Domestic Politics

Cabinet appointments announced on 30 December 2004 gave the main coalition party, the ‘Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement’ (MNSD), 11 out of 27 positions, the rest going to the ‘Convention Démocratique et Sociale’ (CDS) of Mahamane Ousmane and some smaller coalition parties. Only ten ministers of the old cabinet remained while five appointees were women, partly as a result of a quota law. Assisted by his prime minister, Hama Amadou, also the MNSD's chairman and chief strategist, little appeared to stand in the way of Tandja's second term. Moreover, Tandja was elected chairman of ECOWAS on 20 January, which, together with his presidency of the sub-regional organisation UEMOA, added to his international status.

The president's period of calm was shattered when tax riots erupted in Niamey on 15 March, spreading later to Tahoua, Zinder and Maradi. A ‘Coalition Contre la Vie Chère’ (CCVC), created by consumer organisations and trade unions, staged the biggest ever demonstration in Niamey to protest the decision of 4 January by the National Assembly to impose a value added tax of 19% on flour, milk and sugar as well as taxes on the consumption of water and electricity. The demonstration in Niamey ended in violence and looting. The government claimed that the measures were necessary to meet convergence criteria for UEMOA's economic integration plans and refused to back down. In response, CCVC staged a widely observed ‘Pays Mort’ on 22 March, which brought several towns to a standstill. On 26–27 March, five CCVC leaders, including its chairman Nouhou Arzika, were arrested and later charged with conspiracy to overthrow the constitutional order. The independent radio station, ‘Radio Alternative’, was closed down. This only added to popular anger as Niger's urban populations struggled to make ends meet, with food prices rocketing as a result of the failed 2004 harvest and speculation by traders. On 30 March, a second ‘Ville Morte’ paralysed Niamey and Zinder, while clashes took place in Tahoua, a stronghold of the opposition ‘Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme’ (PNDS) led by Mahamadou Issoufou.

The response of the authorities showed a degree of misplaced self-confidence and underestimation of popular feeling, which turned to anxiety when events threatened to overtake the government. The prime minister met CCVC leaders on 1 April. Demands were made for the release of Arzika and his colleagues before any substantive negotiations could begin, but Amadou declined to do this or to address the tax measures. More CCVC members were arrested. On 6 April, the president made an appeal for calm. Tandja deplored the fact that the VAT measures had been introduced at a time of price rises but argued that the riots had been caused by a lack of communication. This observation had some truth to it since no preliminary consultations had taken place when the measures were introduced. When the CCVC leaders were released the next day, the stage was set for genuine talks. Demonstrations on 9 April, which led to violence in Agadez, showed the persistence of popular anger. Consequently, the government caved in and an accord was signed on 19 April. This led to the removal of VAT on milk and flour and the raising of the threshold for taxes on water and electricity. ‘Radio Alternative’ was allowed back on the air and the last protesters were released in May. The accord was a resounding victory for Niger's impoverished urban communities, which had launched a citizens' movement that became a new element in the political equation. The PNDS, as the official opposition, tried to gain from the social unrest, with Mahamadou Issoufou denouncing the arrest of CCVC leaders, dubbing the VAT measures “anti-social” and supporting the CCVC's demands while staying clear of the ‘Ville Morte’ campaign.

The government's handling of the VAT crisis was less than competent. Its claim that the measures had been forced by UEMOA treaty stipulations was untrue, since UEMOA does not dictate how regional convergence of taxation levels is to be met. Other measures could have been taken to generate revenue and broaden the country's limited fiscal base (only 15% of the population being subject to direct taxation while customs revenues have been scaled back in the course of sub-regional integration). Thus, to compensate for the loss of income as a result of the 19 April agreement, it was decided to raise land taxes and the tax on business profits in the formal and informal sectors. While this shifted part of the tax burden on to the rural areas, it was doubted whether tax collection would be as easy as it could have been under the VAT regime. This could become serious, since the government had committed itself to the VAT measures in order to qualify for a new poverty reduction and growth facility of $ 10 m, which the IMF granted on condition that Niger increase tax revenues.

