Bilateral Relations between African and European States

The new EU strategy for Africa was a key document agreed during the UK's EU presidency in December 2005 and was debated and investigated by the British House of Lords in autumn 2006. The committee in charge focused its inquiry on the implementation of the strategy, including the extent of the EU's role in Africa, how the strategy would be financed, what the priorities for its implementation would be and how the EU could best work with the AU and sub-regional organisations to ensure its implementation.

Migration flows to southwestern Europe and particularly the Canary Islands off the West African Coast continued to be a much-debated topic in Spain and between that country and West African countries of origin and transit. The Spanish government emphasised the regional dimension of the issue and sought to discuss the topic in a broader European-African framework.

The French came to the military assistance of the regimes in Chad (starting in April) and in the Central African Republic (CAR) (intensifying in November). In Chad, French troops repelled rebel groups advancing on the capital N'Djaména and thereby seemed to have saved the regime of Idriss Déby (13 April). Throughout the year, Chadian authorities denounced Sudanese support for rebels attacking towns not far from the borders of both Sudan and the CAR (25–26 June; 21 October). In the CAR, French military jets and paratroopers intervened to recapture towns in the north near the Sudanese border that had fallen under rebel control. The intervention in the CAR was supported by CEMAC troops. Both military engagements were officially justified by defence agreements with the respective countries, and represented lingering French Africa policies that hearkened back to well-known patterns of the past. Through these interventions, France risked becoming engaged in the conflict in Sudan, whence rebel groups in both Chad and the CAR came and allegedly were supported. These strong-man interventions in Africa could not stem the increasing sense of fin de règne of President Jacques Chirac. The French military presence in Africa was reasserted, yet the lack of vision in French African policy was apparent, also in Côte d'Ivoire . France's political influence in the Ivorian quagmire decreased further: it remained mired in the conflict without being able to push either side to an agreement. Elections had originally been planned for October 2005. However, they could not be held on time because of delays in the preparations and were postponed to October 2006, a date that was also ultimately not met.

Institutional Development in the Regions – EU and AU

In 2006, several high-level meetings symbolised the increased European interest in the AU . The AU aimed at institutional transformation with a view to clarifying its internal governance. Clearer structures should emerge by strengthening the Commission (as the motor of the AU) and by promoting institutional rationalisation in Africa (e.g., between the AU and the regional economic communities). An updated ‘implementation roadmap’ for these reforms was elaborated at the AU summit in Banjul (1–2 July).

Despite the more favourable odds for Africa in international politics, one could hardly expect rapid change in EU policy-making towards Africa. Implementation of the Africa strategy and the European Consensus on Development was expected to be take time, not least because the goals were broad. The start was indeed slow, as the consultation process between the EU and the AU on a joint strategy has only just begun. Disagreements over Zimbabwe continued to loom large in the highest-level inter-regional meetings between Europe and Africa, even though meetings at working and sub-regional levels were taking place.

The regular meeting of foreign ministers in the EU troika and Africa took place in Vienna in the framework of the EU-Africa dialogue (8 May). In addition to the current EU presidency, represented by the Austrian foreign minister, Ursula Plassnik, the meeting was attended by her counterpart from Congo-Brazzaville, Rodolphe Adada, as chairperson of the AU. A second troika meeting between the EU and AU took place on 10 October in Brazzaville. The AU troika consists of the former, current and future (annual) chairmanship, i.e., in addition to the Congolese foreign minister, the foreign ministers of Nigeria and Sudan were present. The AU commissioners for economic affairs, Maxwell Mkwezalamba, and for peace and security, Said Djinnit, represented African continental institutions. On the European side, also present was the EU commissioner for development cooperation, Louis Michel and the foreign minister of Finland, as well as high-level representatives of the policy unit of the general secretariat of the Council of the EU. The main topic discussed at the meeting was the implementation of the EU strategy for Africa.

