Politics and Elections

More than half the sub-region's countries faced electoral contests, which led to a genuine surprise in only one of them – Sierra Leone. Most attention was focused on the chaotic series of polls conducted in Nigeria , starting with elections for state assemblies and governors and culminating in the voting for the National Assembly and the country's president (14 and 21 April). Although incumbent President Obasanjo was constitutionally barred from standing for a third term, manoeuvres against his vice president, who ran on another party ticket, were seen as benefiting Obasanjo's presumptive successor and the presidential contender for the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), the northerner Umaru Yar'Adua. The elections were plagued by logistical difficulties, not least the updating of the electoral register. Though Yar'Adua won by a comfortable margin, numerous aspects of the polls made this a Pyrrhic victory, certainly for the Nigerian political system. Independent observers disputed the electoral commission's turnout figure, estimating it at a low 20% rather than 55%. Those from Western countries were scathing about the handling of the polls and the widespread intimidation of voters, seizure of ballot boxes, violence and organised rigging, concluding that the presidential elections lacked all credibility. Commonwealth monitors were less critical and the 150–200 person ECOWAS observer team managed to conclude that, compared to the state and gubernatorial elections, those for the president and National Assembly passed off in a “relatively more secure environment”. Admittedly, Yar'Adua's victory represented the first time in the country's history that an elected government had taken over from a previously elected one, but even ECOWAS deplored the “serious logistical problems and sporadic violence and thuggery” that, according to an ECOWAS press release, marred the state assembly and governors' elections. It also listed numerous shortcomings in the general logistics and called for “major electoral reforms”, including ensuring the independence of the electoral commission. Although Western powers decided to work with him, Yar'Adua could do little more than publicly acknowledge the shortcomings of the electoral process, promising that in future it would be up to international standards and establishing an electoral reform committee for this purpose. Typically for Nigeria, courts and election petition tribunals subsequently busied themselves with petitions for annulments and related legal battles. Nevertheless, Yar'Adua's PDP, in power since the return to civilian rule in 1999, consolidated its grip. Nigeria's geopolitical zones all gained a degree of representation in the political system, securing a balance of power in the federation. Both old and new figures gained entry into the new cabinet, but the security apparatus was subjected to a shake-up.

Similarly, Senegal held a series of three elections that reinforced the position of the parties backing incumbent President Wade, who defeated his rivals in the first round of the presidential polls by a large margin. No irregularities on the scale of Nigeria's occurred and turnout for the presidential elections was a high 70%, though it plummeted to an all-time low for the parliamentary ones that followed later. Malian politics were also dominated by presidential and parliamentary elections. President Touré secured a second term, winning a landslide in the first round against contenders who, for the first time, included a woman. Turnout, however, was low and the playing field was tilted to the advantage of the incumbent. In Sierra Leone , opposition candidate Ernest Koroma defeated Vice President Berewa, contender for the ruling party, in a run-off on 8 September. Dissatisfaction over the government's inability to fight corruption and boost employment played an important role, as did the rallying of another opposition contender to Koroma's side. The outcome of the legislative elections reflected the same balance of forces as before. Some incidents took place but observers deemed the polls credible. More importantly, it was the first time that a president whose party had been defeated peacefully handed over to the winning candidate from another party. Finally, Mauritania held presidential and (indirect) senatorial elections to clinch the return to civilian rule after the coup d'état in 2005. As the head of the junta had declared that he and his men would not stand, the playing field was open, forcing a run-off between the two leading contenders. The ultimate victor was Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi by a margin of 53% to 47%. Turnout figures were high, 70% and 68%, and foreign observers deemed the contest free, fair and transparent.

Several countries held elections for their National Assemblies, the most important of which took place in Togo . The election on 14 October was possibly the fairest and most peaceful electoral contest in the country's history and opened the way for the resumption of donor aid after more than a decade of interruption because of dictatorial government and widespread human rights violations. The electoral code was amended to introduce an independent electoral commission, thereby sidelining the partisan interior ministry, and voter registration passed off peacefully. The result was considerably reduced electoral lists, which had been inflated in the course of the rigged 2005 presidential contest. With soldiers in barracks and a special police force, trained with outside help, deployed across the country, campaigning and voting took place with only minor incident, certainly insufficient to affect the result. Despite a massive turnout of 85%, the ruling party managed to win an absolute majority – essentially because of the geographical bias in the electoral system discriminating against the densely populated southern constituencies, the opposition strongholds. Although the opposition parties accepted the result, they were excluded from the new cabinet, thus postponing the crucial test for the transition process to the presidential elections of 2010.

