Domestic Politics

The domestic political scene was completely dominated by the parliamentary elections on 15 May and their violent aftermath. This was one of the most contested and dynamic rounds of voting ever held in the country. All subsequent developments during the year were marked by the outcome: public attitudes, governance, the economy and relations with international donors were all negatively influenced by the awkward handling of post-election events.

These elections for 547 seats in the House of People's Representatives (HPR) and for the House of the Federation (the second chamber) were preceded by a campaign in which, for the first time, opposition parties gained access to the state media and could travel throughout the country and inform voters about the alternatives. The government had opened up the political process, although it remained in firm control. There were also televised debates between the main competing parties. Voter registration and turnout were very high (approx. 90%). Despite this, even before election day there were many incidents of targeted intimidation, negative press campaigns, arrests and occasional killings of opposition activists. Several government ministers also tried to ‘ethnicise’ the campaign, e.g., by intimating that the opposition campaign reflected a course similar to that of the Rwandan Interahamwe, a comparison widely rejected. In August, a local singer countered this with a song saying, “the Rwandan genocide will never happen here”, and it was an instant hit.

From a technical point of view, the elections, organised and overseen by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), went relatively smoothly and without violent incident, as far as could be ascertained from observers' reports. The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its affiliates, who were in solid control of all political institutions and centres of power, ran against a large number of opposition parties. The most important of these were the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United Ethiopian Democratic Front (UEDF), two parties that had quickly grown in popularity in the six months before the elections. CUD was a party with a more national than ethno-regional programme and represented urban populations, middle classes and a substantial portion of the central and northern peasantry (many of Amhara, Gurage and mixed background, although not with a clearly defined ‘ethnic’ profile). The UEDF was a new coalition of mainly southern Ethiopians, Oromo and diaspora-linked parties attracted to federalism and ethnic rights issues. They pleaded for ‘real federalism’ and not EPRDF's centralist kind. A number of smaller ethno-regional parties closely linked to the ruling EPRDF, e.g., in the Somali, Gambela, Afar and Beni-Shangul regions, also gained seats. Smaller ethnic opposition parties were not successful, except the Sheko and Mezenger People's Democratic Unity Organisation (SMPDUO) from the southwest, which won a single seat. Despite intimidation and threats, especially in the rural areas of Amhara and Oromiya, the two main opposition parties, CUD and UEDF, won a substantial number of seats, 161, almost a third. CUD alone won 109 seats, UEDF 52. A new Oromo party, the Oromo Federal Democratic Movement, founded in September 2004, made a good showing with 11 seats. The remaining seats were for SMPDUO and an independent, making for a total of 174 opposition seats. In the final count, the EPRDF and its affiliates won 371 seats, thus retaining a clear majority. The outcome indicated that for the first time many rural people had dared to vote for the opposition. In locations where international observers were present at vote-casting and counting, the opposition usually won. The opposition also took virtually all urban areas. Addis Ababa region was a clean sweep for them, and the CUD leader Berhanu Nega, an economist of repute, was chosen by his party as future mayor.

The vote-counting process was non-transparent and highly contested and dragged on for three months. The CUD opposition cried foul, alleging that it was during this crucial phase that the ruling party – in control of the government, the state and NEBE – secured its victory. Accusations of vote-rigging followed and for 299, mainly rural, constituencies complaints were lodged. The grounds for the opposition's accusations were not always clear, and their often stubborn rhetoric did not help to ease tensions. Only in 31 cases did a repeat vote take place, and all these seats went to the EPRDF. In this new round even some high-profile EPRDF leaders who had lost their seats in the first round now regained their mandates. It was obvious that the EPRDF, which had as usual been confident of victory, had had a great scare at the good showing of the opposition and had underestimated the groundswell of opposition to their achievements as a government. In subsequent meetings between EPRDF leaders and their political cadres, the reproach was heard that they had not properly monitored the views of the people nor ‘prepared’ adequately to secure a victory.