In October, the commissions of both the EU and the AU met for a third joint meeting in Addis Ababa, in which in addition to both commission presidents, ten commissioners each participated (2 October). At their meeting, the two regional organisations further discussed cooperation in their institutional development. Both regional bodies signed a support programme for EU to AU assistance of € 55 m and both institutions declared their willingness to exchange officials and to increase funding for the Erasmus Mundus postgraduate student exchange programme. They also agreed on an EU-Africa infrastructure partnership (see below). Recurring topics between the EU and AU were the political situation in African states, in particular in Darfur, the DR Congo, Chad and Uganda. Not mentioned in any of the public announcements was the situation in Zimbabwe.

A meeting of the EC and African regional integration organisations was held in autumn as a follow-up to the one held last year on the EU-Africa strategy consultation. The meeting had been postponed from May to autumn. Key issues on the European-African agenda were the planned economic partnership agreements and security questions, as well as a joint EU-Africa strategy.

Conflict and Security

In support to the emerging African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Council's general secretariat and the Commission in June 2006 presented a proposed ‘European Union Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’, which was endorsed by the Council on 13 November. The concept was elaborated in the wake the EU Africa strategy commitment to increase work with the AU, regional organisations and African countries on security issues. It elaborated the framework and objectives for EU support as well as the possible measures to be taken. It aimed particularly at combining EU and member state resources and instruments for future engagements. Already in April, the EU council of ministers had decided to extend the Africa Peace Facility (APF) from 2008 to 2010. Funding was increased to € 300 m for that period, to be provided from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF). The APF was meant to financially support African peacekeeping operations under an AU mandate, such as the smaller missions to the CAR (by CEMAC) in the past and the short-term AU-led mission in the Comoros during elections in spring 2006. The major APF-funded activity, however, was the AU's mission to Darfur, Sudan (AMIS). The EU provided some police and military personnel and a total of € 242 m to AMIS, which, nevertheless, was considered a failure as it did not manage to stop the war. Political will in Europe to engage directly in Sudan was limited and the pre-eminence of AU activities was repeatedly emphasised. The AU mission to Sudan was supposed to end in December 2006, yet the regime in Khartoum did not agree to the deployment of a UN mission and played for time. There was no precedent for the suggested integrated AU-UN force that Khartoum suggested in place of a purely UN-led mission. Sudan was also covered in a wider strategy paper by the EC on the Horn of Africa (10 October). The interest in the region was best explained by its strategic value and the important activities by other powers such as the US and China. The EU, meanwhile, attempted to improve its interactions with IGAD. While the Commission's paper attempted to put the conflicts into a broader perspective and identify EU instruments to address various challenges in the region, the EU's presence and its policy impact in the area remained negligible.

