Domestic Politics

In January, after Blaise Compaoré had been re-elected as president the previous year, Prime Minister Ernest Paramanga Yonli put together his third cabinet. Except for the appointment of the two leaders of the largest opposition party, ‘Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Féderation – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain’ (ADF-RDA), as minister of transport (Gilbert Ouedraogo) and acting minister of higher education (Hyppolite Ouedraogo), no major changes were made to the cabinet.

At the start of the year, the forthcoming municipal elections dominated political discussions. They had been scheduled for 2005, prior to the presidential elections, but the new law reducing the presidency from seven years to five years made it necessary to delay them until 12 February 2006. Additional postponements were needed because the expiration of the legal mandate of the ‘Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante’ (CENI) following the presidential elections. Municipal polls were scheduled for 12 March but only took place on 23 April. The legal foundations for the municipal elections lay in the new laws on decentralisation, adopted in its final version on 21 December 2004. These distinguished two levels of territorial entity, regions (made up of various existing provinces) and municipal communities and resulted in a total of 13 regions and 49 urban and 302 rural municipalities. Elected deputies would choose a mayor as well as vice-mayor from their midst and set up committees for general, social and cultural affairs, economic and financial matters, as well as one for environmental and development issues. Several deputies would also be selected to serve on the regional council, a support structure for the regional governor. In the new decentralised system, budgets would only be allocated and administered at the level of the region and the municipality. Even though the ‘haut commissaire’ and the ‘préfet’ were to continue representing the state at the level of the province and ‘département’, they would not have budgetary autonomy in the future.

With its abundance of financial resources, Compaoré's party, the ‘Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès’ (CDP) was able to put up candidates in every constituency, in contrast to the other 47 parties, which had only a limited number of local strongholds. Moreover, due to the strong association of the CDP with state institutions and facilities, it could make more promises to the electorate and engage the services of celebrities such as cabinet ministers in the three-week campaign in April. The ‘Mouvement Burkinabè des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples’ (MBDHP) had vainly proposed that independent candidates should be allowed to stand in order to limit the dominance of political parties and to give local people greater opportunity to influence the political process within their communities.

The CDP's campaign showed that the party was determined to regain lost ground. In 2000, the municipal elections had been strongly influenced by the aftermath of the murder of prominent investigative journalist Norbert Zongo, on 13 December 1998. The suspicion voiced at the time was that Zongo had been murdered by members of the military at the instigation of Blaise Compaoré's younger brother François, and this had boosted the opportunities for opposition parties. The town of Koudougou in particular became one of the opposition's strongholds, first of the ADF-RDA and later – after an internal split in June 2003 – of the ‘Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Développement’ (UNDD) led by Hermann Yaméogo, son of former President Maurice Yaméogo, whose cousin Marcelin had become Koudougou's mayor. However, just before this year's municipal elections, journalists received anonymous letters stating that Hermann Yaméogo had obtained substantial sums of money from the Gbagbo regime in Côte d'Ivoire. This created negative fall-out so that even his own supporters reproached him for making choices that suited the Compaoré regime. In the end, CDP took two-thirds of the Koudougou vote.

Similar shifts occurred in Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouahigouya. In the former, the CDP ousted three ADF-RDA mayors and in Ouahigouya it prevented Gilbert Ouedraogo from obtaining the seats that would have allowed him to rebuild his image as a serious alternative to the CDP. In the campaign, it was especially Compaoré's right-hand Salif Diallo, minister of agriculture and the CDP's regional head, who challenged Ouedraogo's dominance in the north. The CDP was successful both in places where it had to regain ground and where it had been supported all along, notably in Ouagadougou and the rural municipalities. The CDP victory was overwhelming. Of the 3,807,424 registered voters, 1,870,017 Burkinabè turned out (49.1%). The top three parties took 85% of the votes. The CDP won 12,793 seats out of 17,786, leaving 1,572 for the ADF-RDA and 600 for the ‘Union Pour la République’ (UPR), hence nearly becoming the ‘winner takes all’ (‘tuk giuli’ in the major local language, Moore).

In June–July, developments in the Zongo affair once more dominated public debate, this time in relation to the trials of Ousseni Yaro and Marcel Kafando, former members of the presidential guard. While both had been found guilty of murdering David Ouedraogo in 2000, with Ousseni Yaro sentenced to 10 years, in June the judge ordered Yaro's release on grounds of good behaviour. On 31 May, a judge ordered a new cross-examination of Kafando and a prosecution witness, who retracted a statement on the basis of which Kafando had been charged with murder and arson in connection with Zongo's death (February 2001). In the light of these new developments, Kafando was acquitted on 19 July. Moreover, the judge ordered that the investigation of Kafando and any other person for the murder of Zongo be abandoned. Confirmation of this decision on appeal on 16 August meant that no further attempts would be made to find out who murdered Zongo. The court ruled that the case could be reopened only if sufficient new incriminating evidence was provided. An attempt by Robert Ménard, secretary-general of ‘Reporters sans Frontières’ (RSF), to have new material admitted was rejected on 23 October. These rulings, together with the fact that Kafando had never served time in prison, but had stayed at home sick; that Yaro had been regularly seen on the streets of Ouagadougou; and that the complicity of Compaoré's younger brother had never been seriously investigated, reinforced popular perceptions of the regime's impunity.

