Conflict and attempts to advance peace negotiations dominated the first part of the year, leading to the government and armed opposition groups agreeing to a breakthrough deal in Khartoum in June. This led to the headline event of the year, the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan in September in Addis Ababa by many, but not all, of the warring parties. This latest agreement raised some cautious hope, but doubts about the prospects for its successful implementation had already deepened by the end of the year. The headlines about the Revitalized Agreement upstaged the reality of continuing conflict, economic difficulty, and immense humanitarian challenges. With the fifth anniversary of civil war in South Sudan passing on 15 December, the prospects for the latest deal did not appear to be particularly good.
Given the regional importance of South Africa as the economic powerhouse, political shifts to a post-Zuma government during the year were the most watched events that were unfolding, so far with little visible impact on the sub-region. Elections in Zimbabwe were among the other important markers, while a newly elected president in Madagascar and a new president in Botswana was in a regional perspective considered of less relevance than the replacement of Jacob Zuma as South Africa’s head of state by Cyril Ramaphosa. The Kingdom of Swaziland was renamed into eSwatini in April. Relative political stability prevailed as before in most countries, without any meaningful peace dividend. The weak socioeconomic performance of sadc economies left the ordinary population with little to no improvements in their daily lives, while sadc as an organisation, including a security component in its mandate, was kept busy observing events developing in Zimbabwe and the drc.
Despite some notable improvements in infrastructure, overall economic performance in ssa remained relatively sluggish in comparison to other regions of the world, even though the Chinese offensive in terms of economic support – also through loans – continued. The apparent geostrategic motivation for financing the infrastructural support was criticised by the United States. Suspicions that the au headquarters, built by China as a donation, was under Chinese surveillance did not harm the positive ties. Institutional reform of the au remained a challenge, not least because of member states being unreliable in paying their contributions, while the aprm maintained some new momentum. Democratic performance was again mixed, with electoral violence, manipulation, and disputed election results continuing features. Some of the autocratic regimes put to vote during the year managed to remain in power, while political transitions through elections took place in some other countries. For the first time for more than a decade, not a single violent or unconstitutional overthrow of government was recorded. However, internal conflicts, as well as the effects of climate change, continued to affect the living conditions of a growing number of people negatively.
Sudan continued to sink into a deep political and economic crisis during the year. Two devaluations of the Sudanese pound (sdg) contributed to major inflation (72%) and cash shortages. Fuel and diesel shortages also hit the country throughout the year. The economic crisis worsened the existing political crisis, reaching its peak from 19 December, as important popular mobilisations started, asking for the abdication of the regime and the organisation of a transitional period. International sanctions from the icc were maintained against individuals related to crimes committed in Darfur, including president Omar al-Bashir. At the regional and international level, Sudan continued its policy of normalisation with foreign actors, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, the uae, Qatar, and Turkey. Russia developed military and energy-related projects in Sudan. The eu remained an important partner in the framework of its migratory policies (eu-Emergency Trust Fund for Africa).
The year was characterised by continued autocratic limitations on democratic rights and freedoms and a worsening security and human rights situation, but also by the president’s anti-corruption drive. Relations with most Western donors deteriorated significantly over human rights issues. Relations with neighbouring countries remained friendly; trade disputes, mainly with Kenya, nevertheless caused some resentment. China remained a major partner despite some complaints from the Chinese business community about a worsening investment and business environment. The government pursued its strategy to transform the country into a semi-industrialised middle-income country by 2025 and continued to implement major infrastructure and energy projects. The year witnessed a rather mixed economic outcome, with slightly reduced gdp growth, a deteriorating business climate, and continuing uncertainties about the government’s economic orientation, as well as politically motivated interventions in the private sector.
Throughout the year controversial legislative elections dominated the political landscape. Huge anti-government demonstrations called in vain for political change. The legislative elections of 20 December, boycotted by the major opposition parties, resulted in an easy victory for the ruling party, however without the expected constitutional amendment majority. Therefore, the prime minister and his cabinet were replaced. The local elections, crucial for democratisation at the grass roots but postponed repeatedly since 1987, were again postponed in December sine die. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum. Public investment in infrastructure (e.g., roads, harbour) and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, were the key drivers of economic growth. Moreover, money laundering, illegal money transfers, and trafficking grew alarmingly. Unemployment and a lack of political change caused increasing migration.
A constitutional path to a sixth term for incumbent President Museveni in 2021 cleared in late 2017, the political year was marked by the emergence of the musician-turned-politician Robert Kyagulanyi’s (known by his stage name, Bobi Wine) ‘people power’ platform, on which several candidates successfully campaigned in parliamentary by-elections, and by the ruling National Resistance Movement’s (nrm) clumsy, violent attempts to counter the growing opposition movement. Uganda scored a foreign policy victory when a joint initiative of Khartoum and Kampala achieved a new peace agreement in South Sudan, although it failed to contain escalating tensions with Rwanda. Museveni’s government failed to stimulate economic growth and create new employment opportunities for aggrieved youth, ‘people power’s’ core constituency, with expensive, prestigious infrastructure projects largely financed by China further increasing the country’s external debt burden.
Various political transition programmes, as well as the continuation of key economic and structural reforms, by countries in the region continued to produce mixed outcomes. Most countries in the region faced various types of security challenges. Also, many countries continued to grapple with major corruption-related challenges. Most were ranked among the higher (meaning worse) positions in ti’s Corruption Perception Index for the year. Also, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (issued by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation) regularly drew attention to key indicators of poor governance in most countries of the sub-region.
Edgar Lungu’s presidency faced significant political and economic challenges in a year that marked the fifty-fourth anniversary of Zambia’s independence. Several critics of the regime faced legal action, repression, and intimidation. There were repeated attacks on media freedom. The opposition filed an impeachment motion against Lungu, but a legal challenge prevented it being tabled until the end of the year. The Constitutional Court ruled that Lungu was eligible to run in 2021. Lungu became chairperson of the sadc’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation. Important bilateral agreements were established. China continued to be a strategic trade and investment partner. Chinese investments triggered protests and fuelled interparty conflict over the lack of transparency in the government’s dealings. The government increased the minimum wages for various categories of workers. Despite growth in the economy, major challenges remained.