Domestic Politics

Much of the credit for the unaccustomed period of civil peace must go to the MMP electoral system, which, in replacing the formerly used Westminster-style First Past the Post (FPTP) system, has provided for the proportional representation (PR) of opposition parties in parliament. After years of recurrent strife, MMP is almost universally accepted, although a conference on electoral reform conducted under the auspices of the Lesotho council of non-governmental organisations in Maseru (13–15 October), worried that improved representation did not automatically translate into accountability and efficiency. Members of parliament elected from PR lists are widely regarded as less worthy than those elected for constituencies; the shift to PR has done little to improve democracy within political parties; and there remains a need for continuing civic education among both parliamentarians and the electorate about the advantages and workings of the new model. Some of these concerns were subsequently listed as falling under the purview of a 30-member parliamentary reform committee, which, according to the speaker, Ms. Ntlhoi Motsemai, would look at ways of increasing legislative efficiency and public participation in parliamentary affairs.

Local elections were repeatedly delayed, principally because of the complexities of the reformed system of local government that the act envisaged. Essentially, these will introduce four types of authority: community councils (serving approximately 10,000 people each); district councils, which will serve the populations of the ten administrative districts except for those that live in urban areas; urban councils, which will serve smaller towns; and municipal councils, which serve the larger areas (notably the capital Maseru). The reformed system will constitute a massive reorganisation of service delivery, with functions being coordinated at district level through committees that will be composed of centrally appointed bureaucrats and councillors. Hitherto, except in the case of Maseru, local government was in the hands of village development committees with few resources and little authority, alongside a parallel system of chieftaincy, which has provided a framework for such activities as the local management of land and conflict resolution. The new system is seen by many of the government's opponents as a politically motivated attack on the chiefs, who historically have overwhelmingly supported the Basotho National Party (which ruled the country from 1966 until overthrown by the military in 1986).

The government has responded to such criticisms through a Local Government (Amendment) Act of 2004, gazetted on 17 May, by providing for chiefs to elect a limited number of their own to sit on district councils. However, this provision is unlikely to be enough to satisfy the chiefs, who continue to wield considerable power, while opposition parties have reacted with howls of protest to the act's further provision that not less than one-third of seats on any council shall be reserved for women. Whilst welcomed by women's groups as a victory, various civic groups and lawyers have questioned the constitutionality of the move, while at least one opposition party (the Basutoland African Congress/BAC) has indicated that it may refer what it has denounced as ‘sexual apartheid’ to the courts. While the opposition political parties, which are almost entirely dominated by men, may be less enthusiastic about the concept of proportionality if it is extended to include more appropriate representation for women, the more pressing concern may be that the new local government system will not be based upon MMP, with councillors being exclusively elected to represent electoral divisions. As it is not clear how one-third of seats on councils can be reserved for women without some introduction of a PR list system, it is clear that the independent electoral commission (which will supervise the elections) will have its work cut out to convince the opposition parties that they are being fairly treated.

The envisaged changes in local government are in line with other aspects of the government's programme, which Prime Minister Mosisili has worked hard to render more professional and proficient. His growing mastery of the political scene was indicated on 18 November by his implementation of a cabinet reshuffle, which saw five senior ministers being allocated to new portfolios and the promotion of two junior ministers to senior positions to fill vacant posts. Another sign that he demands results was the publication of the acting auditor general's report on public accounts for the year ending 31 March 2003. Although dated 30 July and published only at the end of November, this was a marked improvement on recent years, and indicated the government's commitment to combating corruption and inefficiency.

Lacking ideas about how to challenge a government that is as confident as it is dominant, the opposition parties appear as fractious and divided as ever. Only two minor parties, the MaremaTlou Freedom Party and the Patriotic Front for Democracy put up candidates against the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) in a by-election in Qhoali on 16 October. LCD candidate ‘Matanki Mokhabi trounced her opponents in what was anyway a very low poll (with a turnout of 26.7%). For its part, the BAC, which has just three MPs, split in two following a struggle between its leader Molapo Qhobela, and its former deputy-leader, Dr. Khauhelo Deborah Raditapole. The latter had been elected as leader of the party at its special conference in November 2003; Qhobela's appeal to the high court that the conference had been improperly constituted was upheld; but Raditapole was re-elected by the party's annual conference on 28 February, subsequent to which Qhobela went ahead with his own annual conference the following weekend. This duly claimed to have suspended Raditapole and displaced her chosen executive committee with its own.

Foreign Affairs

Prior to 1994, Lesotho had served as a strategic site for the diplomatic struggle against apartheid. However, since the advent of democracy in South Africa its international profile has declined. Many countries, which were previously directly represented in Maseru, now covered the country from Pretoria. The latest and most hurtful of all these withdrawals was that made by Britain. Following a downsizing of its representation in Maseru from January, the former colonial power subsequently announced the closing of its high commission, leaving the United States and South Africa as the most significant countries with a direct presence. This merely confirms what has become increasingly evident since the South African military intervention in Lesotho to quell the post-election disorder in 1998. Although remaining a formally sovereign state, Lesotho has now become a de facto South African protectorate, with Pretoria's principal interests lying in the maintenance of political stability and its continuing access to water from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP).