Parliamentary elections also took place in Benin, Burkina and Gambia. In the last two cases, they fully consolidated the position of the incumbent president. Gambia's ruling party crushed the opposition parties, which failed to unite, while in Burkina President Compaoré's ruling party secured a comfortable margin in the assembly but fell short of a two-thirds majority. As in Gambia, the opposition forces were splintered. Rather than fraud, it was the organisation of the constituency system, which discouraged nationwide opposition parties, that contributed to the government party's victory.

As an outgrowth of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord in Côte d'Ivoire , the leader of the rebel ‘Forces Nouvelles’ was appointed prime minister in a new transition government. A task force and mobile courts were established to conduct the identification of voters – one of the most contentious issues in the civil war and one that had held back the organisation of presidential elections, given the large number of disenfranchised immigrants. While under the peace agreement this identification process was to have been completed by August, the electoral commission did not expect elections before October 2008. In Cape Verde , the National Assembly adopted a new electoral code providing the electoral commission with more autonomy and calling for a new electoral census, which, however, had not been conducted by year's end due to disagreements among the political parties that delayed the exercise and pushed back the calendar for the municipal elections scheduled for 2008. Ghana and Niger saw political manoeuvring ahead of electoral contests in 2008–09. This led in the former case to a fierce battle to succeed outgoing President Kufuor as the candidate of the ruling party, while in the latter it complicated the development of an effective political response to the Tuareg rebellion.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law

West Africa's human rights record proved to be a mixed bag: there were court cases against war criminals, anti-corruption campaigns, media harassment and a few more serious cases of civil liberty violations. The special court for Sierra Leone handed down its first verdicts against members of the forces that had fought in the civil war. Three army commanders were sentenced to long prison terms for crimes against humanity and for war crimes, while two members of the militias established to fight the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) received shorter sentences. On 4 June, the court began the trial of former Liberian President Taylor, the case taking place for security reasons at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Taylor had been indicted for supporting the RUF's bloody campaign and flown to the Netherlands after his extradition by Nigeria in 2006. The trial was immediately adjourned for procedural reasons and had not restarted at year's end. Senegal, home to exiled former Chadian President Habré, adopted a law permitting prosecution of crimes against humanity, even those committed outside the national territory, in order to allow Habré's prosecution as mandated by the AU. In Mali, President Touré planned the abolition of the death penalty but was forced to postpone the bill in response to public pressure.

In Guinea, security forces went on the rampage after the president declared a state of siege, leading to the raping and robbing of civilians. In the course of massive social protests, many civilians were killed, often shot by security forces at close range. The UN special rapporteur on torture concluded that torture and maltreatment were part and parcel of police practices in Nigeria. Kano state government admitted to extrajudicial executions the previous year. In Mauritania, five of 14 suspected members of the ‘Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat’ were sentenced on lesser charges, while the remainder were acquitted. It was alleged that confessions had been extracted under torture. Finally, in Niger Human Rights Watch and AI reported on widespread rape and extrajudicial killings, as well as the torture and execution of civilians caught up in an engagement between Tuareg rebels and the military on 9 December.

As in previous years, media harassment continued, although it further decreased in Nigeria. The worst offenders were Niger, Gambia and Senegal. In Niger, harassment took place in the context of the Tuareg rebellion and developed into a total clampdown, resulting in the detention of several journalists, foreign and national. One allegedly received a death threat from the army chief of staff. Numerous journalists in Gambia were the object of harassment, notably through court action. A US-based Gambian journalist was detained by her country's intelligence agency on the charge of offending the president, while the government twice failed to appear before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, where a complaint was lodged by the Media Foundation for West Africa on behalf of disappeared journalists. In Senegal's heated electoral climate, several journalists were arrested on charges of offending the president or endangering security, while others were threatened by government officials. Similarly, in Mali journalists were arrested for reporting on a secondary school assignment involving an essay about a president and his mistress. Lesser incidents took place in Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau, where the director of state television was dismissed for failing to report on a presidential speech.