On 4 December, Joseph Ki-Zerbo, one of the country's leading academics and politicians, died. Well known internationally and the recipient of numerous prizes, Ki-Zerbo represented the ‘Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès/Parti Socialiste’ in parliament. Numerous obituaries for this pan-Africanist of the first hour celebrated Ki-Zerbo's intelligence and integrity.

At year's end, there were deadly clashes in the streets of Ouagadougou between the lower ranks of the military and members of the elite security police, ‘Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité’ (CRS). This episode began when on 17 December CRS police prevented a group of soldiers from taking seats for which they had no proper tickets for a concert in the football stadium. In retaliation, the soldiers attacked the central police station in the heart of Ouagadougou on 19 December. Shots were fired, killing one soldier and wounding three. This unleashed more violence the following day, with police headquarters coming under heavy machine gun and rocket fire for the entire day. Soldiers stole ammunition, opened prison doors (releasing 600 inmates) and robbed petrol stations. In all, two police officers and three soldiers were killed and several civilians wounded. The government was forced to postpone the ECOWAS and UEMOA summits scheduled for 22 and 23 December in Ouagadougou.

Immediately after the violent incidents, Minister of Defence Yéro Boly and Djibrill Bassolé, minister of security, gave a press conference, deeply deploring the events and promising to improve the relationship between the different security forces, characterised by different hierarchical systems. Questions about the causes of the violence were also raised in the press. While army mutinies have been rare since Blaise Compaoré came to power, the rank and file have voiced complaints about worsening conditions of service, including health insurance and pension packages. Lower ranks have felt alienated from their superior officers, who over the years had secured additional tasks and privileges linked, among other things, to their participation in international peacekeeping missions. Rumour had it that most of the officers had left Ouagadougou during the fighting.

The gradual reduction of the army's lower ranks combined with the proliferation of special security services, such as the CRS, formed the background to this conflict. The elite but controversial CRS, whose deployments included fighting highway banditry, triggered considerable criticism from MPs and human rights associations when on 28 October they executed three businessmen/criminals in Bogande on suspicion of being bandits. The later incidents in Ouagadougou more generally pointed to powerful undercurrents in the armed forces suggesting that Compaoré's position was weaker than intimated by the outcome of the local elections.

Foreign Affairs

As a sign of improved bilateral relations, President Compaoré paid a visit to Mauritania on 16 and 17 March. In the past, Libya and Burkina had allegedly supported rebels against former President Maaouiya Ould Taya. The coup d'etat in Mauretania by Colonel Ely Ould Vall in August 2005 opened up the possibility of restoring relations with Burkina. At Nouakchott, the two presidents proclaimed their wish to collaborate in the fields of agriculture and cattle keeping. Burkina's state-run newspaper ‘Sidwaya’ asserted that Mauritania's new president could benefit from Compaoré's expertise in conflict resolution, as shown in Chad, DR Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Togo and with regard to Touareg rebels. This report was also an allusion to the progressive change in role of Compaoré in the sub-region, developing from meddler in conflicts into a potential and effective mediator.

This shift could be clearly observed with regard to relations with Togo and Côte d'Ivoire. After the death of President Eyadéma in February 2005, Compaoré chose to support his son Faure Gnassingbé in the hope of improving relations. Under Eyadéma, these had been marred by mutual accusations of subversion, notably in the border regions. However, with the onset of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, Lomé became the major port for Burkina's trade, including cement and cotton, making it worthwhile for Compaoré to try to improve ties and leading him to step in as mediator in the dispute over Togo's fraudulent presidential elections in 2005. This year, on 20 August, he successfully mediated the signing of an agreement to resolve the crisis by forming a government of national unity and organising parliamentary elections. The agreement was co-signed by Compaoré.

With the growing presence of mainland China, Compaoré chose to express his loyalty towards his Taiwanese allies, who had given extensive aid in the construction and health sectors since 1994. On 22 September, he once more supported Taiwan's request to become a full member of the UN. He stated that with its 23 m inhabitants, Taiwan should be allowed a mature status on the international scene. Compaoré visited Taipei from 19 to 23 November. He stressed that he wanted to strengthen bilateral relations with regard to both economic collaboration and issues of democratisation.

Burkina's head of state also strengthened his international profile within the ECOWAS framework, even though its summit in Ouagadougou had to be postponed because of the fighting in the capital. It was expected, however, that Compaoré would be elected ECOWAS chairman in 2007 to replace President Mamadou Tandja of Niger, who had held the position for a second consecutive year. This development would have relevance for Compaoré's position as mediator in the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire.

