Domestic Politics

From the very beginning of the TFG in October 2004, MPs were divided over the question of foreign troops and the status of the capital.

The situation in the Somali capital had grown more than ever difficult after 2002. Not only had the different factions fought each other, but security had collapsed with the appearance of gangs of delinquents and a veritable kidnapping industry. The city's inhabitants and businesses – large and small – confronted this situation by creating neighbourhood militias. In some zones of the capital, Islamic courts were created in 2004 and 2005, but their jurisdiction extended to only about ten blocks in the entire city.

With the return of the factional leaders and their inner circles to Mogadishu, city dwellers hoped for a return to normalcy. Initially, this did occur but it had swiftly collapsed by the summer of 2005, when the factional leaders were unable to rise above their self-serving interests and petty jealousy. Popular support for the Islamic courts took shape in the acute resentment of the city's inhabitants. These courts were initially local responses to the lack of security. Their creation followed more or less the same format. In a war-torn urban environment, some zones were dominated numerically by a particular clan. In several cases, because of gang violence the clan elders decided to form an Islamic court. In naming the court's members, they were careful to choose judges who represented the diverse spectrum of Islam in Somalia. The militias had no connection to a particular religious trend. Islamic and Islamist movements were obviously present in these institutions because their leaders had prestige and often had the organisational skills that were otherwise lacking. These courts, which numbered less than ten before 2006, led a determined struggle against bandits and gangs. The situation did not improve because of the return of the factional leaders in spring 2005. The improvement was the result of the actions of these courts.

In early January, the TFG president and the president of parliament met in Aden and reached agreement on the reunification of transitional institutions in the city of Baidoa (Baydhabo). The revolt of the factional leaders in Mogadishu was cut short. Early on, it was clear that they were unable to secure the capital and if they returned to Baidoa they would be politically marginalised. In this context, a conflict erupted in early February 2006 between what was soon called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism and the Islamic courts.

Several wars merged into a series of extremely violent confrontations between January and June. First, there was the clan element: faction leaders tried to establish a local parliament in Mogadishu in the fall of 2005 but refused to give it an elected speaker. In the ensuing debate, threats were made against certain clans, which could explain their participation in the war against the factions. These tensions, however, were not enough to provoke such violence and the courts did not even take part in this dispute. Simultaneously, there was a violent conflict between two groups of businessmen, one led by an American ally (Bashir Rage) and one by an ally of the courts (Abuker Omar Adane). These two men were members of the same Abgal sub-sub clan. The increasingly violent skirmishes concerned a piece of land on the coast that was to house a port for exporting charcoal, one of the most profitable and environmentally destructive exports. This bloody competition began in 2005 but in 2006 the Islamic courts became involved. They had received substantial donations from Abukar Omar Adane and he requested their assistance. Bashir Rage used his American allies in the CIA and established the famous alliance against international terrorism.

American involvement changed the nature of the war. Anti-American sentiment brought the local population together, along with its hostility to a series of assassinations after September 2001 and kidnappings of religious figures. The assassinations and kidnappings, carried out by the factions, were thought to have been ordered by the Americans and Ethiopians. American involvement mobilised Islamic movements well beyond Mogadishu. While these movements were very different in terms of rites, ideology and recruitment, they were united in their opposition to the US. Hundreds of combatants arrived from Somaliland and others from southern Somalia. In the less populated Puntland, there were fewer recruits but large donations were collected: the diaspora supporting the courts also made substantial donations. The heterogeneity of the war meant that support did not come solely from radicals and Islamists. Some factions, such as the Juba Valley Alliance based in Kismaayo, joined the combat.

When the factional leaders fled the capital in early June, the Islamic courts were the only agency that could take advantage of the victory, since the clans and the businessmen supporting the war effort were not organised. It was a victory by default and the leaders of the UIC, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hasan Dahir Aweys, were well aware of this from the start.

This victory inaugurated a radical transformation of the political arena in Mogadishu and, soon, beyond the capital. It also changed the balance and reshaped relationships between the courts and their component backers. Just as in 1991, when Mohamed Siyad Barre was overthrown and the militiamen close to General Aydid gained strength by looting barracks, some Islamic groups took control of factional arsenals and methodically consolidated their influence in the movement after June. ‘Hizb al-Shabab’, the Youth Party characterised by its radical Islamist populism, gained strength and appeal. The inhabitants of the capital had not appreciated the desecration of the Italian cemetery in February 2005 by the Youth Party leader, Adan Hashi Farah Eyro, when Italy was giving almost official and religious burial to Somali immigrants who had drowned during their Mediterranean crossing. But his involvements in the frontline and his control of a powerful arsenal changed public opinion for a time.