A more dramatic social crisis confronted the government in the rural areas. Since October 2004, when it became clear that harvests had largely failed, it was clear that Niger would go through hard times until the 2005 autumn harvest. It is not true that the government did nothing, although under the circumstances the policies pursued were the wrong ones. On 26 October 2004, the administration had started selling cereals at subsidised prices. In November, it launched its first international appeal for food aid. With an estimated cereal shortage of 223,000 tonnes, the government announced on 23 February that it would sell 67,000 tonnes of grain below market prices in affected areas. Its objectives were to feed the needy and to prevent speculation, but it failed in both of these since the amounts sold fell far short of what was needed, and for many poor families even the subsidised price was beyond reach. In contrast to Mali, where the government had already begun to hand out grain for free in January, Niger declined to distribute cereals free of charge.

The background to this decision seems to have been a mixture of considerations. The government did not wish to upset local market conditions with free grain and thus continued pursuing the policies that the IMF and World Bank had imposed, even though free market policies would under the circumstances lead to disaster. The limited nature of its own reserves played some role as well, particularly as the international community failed to come forward with pledges. Harassed by the country's social forces and criticised by the opposition, the government feared the political consequences of the food crisis. In 1974, a government had fallen under similar circumstances. This contributed to a tendency to play down the severity of food shortages.

Nevertheless, on 7 April, the National Assembly issued an appeal to the international community for aid, which was ignored. With a steadily deteriorating situation, on 22 May the PNDS denounced the way the government was handling the crisis, calling for the regulation of cereal prices and free handouts. Six days later, the prime minister admitted that the government's subsidised sales were insufficient. Yet, when 2,000 people marched through Niamey on 2 June demanding food, the government retorted that this was impossible since the funds obtained through the sale of cereals were needed to replenish stocks, as demanded by foreign donors. As food shortages became acute, the government had to change tack, at least in part. On 6 June, it announced loans of 100 kg of millet and sorghum per family to help people survive until harvest time, a plan requiring some 18,000 tonnes of cereals. The coordinator of the food crisis unit stressed that it was vital for farmers to stay on their lands in order to prepare for the cultivation of the autumn crop.

As the international community began to realise the extent of the crisis, the government became more jumpy. On 9 August, Tandja gave an interview to the BBC in which he denied the famine, arguing that this was an invention of the opposition. He thus contradicted his own prime minister, who had admitted that there was famine. Furthermore, the president only visited affected areas when the king of Morocco, while on a state visit to Niger, was seen calling on food crisis centres on 19 July. Tandja claimed that there were periodic shortages and that, if there had been famine, people would have flocked to the cities. Yet, many of the men-folk had already trekked to the cities in search of help. The president's response was made worse by his accusation that aid agencies were exaggerating the crisis to enhance their funding. WFP's response that it had spoken of severe malnutrition rather than ‘famine’ merely illustrated Tandja's undignified politicking. The fall-out was hardly offset by Tandja's independence speech on 2 August, when he announced the expansion of future grain reserves to 100,000 tonnes, a plan detailed by the prime minister as costing CFAfr 5 bn ($ 9.2 m).

The entire affair led to political tension between Tandja and his prime minister, who had been more candid about the crisis and now suffered the consequences in the cooling of his relations with the president. Whereas during the spring, Hama Amadou had strengthened his position with the appointment of party members to the MNSD's political bureau, at a cabinet meeting on 2 September Tandja had several allies appointed to positions in central and provincial government. In the course of the year, several journalists were harassed for their reporting on the food crisis. On 29 April, the editor of the government-owned ‘Le Sahel Dimanche’ was sacked for writing too graphically about rural conditions. The director of the ‘Echo Express’ was sentenced on 27 September to four months and a heavy fine for defaming the governor of Agadez, who was accused of having misappropriated food aid. Another journalist was also prosecuted.

On 14 January, it was reported that Mohamed Ag Boula, leader of the ‘Front de Libération de l'Aïr et de l'Azawagh’ (FLAA) that he claimed to have resuscitated, was offering the release of four hostages taken during ambushes in 2004 in exchange for his brother, Rhissa Ag Boula. Rhissa, the Tuareg minister of tourism, was fired in 2004 and imprisoned for alleged involvement in the murder of an MNSD militant. After the hostages were freed, with the help of Libyan mediation, Rhissa was released on 5 March, though the government denied any deal with the hostage takers. In the autumn, the government launched an assistance programme for ex-combatants in the Tuareg rebellion, as part of the final phase of the 1995 peace agreement. The agreement was funded by the US, Libya and France, and would enable 3,000 Tuaregs to get $ 300 worth of micro-credits to set up projects in animal husbandry, vegetable gardening and the crafts industry.