Socioeconomic Developments

Multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and IMF, together with Burkina's government, continued to praise Burkina's economic performance. Growth figures were up again this year, to 6%. These positive assessments continued to trigger forms of aid. On 17 and 18 May, a meeting took place with the regional coordinator of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the US donor fund for which the country had qualified in November the previous year. Earlier in 2006, a national coordinators' team had been appointed and reported on the initial results of their tour of Burkina's 13 regions. They proposed several projects to be funded with the $ 4 bn to be made available in the near future.

Despite this international optimism, there were ample signs that the effects of growth were unevenly distributed. In June, a large movement principally made up of labour unions organised protest marches under the slogan ‘La Vie est Chère’. Rising petrol prices increased the prices of imported goods, among other things. The government was blamed for the fact that petrol prices were higher than in neighbouring Mali.

More setbacks came from the cotton sector. With more than a quarter of the population dependent on cotton-generated incomes and the crop comprising 60% of the country's export revenues, farmers would receive only $ 0.30 a kilogram for their next harvest, i.e., 9% less than the previous year. Even the SOFITEX cotton-buying company was struggling to survive, its expenses of around $ 80.45 m outstripped its income over the last two years. Meanwhile, many Burkinabè farmers tried to switch from cotton to cereals such as corn, millet and soya beans, but cereal prices were even more volatile and the crops themselves more vulnerable to the periodic droughts. This year, a 100 kg bag of maize cost just $ 6.03 compared to $ 50.28 two years earlier. The US, which has heavily subsidised 25,000 of its cotton farmers, was blamed for the low price of cotton. In October, President Compaoré told US farmers and congressmen in a video conference organised by the World Bank that cotton was essential to alleviating poverty in his country as well as in Benin, Mali, Niger and Chad. “But our economies have been reformed so that there are no forms of subsidies for farmers”, he said. “While alas, certain [Western] countries have chosen to flout the rules of the market.”

Compaoré continued his role as a free market champion. On 30 December, a contract was signed with Maroc Telecom providing it control of 51% of the shares of Burkina's telecommunications company ONATEL. The state sold its majority share in ONATEL, together with its cellphone division Telmob, for $ 290 m. Maroc Telecom planned to integrate ONATEL's services into wider sub-regional communication networks. Both company and government officials expected that information and communication technologies would play a major role in furthering social and economic development.

Gold, the country's second largest export after cotton, was the most promising sector. Gold prices continued to climb, peaking in June at $ 680 per ounce and falling back a little to $ 600 per ounce in the second half of the year. The government received $ 2.5 m in annual taxes from mining companies, which were active at Taparko, situated between Kaya and Dori (High River Gold), at Essakan in the northeast (the largest deposit worked by the South African firm Gold Fields and the Canadian firm Orezone) and Youga, near the border with Ghana (the Canadian junior Etruscan). Gold production was expected to reach 8,700 kg in 2007 – a nearly sixfold increase over 2005. The country's potential was now compared to that of Ghana and Mali, West Africa's largest gold producers.

From 4 to 7 December, the PROMIN event took place (‘Journées de promotion minière du Burkina’) organised by the ministry of mining with the object of attracting additional capital. The event, the third of its kind, was attended by representatives of several mining companies. A large delegation visited the Taparko site, slated to open as an industrially exploited open pit mine in 2007.

On 17 August, a serious accident occurred at Poura mining site, Burkina's first industrial mine, dating back to colonial times. The mine was closed in 1999, but ever since illegal miners had continued to work the shafts, a haphazard activity, particularly during the rainy season. The accident, caused by a blast, cost the lives of three people and another five were injured. The incident rekindled discussions on how to promote safety in artisanal mining, also in view of the widespread use of mercury and other chemicals. In addition, environmental problems would have to be addressed.

In tackling problems of infrastructure, Burkina saw the completion of the tarred road between Kaya and Dori. This, and the road between Ouagadougou and Kongoussi expected to be ready the following year, are important for mining companies as well as for the export of vegetables. The latter are cultivated on irrigation sites that are the result of ongoing development initiatives by the ministry of agriculture in dry season agriculture involving the cultivation of vegetables, maize and rice on fields adjacent to lakes created by artificial dams. In March and June, the minister of ‘l'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques’, Salif Diallo, inaugurated dam-building projects in Bagré and Andékanda. The ‘Agence française de Développement’ provided the $ 14.5 m needed for the first, while the second was financed ($ 6 m) by the ‘Banque Islamique de Développement’ (BID) together with the Burkina government. Oumarou Kanazoe, by far the largest builder in Burkina Faso and a close associate of the Compaoré regime, was given the responsibility for these public works. A first national conference on dams took place on 5 December. National and international experts and engineers discussed the role of dams in socioeconomic development, as well as solutions for the social and technical problems related to the construction of dams and the maintenance of irrigated areas. The World Bank announced that $ 50 m would be made available for new irrigation projects, both large- and small-scale.

In December, the president announced that his presidency of ECOWAS would serve to put economic growth high on the sub-regional agenda.