The influence of the courts spread rapidly beyond the borders of the capital. The first extension was linked to securing the capital: they could not leave the town of Jowhar in the Alliance's hands. The struggle to secure the town against the factions was, however, very minimal in late June and July. Second, courts rapidly appeared in other cities and called for UIC assistance during the summer. The victory of the courts in Mogadishu meant the end of the faction as a form for organising Somali political life, a role it had held since 1991. This victory also signalled the arrival of a new generation of political actors. Behind the old leaders and religious figures, a younger generation of men had stepped forward, most of them less than 40. Opportunism was also evident: the creation of an Islamic court could allow one to challenge those who had assumed power or who had directly or indirectly benefited from the power of a faction. For example, in Beled Weyne and Jowhar, as in Mogadishu, there was no ‘religious revolution’, just the dismissal of an unpopular administration by sectors of the population that took advantage of the Islamic courts' rise by joining them. These revolutions were fundamentally ‘political’. Another form of expansion gave more credence to Ethiopian and American claims: military annexation, primarily in the lower Juba region with the capture of Kismaayo by the UIC in September.

The courts committed this major error as a result of several factors. The Juba Valley Alliance that controlled Kismaayo had been divided for months, not over interpretations of the Quran, but over the more secular distribution of money from the port and the future structure of the local administration. Initially, the courts did not wish to be involved in this affair, because they did not feel ready to extend their influence before coming to terms with serious internal problems. After several weeks of hesitation, however, they became involved in September. Eritrean advisers warned in early September that Kismaayo would be occupied by Ugandans and Ethiopians. Moreover, Hasan Abdullah Hersi ‘al-Turki’ and his followers in the Hizb al-Shabab and the courts were pushing to secure lower Juba and the border with Kenya. They won the debate on the strength of rumours of an American presence in northeastern Kenya. Kismaayo's capture was not without consequence. It gave rise to the first popular opposition to the courts, which sent one of their harshest leaders to the region. This action gave credence to the idea of the encirclement of the TFG after several earlier armed incidents provoked in and around Baidoa by Shabab commanders.

But the developments outside the capital contributed less to the dysfunction of the UIC than other obstacles: problems of internal organisation, ideological difference and clan troubles. Early in June, the courts established an executive committee that quickly grew to 20 members, presided over by Sheikh Sharif. The advisory committee, the shura, presided over by Hasan Dahir Aweys, ballooned to more than 90 members. Which of the two bodies had the final say? What were the decision-making procedures? Who had the mandate to do what? No one knew, including the courts themselves. Not only did they do nothing to eliminate these many ambiguities, but decisions were also often made by commanders in the field who had only relative respect for these two authoritative bodies and favoured their own contacts on each committee. Simply accepting fait accompli rather than debating decisions became a common occurrence.

The ban on qat in October and on charcoal exports in August, the requirement for women to be accompanied outside by a male family member (July), the proscription of cinema and sport, etc. (June), were all decisions made without a collective process at the top and had only local validity that spread through horizontal relationships between militia leaders. Ironically, the courts, which had wanted to preserve justice, renewed the arbitrary authority of the militias.

The terms of debate inside the country changed with the massing of Ethiopian troops on Somali territory from August onward, when unity became a question of life or death. Contrary to what some have called a ‘Talibanisation’, in many places in Somalia daily life continued without interference or coercion from court representatives. Yet, the prime minister of the TFG and the Ethiopians singled out examples of coercion to prove the al-Qaida influence within the UIC after June.

There were deep ideological differences in the Islamic courts. Somali Islam and Islamism are profoundly connected to global dynamics. There is no need to invoke al-Qaida to explain the extremism of some of the tariqa (Muslim brotherhood) and the moderation of others. Many thought that discussions should be held with the TFG, which would return to govern in the long term, while the courts would continue to use their prerogative to maintain order. Others wanted a power-sharing agreement and welcomed the negotiations sponsored by the Arab League in Khartoum in June, August and October. They did not contest the TFG president: however, the prime minister was unanimously opposed. The latter, who welcomed the losses of the factional leaders, held the most radical position against the courts, revealing his dependence on Addis Ababa and his desire to stay in his position no matter what the cost to Somalia. However, a radical and military popular element – oversimplified by those who say it was the Shabab alone – refused negotiations, seeing them as a betrayal and even trying at all costs to sabotage them until the last minute.