Child trafficking and labour attracted considerable attention in Ghana, where another problem – domestic violence – led to the adoption of a bill by parliament. However, the debate on decriminalising homosexuality continued when the government declined to take action. Cases of rape gained publicity in Liberia where a British charity reported that 40% of Liberians had suffered sexual abuse during the civil war, including children. Women in Sierra Leone marched through the capital protesting against violence against their sex. Later in the year, parliament enacted new laws expanding women's rights to cover protection against domestic violence, forced marriage and the inheritance of property. This contrasted with Liberia, where problems surrounding land reform continued, despite the establishment of a government commission to fill the vacuum left by the courts, which were still in a state of disarray. Finally, a new labour code was enacted in Cape Verde that improved conditions for workers.

In many countries, anti-corruption campaigns, sometimes forming part of political manoeuvres, continued. In Benin, where an important report was published on corruption in the public sector, the president took part in a ‘Green March’ against bad governance. Even in better-off Cape Verde, an audit uncovered various irregularities in public spending, though not on the scale of plundered Liberia, where several major political figures were charged with embezzlement. An accusation, however, by the auditor general that the country was far more corrupt than in the past appeared over-hasty. The government made progress in developing donor-initiated financial control mechanisms. Similarly, in Nigeria a former state governor was sentenced for money laundering while several others, including senators, were arrested and charged after a series of investigations codenamed Operation Hawk. Corruption in Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa sector, an important source of funds in the civil war, remained out of control and was the subject of a report by Global Witness. Perhaps not coincidentally, the national audit office in Guinea-Bissau, a country which this year earned notoriety as the sub-region's narco-state, began inquiries into self-enrichment practices. Corruption remained one of the principal concerns in Sierra Leone as well, while the fight against self-enrichment suffered a blow in Ghana when a court ruled that an investigative body had overstepped its powers.

Conflict, Instability and Violence

As in previous years, Nigeria was West Africa's most violent country by far, although this circumstance had few repercussions for the sub-region. Different forms of violence, with political, religious, sectarian or criminal motivations, rocked almost all parts of Nigerian society. Intimidation and violence against voters were widespread in the general elections. The north stood out for the violent actions by Islamist militants as well as sectarian clashes between Sunni Muslims and sympathisers with the Iranian revolution. In total, dozens of people were killed there and hundreds displaced. The Niger delta, however, continued to be the country's most volatile region, marked by shoot-outs between militias and military personnel, robbery and kidnapping for ransom. Nigerians as well as expatriates (mostly working in the oil business) fell victim to this. Several dozens of people died. Almost 100 policemen were killed in Nigeria in the course of duty, excluding those who fell in the Niger delta and during the elections. As a graphic indication of the violent nature of Nigerian society, contract killings targeting politicians and businessmen increased.

The Ivorian civil war, with relatively few casualties but with significant repercussions for the sub-region, appeared to be winding down further. The Ouagadougou Peace Accord of 4 March, brokered by Burkina's President Compaoré, provided for a unified army command and a power-sharing agreement between President Gbagbo's party and the rebel ‘Forces Nouvelles’, whose leader Guillaume Soro was appointed transitional prime minister. The UN- and French-patrolled buffer zone separating the northern rebels and the government's forces in the south was abolished, but doubts about the disarmament of both sides persisted. With the civilian opposition parties in disarray, rumblings of discord were heard in both the rebel and government camps. An attempted assassination of rebel leader, now Prime Minister Soro, was followed at year's end by fighting between different rebel forces, raising doubts about the future and stability of the peace accord.