Despite their good showing, it appeared unlikely that the opposition would gain an outright victory. CUD in particular refused to accept the final results, calling for a repeat of the elections and staging peaceful protests to express its dissatisfaction. Despite a ban on all demonstrations and gatherings declared by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on election day, in early June students began to challenge the vote-counting process. The troubles started on the night of 5 June, when armed soldiers entered a student dormitory at Addis Ababa University at midnight to arrest CUD supporters, for unknown reasons. Other students then protested against this action and resisted, chanting, “The votes of our peasant fathers shall not be stolen, and election problems should be solved by legal means”. On 6 June, government forces arrested dozens of peacefully demonstrating students. They also shot a young woman and a student at Kotebe college. After their deaths, a cycle of protests and violent suppression began. Most Addis Ababa residents were struck by the humiliating and brutal behaviour of police and special forces, who showed little regard for human life or property.

The post-election period was thus marked by repressive state violence, persistent threats against the opposition and lack of successful dialogue, in which neither government nor opposition were skilled. In June, police and special forces killed at least 42 people, and many thousands – mostly youngsters, some only 14 years old – were arrested with-out charge in night raids and transferred to improvised, ill-equipped detention camps. On 12 June, government militia shot and killed the newly elected MP Tesfaye Adane Jara (CUD) in Arsi Negele town, and other deaths of opposition members were also reported.

The elections were witnessed by more than 300 foreign observers, from the US (non-governmental), the AU and the EU. The EU group was the largest and best prepared. The AU report was uncritical. The US and especially the EU reports complimented Ethiopia on the progress made, but stated that on the whole the elections could not be called free and fair and fell short of international standards. The EU observers and their mission head, European parliamentarian Ana Gomes, then drew heavy criticism and insults from the Ethiopian authorities, which stated that their report was “garbage” and that the observers had contributed to the election violence. Remarkable was the silence and inaction of the US, which continued to view all domestic developments in Ethiopia through the prism of the international ‘war on terror’ (with US troops stationed in eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti), seeing Meles Zenawi's regime, for some undisclosed reason, as a necessary partner. The US voiced only superficial concerns about the violence and the arrests of opposition figures. The only tangible act was to forbid the sale of Humvee vehicles to the Ethiopian police and military. However, there were reports that the government used newly acquired technology and skills for its security forces in its efforts to suppress domestic post-election dissent. The government had few if any answers to the frequent reports and questions by national and international organisations about human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, summary executions, torture, abduction, destruction of property, humiliation and unjustified imprisonment of citizens during the course of the year.

The independent press also suffered in the clamp-down, and a general curtailing of news reports followed. Rumours and unverifiable stories began to circulate and created unrest and insecurity. About 13 journalists were in jail or accused of crimes, some for ‘treason’. Virtually all non-government newspapers closed down. No independent radio and TV stations existed anyway. During the course of the year the government also targeted foreign journalists: well-known British correspondents from AP and ‘The Guardian’ were forced to leave the country, and correspondents from VOA and ‘Deutsche Welle’ had already been barred earlier in the year. Censorship and self-censorship increased notably, leading to a scarcity of information in the country.

After the final election result was made public by NEBE on 5 September, most opposition parliamentarians from CUD and some from UEDF refused to take their seats in the HPR, rejecting its legitimacy. While CUD called for peaceful protests and civil disobedience, a mass demonstration in early October in the central square of Addis Ababa was called off by them for fear of government violence.

In October, a new government, with the same party, prime minister and inner circle of trusted confidantes, was confirmed in power. Some remarkable ministerial appointments were made, e.g., that of former Oromiya region leader Kuma Demeqsa, who had a record of being dismissed from most previously held positions, as minister of defence, and of controversial figures such as Addisu Leggese as vice-premier and minister of agriculture and Tefera Walwa as minister of capacity building. The former information minister and EPRDF election campaign leader Bereket Sim'on, seen as quite a divisive person, was appointed special advisor to the prime minister. Some parliamentary procedures had already been changed in the intervening period, notably the rule that new parliamentary agenda topics could be proposed by 20% of parliamentarians: this was now raised to 51%, to minimise the impact of the opposition. Key Addis Ababa region services, such as the road transport authority, public rally permit office, NGO licensing bureau, authentication-registration bureau and quarantine service department, were also brought under the federal government, apparently to undermine the incoming CUD administration of the city. For the same reason, the government moved the seat of the Oromiya regional capital back from Nazreth to Addis Ababa.

