his staff of office, thus formalising the government's recognition of his unique position.
The Niger Delta was the most volatile part of the country, although several other states also experienced violence, especially bloody communal clashes over the control of land. Even the conditional release of Mujahid Dokubo-Asari (14 June), leader of the illegal Ijaw Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), who had been held on treason charges since 2005, did not improve the situation. While the supreme court had dismissed Dokubo-Asari's appeal to be released on bail on 8 June, describing him as a threat to national security, the federal high court in Abuja eventually changed its mind on medical grounds. Moreover, the court adjourned the trial until the accused was ready to stand. The federal government, however, did not intervene, indicating that the previous meeting of three Niger Delta governors with President Yar'Adua had paved the way for a political deal intended to boost a nascent peace process. Consequently, Dokubo-Asari met Vice President Jonathan in Abuja on 13 July, and maintained that abductions were not part of his struggle.
Notwithstanding this, violence in the Niger Delta reached new levels. As in the previous year, the crisis at times descended into open warfare, seriously affecting oil and gas production. Shoot-outs between militias and military personnel, kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, killing innocent people and blowing up pipelines became the norm in the area. In the course of the year, several dozen foreign oil workers were taken hostage. In almost all cases, the hostages were released after some days, weeks or months, usually after a financial deal had been struck, thereby fuelling further hostage-taking as a lucrative and flourishing business. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was the most visible group involved in this business, a business that gave rise to the constant proliferation of small armed groups.
For the first time, Chinese, Indian and South Korean workers were targeted, reminding the Nigerian public that these countries had become major economic players in Nigeria. On 5 January, five Chinese telecommunications workers were abducted at Rumuokunde, Emohua local government in Rivers state, but released on 18 January. A few days later, nine Chinese oil workers were taken hostage in Sagbama local government area in Bayelsa state after the kidnappers broke into the offices of a Chinese oil company, seizing cash as well. The hostages were set free after 11 days in captivity. Nine South Korean workers on a Daewoo oil facility were abducted on 10 January, but regained their freedom two days later. Another three Daewoo engineering workers, along with eight Filipinos, were taken at gunpoint from the Afam power plant northeast of Port Harcourt on 3 May. On 20 January, MEND had abducted 24 Filipinos from a cargo ship in Warri Southwest local government in Delta state; they spent 24 days in captivity. Only hours after they were freed on 8 May, armed men in speedboats seized four US citizens from a barge in Delta state, but they were released by the end of the month. However, the Indonesian Indorama Petrochemical Company in Eleme local government in Rivers state was one of those worst hit. On 19 May, seven Indians were rescued by a joint task force after a distress call from the company's residential quarters, but two were kidnapped and three Nigerians killed. On 1 June, militants stormed the residential estate again, abducting ten of the expatriate workers and killing two policemen attached to the place. The workers were released after more than two weeks.
In total, foreigners from at least another 16 countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East and Africa, working for international oil companies such as Shell, ChevronTexaco, Agip/ENI, TotalFinaElf, ExxonMobil and others, were affected. In January, leading tyre manufacturer Michelin announced its decision to pull out of tyre production at its plant in Port Harcourt, but maintained its large rubber plantation.
Nigerians were even worse affected and several fell victim to the attackers, including policemen and soldiers. On 16 January, gunmen killed 12 people, including four local chiefs from the Kula kingdom in Rivers state. Late in the month (28 January), some 120 criminal suspects were sprung from two police stations by armed militants in Port Harcourt, among them Soboma George, a leading militant. There were casualties on both sides. Another prominent gang leader, Ateke Tom, however, a former ally of Dokubo-Asari, could operate almost unhindered. The attacks reached their climax when militants destroyed the house of Vice President-elect Goodluck Jonathan in Otuoke village and the police station in Ogbia in Jonathan's home state of Bayelsa (16 May). Three policemen died.
Despite the fact that the newly elected president took office towards the end of May and the conditional release of Dokubo-Asari, the overall situation did not improve. On 23 August, Emohua local government again experienced a serious incident when 20 locals were killed in Rumuekpe. On 20 October, three expatriates along with four Nigerians working for Shell were abducted in Bayelsa state, and the US company Wilbros was attacked in Bonny, Rivers state, on 27 November. Two policemen and a civilian guard lost their lives. On New Year's Eve, Ateke Tom's Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) geared up for another attack in Port Harcourt early the following morning.