Given the lack of ideological unity and the pressure from foreign threat, this Shabab movement gained ground in the court-controlled regions. It sparked increasing resistance in court organisations, but also among the populace. The people began to protest the drastic rise in taxes in October, the ban on qat that punished thousands of people who earned their living in its trade and the normative coercion that saw young militia members with limited religious knowledge humiliating anyone in the street who did not seem sufficiently pious.

Given this context, the negotiations mediated by the Arab League between the TFG and the UIC were rife with problems. The first meetings in Khartoum on 23 June produced meagre results but could have gained some momentum. Not only was there mutual recognition, which is not negligible, but the parties declared a ceasefire However, the Arab League did not insist on the creation of a joint commission for verification. During the second round of discussions in August, this idea was included in the final document, but the TFG second-guessed its own delegates. The Europeans were on vacation and applied no pressure to immediately enact the principle of a joint commission for verification. The negotiations in Khartoum 3 in October did not even start and the courts made a further strategic mistake. By placing preconditions on the negotiations, they appeared to be the cause of their failure. The US and Ethiopia had their casus belli. War, once only probable, became certain. There were, however, two glimmers of hope. First, the speaker of parliament travelled to Mogadishu in early November following the failure of Khartoum 3 and made an agreement to return to real negotiations on 15 December. However, TFG once again turned a deaf ear. On 20 December, European Commissioner for Development Louis Michel went to Baidoa and Mogadishu to obtain signatures on a memorandum to return to negotiations, establish a joint commission and ensure European involvement. But his political success was swept aside by fighting between the Ethiopian army and the militias of the courts.

Before the intervention, the Security Council passed resolution 1725 on 6 December. The text proposed by the US was very surprising. It authorised an organisation, the AU, to intervene in Somalia and asked the international community to finance the intervention. The UN would not be involved in any way! Predictably, after violently criticising the resolution, the UIC issued an ultimatum on 13 December demanding the departure of Ethiopian troops. They lifted their threat when Louis Michel's visit was announced. But skirmishes began on the night of 19 December and by 20 December war had begun.

The TFG was playing two cards after the intervention. On the one hand, it endorsed American and Ethiopian decisions, at least on a rhetorical level, to demonstrate its connections with its powerful allies. On the other, it told the international community that if it did not receive the support it deserved, chaos would emerge when all the Islamists in the world descend on Mogadishu. In short: send money and troops, reconciliation could wait.

Foreign Affairs

The decision to intervene in Somalia merged two different logics. On the one hand, there was the global agenda based on the vision professed by Washington concerning the war on terror and the hunt for members of al-Qaida. On the other, the Ethiopian regime, which is contested from inside the country, was trying to prevent a new power from emerging along its southern flank that would have cordial relations with its Eritrean enemies and armed Ethiopian opposition groups. The end result was a growing challenge to stability in Somalia and beyond, in the whole region.

The intervention that started on 20 December was Ethiopian, but not exclusively Ethiopian. It would not have been possible without American consent and, most of all, American funding. The intervention was American but not only American. If Ethiopia had refused to invade, the US would have returned to its policy of funding Somali groups to hunt down members of al-Qaida.

With a common frontier of more than 1,500 km, Ethiopia could hardly remain indifferent to the Somali situation. However, history and the situation in the region did not make the task any easier. Moreover, in 2005, the fatigue over authoritarianism brought the overconfident Ethiopian rulers electoral defeat.

Ethiopia's extreme response was all the more logical given the level of hostilities between Addis Ababa and Eritrea and the Eritrean regime's historic ties with the armed groups based in Ogaden to whom it had provided training facilities and weapons to the extent that it could afford them. As early as 1999, Eritrea had some success in sending Oromo fighters through Somalia. This project gained new currency with the rise of the Islamic courts and their direct nationalist opposition to Ethiopian policies. Eritrean support for the courts, which began in the spring of 2006, was aimed at weakening the position of the TFG, which in the eyes of Eritrean leaders was from the start an instrument of Ethiopian power. The leaders of the courts shared the idea of a strong, centralised and united Somalia. They saw the creation of Somaliland in 1991 and Puntland in 1998 as attempts by Ethiopia to balkanise Somalia and to weaken Somalis as well as the Muslims of the Horn of Africa. The courts issued several contradictory statements about pan-Somalism and their claims for Ethiopian territories inhabited by Somalis.