A second round of demonstrations started in November and the government again responded with violent suppression. Another 40 to 50 people were killed, including several policemen (as in the June killings, exact numbers were unknown, because some people were not traced), and many thousands of opposition sympathisers from all over the country were detained and put in camps. On 15 November, the government admitted that it held over 5,400 people but had freed nearly 8,000 arrested earlier. However, during December more people were arrested, and estimates were that a total of 18,000 people were being held. By this time, a large group of opposition leaders (including the entire CUD leadership, among them Berhanu Nega, Mesfin Wolde-Mariam, Yaqob Haile-Mariam, Hailu Shawel and Ms. Birtukan Mideqsa), civil society activists and journalists had been put in jail, accused of having incited the violence. They were later charged with ‘treason’ and ‘genocide’ – charges for which no credible evidence was available – and were repeatedly denied bail. A list of 131 accused was then prepared, which included Ethiopian intellectuals and critical opinion leaders in the diaspora. The government also started to undermine the two main opposition parties, CUD and UEDF, by fomenting internal dissent via ‘moles’ and by refusing to recognise the legal status of the CUD, which tried in vain to register with NEBE as CUDF after one of the four constituent parties had left the coalition.

Following the November troubles, opposition activists and supporters throughout the country were persecuted and harassed. Protests and clashes between citizens and security forces continued, notably in the Oromiya, Gambella and Amhara regions, as well as in various towns such as Awasa, Dessie, Ambo, Jimma, Neqemte, Bahir Dar, Gondar and obviously Addis Ababa, where high-school pupils were in the forefront.

Despite the relatively promising election campaign, the televised debates, the improved press reporting, and the opposition parties' substantial gains, no decisive democratic breakthrough on the national level was achieved in 2005. On the contrary, an authoritarian government incapable of dealing with dissent reasserted itself. The response of NEBE, the police, army and judiciary to the election-related unrest and disputes was not professional and led to an undue escalation of violence. Despite the show of force, the regime was weakened and lost much of its legitimacy. The political atmosphere turned from elation and optimism in the early part of the year to gloom and violence in December, and despite numerous efforts by Western donor countries, no negotiated end to the crisis was in sight. Many Ethiopians saw the crisis as a turning point, and stated that the regime had now shown its true colours and that to expect the establishment of real democracy and the rule of law was an illusion, only believed by gullible Western foreigners who did not wish to admit the mistake of having put their bets on the EPRDF.

Throughout the last months of 2005, several small-scale bomb and hand grenade attacks were reported, especially in Addis Ababa. They caused little damage and no injuries or deaths and no culprits were arrested. But city residents and observers suspected that the devices were planted by (pro-) government individuals to create unrest and justify even further clamp-downs. The election crisis, resulting in growing distrust of the central government, thus aggravated the overall security situation.

On the domestic front, the year also saw a continuation of ethnic and regional tensions, with local-level conflict flaring up, especially in the Gambela region and along the boundaries between the Oromiya and Somali regions. Hundreds of people probably died during the year in repeated clashes. Mediation efforts and judicial action were rarely tried or had no success. A solution to the long-standing Gambela crisis, which had led to repeated armed clashes between the army, the indigenous Anywaa people and the Nuer people (with their numbers constantly augmented by Nuer newcomers from Sudan) was not achieved. Nothing was heard of a government commission of inquiry to investigate the clashes of 2003–04 in which hundreds of people were killed. Ethnic tensions were also reported in the Afar area (e.g., with Issa) and in the southwest. In the Southern region disputes were frequent, especially on local borders. Small-scale rebel activities were noted in the Ogaden region, where the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) maintained a presence, in parts of Oromiya (east and west) where the insurgent Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) operated, and to a lesser extent in some parts of the northern Amhara region, where unrest intensified after the election crisis in the second half of the year. More bandit activities were reported in the remoter parts of the country and occasionally on some highways. The formula of ‘ethnic politics’, which gives political expression to ethnic identity on all administrative levels, did not ease ethnic tensions but sharpened them, making ethnic identity a contested resource and political instrument. Despite the positive recognition of ethnic heritage and culture by minority groups, local-level conflicts and confrontations, notably over borders and access to regional or zonal budgets, were frequent.