The counter attacks by the military were somewhat counterproductive. Although they freed several hostages and killed dozens of militants, the military failed to ease the tensions, let alone stop the kidnappings. On 12 March, the joint task force rescued three Croatians in Ogbakiri, Rivers state. On 21 June, the task force recaptured an occupied Agip/ENI oil platform in Bayelsa state, killing 12 militants and freeing some 28 hostages. Two company staff and at least three soldiers lost their lives during the operation. In late August, 15 militants were killed in a security operation in Tombia, Degeme local government in Rivers state, and seven lost their lives after a gun battle with navy personnel on 31 October. One naval officer was killed.
The Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria (IPMAN) announced on 5 July that it had entered into a special arrangement with vigilante groups to protect pipelines. On 22 October, Col. Nanven Rintip replaced Brig. Lawrence Ngubane as commander of the joint task force. In addition, the paramount ruler of Evo kingdom in Rivers state, Eze Francis Amadi, admitted he had paid a ransom of naira 3 m (some $ 25,000) to free his kidnapped child. For the first time, the amount of the ransom was publicly acknowledged.
As in the previous year, close to 100 policemen lost their lives on duty – excluding those who fell victim to the violence in the Niger Delta and during the elections and the 28 mobile policemen who died in a road crash in Benue state. On 15 November, the inspector-general of police admitted that 785 suspected armed robbers had died in encounters with police and that almost 1,600 had been arrested the previous three months. During the same period, 62 officers lost their lives. Despite this, the police retained their poor reputation, as indicated by the findings of the UN special rapporteur on torture. After a week-long visit ending on 9 March, Manfred Nowak concluded that torture and ill-treatment in police custody were widespread and that torture was part and parcel of law enforcement operations in the country. Notwithstanding this woeful conclusion, Nowak thanked top police officials for opening up police facilities to unannounced visits.
The human and civil rights record was again mixed, although harassment of journalists decreased further. In addition, the federal high court in Abuja granted the detained Ralph Uwazuruike, leader of the banned militia Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), three months of bail to accord his late mother a fitting burial (26 October). He had been arrested in 2005 and charged with treason. Courts in Enugu and Jos had earlier (in March and July) acquitted 29 MASSOB members. On 10 December, the court of appeal dismissed an appeal by the inspector-general of police to reverse a verdict voiding a Public Order Act, which made it mandatory to obtain a police permit before protest rallies. Nevertheless, the human and civil rights record was seriously tarnished on 17 December when the Kano state government admitted that seven convicts had been secretly executed the previous year outside the state. Only a little while before, the federal government had informed the UN that Nigeria had not carried out any executions in recent years.
While highway robbery decreased slightly, the number of bank raids and raids on bureaux de change again rose, leading to the deaths of several policemen and civilians. As in previous years, Lagos was the centre of armed robbery and bank raids, and in July the new AC state government approved naira 2 bn for the immediate expansion, reorganisation and upgrading of the state's rapid response squad. However, more and more banks in urban centres in the north were also affected, namely Abuja, Suleja, Kaduna, Katsina and Kano.
Premeditated killings and assassinations also increased. The traditional ruler Eze Davidson Okoro Anyanwu in Ahiazu-Mbaise local government in Imo state was gunned down on 1 May. Tunde Awanebi, chief security officer of the governor of Ondo state, was shot on 30 May, just hours after leaving office. Auwalu Jibril, former sole administrator of Minjibir local government in Kano state, was murdered on 19 June, while Mohammed Rabiu Yunus, deputy general manager of Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemical, was shot dead on 15 July. Retired Col. Lawrence Balogun was killed in Lagos on 23 July, the businessman Hamza Isa Kano in Abuja on 5 August and the Dutch businessman Tony Kouwenhoven in Port Harcourt on 2 September. More was to come. Olusegun Oladimeji, PDP member of the house of representatives, was assassinated in his home area in Oyo state on 14 September. The special advisor on revenue issues to the governor of Jigawa state, Alqasim Ahmad Gwaram, was hacked to death in Kano on 2 December and a prominent Kano Islamic scholar, Sani Naiya, was murdered on 17 December. As in preceding years, most well-known national and local victims were killed for political or personal reasons by hired assassins, as evidenced by the fact that victims were not robbed, suggesting that contract killing was becoming part of political and business life. It was estimated that contract killings could cost as little as naira 100,000 ($ 800). In fact, neither police nor other security agencies were able or willing to investigate. On rare occasions, such as the death in 2001 of Bola Ige, former justice minister and attorney-general, suspects were charged but eventually acquitted for want of evidence.