Another conflict, similarly characterised by a low level of violence, was the new Tuareg rebellion in Niger. With the government refusing to negotiate but unable to neutralise the rebels, several dozen people were killed, government soldiers taken hostage and thousands of civilians displaced. The rebel force had some, albeit unclear, links with Tuareg fighters confronting the government in Mali, where a truce established in 2006 broke down. Several people were killed there and dozens of soldiers taken hostage, while a US military plane bringing in food supplies was hit by gunfire. There were no signs of ties with Islamist groups in the Sahara or North Africa. Allegations of Libyan involvement on the side of the Nigérien rebels were not substantiated.

Politics in Guinea were exceptionally violent. Security forces clamped down on social protest and on 22 January killed over 180 people marching to the presidential palace. President Conté was shaken, and he was forced to make concessions. Besides appointing a new prime minister who had the confidence of the population, the military hierarchy was reshuffled after a mutiny over back pay. The government also promised a commission of inquiry into the January massacre, but by year's end this had not materialised and Conté was back at his old game of weakening the cabinet by sacking a widely respected minister. In neighbouring Guinea-Bissau , the political year opened with an assassination that added to the country's instability. Unidentified gunmen killed the former head of the country's navy, who in 1998 had supported the overthrow of President Vieira. Rumours circulated about the involvement of Vieira, back in office since 2005, and when former Prime Minister Gomes, leader of the largest political party, publicly added his voice to the gossip, the government issued an arrest warrant for libel. Gomes fled to the local UN building and the international contact group on Guinea-Bissau mediated a truce, though by December the libel case appeared to be still alive.

In the only episode of its kind in the sub-region, the convoy of President Yayi Boni in Benin came under attack by gunmen on 15 March, with the head of state escaping unhurt. Although he intimated political motives, nothing further could be established. Burkina was rocked by social unrest and strike action in various sectors.

Socioeconomic Developments

Growth continued to be high, although in most countries it remained significantly below the 7% required to reduce poverty. Real GDP growth in 2007, according to the IMF's April 2008 regional economic outlook, varied from an exceptional 9.4% for Liberia (other estimates, although lower, were still a respectable 7.9%) and high rates for Cape Verde (6.9%), Ghana and Nigeria (both 6.4%), to a dismal 2.1% for Togo, 1.6% for Côte d'Ivoire and 1.5% for Guinea. Such figures, however, said little about the distribution of wealth. Thus, a GDP growth rate of 6.5% in Sierra Leone did not alter the fact that two-thirds of the population was un- or underemployed. On UNDP's Human Development Index for 2007–08, oil-rich Nigeria occupied the 158th position on a list of 177 countries. Rocketing oil prices, however, enabled its government to accumulate foreign reserves to the value of $ 50 bn, despite the upheavals in the Niger delta. It could settle its debts with the London Club of creditors. In contrast, a report by Ghana's statistical service indicated that the overall incidence of poverty had fallen from 51% in 1991 to 28% to 2005 – a significant reduction.

Throughout the sub-region, however, people were confronted with the rising cost of living as a result of the steep increase in petrol prices. People in Guinea were again confronted with a deterioration in living standards. Average salaried Guineans – a minority of people but supporting a large group of extended kin – saw their purchasing power reduced by three-quarters during the three preceding years. Towns in Mauritania were hit by violent protests as food prices climbed to record heights. Imported wheat rose in cost by 75%. Protests also took place in the Senegalese capital Dakar, where people suffered particularly as a result of the rise in rice prices. The removal of street vendors to improve traffic circulation led to violent riots that were in part fed by dissatisfaction over deteriorating conditions. As the exception in the sub-region, Cape Verde expected its transition from least-developed country (LDC) to a medium-developed country (MDC) to be completed by year's end.

Several countries were hit by torrential rains and flooding. In Burkina, some 40,000 people were left homeless; in Mauritania two-thirds of the dwellings in the southeastern Tintane region were destroyed; and in Niger a dozen people were killed. The floods threatened cereal production in several areas in Mali, where cereal and rice production had risen substantially over the 2006–07 season, though projections for the 2007–08 season were modest. Despite the floods, the harvest in Burkina was satisfactory overall, as in Niger where, however, isolated pockets of food shortage remained – a problem shared by most countries in the Sahelian zone. An official of the ‘Club du Sahel’ reported that redistribution of regional cereal production remained one of the main problems of food provisioning.