Ethiopians remained committed to religion, and with various shades of affiliation: about 40% adhered to Orthodox Christianity, 38–40% to Islam, 10–12% to Protestant-Evangelical Christianity and the remainder to traditional religions. Religious leaders of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), the Muslim community and the Pentecostal-Evangelical movements were not prominent in the public or political sphere. For instance, hardly any statements or appeals about the election crisis, the insecurity, the ethnic tensions or the deadly violence were heard during the year. Fearing political repression, religious leaders rarely exerted themselves by calling for mediation or restraint. The position of the incumbent pro-government EOC patriarch continued to be contested within and outside the church. An indication of this was the frequent reports of worshippers leaving a church when he entered to lead the service. Communal relations between the three major religious blocs in general continued to be outwardly peaceful, but tensions under the surface remained. There were growing rivalries and in some areas violent clashes between Muslims, Orthodox and Pentecostals. In some places, disputes over new mosque and church buildings as well as over burial grounds were frequent. Precise information about religious conflicts was difficult to obtain, but in several places religious differences became enmeshed with the political strife of the post-election period. Christians and Christian evangelists were repeatedly harassed by Muslims. In one incident in September in the southeast, a bus was stopped by Muslim militants and passengers forced to cite the Muslim creed: one man was reportedly killed when he refused. In November, ten Christians were killed in Kore village in central Ethiopia by Muslim inhabitants allegedly incited by government cadres, and some 100 houses were burnt down. There were also skirmishes, but not killings, between Orthodox believers and Evangelicals. In the Ethiopian Christian community, Evangelist-Pentecostal affiliation continued to grow. In the Muslim community, the grassroots influence of stricter ‘foreign-style’ Islam (i.e., Saudi ‘Wahhabi’) increased, but radical or political Islam was not prominent in the public sphere. Involvement by Ethiopian Muslims in Islamist terrorist activity was quite rare.

Reforms to the judicial system were slow to materialise. The lack of funding and manpower continued undiminished, the case load of the courts was huge and the training and experience of most judges inadequate. Getting justice within a reasonable period was therefore impossible. Law enforcement was not strong, and an oft-heard opinion was that “there is no law in this country”. Citizens' perceptions of the independence of the courts and judges were unfavourable and bribery was a problem. According to the US state department human rights report for 2005, police and security forces, as a direct extension of the political power-holders, also showed contempt for court orders, e.g., those relating to the release of prisoners held without charge or found to be wrongly accused. Abuses by the police and in prisons, including frequent cases of beatings and torture, mostly occurred with impunity. In March, a 530-page report entitled “Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program” was offered to the government by a Dutch consultancy office, but the chances that the long list of recommendations will be implemented are likely to be slim. Prison conditions were marked by overcrowding, lack of food and poor hygiene. The trials of former ‘Derg’ (Mengistu regime) officials dragged on into their 15th year, thereby protracting the denial of justice to the accused.