In December, Transparency International classified Nigeria the seventh most corrupt country in the world. The anti-corruption campaign did produce some positive results and there was a small ray of hope, when, on 26 July, former Bayelsa state Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was found guilty of money laundering and sentenced to two years imprisonment. He also had to forfeit property in South Africa and Abuja as well as various bank accounts and was released from prison the following day, having already spent his term in detention. The case was in line with a decision by the supreme court, which in February affirmed that the anti-corruption commission EFCC could investigate state governments, considered to be the most corrupt institutions. With this ruling in mind, outgoing President Obasanjo approved another four-year term for EFCC chairman Nuhu Ribadu. The EFCC verdict was eventually confirmed on 25 October, when the court declined to nullify the EFCC Act of 2004.
Against this backdrop, EFCC went ahead with its investigation of 15 ex-governors on 6 June and arrested several of them, including Senators Nnamani and Turaki. The second anti-corruption agency, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) disclosed on 2 July the launching in all 36 states of investigations codenamed Operation Hawk. By the end of the year, eight governors had been charged, all but one of them being freed on bail. Despite this, it was rumoured that the new justice minister and attorney-general, Aondoakaa, was obstructing the investigations – rumours given greater credence by the alleged temporary removal of the EFCC chairman at the end of the year to go on a special training course. Interestingly, late in the year it emerged that in February Obasanjo had approved two radio and two TV licences for himself as part of a pool of 38 new licences. However, on 13 November the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) applauded the work of the EFCC and Nigeria's participation in the UNODC and World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR).
Foreign Affairs
Nigeria maintained good relations with the US, its biggest crude oil customer, and former colonial power Britain. It consolidated its relations with China, expanded its cooperation with India and was increasingly involved in peacekeeping missions in Darfur.
The launching of the US-Africa command, known as AFRICOM, which became operational on 1 October, brought mixed if guarded reviews. Thus, the Pentagon was careful to stress that the aim of the new command was to help struggling states with training and aid. The new Nigerian government, still under internal pressure on account of the flawed elections, was backed by the US when the deputy secretary of state, John Negroponte, and the assistant secretary, Jendayi Frazer, visited Nigeria on their West Africa tour (12–13 November). Negroponte pointed out that Nigeria was an important strategic partner and that the US was committed to maintaining a robust bilateral partnership, a commitment reiterated by the newly appointed ambassador Robin Sanders when she presenting her credentials in early December. Shortly beforehand, on 29 November, two senior command officials, Vice-Admiral Robert Moeller, deputy commander of the military, and Mary Carlin Yates, responsible for civil-military activities, mounted a charm offensive in Nigeria to dispel misgivings about AFRICOM. These statements and initiatives and Yar'Adua's subsequent official visit to the US, where he held talks with President Bush on 13 December, silenced critics of AFRICOM inside and outside the Nigerian government. Moreover, the Sultan of Sokoto's speech to the US Institute of Peace in Washington on Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria (13 November) was aimed at silencing Nigerian Muslims critical of the US.
However, in its annual report on terrorism published at the end of April, the US mentioned Nigeria as a country where some individuals and groups had ties with possible terrorists in Sudan, Iran and elsewhere, and suggested that international terrorist groups had operated and recruited in Nigeria. Nevertheless, in May the US financial crimes enforcement network removed Nigeria from the list of non-cooperating countries in the fight against money laundering and set aside $ 15 m to support electoral reforms over a three-year period. In December, Delta Airlines started daily direct flights between Atlanta and Lagos. On 26 September, Yar'Adua gave his maiden speech at the UN General Assembly.