The single key issue that stood out in European policy towards Africa in 2006 was the elections in DR Congo . Discussion about a European military force alongside the UN mission to Congo (MONUC) commenced in February when the EU expressed a general willingness to provide assistance. For the EU, the mission was politically important as it aimed at creating credibility for its unfolding common security policy as formulated in the European security strategy of 2003. This document called for the ability for autonomous European operations within a radius of 5,000 km, that is, most of sub-Saharan Africa. However, details of the mission proved tricky, as the Union faced continuing – and public – quarrels over the composition and the exact mandate of the EU force. Burden-sharing discussions within the EU pointed to a German lead of this peacekeeping mission, while the German government insisted on broad participation by other EU member states in the mission before it would be willing to accept the lead. The agreement was for 400–500 troops from other EU member states. On 27 April, two days after the UN mandate had been decided upon, the European Council agreed to the EUFOR mission to Congo, appointing Lt.Gen. Karlheinz Viereck (Germany) EU operational commander and Maj.Gen. Christian Damay (France) EU force commander. While EUFOR's mission was officially to assist the UN troops already deployed to Congo, it remained an autonomous, non-integrated mission. The elections in DR Congo were originally scheduled for June and were delayed several times because of political and technical difficulties, for example, with voter registration and the hesitation of President Joseph Kabila to officially invite the EU troops. Parliamentary elections and the first round of presidential elections finally took place on 30 July. When no candidate achieved the necessary absolute majority of votes, a second round of presidential elections was held in autumn (30 October). The EU mission was deployed to Central Africa in the second half of the year, with its official start on election day, 30 July. It was meant to function as a force d'ordre for four months during the elections. The force headquarters in Congo were in Kinshasa at the N'Dolo airfield. Most of the soldiers were stationed there, with a few EUFOR soldiers also stationed at the N'Djilli airfield. The largest part of the force was not stationed in DR Congo but in Libreville, Gabon, and were be deployed when they were needed. The mission itself and particularly its mandate were highly contested. The mission was declared to be mostly a deterrent to political forces that might want to contest the results of the election immediately after the counting of votes. Critics, including members of the European parliament, agreed that the EU had an interest in stability in Africa, but questioned the EU's capacity to work effectively in Africa and pointed to the risks of becoming caught up in a long conflict. Intervention should therefore be limited. This, on the one hand, meant a technically feasible, geographically restricted mission with a clear timeline until the end of 2006. On the other hand, these limitations potentially affected the value of the peace operation in DR Congo. One criticism was the restriction to the capital city of Kinshasa, in a vast country with particularly virulent conflicts in its eastern and southern provinces. Furthermore, it was argued, the strict deadline for the end of the mission was also known to potential political contestants, so the EU force deliberately created incentives to play for time and thereby reduced the deterrent impact. The EUFOR mission ended on 30 November after the final results of the election were announced. The last EU troops left Kinshasa before Christmas, after the Congolese opposition had accepted the incumbent as the newly elected president. However, the political situation in DR Congo remained tense and the peace was fragile.

The EU decided on a policy framework for support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) that aimed at greater coherence of EU activities across different funding modalities (from the EU budget and via the Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP – funding). The EC has supported SSR reforms in South Africa in areas of policing and justice reform and afterwards provided similar support in 25 other African countries. Activities under SSR included capacity building of law enforcement agencies and key ministries in the areas of justice reform, rule of law and civilian oversight. EU engagement with SSR in Africa also took place in the DR Congo in the area of defence and security policy, through its EUPOL mission, among others. EUPOL, an EU police mission in Kinshasa, had approximately 30 staff, and started in 2005. It was extended until 30 June 2007 (8 December).

Besides an observation mission alongside EUFOR in DR Congo, EU election observation missions were active in Uganda, Zambia and Madagascar in 2006.

Cotonou Partnership Agreement

In January, the planning for the 10th EDF started and a series of regional planning seminars at the highest political level were launched in the ACP regions. After discussions in the previous year, European states have committed € 22.7 bn to the EDF, covering the period from 2008–13. Discussions and planning were envisaged to continue until 2007.

In 2006, two programmes within the 10th EDF already took shape, one being the governance initiative, the second an EU-Africa partnership on infrastructure. In August, the Commission published the first outlines of the governance initiative, which arises from the renewed emphasis on governance in the European Consensus on Development. The initiative was approved by the council of ministers on 16–17 October. The governance initiative aimed at creating a new incentive mechanism that would give ACP partner countries access to funding, depending on their commitment to democratic governance reform programmes. Of the 10th EDF, € 2.7 bn was reserved for these incentive tranches, which were apparently meant to be more flexible funding alongside the funds planned to be provided by member states. A key instrument of this mechanism appeared to be a ‘governance profile’ established by the Commission and EU member states for each ACP country. The draft profiles were collated at country level and contextualised in Brussels. These profiles, intended as an analytical tool, gave an overview of nine areas: political governance, the rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, economic governance, internal and external security, social governance, the regional and international context and the ‘quality of partnership’. The papers were intended to be – and in fact in some cases were – critical assessments of the governance situation. The assessment provided for an analysis of the current situation and trends, as well as the European perception of the respective ACP government's commitment to reform. The governance profiles were not published, as work on the profile continued throughout the year. The Commission announced that the profile's conclusions would be shared ‘as appropriate’ with the partner government during the programming of assistance. According to the EC, funding would be used to support “relevant, ambitious and credible reforms”. Good performance and respect for the commitments made by the ACP countries, particularly in terms of good governance, the proper management of public funds and efficient administration would become key factors in the increase of the matching financial allocations to each country.