Foreign Affairs

In what seemed to become an unsolvable stalemate, the conflict with Eritrea was marked by an almost total lack of progress and creeping deterioration, mainly as a result of additional restrictive measures imposed by the Eritreans on the United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) forces. Eritrea insisted on unconditional, non-negotiable demarcation of the border as determined in the April 2002 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) decision, despite the fact that in the decision no details for a realistic demarcation on the ground were given. Predictions by international observers and experts that “war might well break out soon” were heard throughout the year, usually following Eritrea's threats and predictable rhetoric about Ethiopia's refusal to implement the PCA border decision. This was Eritrea's excuse to keep hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the army, keep Eritrean society militarised and delay domestic democratisation indefinitely. Ethiopia did not budge either, sticking to its November 2004 ‘Five Point Peace Plan’ calling for a wider discussion of normalisation and border demarcation issues. Some 300–400,000 landmines remained in the border area, and dozens of local people were killed by mines. Tens of thousands of displaced people on both sides of the border continued to live in under-equipped camps. There were no economic or air links between the two countries. International mediation efforts by Canadian UN special envoy L. Axworthy and later by retired US General C.W. Fulford were not successful. The conflict remains unlikely to be resolved while the two current regimes remain in power. The UNMEE maintained a presence of about 3,200 personnel in the 25 kilometre-wide security zone along the 950 kilometre border. Observers noted that Eritreans crossed into the zone and reinforced their positions. Ethiopia was also reported to have occupied an area inside the zone. Due to the restrictions imposed by Eritrea, UNMEE effectively controlled only about 40% of the zone in December. There were discussions about further reducing the UNMEE force.

With its other neighbours – Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Somaliland and Kenya – Ethiopia maintained relatively good and uneventful relations. Djibouti remains the main seaport for Ethiopia, a status it has had since Ethiopia trapped itself into becoming landlocked in 1993 by recognising Eritrea, without border adjustments. Controlling contraband trade in goods was an enduring problem, with several government officials also involved. Relations with Somalia improved, as the government intensified contacts with the new Somali president Abdullahi Yusuf, a long-term ally. Ethiopia continued to keep a close watch on Somali Islamist insurgent groups in the border area, such as ‘al-Itihaad al-Islami’.

Ethiopia pursued a course of good relations with self-declared independent Somaliland, in view of its growing use of the port of Berbera. It also expanded contacts with Sudan and undertook negotiations over future oil supplies from Sudan to Ethiopia. On the Kenyan border, there were trans-border clashes between Ethiopian and Kenyan agro-pastoral groups (e.g., Somali, Boran, Degodia, Gabbra), resulting in dozens of deaths. Drought in the last few months of 2005 aggravated the problem.

Ethiopia remained active in IGAD, the sub-regional organisation of northeastern African countries, although its contribution was insignificant in 2005. One prominent issue was the Nile question, where no breakthrough was achieved as to the future use of its waters by the member states cooperating in the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). Prime Minister Meles confirmed in February that the current situation, based on old colonial treaties favouring Egypt, was untenable as Ethiopia, the source of 85% of the Nile's waters, was denied rights to use water from the Blue Nile for agriculture. Planning started for the building of a large dam at Kara Dombe on the Blue Nile.

Relations with the Western donor community deteriorated sharply because of the government's harsh suppression of post-election demonstrations, its treatment of the opposition and the worsening human rights situation. Donor country policy circles had no clear idea of what long-term conclusions to draw from the political crisis. Several EU countries announced a freeze or cutbacks in development aid and the re-channelling of funding, but no radical measures were taken. The crisis had negative effects on the economy, the investment climate and on Ethiopia's international standing, with even the World Bank making critical notes on the government's over-reaction and the damage to governance and operational reliability. The EPRDF and Prime Minister Meles thought that the country just had to revert to ‘business as usual’, but this was unlikely to happen.

The trend among the Ethiopian leadership to re-orient itself towards Asian countries, notably China, was strengthened. China, asking no questions about human rights and searching for oil and resources for its own economic expansion, was seen as the model of development for more than one reason: developing fast economically while retaining authoritarian one-party rule. China's business interests in Ethiopia notably increased, and Ethiopia also announced closer military cooperation with that country.