Chinese investments continued to increase despite the dangers for Chinese citizens in the Niger Delta. On 13 May, China Great Wall Industry Corporation, acting as the international cooperation platform for China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, launched into orbit Nigeria's communications satellite NIGCOMSAT-1 using a ‘Long March’ 3-B rocket. This was the first time that a foreign customer had purchased both a Chinese satellite and a Chinese launching service. The satellite is supposed to remain in operation for 15 years, offering broadcasting, broadband internet and phone services and control of it was eventually passed to the federal government in July. Both governments tried to strengthen military cooperation, indicated by the meeting of then defence minister Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi with his counterpart in Beijing on 5 April. Xu Jialu, special envoy of Chinese President Hu Jintao, attended Yar'Adua's inauguration. Shortly afterwards, the new president held bilateral talks with his Chinese counterpart in Berlin on 7 June in the run-up to the G8 summit in Heiligendamm. Financial cooperation between the two partners received a boost when the United Bank for Africa, one of Nigeria's top banks, entered into a partnership arrangement with the China Development Bank in October.
Nigeria's strong orientation towards Asia was underlined by the three-day state visit of India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (14–16 October). It was the first time since Jawaharlal Nehru's visit in 1962 that an Indian prime minister had come to Nigeria, which is now India's biggest African trading partner. Indeed, India had become the second biggest importer of Nigerian oil after the US. Singh's address to the National Assembly highlighted the need for and desire to set the stage for an Indo-Nigerian strategic partnership. Against this background, the Abuja Declaration was signed. It includes several agreements, including direct flights, closer defence cooperation, double taxation avoidance, protection of investments and mutual legal assistance. In early November, the Indian Oil Corporation, the leading oil and refinery company on the subcontinent, made a request to raise Nigeria's annual crude oil export from 2 to 3 m tonnes.
To an extent, relations with Britain were influenced by the corruption investigations against Nigerian ex-governors who owned assets and properties worth millions of dollars, particularly in Greater London. In addition, the Nigerian government requested the return of funds looted by ex-Governors Dariye and Alamieyeseigha and still held in Britain. Former Delta state Governor James Ibori's legal battle in British courts over his assets outside Nigeria worth $ 35 m reminded the British public that Nigerians constituted by far the biggest part of the African diaspora. Africans have become Britain's fastest-growing minority and number up to one million, of whom 80% live in the London area alone. Immigrants of Nigerian origin have been by far the most successful, only slightly lagging behind those from the US, thanks to the reasonably good Nigerian education system in the 1970s and 1980s. This diaspora continues to provide a large part of the estimated $ 4 bn in annual remittances worldwide. Against this background, Theresa Nkoyo Ibori, wife of ex-governor James Ibori, was arrested at Heathrow airport on 1 November in connection with an ongoing money laundering inquiry. The information made public revealed that in the early 1990s he had been convicted in Britain of credit card fraud and fined for theft, along with his wife and then girlfriend. In April, Joyce Bamidele Oyebanjo, an accomplice of Dariye, was sentenced to three years imprisonment for laundering the proceeds of his loot.
On the political front, Prime Minister Tony Blair maintained that Britain would work with the next government of Nigeria, despite widespread rigging in April's elections, but stayed away from Yar'Adua's inauguration and sent Baroness Royall of Blaisdon instead. Earlier, on 1 February, Lord David Triesman, in charge of African and Commonwealth issues, had held talks with the Nigerian government on the forthcoming elections, in which it was maintained that the process was on course. At the end of August, Britain's new under-secretary of state for international development, Shriti Vadera, paid a two-day visit to Nigeria to assess the ambitious plans of the British government's aid agency, Department for International Development (DFID). At the Commonwealth summit in Uganda in November, the president asked new British Prime Minister Gordon Brown for help in reorganising Nigeria's police force.