There were some reports about Niger's chronic border insecurity, marked by arms smuggling and banditry, of which cattle herders in the northern Tillabéri region were especially victim. An ICG report on Islamist violence in the Sahel, however, emphasised that Niger faced little danger, as the country has had a long tradition of secular politics and is only affected from time to time by fundamentalist influences pouring across the border with northern Nigeria. Finally, three soldiers were sentenced on 22 July for kidnapping and torturing an army major in an effort to secure the release of 100 soldiers arrested after Tandja's first election as president in 1999. Eleven others were sentenced in absentia.

Foreign Affairs

As ECOWAS chairman, Tandja visited Guinea-Bissau shortly before that country's presidential elections on 19 June, which were destined to finalise Guinea's transition period. He also vowed to pursue efforts in the Ivorian peace process and was part of a delegation mediating in the Togolese constitutional crisis, but made little headway on either count. Niger scored a political victory on 12 July when the International Court of Justice announced its verdict in the long-running border conflict with Benin , awarding 16 of 25 islands in the Niger and Mékrou rivers to Niger, including Lété Island, the heart of the dispute. Equipped with the dual presidency of UEMOA and ECOWAS, Tandja was one of five African heads of state invited to the White House on 13 June, which led only to talks about the strengthening of commercial ties. Relations with the United States were more generally marked by security cooperation, involving the provision of US logistical support and training to a Niger army unit of 150 men as part of Washington's ‘anti-terrorism’ measures. Joint military exercises with US forces and troops from other Sahelian countries took place from 6 to 26 June (Operation Flintlock). The visit of the king of Morocco (18–20 July) took place in the light of the food crisis. Libya mediated the release of hostages taken by Tuareg rebels in 2004.

The main element in Niger's foreign dealings was passive – being the subject of belated international humanitarian attention. International agencies were consistent in their expressions of concern about Niger, in contrast to Western governments. In October 2004, WFP had already warned about the effects of the locust invasion and insufficient rainfall, respectively responsible for 30% and 70% of the cereal shortfall. In December 2004, as well as during the following month, WFP launched appeals for aid that fell on deaf ears, which were tuned in to the tsunami disaster. In February, FAO reported that Niger would need to import 40% more grain than in the previous year. In mid-May, the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs issued an appeal for $ 16 m in food aid for a third of Niger's population, some 3.6 m people. By the end of June, only $ 2.7 m had been pledged, though not paid, mostly by small Western nations. The EU decided to disburse – 6.6 m to alleviate food shortages in Mali and Niger, the latter getting – 4.6 m. However, it was especially ‘Médecins sans Frontières’ (MSF) that beat the drum to wake up Western governments. In July, it called for the distribution of free food instead of subsidised sales of cereals. UN humanitarian coordinator Jan Egeland sharply criticised Western governments, arguing that the death of young children was unacceptable, especially since the crisis had been predicted from the start. The IMF, for its part, denied allegations that its policies were to blame. It pointed out that it allowed famine-related spending, that it was willing to help Niger find the extra cash and, somewhat disingenuously, that it did not dictate market-based policies but that these policies were part of Niger's own poverty reduction strategies. The G8 summit in Gleneagles completely ignored Niger.

In late July, the French government airlifted 35.4 tonnes of therapeutic milk and food in addition to medicine as a donation to UNICEF-Niger. By August, WFP reported that it had received $ 20.6 m of a requested $ 57.6 m, stating that a further 58,939 tonnes of cereals were urgently needed. Limited food aid was received from northern Nigeria. The crisis achieved such a high profile that Kofi Annan felt constrained, amid criticism by MSF of the conduct of UN agencies, to fly to Niger and visit the Zinder region (23 August). By then, only half of a new UN appeal of $ 81 m – i.e., five times the original estimate of the amount required – had been received, with the secretary-general pleading for reform of the humanitarian aid ‘system’.

Socioeconomic Developments

In September, the government agreed to a memorandum with trade unions entailing public sector pay rises of 10%. This followed earlier agreements with teachers – who on 8 January called off a strike that had begun in October 2004 – on retirement, housing allowances and the payment of one month salary arrears. These actions demonstrated the government's wish to avoid further trouble with the unions, which had strengthened their position with the VAT crisis and the establishment of a union federation on 5 January, the ‘Entente des Travailleurs du Niger’. The social necessity for these measures should be seen against the backdrop of a decade of declining purchasing power, but it was predicted that it would be difficult to avoid a widening deficit.