This initiative was also announced as part of European financial support to the APRM , an African self-assessment tool within the NEPAD programme. Twenty-six of 53 African countries have acceded to the APRM, some of them being North African non-ACP countries (Algeria and Egypt) or ACP members that are ineligible for EDF funding (South Africa).

To support the development of Africa's infrastructure – and presumably also to mark European engagement in an area where China is increasingly active – the Commission proposed an EU-Africa partnership on infrastructure (13 July). The partnership claimed to support the development goals of the AU and of NEPAD. Emphasis was laid on the establishment of transborder networks in transport, water, energy and communications. The funding needs for this area of cooperation were considerable. Funding for the EU-Africa partnership on infrastructure was to come from the EDF. In the 10th EDF, approximately € 5.6 bn was earmarked for infrastructure. Additionally, an EU-Africa infrastructure trust fund was set up. This new instrument aimed at allowing the EC and EU member states to co-finance projects with the European Investment Bank and with African and European financial and development institutions. Co-financing had been legally difficult within the EU in the past.

EU-South Africa relations were discussed as a ‘strategic partnership’, that is emphasis would be put on joint actions, beyond reactive political dialogue, that should also include regional and global issues. On 28 June, the EC published a proposal with this intent and this was taken up by the EU council of ministers on 17 October. Issues on the joint agenda included HIV/AIDS, the development of the UN, international terrorism, the Middle East and Zimbabwe. South Africa's ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe was criticised in the EU paper for not having had the desired results.

Consultations under article 96 on the violation of essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement (i.e., democracy, human rights and the rule of law) were held with Guinea, Mauritania, Togo and Zimbabwe . While the EC claimed that progress could be observed in Guinea, Togo and Mauritania, relations with Zimbabwe continued to be ‘problematic’. The EU renewed its sanctions against the regime of Robert Mugabe – including a travel ban for key figures in the regime – for a further year. The restrictive measures have been in place since 2002 without having achieved the isolation of Robert Mugabe within Africa.

EU Development Cooperation

In autumn, the EC staged the first European Development Days (13–17 November) in Brussels. In addition to a trade fair on European national development programmes, the event provided an opportunity for high-level thematic discussions, including a former African presidents' roundtable and an EU-Africa business forum. The Development Days were subsequently declared an annual event, to take place in the capital of the EU country holding Council presidency at that time.

Agreement on the EU's financial framework between 2007 and 2013 included reforms to budget organisation. This reorganisation was needed to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency. With most past and prospective ODA increases being channelled through member state's bilateral programmes – because the financial framework placed an absolute cap on EU spending on external relations – it was already foreseeable that the need for efficient use of resources would become more urgent. While the EC accounted for 20% of European ODA, this share was expected to fall to 15% by 2010, if ODA commitments were met by member states, hence the approaches like the EU-Africa infrastructure trust fund noted above. Yet, the increases decided upon within the framework of the EU budget would result in a de facto doubling of aid through the EC until 2013. While regrouping activities may in the short run only amount to the relabelling and refiling of ongoing activities, these structural changes potentially implied wider political consequences.

Particularly contentious in the rearrangement of external affairs activities was the combination of development cooperation and economic cooperation in one so-called instrument. Much legal wrangling between parliament and the EC arose out of this grouping, mainly based on concerns that the development focus and assistance to poor countries could be diverted to key strategic partners. Parliament thus initially rejected this combination of tasks under one heading for fear of losing its powers of oversight.