Against the background of the flawed elections, the political relationship with the EU cooled somewhat. Several members of the EU parliament demanded that the EU freeze its aid to Nigeria until free and fair elections were held, recalling that over the past five years the EU had spent more than € 500 m on projects including good governance, water supply and health. However, the EU commission was against cutting aid, arguing that such action would harm the Nigerian people rather than the government. In November, Nigeria was accused of being one of the obstacles in the path of the new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between African states and the EU. Notwithstanding this, Yar'Adua attended the second African-European summit in Lisbon (8–9 December).
As to relations with other African states, Nigeria focused on the crisis in Darfur, the Bakassi peninsula conflict with Cameroon, the AU summit in Accra and ECOWAS summit in Abuja, both in June, and a meeting of the Gulf of Guinea commission in Abuja in July. Additionally, Yar'Adua toured key African countries, including Ghana and South Africa, immediately after his election, in a shrewdly judged show of leadership in a politically crucial situation. The visits, at short notice, paid off, as indicated by the attendance of Thabo Mbeki (South Africa) and John Kufuor (Ghana) at Yar'Adua's inauguration. Their attendance helped to endorse Nigeria's leadership under the new president.
Nigeria's peacekeeping efforts in Darfur were recognised on 24 May when General Martin Luther Agwai was appointed as the new force commander of the AU peace mission, AMIS, and the subsequent AU/UN hybrid operation, UNAMID. Agwai had served as deputy commander of the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone and deputy military advisor in the UN peacekeeping department in New York. However, Nigerian forces suffered several casualties, many more than in previous years. During two attacks by rebel militias in May and September, 11 soldiers lost their lives. Despite these setbacks, another contingent of 680 soldiers left for Sudan in early October.
The Bakassi conflict, supposed to have been resolved the previous year, re-emerged on the political agenda. On 22 November, the newly elected senate passed a resolution repudiating the 2006 agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon, in terms of which the Bakassi peninsula was ceded to Cameroon. The senate questioned the validity of the agreement, claiming that then President Obasanjo had failed to bring the treaty before the National Assembly for ratification. It was subsequently revealed that his letter seeking ratification had been read on 14 June 2006, although due process had not been followed for either the letter or the agreement. On 28 November, Bola Ajibola, Nigeria's representative on the Nigerian-Cameroon mixed commission, countered the senate's claim by asserting that his government would not renege on the treaty and ruled out any possibility of reopening the Bakassi issue.
However, tension increased when at least 21 Cameroonian soldiers were killed in a cross-border raid on 12 November. The Nigerian military denied involvement in the attack, blaming the Nigerian militants who had also attacked Nigerian naval forces in the coastal town of Ibeka in the same area. An observer team, made up of the UN, Cameroon and Nigeria, was put together under the auspices of the UN in New York on 8 December. The team was supposed to visit the Bakassi peninsula in early 2008 to assess the challenges faced by those displaced in the wake of the International Court of Justice verdict on Bakassi.
Socioeconomic Developments
The oil price rallied to new heights and Nigeria's high quality crude rose from $ 60 per barrel at the start of the year to close to $ 100 by the end of November, before falling slightly towards the end of 2007. In spite of the permanent upheaval in the Delta region, which forced oil companies to cut oil and gas production, Nigeria accumulated more than $ 50 bn in foreign reserves by year's end. Thus, newly elected President Yar'Adua inherited the healthiest balance sheet of any new head of state since independence. This included the annual budget, which for the first time since 1999 was already in effect at the beginning of the financial year, which coincided with the calendar year. His predecessor and the previous National Assembly had passed the 2007 budget totalling naira 2.3 trillion ($ 18.2 bn). A deficit of naira 579 bn had been projected, based on the benchmark of $ 40 per barrel and an exchange rate of naira 125:$ 1. The naira, in fact, appreciated against the US dollar from 132:1 at the beginning to 116:1 by year's end. Security and public works got the highest allocation, 12% each, followed by education (10%) and health (7%), while power and water supply each received 6%.
Nigeria was able to settle its debts with the London Club of creditors. The government bought back promissory notes worth about $ 500 m, due in 2010, and settled oil warrants of some $ 400 m. Thus, the accumulated external debts owed by the federal government and the 36 federal states stood at $ 3.3 bn. Nevertheless, internal indebtedness grew to almost naira 1.9 trillion. In January, the AfDB successfully launched its first bond issue denominated in naira, with a maturity of one year. The issue had a face value of naira 127.80 m and a fixed coupon rate of 9.25%. In November, the debt management office issued new three-year and 10-year bonds worth naira 50 bn and with a yield of more than 9%.