In the mobilisation of world opinion, the precise nature of the food crisis eluded many. Some specialists argued that it did not amount to famine in the classical sense, meaning a generalised food shortage, but everyone agreed it involved severe food shortages that particularly affected young children, women and the elderly. Cereal deficits recur on a regular basis in Niger while malnutrition is structural even in the best of years, especially among children, 40% of whom according to WHO are underweight. The average grain deficit is 10%, i.e., 300,000 tonnes on a total needs basis of three million. The core of the problem is the generalised condition of poverty at nearly all levels, which undermines the capacity of people to absorb shocks and makes a mockery of free-market prescriptions. Thus, in the Ouallam region, a 100 kg bag of millet went through the CFAfr 30,000 ceiling ($ 55), making it inaccessible to most people. Free distribution of cereals began in July, which was far too late.

Exactly how many people perished under the circumstances is difficult to say. By June it was reported that 150,000 children were severely malnourished. Figures in July–August spoke of 32,000, with another 160,000 at risk. An estimated 3.6 m people, or 28% of the population, were hit by the crisis, with total acute malnutrition rates estimated to have reached 20% in the worst affected zones. The UN claimed that 800,000 children were, in one way or another, affected by food shortages, with another 800,000 people over 15 years of age in a “critical state”. In August, the UN reported that the deterioration in conditions had been arrested but not yet reversed. In September, it was reported that in one area in the east children were still dying at a rate of 40 a day. However, by then the UN announced it would begin scaling back aid in anticipation of the harvest. At the time of writing, no firm total figure of victims was available. With a ‘normal' mortality rate for children under five at 274 per 1,000 – among the highest in the world – 200,000 people die in Niger each year, half of them children.

With fairly good rains, the autumn harvest was above average. However, since people had used up their reserves, difficulties were expected to continue. WFP estimated in November that almost two million people experienced moderate food insecurity, with severe food insecurity for 20% to 30% of households in numerous regions. Pastoralists had lost 300,000 head of cattle, many of which were sold to offset a fodder shortage of nearly five million tonnes at prices that tumbled as livestock glutted the market. FAO estimated that 10,000 families had lost animals. Since livestock is an important food buffer, apart from being Niger's second largest export earner, Peul and Tuareg communities were expected to face serious difficulties.

The growth rate was calculated at 3.8%, while inflation was estimated to have risen to 6%, in part because of food price increases. Niger lost its penultimate place on the Human Development Index, dropping to the very bottom of the list as the world's poorest country. Concerns about high population growth persisted. With a net population growth of 400,000 people a year, the new total population estimate according to the UN is 14 million. The 2006 budget was presented on 10 October, with projected expenditure totalling CFAfr 457 bn ($ 846 m). On 31 January, the IMF approved a three-year poverty reduction and growth facil-ity of $ 10 m to support the government's economic programme into 2008. The World Bank approved an IDA loan of $ 40 m for this purpose on 24 May. The success of the IMF facility, however, was dependent on the government being able to raise additional revenues and generate increased private investment. Niger has the lowest fiscal pressure in the UEMOA zone – a mark of its overall poverty – while private investment is not easily forthcoming. Overall foreign direct investment, much lower than in Burkina and Mali, stood at approximately $ 20 m. Most private capital goes to the mining sector, which despite important mineral reserves is hampered by transportation difficulties. While the Malaysian parastal Petronas struck oil in the easternmost part of the country in January, these reserves were too small to warrant exploitation. Exploration also continued in the north. Uranium production was expected to rise as a result of anticipated price increases, pushed on by the building of new nuclear reactors in China, India and Russia. As the oil import bill rose, foreign exchange reserves continued to fall. Good news came from the United States, which cancelled a $ 10 m debt.

Between 7 and 17 December the country staged the long-awaited Francophonie Games. The games drew criticism from foreign quarters as an example of misplaced spending. On 11 April, the French development agency provided aid to the value of CFAfr 6.6 bn (€ 10 m) for the renovation of Niamey's infrastructure. Under the circumstances, this action hardly helped foster the country's international image.