Oil exploration and production were on the whole disappointing. No news could be reported from Niger, where several companies were active, while production of oil and gas in Nigeria fell as a result of the chronic insecurity in the Niger delta. Despite the announcement of a significant offshore oil discovery in Ghana (estimated by the president at three billion barrels), Mauritania's much publicised Chinguetti field disappointed, with production not exceeding a daily 18,000 barrels instead of the estimated 75,000. A British company considered ending its operations and also reported that finds in Guinea-Bissau remained below recoverable standards.

In contrast, gold production and exploration continued unabated, benefiting state coffers in Ghana, Niger and Burkina, where a new mine went into operation. The exploration of uranium expanded in Niger, where numerous new licences were given out and the French Areva company lost its decades-long monopoly. In Guinea, too, a find of uranium was announced, though it was especially bauxite and iron ore that continued to attract foreign investors, despite the country's instability. Mauritania announced an export deal with China for iron ore. Iron ore mining was the subject of an important review of contracts in Liberia (among others with Arcelor Mittal) signed by previous corrupt administrations. In Sierra Leone, the incoming president announced that contracts for mining rutile and bauxite would also be renegotiated, with higher taxes. Also in Liberia, the government repossessed some of the rubber plantations occupied by ex-combatants. Liberia was admitted to the Kimberley Process certification scheme to combat the marketing of so-called blood diamonds, thereby clearing the way for the government to lift its self-imposed ban on mining. The UN Security Council lifted its embargo on exports. However, since the mining is alluvial, smuggling continued, as was the case in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Finally, Togo's major export earner, phosphate, benefited from soaring global demand, with the retail price doubling by year's end. During the previous decade, production had plummeted as a result of poor terms of trade and poor management.

Developments in the fisheries sector were unsettling. With governments having oversold fishing rights to foreign trawlers from the EU, Russia and China, stocks declined further. Several species had already disappeared from Senegalese and Mauritanian waters, and according to some this situation has encouraged the illegal migration of youngsters to Europe. While the EU pointed to the responsibility of West African governments, and NGOs and African fishermen blamed the EU, Guinea-Bissau entered a new fisheries treaty with the EU for 2007–11. The country lacked the resources to patrol its waters and protect stocks against unlicensed fleets from East Asia, among other places. The EU nevertheless announced help in replacing the wooden ‘pirogues’ (canoes) in Senegal, accounting for 80% of the nation's yearly catch, with glass fibre ones. Although income per canoe in Sierra Leone was halved, its government entered into new agreements with Russian, Chinese and Egyptian trawlers, even though it lacked the resources to patrol their activities or prevent illegal fishing.

Cotton production continued to suffer as a result of US subsidies to American farmers, which, although declared illegal by the WTO, decreased by only 10%. The president of Benin wrote to the US Congress on the subject. USAID provided little solace by signing a $ 27 m deal to help improve production, quality and marketing in Benin, Burkina and Mali. Faced with losses, many farmers reduced production and switched to other crops. Production in Burkina, accounting for about 60% of national exports in 2001–05, dropped substantially, as it did in Mali and the rebel-controlled areas of Côte d'Ivoire. In Benin, however, government-paid prices went up, boosting the yield in a sector that touches the lives of 40% of the population. Togolese production also increased because of higher state payments. The cocoa sector continued to struggle in a volatile market, affecting the lives of farmers in Côte d'Ivoire, who were already suffering under excessive taxation, Ghana and Nigeria.

There were outbreaks of avian flu of the deadly H5N1 variety in Togo and Benin. HIV/AIDS increased in Ghana, with the highest rate of infection in the east and the lowest in the north, but with an overall rise from 2.7% to 3.2%. The spread of AIDS continued in Nigeria, affecting four million people, in addition to an increase in tuberculosis. Half a million people infected with HIV/AIDS lived in the Lagos area, of whom 100,000 were children. Benin distributed 1.4 million nets to prevent malaria among pregnant women and children under five. The government in Mali also began a major campaign to distribute nets, with the ultimate goal of reaching 80% of pregnant women and children under five, in addition to vaccination campaigns against measles and polio. There were isolated cases of polio in Niger, due to its proximity with Nigeria, where, despite an 80% decrease in new cases, the government had to confront an outbreak of a rare vaccine-derived form of the disease that struck 69 children in the north. This only fuelled the deep-seated suspicion of immunisation, motivated by religious considerations but also arising from a flawed anti-meningitis drug trial that had resulted in the deaths of several children in 2001 and was still the subject of lawsuits against pharmaceutical company Pfizer.