The phenomenal growth in Nigeria's telecommunications sector continued as the number of subscribers skyrocketed to more than 46 m towards the end of the year. That number translated into 27 mobile phones per 100 people. Against this background, at the end of May British Telecom (BT) entered into a lucrative partnership with the Nigerian wireless telecommunication firm 21st Century Technologies, which was to manage the Nigerian end of the connection to BT's global platform for a new generation of internet protocol. Shortly before, BT pulled out of the technical services agreement with Transcorp, the majority shareholder of NITEL (Nigerian Telecommunication Limited), which had been privatised the previous year. The pull-out followed the termination of John Weir's appointment as head of the mobile subsidiary M-TEL over serious in-house disagreements over the selection of equipment suppliers. NITEL and M-TEL still had estimated debts of about naira 29 bn and a generally poor reputation, which worsened their competitiveness in an otherwise profitable market.
The privatisation programme slowed down again, after the local Bluestar Oil Services consortium pulled out of its purchase of 51% equity in the state-owned Kaduna and Port Harcourt refineries in July. The consortium had emerged as the preferred bidder days before the new president took power. He soon indicated that he might cancel the deal, allegedly due to pressure from labour unions. As in previous years, Nigeria depended on the importation of petroleum products because the National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) could not revamp the four ailing refineries in order to meet the high demand, thereby causing permanent nationwide fuel shortages. In addition, the power situation went from bad to worse, even though at least $ 5 bn had been spent since 1999 to improve the sector. Licences were issued to five new independent power producers, bringing the total to 20. At the end of November, however, government agreed to review all privatisation deals approved by the former president.
On the eve of handing over power, Obasanjo increased the pump price of one litre of petrol by naira 10 to naira 75 and the value added tax from 5% to 10%. On assuming office, Yar'Adua was confronted with a nationwide strike, which began on 20 June. The labour unions and civil society groups under the umbrella of the Joint Action Forum wanted the measures reversed, including the sale of two refineries. After four days, the unions resolved to call off the strike after both sides agreed to fix the petrol price at naira 70, provided there were no further hikes for 12 months. The government also eventually suspended the new VAT rate.
The spread of HIV/AIDS continued unabated and Nigeria retained its position as the third most infected country, with some four million people living with the virus. The megacity of Lagos topped the infection rate with over 500,000, including 100,000 children. While, with 380,000 new cases, tuberculosis was on the increase, the fight against polio gained momentum and the number of cases decreased by 80%. In October, however, authorities were combating the outbreak of a rare vaccine-derived form of polio in the far north, where 69 children caught the paralysing disease from others who had already been vaccinated.
The deep-seated suspicion of any form of immunisation programme in the Muslim north was illustrated by two lawsuits in Abuja and Kano, in which the federal and Kano state governments sued the international pharmaceutical company Pfizer for damages and compensation for the families of those who had died or suffered serious side-effects. The lawsuits stemmed from an unregistered drug test in Kano state in 1996 during an outbreak of meningitis. Some 200 children took part in the trials of a new anti-meningitis drug. In 2001, a medical panel reviewing the drug trial concluded that the experiment was an illegal trial of an unregistered drug. According to government officials, more than 50 children had died in the experiment, while many others had developed mental and physical deformities. Pfizer dismissed those claims, maintaining that the trials were lawful and only 11 had died. In December, the $ 8.5 bn lawsuits were adjourned until February 2008.
On 3 March, Newton Aduaka's film ‘Ezra’ won the Yennenga Stallion prize, the top prize at the 20th Panafrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO) in Burkina Faso, while the celebrated author Chinua Achebe was awarded the Man Booker International Prize on 13 June for his contributions to world literature. The previous week, his former pupil Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie won the prestigious Orange Broadband Prize for Fiction for her novel ‘Half of a Yellow Sun’. Last but not least, Nigeria won the fourth FIFA U17 world cup in South Korea for the third time, defeating Spain 3–0 on 9 September.