Socioeconomic Developments

Macroeconomic figures were contradictory, but Ethiopia probably achieved a GDP growth of 6–7%, down from earlier projections of 8.7%. GDP per capita remained basically stagnant, mainly due to high population growth. In the second part of the year, agriculture, the mainstay of the economy, suffered from drought conditions, resulting in less production and thus in a downward trend in growth. Due to the weather conditions, there was an average reduction of 1.2% in agricultural output per capita, mainly in staple crops. However, export crops like coffee and flowers recorded a significant increase compared to 2004. The emergence of the flower export businesses, set up both by Ethiopians and foreigners, was a new and promising phenomenon, which in 2005 accounted for revenues of about $ 20 m, compared to zero five years ago. Encouraging was the overall growth in the value of exports by 7.6%. But imports – mainly oil – increased by 32.6%. The value of coffee exports was $ 340 m, a growth of 35.8% growth due to higher world market prices and increased production. Non-coffee exports such as sugar, oil seeds, the stimulant ‘ch'at’, hides and skins, livestock, gold and flowers, grew by 21.8% to some $ 390 m. Industry, distributive services and other services also recorded growth rates of 6.9%, 7.6% and 6.3% respectively. Tourism took a dip because of the political disturbances.

The growth figures and prudent financial management kept hopes high among certain donors, such as the US, World Bank and IMF, for take-off growth and governance improvements. However, the stumbling blocks were government's continued refusal to open up capital and financial service markets to foreign capital – motivated by a probably justified fear of domination by outsiders – and the political crisis, which negatively affected governance, accountability and the investment climate and raised security costs. Economic growth was inhibited by the increasing cost of oil imports, which reached about 7.5% of GDP and were expected to rise by some $ 280 m (or 11% of GDP, 20% of total imports).

Demographic issues remained the subtext of much of Ethiopia's economic woes: with a persistent 3% annual growth rate, the population reached 75 m in 2005, putting undiminished stress on natural resources and on already overburdened infrastructural and government service facilities. Of the population, 43.9% was under the age of 15, and the median age was 17.7 years. Population pressure also contributed to environmental problems, conflicts over land and water and to food insecurity: in most rural areas, especially the pastoralist sector, parents had great trouble in feeding their many children adequately, even though the year started out with good harvest prospects. In the last three months of the year, however, drought conditions exacerbated the food situation. (Even in normal harvest years, at least 2.5 m Ethiopians need food aid).

The national budget for the Ethiopian financial year (1 July 2004–30 June 2005) was about $ 3.5 bn, 22% of which was destined for the regional states. The current account deficit was reported to be 11.6% of GDP, or about $ 420 m. The country's overall trade balance deficit increased by 4% of GDP and reached about a quarter of total annual GDP. The country imported almost three times the sum earned from exports, $ 3.4 bn versus $ 850 m, the deficit being compensated for by donor grants and a variety of borrowing schemes. Foreign reserves fell from five months worth of imports to 3.7 months. Inflation on an annual basis reached 10.5%, more than double that of last year and caused by higher prices for fuel, building materials, food staples, services and imported goods.

The foreign debt remained more or less stable at approximately $ 6 bn, with external debt service payments taking 6.5% of export earnings. Ethiopia again made calls for debt cancellation (from which it had already benefited to the tune of $ 9.2 bn over the past 15 years), and in July the G8 summit discussed Ethiopia as one of the countries eligible for a 100% multilateral debt write-off, which would mean the cancellation of Ethiopia's $ 161 m debt with the IMF, ADB and World Bank. But the decision was not executed, partly due to the political crisis. In December, several key donors (EU, UK and World Bank) threatened to withhold direct budget support of $ 375 m, one-quarter of projected total donor funding. The government counted on higher levels of donor funding for the coming years, but this was unlikely to materialise in view of the political crisis and the limited absorptive capacity of the administration. Foreign direct investments showed a notable increase of 40–50%, creating tens of thousands of jobs in sectors such as horticulture, aluminium, plastics production, mining, transportation and services.

About half the population remained below the poverty line. The effects of the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme, the earlier PRGF of the IMF and related plans developed in the framework of the UN MDGs, were not very visible and indeed were seen by many to be illusory.