Changes within the EC's programmes in development cooperation were pursued under the slogan of increasing efficiency and aid effectiveness. With regard to the second source of funding for European-African development cooperation, the general EU budget, the Commission decided on a re-organisation of thematic programmes under the budget. After years of incremental addition of new thematic lines and subsequent cleaning-up, the Commission suggested the filing of all expenditure on foreign assistance under seven thematic headings instead of the current 15. Thematic budget lines, as they are called, aim at policy objectives that were not covered by country or regional programmes such as the Cotonou Agreement with ACP states. Programmes were to include human and social development (‘investing in people’, thus bearing the same title as the criteria under the US Millennium Challenge Account), including, inter alia, health, gender equality and culture. Civil society activities were curiously grouped with sub-national state bodies in a programme labelled non-state actors and local authorities. Early planning for the 10th EDF was criticised for lack of civil society involvement. Discussions within the EU have also given consideration to the possibility of EU development assistance being used in the fight against terrorism. In future, these activities will be funded through the stability instrument within external relations.

Trade and Development

The EU continued to conduct negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with six ACP sub-regions. According to the Cotonou partnership agreement, EPAs are supposed to replace existing non-reciprocal trade preferences in 2008. In its progress report on the implementation of the EU Africa strategy (12 October), the EC admitted that the “atmosphere surrounding the EPA negotiations [was] not good and that major political difficulties [might] arise.” This, the Commission claimed, was mostly due to a lack of financial support by EU member states. Aid for trade was particularly emphasised in this context: the EU has collectively pledged € 1 bn per year in aid for trade by 2010, of which a substantial part would be spent on Africa.

The EU-West Africa discussions were apparently slow. Negotiations with the West Africa grouping – consisting of ECOWAS plus Mauritania – proceeded only in autumn (6 October) to the second stage of negotiations, during which the actual text of the agreement would be drafted and discussed. In the first phase of the negotiations, from 2004 until October 2006, general questions on regional economic integration had been discussed, grouped in five thematic technical clusters, namely regional markets (free-trade area, common external tariff and trade facilitation), technical and sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards and measures (SPS), services and investment, other trade related issues and the analysis of productive sectors. The negotiations with the Central Africa grouping had reached a similar stage. This grouping consisted of CEMAC and São Tomé and Príncipe. Only in late autumn (24 November) could both sides agree to proceed to the next stage, which consisted of drafting the actual EPA text until December.

Negotiations with Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) appeared to be more advanced. The group consisted of COMESA minus Egypt and Libya with overlap into Central Africa (DR Congo) and SADC (Swaziland). Representatives from the EU and the ESA region have come together at several meetings. A session in Mauritius (17 July) agreed that development should be anchored in the EPA, both with a dedicated chapter and across the sectoral chapters in the trade agreement. Shortly after this discussion round, a trade negotiating session was held, both at technical and senior levels (24–26 July). The Commission reported good progress on the issues already under discussion (market access, agriculture, fisheries) and talks began on trade-related issues and services. At the end of August 2006, a first draft EPA text was submitted by ESA, which was discussed at a meeting of ambassadors and senior officials of the EU and ESA in Mombasa (27–29 September).

Negotiations with SADC faced a bumpier ride. They had been suspended at technical level in late 2005 at the request of SADC, mainly due to questions about the regional composition of SADC. EU-SADC negotiations were subsequently continued without DR Congo (which joined the Central Africa grouping), but continued to be tricky because of the linkages between the EU-South Africa Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) and the future EPA: South Africa is closely linked to its neighbours in a customs union (SACU). In early 2006 (7 March), SADC presented its EPA framework, which was discussed on the same date by senior officials as well as during a senior officials meeting in Swaziland on 18 May. In autumn, the EC tried to adapt its EPA directives to allow for conditional inclusion of South Africa into the EPA with SADC (28 November). Since the senior officials meeting in May, negotiations had been suspended, as the EU needed to conduct internal consultations with its constituents before being able to reply officially to the SADC framework.