Islamism was not Ethiopia's primary concern, despite its public pronouncements. Addis Ababa had other priorities. The first was to block Asmara and maintain Eritrea's isolation in the region, especially at a time when relations between Eritrea and Sudan had been improving since the summer of 2006. The second priority was to ensure that Ethiopian armed groups would not have sanctuary in Somalia. The third was to secure its southern flank by controlling the emergence of a Somali government: instead of dividing Somalia into ‘little republics’, it could prevent the appearance of autonomous political agents. That is what it did by helping create the TFG. This imperial approach to security is problematic, but Addis Ababa has a strong diplomatic argument: the fight against terrorism.

Since 1998, the US has considered Somalia to be a security problem. Some reasons for this include the preparations in Somalia for the attacks against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the summer of 1998 and the attack on a Mombassa hotel and an Israeli plane in November 2002. Once the idea of entering Somalia was abandoned in December 2001, the US established a containment policy that was successful until the mistake of February 2006, when the CIA offered massive support to the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. For several years, they had funded faction leaders, informers and gangs to enact their counter-terrorism policies. Adan Eyro narrowly escaped capture while the members of his inner circle living in his house were killed in 2003. The Islamists responded by executing officers or members of civil society who were suspected of working for American and Ethiopian intelligence services.

After the failure of the Alliance, the state department moved quickly to push for the creation of an International Somalia Contact Group. The group initially appeared to be an attempt by the US to rehabilitate itself and promote political solutions to the Somali question. By the fall, however, it became clear that it was just a manoeuvre to stave off criticism from the media and public opinion and that security concerns continued to dominate policy. On 14 December, US officials finally announced that the UIC was controlled by al-Qaida.

The US-Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia was a turning point in the fight against terrorism. In conformity with the priorities listed in the quadrennial defence review in 2005, American policy intends to grant certain countries the status of ‘new regional power’ in the fight against terrorism. This designation has several advantages in the case of Ethiopia: its army does not hesitate to respond to attacks and the regime has already dismissed the criticism of the international media. This strategy also gives an increased role to the Pentagon over the CIA and state department. Although international events argue for a police approach to fighting terrorism, this policy favours a military approach.

The regional organisation, IGAD , once more played no significant role except to endorse the Ethiopian priorities in Somalia. Uganda and Kenya sided with Addis Ababa in all major issues, while Eritrea and Djibouti were either silent or sidelined. More surprising, Khartoum kept a very low profile owing to the ongoing Darfur crisis and its wish to be chair of the AU after the one-year interim presidency of the Congo. The AU, as always in the case of Somalia, endorsed all decisions made by IGAD without any consideration for peace in the region: ignorance, disdain or US follow-my-leader attitude.

The EU was split. While Italy and France firmly supported the negotiations and questioned the war on terror rhetoric, Germany and the UK endorsed the US priorities or kept silent for their own reasons. The late involvement of Louis Michel, commissioner for development, was courageous and productive but too late to provide an international alternative to the US-Ethiopian intervention.

The TFG was entering Mogadishu thanks to foreign troops and this would weaken its already notional legitimacy. Reconciliation was the only cure but its core figures were not inclined to it. The terrorism issue was used as a justification for the whole invasion. Most of the international media adopted this explanation without asking simple questions. How many were those terrorists? What was the quality of the intelligence? Was it worth invading a country for an alleged couple of dozen terrorists and risk opening a new front in the Horn of Africa? US and Ethiopian behaviour looked increasingly like a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Socioeconomic Developments

The reopening of the international port and the airport in Mogadishu had an important positive impact on prices as it led to the reconfiguration of the supply networks in south and central Somalia, the improved security being another important factor. By a kind of ‘re-nationalisation’ of operators, a new component in the telecom sector was established. Animal husbandry still dominated Somalia's economy. Saudi Arabia was the last of the Gulf states to lift its ban on the import of livestock from Somalia, which it did in early December. The opening of the Saudi Arabian market was expected to lead to a boom in exports, in particular from Puntland and Somaliland.

In March, the food security and nutrition report for Somalia, published by the FAO's food security analysis unit, sounded an early caution that Somalia was at high risk of famine because of shortage of rains. About 2.1 m Somalis faced a critical food security situation. Food prices rose vastly as a result of the lowest annual cereal harvest in more than ten years. Rains finally came and a major humanitarian crisis was averted, despite local pockets of serious difficulty. At the end of the year, prices of many basic food items had fallen noticeably in areas under the control of the UIC.

As a result of the expected armed confrontations between UIC and the interim government, a large number of refugees fled to Kenya, with the exodus increasing dramatically in October. Additionally, floods in November (affecting neighbouring countries as well) forced people to leave their homes.