Illegal migration to Europe was subject of discussions in ECOWAS at a meeting on 14 June. It was estimated that the sub-region harboured 7.5 million migrants from other countries. The meeting pleaded for freer intra-regional movement as one measure to counter the illegal and dangerous voyage to Europe. In July, another meeting was held in Senegal to raise awareness of the dangers involved. A common approach to migration, an issue dear to President Touré of Mali, was pursued at the ECOWAS-EU meeting in Ouagadougou in mid-October. An EU delegation had visited Senegal shortly before. France signed bilateral accords with Benin in this area, selling Sarkozy's new policy on immigration as a measure against West Africa's brain-drain. Spain opened an embassy in Guinea-Bissau and provided extra aid to stem the flow of jobseekers, while also entering into discussions with Mauritania and signing an agreement with Senegal regulating limited migration.

Latin American cocaine dealers boosted their presence, using various ports in the sub-region as entrepôts on the route to Europe, in particular the Ghanaian ports of Tema and Takoradi. They also favoured the coast of Guinea-Bissau, which was ideal for smuggling because of its numerous islands. There was concern about the stability of Guinea-Bissau, where corrupt members of the military and government continued to develop ties with the Colombian drug barons who had established themselves in the country. Guinea-Bissau's only prison had been destroyed in the civil war earlier in the decade, weakening the authorities' law enforcement abilities and contributing to the total impunity enjoyed by drugs dealers. The UN studied ways to raise funds for the reform of the security sector. More generally, representatives of ECOWAS member states' inter-ministerial drugs committees met in Ouagadougou on 3–5 September to discuss money laundering, other drugs-related issues and a report of the West African Joint Operations (WAJO), an initiative in police cooperation with a secretariat based in Lagos. Cocaine seizures increased significantly across the sub-region and more than half of all seizures on the continent were now made in West Africa. Army officers in Guinea and Gambia, a major entrepôt on the route to Britain, were reported to be involved in the trade, while seizures were made in numerous countries, including Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina, Nigeria and Cape Verde. The Sahel zone continued to be vulnerable to the trafficking of hashish, as a cannabis seizure in Niger demonstrated. The use of cocaine and crack cocaine in the sub-region itself went up, including in Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Guinea and Senegal. Heroin use also increased, a development with potential repercussions for the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Sub-regional Organisations: Cooperation and Conflict

The institutional reform of ECOWAS led to the remodelling of the secretariat into a ‘Commission’ headed by its old executive secretary, now called ‘president’, the Ghanaian Mohamed Ibn Chambas. The Commission is composed of the president, a vice president and seven commissioners, who started work in February. The vice president was provided by Burkina. The commissioner for administration and finance came from Nigeria and for trade, customs, industry and free movement of persons from Sierra Leone. Niger provided the commissioner for agriculture, environment and water resources; Togo the commissioner for infrastructure; Côte d'Ivoire macroeconomic policy; Mali political affairs and security issues; and Senegal human development and gender. Inspired by the model of the AU, the restructuring exercise was presented as a reinforcement of the Community spirit and an effort to boost the integration process.

In addition, the regional judicial council, made up of national chief justices and set up in 2006 to contribute to the functioning of the Community Court of Justice, adopted its rules of procedure. The ECOWAS technical committee of experts on political affairs, peace and security, comprising directors of political affairs in the foreign ministries of the member states, met on 4 September and called on the Commission to prepare amendments of ECOWAS instruments in the field of peace and security. The committee, established as an advisory body of the ECOWAS mediation and security council, also appealed to member states to ratify the ECOWAS convention on small arms and light weapons. The ratification campaign got a boost from Burkina Faso, Togo and Mali, the presidents of whose National Assemblies and cabinet ministers declared their support for quick ratification. Niger became the first member state to ratify. A UNDP-backed forum encompassing West African civil society organisations added its voice to the campaign.