Although the 2005 grain harvest was relatively good, 2.6 m people were again dependent on emergency food aid, while there were 5.1 m beneficiaries under a new government scheme, the Productive Safety Net Programme, although this has yet to guarantee adequate assistance. The food shortage could be largely remedied – with foreign funding – from domestic sources. Food insecurity thus remained a persistent problem, despite government efforts to increase production, agricultural extension, irrigation, dyking, etc. The 2005 UN-donor appeal for humanitarian assistance was for almost $ 272 m, of which $ 159 m was for food aid. Emergency food aid requirements in December were estimated at approx. 340,000 tonnes. UNICEF made appeals for a total of $ 91 m to combat malnutrition and the spread of disease among children in the wake of famine conditions. Donor food aid support again illustrated Ethiopia's continued food aid addiction.

Chinese and Malaysian companies were given concessions to explore oil deposits in the Gambella area and the Ogaden. The ambitious Kalub gas project, a joint venture with the Jordanian company SI-Tech International to exploit the large natural gas reserves (118 bn cubic metres) in the Ogaden did not make progress and was on the verge of collapse in December.

The two main players in the Ethiopian economy remained the EPRDF, among whose members and cronies were owners of, or large stakeholders in, many core business conglomerates in construction, media, trading and infrastructural works, and the Saudi-Ethiopian tycoon Mohammed al-Amuddin, who expanded his mega-business empire with new acquisitions and activities in various fields such as construction, hotels, mineral exploration and food and drinks factories. He also had many overseas interests. Other business people continued to complain about the power, privileges and insider knowledge of these two business blocs. On the 2005 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Ethiopia shared rank 137 with seven other countries (out of 159), a drop for the third consecutive year.

In some areas of national policy, such as education, progress was made. According to government figures, primary school coverage reached about 60–65%. However, concerns about declining quality were repeatedly voiced by parents and education experts, and the drop-out rate was some 18%. Secondary education coverage reportedly reached 30%. Violence in secondary schools was a growing problem. Universities saw a 14% higher enrolment, and 13 more regional universities were being built. Quality concerns were also heard about university education, with universities again required to take in greatly increased numbers of students, leading to similar problems as in 2004: a notable increase in the workload of teachers, alarming staff shortages, decline in student achievement and a severe reduction of the research capacity of staff. Many of the graduates could not find work. The opening of Addis Ababa University and a few others in the south where protests were organised was delayed by several months because of the post-election turmoil. In late 2005, the government announced that more than 600 Nigerian teachers were to be hired for higher education institutions.

The public health situation remained critical, the most serious diseases being malaria, TB, infections, diarrhoea and HIV/AIDS, which claimed an estimated 100,000 lives during the year. About one in every 35 Ethiopians was infected (approx. two million). The government started to provide antiretroviral drugs to a select number of people. This donor-funded programme was set to be expanded in coming years. Maternal mortality rates remained among the highest in Africa. The health sector received significant investments, e.g., with the building of more rural health stations and the training of more people, but equipment and staffing were still insufficient to deal with the grave challenges.

The ongoing social crisis was reflected in urban unemployment, which stood at about. 40%, with youths between 16 and 24 comprising the majority of the unemployed. The government and its media outlets often called them ‘adegena bozenewotch’, an insulting Amharic term meaning ‘dangerous vagrants’. Although new schemes to alleviate youth unemployment were tried, they have had little success yet. During the election demonstrations, the young urban unemployed supplied many of the street protesters, more to vent their anger and their hopelessness than in support of the opposition.

Internal migration to the cities or to other regions in Ethiopia remained limited. The population of the urban areas was about 20% of the total. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was between 150–165,000 people, including 62,000 displaced in the Tigray region by the 1998–2000 border war with Eritrea, some 50,000 people uprooted by ‘ethnic clashes’ in Gambella, as well as tens of thousands of people displaced by inter-ethnic conflicts in the Somali region (e.g., Mieso area), along the border between Somali and Oromiya regions and by small-scale clashes elsewhere. The brain-drain to Western countries continued unabated, as did the outflow of low-skilled workers, domestic servants, etc., to the Middle East. The reasons for this were abject poverty, want of opportunities to improve one's life, ethnic discrimination in the regions and overall political insecurity.