The strong ties between Lesotho and South Africa were confirmed on 16 March when South African President Thabo Mbeki officiated with King Letsie III at the inauguration of Phase IB of the LHWP, namely the completion of Mohale dam and tunnel. This represents the next major step in the project following the completion of the Katse dam in 1996 and its first release of water to South Africa in 1998. Mbeki used the occasion to praise Lesotho for the way in which it had dealt with corruption around the LHWP. President Festus Mogae of Botswana joined Mbeki in praising Lesotho for its stand against corruption when he paid a state visit on 15 April, citing the country as a beacon of peace and democracy in Africa. Similar sentiments were expressed by retiring Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano when he paid a farewell visit to Maseru on 2–3 November.

Socioeconomic Developments

The anti-corruption initiatives praised by the foreign heads of state referred to the prosecution of multinational corporations for their involvement in bribing leading officials, notably Masupha Sole, chief executive of the highlands development authority, in order to gain contracts. Mbeki stated during his state visit that the prosecutions had promoted greater investor confidence in involvement in major development projects throughout the whole region. However, the cost of the corruption saga has been far greater than any recompense it may have led to from the payment of fines. Sole's acceptance of bribes led to costly delays in the construction of the ‘Muela power station, resulting in a M (maloti) 40 m bypass having to be constructed so that SA could receive its water from the project on time; caused international bodies granting concessionary loans for the hydropower component to distance themselves from the project, forcing the government to obtain commercial loans at much higher interest rates; and although the ‘Muela hydropower project had been planned to provide Lesotho with electricity, the cost of the latter had become more expensive than that obtainable from South Africa's Eskom, forcing Lesotho to inject several further hundred million Maloti into the project so that the Lesotho electricity corporation could afford to buy its power from within the country. Furthermore, the cost of the trials themselves amounted in excess of M 28 m. In short, the total cost of corruption appears to have been in excess of M 300 m.

Finance Minister Timothy Thahane presented his budget for the 2004/05 financial year on 16 February. Overall, the total budget allocation was M 4,337 m, of which M 483 m would be financed by loans and grants and the remaining M 3,854 m by the government. The economy was estimated to have grown by 3.7% in 2002 but only by 3.4% in 2003, because the strong loti/rand had reduced the profitability of the textile sector. However, projections for 2004, 2005 and 2006 were 3.6%, 3.9% and 4% respectively. The 2003/04 budget had anticipated a fiscal deficit of 5.2% of GDP, although this was likely to be reduced to 3%. For 2004/05, a budget surplus of M 251 m or 2.7% of GDP was anticipated and would be used to repay maturing loans and treasury bills, this made possible by a windfall in SACU revenue. For the first time, it was proposed that people aged 70 or more would receive a pension of M 150 per month, M 45 m being set aside for this purpose. Lesotho's annual inflation rate, which had reached a 34-year low of 4.6% in July 2004, continued to remain low for the rest of the year, buoyed by the rise in the value of the loti against the US dollar.

A major threat to the country's economic performance is the end to the quota system (from January 2005) under which AGOA limited exports of textiles and clothing to the United States from countries such as cheap producers China, India and Pakistan to the marked advantage of Lesotho and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Mpho Malie, minister of trade and industry, noted on 13 December that AGOA had provided for a massive increase in jobs in the country's textile and clothing sector, from 20,000 in 2002 to 50,000 in 2004, while facilitating an expansion of the value of exports to the US from $ 120 to $ 400 m and an inflow of foreign direct investment over the period to over $ 150 m. It was for this reason that Lesotho joined with other countries within SACU to invite US trade representative Robert Zoellick to visit the region to discuss the implications of the ending of quotas, which by the end of June 2004 had already resulted in an alarming loss of 12,276 jobs in Lesotho alone, due to the closure of factories moving to cheaper production sites elsewhere in anticipation of their ending. The Factory Workers' Union complained that three of the six companies that had left Lesotho by the end of 2004 had done so without paying workers their wages.

To deal with the crisis, the government formed a special task force to prepare for a high-level visit to the US in 2005 in a bid to persuade US politicians and importers to maintain their markets for Lesotho's exports. However, during his visit to Lesotho on 13 December, Zoellick made no such commitments, and, rather, encouraged African cotton producers such as Somalia, Benin and Senegal to forge integrated production linkages with textile manufacturing countries such as Mauritius and Lesotho, thereby increasing their global competitiveness.

A longer-term threat to Lesotho is presented by a decline in its population, as younger people look for opportunities in South Africa next door. Population growth for 2001–05 is estimated at a mere 0.1% per annum, and the United Nations Population Fund has recently suggested that Lesotho's present population of around 1.8 m will fall to 1.4 m in 2050. Such statistics reflect a grim deterioration in the health status of Basotho, including an alarmingly high HIV/AIDS infection rate. If such predictions are correct, Lesotho's future may fulfil prophecies that see the country as unable to escape its historic role as an exporter of skills and labour to South Africa, and as a reservoir of the very young, the old and the physically unable.