Tangible contributions to conflict mediation were limited and emanated from member states acting in the name of ECOWAS. The most concrete achievement came from Burkina's President Compaoré, who hammered out the Ouagadougou Peace Accord on Côte d'Ivoire. ECOWAS expressed concern about the killings in Guinea and Compaoré engaged in consultations that led to the dispatch of a one-day fact-finding mission headed by former Nigerian President Babangida on 17 February. He was accompanied by Commission president Chambas, who condemned renewed killings later in February and called on the government to implement the agreement it had reached earlier with trade unions. ECOWAS participated in a confidence-building mission of the international contact group on Guinea-Bissau at the end of March to discuss the country's chronic instability. Election monitoring teams were sent to several countries, including Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone and Togo. In this regard, the Community acted under the provisions of the protocol on democracy and good governance, a supplement to the mechanism on conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security, which mandated the organisation to dispatch fact-finding missions to evaluate preparations for elections in member states. Apart from the rather optimistic judgment it gave on the Nigerian elections, ECOWAS assessed the polls in Senegal as free and fair and also lauded the organisation of the parliamentary elections in Gambia.

On 19 January, the ECOWAS heads of state and government held a summit in Ouagadougou, originally scheduled for 22 December 2006 but delayed on account of a mutiny by soldiers in Burkina. At the summit, President Compaoré took over the presidency of the heads of state authority from President Tandja of Niger. Like Tandja, he was also elected acting chairman of UEMOA. Illegal migration to Europe was one of the topics discussed at the ECOWAS summit as well as various security issues. A second summit was held in Nigeria's capital Abuja on 15 June.

Chiefs of defence staff met in Abuja on 10–12 April as members of the committee of experts on peace, formerly known as the Defence and Security Commission. It discussed a report on the implementation of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) to be made up of a task force of 1,500 and a brigade of 5,000. Nigeria had earmarked land for the headquarters of its core task force. There was concern about difficulties surrounding the peace support operations logistics depot at the Hastings airstrip in Sierra Leone, handed over to ECOWAS in 2006. Training programmes were discussed, and in July officers of the ESF completed a course in Bamako given by officers from Mali, Senegal and Niger. The chiefs of defence staff met again in Liberia early in November to further discuss ESF issues. Liberia welcomed the American decision to form a separate Africa Command (AFRICOM) and offered to host the new structure. Members of the US military visited Nigeria to counter West African criticism of the establishment of AFRICOM. By year's end, no decision had been taken on AFRICOM's land headquarters, but the US navy planned to send ships to the Gulf of Guinea as part of a global fleet station, called Africa Partnership Station, in the context of oil security, anti-terrorism and drugs surveillance.

In its relationship with the EU , the sub-region failed to agree on a common EPA, and both Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana reached individual interim agreements with the EU on 13 December, while Nigeria applied for another status. Thirteen LDCs, including Mali, fell back on yet another type of agreement, thus giving rise to three different accords, thereby complicating, among other matters, UEMOA's internal customs union. At year's end, preparations were being made for further negotiations among all the countries of the sub-region to try to come up with a common position at a later date. West African manufacturing interests in October expressed concern about the survival of their industries.

Progress in West Africa-wide economic integration remained limited or non-existent. The ECOWAS summit in Ougadougou urged members to redouble their efforts to comply with the criteria for macroeconomic convergence. With the objective of approaching a single West African currency through a two-track strategy, the convergence council of the West African monetary zone, consisting of the non-CFAfr countries Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, gave approval to the reciprocal convertibility of their national currencies as a step towards the introduction in 2009 of a common currency, the ‘ECO’ alongside the CFA franc. However, the ECOWAS summit in Abuja questioned the feasibility of the two-track approach and on 9 October ECOWAS finance ministers and central bank governors agreed to commission a study of the most feasible option for introducing a single West African currency. The inability of member states to achieve macroeconomic stability and boost intra-regional trade has so far hampered the realisation of this objective.